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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how Portuguese foreign policy is constructed, drawing upon 
qualitative data gathered from interviews with policy-making elites and official 
documentation. It assesses the extent to which Portugal’s accession to the European 
Community in 1986 has resulted in a transformation of the domestic policy-making 
structures, and how this has impacted Portuguese foreign policy, by building upon 
sociological institutionalist accounts of how European integration has shaped aspects of 
national identity and the construction of national foreign policy roles. Through 
increased familiarity with the EU and elite socialisation, Portuguese foreign policy-
making processes have become increasingly mindful of the European context. However, 
in terms of policy outputs, the Lusophone world and NATO remain key areas of interest 
for Portugal.  
 
The Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy is, therefore, limited. While Member 
States shape, and are shaped by, EU policies, the transformative effects of the EU on 
national foreign policies are restricted, as the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
the Common Security and Defence Policy reflect more of a patchwork of different 
national foreign policy priorities interacting in an intergovernmental framework. While 
common interests and norms of behaviour have emerged, these are not necessarily a 
consequence of EU membership and Europeanisation processes. For example, NATO’s 
role in the internationalisation and multilateralisation of Portuguese foreign and security 
policy was significant. Contemporary Portuguese foreign policy operates in an 
internationalised, multilateral context. Portugal maintains strong ties with its former 
colonies, whilst supporting the UN and NATO and contributing to the development of 
the EU’s global actorness. Stressing the complementarity of the EU, NATO and the 
Lusophone global community, allows Portugal to pursue its Lusophone interests 
without reneging on its other commitments.  
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 Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Goals and Content of the Thesis 
 
In its short history, the European Union has expanded its influence over a range of 
policy areas, and is now seeking to articulate a common foreign policy for Europe. This 
development could put considerable pressure on its constituent Member States to 
modify their foreign policy priorities and adapt their diplomatic modi operandi. While 
Portugal is committed to European integration, and its policy-makers are increasingly 
aware of the European context within which the national interest is formulated, the 
scope for Europeanisation to transform Portuguese national foreign priorities remains 
limited. By investigating policy-making processes, institutional interactions, strategic 
priorities, and the broader cultural factors that underpin Portuguese statecraft, this thesis 
considers how Portugal’s foreign policy roles are managed in multiple areas of interest. 
The Portuguese case highlights how European integration and support for the 
development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy result in significant changes to 
national policy-making and co-ordination processes. However, because of the historical 
and cultural embeddedness of certain aspects of Portugal’s foreign policy role identity, 
the Portuguese experience also illustrates how nation-states can retain considerable 
independence and are able to pursue other areas of interest beyond the European Union 
(EU). For Portugal, European integration and the Europeanisation of national foreign 
policy-making contribute to the broader multilateralisation and internationalisation of 
Portuguese diplomacy, which allows the country to adhere to the Atlantic Alliance and 
to strengthen ties with its former colonies. 
 
 
1.1.1 The study in context  
 
This thesis deals with the research puzzle of how changes to long-established norms of 
behaviour at the nation-state level can occur, and how these changes can be seen as 
desirable through a readjustment of what constitutes the ‘national’ interest. The 
potential for the transformation of national foreign policy-making processes must be 
reconciled with patterns of resistance and continuities within institutions. Times of 
upheaval give opportunities for wide-spread change, but these represent a short-term, 
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 instrumental, reaction to events. More dramatic changes may occur slowly over time, 
involving the moulding of behaviours, norms, identities and the slow absorption of 
ideas and ways of doing things, which can leave their mark on national political debates 
and public policy-making processes. 
 
The interplay between the pressures to adapt and change, on the one hand, and the 
embeddedness of structure, cultural persistence, and institutional resistance on the other, 
is at the heart of Portugal’s exploration of the ‘European option’ post-1974. Unravelling 
these dynamics is a difficult task, but the emphasis of this thesis is on mapping out the 
nuances and complexities that were revealed using qualitative analysis, including 
interviews with policy practitioners. 
 
Unlike many studies of the Europeanisation of national policy-making structures, this 
study locates Europeanisation processes in the broader European and global context. 
While the scope for transformation is assessed in the Portuguese case, the ability of 
Europeanisation as a concept to account for these processes is also examined. This 
thesis seeks to clarify some of the differences between concepts which have become 
conflated in the literature, unpacking Europeanisation, ‘EU-isation’, modernisation, 
internationalisation, multilateralisation, globalisation and assessing the distinctiveness 
of Europeanisation pressures and their applicability to the study of Portugal, and to 
foreign policy more broadly. 
 
 
1.1.2 Research questions 
 
The main question of this thesis is: to what extent has the emergence of the European 
Union as a foreign and security policy actor changed Portugal’s foreign policy priorities 
and transformed how Portugal interacts with the outside world? 
 
This broad research focus generates specific sub-questions, namely:  
 What has been the overall impact of EU membership on foreign and security 
policy-making processes in Portugal?  
 Is the EU the principal, or only, focus of contemporary Portuguese foreign policy, 
or are there other areas of interest which matter?  
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  If important non-EU priorities for Portugal do exist, are they meaningful and 
strong enough to be sustained without Portugal being an EU Member State?  
 What Europeanisation pressures and transformations can be identified in 
Portuguese foreign and security policy-making?  
 Is Europeanisation able to account for unique processes of change, which cannot 
be explained through other concepts?  
 If Europeanisation has significantly transformed domestic policy-making 
processes in the Portuguese case, what was the motivation of domestic actors, and 
can evidence of resistance be found to challenge the Europeanisation narrative in 
order to paint a more nuanced picture of domestic change in the face of European 
integration and pressures from outside the nation-state?  
 
The research questions are focused on the current state of play in Portuguese foreign 
policy-making. Therefore, the research is relevant to current practices and the 
challenges facing modern diplomacy, in the Portuguese context, as well as more widely 
in international affairs. The main research question and the additional sub-questions 
reflect the approach of this investigation: namely, that Europeanisation is not assumed, 
necessarily, to exist in the Portuguese case and that other possible explanations should 
be considered. The presence of Europeanisation in this case would stand out, because 
previous research on other national case studies has often overstated the influence of the 
EU, and not thoroughly considered alternative explanations to Europeanisation 
(Radaelli, 2000: 25–26). The reality, in the Portuguese case at least, is more nuanced, 
and this suggests that the situation might be less clear-cut in other cases. 
 
In order to formulate responses to these questions, the thesis focuses on three areas: 
Portuguese security policy; Portugal’s renewed African vocation; and the current 
institutional framework for Portuguese foreign policy-making. These areas form the 
substantive chapters of the thesis, and offer the empirical evidence to support the 
theoretical framework, in order for the research questions to be systematically addressed 
in the concluding chapter.  
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 1.1.3 Research design 
 
Having established some important research questions and introduced the subject of this 
thesis, it is necessary to detail what form the thesis takes and how the chapters are 
organised. Firstly, however, it is important to reflect on the research design and 
methodological approach, to identify the data required in order to respond to the 
research questions outlined above, and to describe the data collection methods used.  
 
The research design is based upon a qualitative intensive single-country case study 
approach, drawing heavily upon sociological institutionalism and constructivist political 
science. The main focus of this case study is to assess how Europeanisation is perceived 
by foreign policy-makers, and how this impacts upon socially constructed, and 
culturally meaningful, aspects of Portuguese national identity: this suggests that a 
detailed qualitative approach is appropriate. From assessing primary documents and 
interview data, the impact of Europeanisation on Portuguese foreign policy outputs can 
then be assessed and contextualised. 
 
The motivation for undertaking case study research is to attempt to draw generalisable 
conclusions from the detailed findings of a specific subject. A case study is a puzzle, a 
specific problem, which requires deep reflection and is chosen, not only because the 
findings would be interesting in addressing that specific problem, but because the 
findings might offer generalisable knowledge, theory refinement, or empirical details 
which can illuminate research on other similar cases. Taking a single-country case 
study, such as Portugal, can be beneficial as it sharpens the analytical focus, which 
provides for richer empirical detail. The richer the empirical detail derived from the 
single-country case study, the more potential there is to identify similarities with other 
countries. This, in turn, allows for existing theoretical models to be revised or 
challenged (Vennesson, 2008: 226–227). 
 
The principal aim of this investigation is to assess whether the continuities and changes 
in how Portuguese foreign policy is constructed can be viewed as a ‘case’ of 
Europeanisation. If the empirical evidence for a detailed specific case study, such as 
this, finds insufficient data to support the broader claim that Portuguese foreign policy 
is a case of Europeanisation, then the case study process has been successful in two 
ways. Firstly, it sheds light on the specific case and highlights specific factors which 
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 may be unique, so as to challenge the generalisation of fact in the literature and to 
instead present a more nuanced case. Secondly, empirical evidence gathered from 
examining a specific case through particular theoretical models can lead to the revision 
and refinement of theoretical tools. This allows for the conceptual tools to be sharpened 
without completely falsifying a particular analytical model which has shown some 
usefulness in the past (Vennesson, 2008: 229).  
 
The primary data were collected from three principal locations: the Internet; Lisbon; and 
Brussels. Specific reports, statistical data, organisational information and contact lists 
were gathered online. Aside from material gathered from the public domain, the bulk of 
which was harvested via the Internet, the remaining primary data were collected during 
fieldwork conducted in Lisbon and Brussels over the course of 2010. During the 
fieldwork, 32 people were interviewed, including an incumbent Secretary of State, a 
former Minister for National Defence, seventeen Portuguese career diplomats/civil 
servants, five officers in the Portuguese Armed Forces, a British diplomat posted to 
Lisbon, a journalist, and six Portuguese academics. Interviewees were recruited on a 
voluntary basis and their anonymity has been preserved. 
 
The principal focus was the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministério dos 
Negócios Estrangeiros – MNE),1 where interviews were conducted in three key arms of 
the Ministry in Lisbon. These were: the Directorate-General for External Policy 
(Direcção-Geral de Política Externa – DGPE); the Directorate-General for European 
Affairs (Direcção-Geral dos Assuntos Europeus – DGAE); and the Portuguese Institute 
for Development Assistance (Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento – 
IPAD). Interviews were also conducted with diplomats seconded to Brussels, to 
determine whether working at the Portuguese Permanent Representation to the 
European Union (Representação Permanente de Portugal junto da União Europeia – 
REPER) changes how problems relating to the national interest are framed. 
 
The MNE is responsible for Portuguese diplomacy and co-ordinates Portugal’s roles in 
international security organisations. Therefore, the MNE plays a significant role in 
Portuguese defence and security policy. Nonetheless, the principal institutional actors 
                                                 
1 Often studies of foreign ministries use the abbreviation ‘MFA’ to denote Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
however this could cause confusion in the Portuguese context. Hereon, the abbreviation MNE is used to 
denote the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to avoid confusing it with the Armed Forces 
Movement – Movimento das Forças Armadas, which is often referred to as the MFA in Portugal. 
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 involved in developing and executing Portuguese security and defence policy are the 
Armed Forces and the Ministry of National Defence (Ministério da Defesa Nacional – 
MDN). It was, therefore, necessary to talk to senior members of the Portuguese military 
and to visit the MDN. Additionally, in order to explore Portuguese attitudes to the 
development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), it was 
essential to gauge the views of officials working at the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) in Brussels. 
 
Institutional support and access to the MNE was granted by the Ministry’s cultural arm, 
the Camões Institute, and through the Portuguese Embassy in London. It was useful to 
begin by infiltrating the MNE at the higher levels, exploiting the support of the Camões 
Institute and securing potential interviewees through academic contacts. Securing access 
into an organisation through senior gatekeepers was an effective tactic: once the 
research (and the researcher) was recognised by those towards the top of the hierarchy, 
with senior officials seeing fit to sacrifice their time for the study, it was more likely 
that their immediate subordinates would be inclined to agree to be interviewed (Arksey 
and Knight, 1999: 122–123). Visiting the Ministry first, and establishing a relationship 
with the DGAE in Lisbon, made gaining access to the officials working at REPER in 
Brussels much easier. 
 
The purpose of visiting these institutions and conducting interviews was to get a broad 
sense of how Portugal manages its relationships with multilateral international 
organisations such as the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the 
United Nations and the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP – 
Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries), and from there it was possible to assess 
the extent to which Portuguese foreign policy-making processes can be said to have 
been Europeanised. By examining these specific institutions, (and by gauging how 
policy-makers have reacted to Europe and how they perceive that Portugal’s 
membership of the EU has changed the parameters of the country’s foreign policy 
priorities and national interests), it was possible to then infer the extent to which 
Europeanisation shapes contemporary Portuguese foreign policy outputs and guides the 
formulation of national priorities.  
 
In addition to gathering data from elite interviews, this thesis draws upon several 
official documents, available in the public domain. These include statutes published in 
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 Diário da República, websites of government departments, official reports, 
organisational charts and statistics. With this material, and the secondary sources cited, 
the responsibility for translations into English, from the original Portuguese, rests with 
the author. 
 
The opening chapter of this thesis introduces the topic, provides some specific research 
questions, discusses the research design used, provides the background context of 
Portuguese foreign policy analysis and explains the motivation behind focusing on 
Portugal as a specific case study. This chapter outlines how certain historical legacies, 
namely, Portugal’s empire and its transition to democracy, shape contemporary 
Portuguese foreign policy-making. Additionally, this chapter assesses how previous 
studies have applied Europeanisation to the Portuguese case. 
 
The focus of chapter 2 is on developing a theoretical framework to assess the 
Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy. This chapter examines the 
existing literature on how foreign policy-making is theorised and focuses on 
constructivism, studies of ‘small states’, institutional approaches, the concept of 
Europeanisation and its application to studies of national foreign policies. While 
broadly consistent with constructivist and sociological institutionalist logic, 
Europeanisation as a conceptual tool is too restrictive and does not give sufficient credit 
to other processes which contribute to the transformation of national political systems. 
As Europeanisation is often conflated with other processes, the conceptual framework 
developed at the end of chapter 2 allows for the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign 
and security to be tested against possible alternative explanations on seven levels of 
analysis.  
 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the institutions of Portuguese foreign policy-making. The 
chapter details the various governmental bodies that contribute to Portuguese foreign 
policy-making and engages with how Europeanisation pressures have forced Portuguese 
foreign policy-making institutions to respond to the realities and challenges of being in 
the EU. While foreign policy-makers recognise the importance of strengthening 
Portugal’s role in the EU, as way of renewing its foreign policy more broadly, certain 
key relations are sheltered from Europeanisation pressures and some significant 
institutional disconnects exist.  
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 Building upon the analysis of Europeanisation on the foreign policy-making process in 
Portugal, chapters 4 and 5 are mini-case studies of Portugal’s relationship with Africa 
and Portuguese security policy. Given that the EU has been an established actor in 
development policy for some years, and that in security policy NATO is still an 
important consideration, a greater degree of Europeanisation would be expected with 
regard to Portuguese development policy. As such, chapter 4 focuses on Portugal’s 
relationship with Africa in the twenty-first century and how its practices with regard to 
Lusophone Africa, in the domains of development assistance and cultural policy, reflect 
the establishment of a renewed African vocation for Portuguese foreign policy. Since 
independence was granted to Portugal’s African colonies in the 1970s, there has been a 
steady growth in the importance of Lusophone Africa to Portuguese foreign policy, but 
rather than being limited to bilateral relations, Portugal is engaging with Africa 
increasingly via multilateral organisations. This is partially due to Portugal being in the 
EU, and Portuguese foreign policy’s more general internationalisation in recent years, 
but multilateral engagement also legitimises Portugal’s neo-colonialist interests with 
regard to Africa, allowing it to promote the Portuguese language and maintain its 
influence in the continent.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the Europeanisation of Portuguese security policy, by focusing on 
Portugal’s commitment to security co-operation in the EU, the Lusophone world and its 
continued emphasis on the importance of NATO in the post-Cold War era. Despite the 
emergence of the EU as a security actor and Portugal’s participation in EU security 
missions, the Lusophone world and NATO remain important priorities for Portugal. 
Consequently, Portuguese political and military elites have been socialised into these 
co-operation mechanisms, in addition to the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy framework. 
 
In the final chapter, the findings from chapters 3, 4 and 5 are brought together and the 
overall impact of Europeanisation in the case of Portuguese foreign policy is assessed 
by referring back to the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2 and responding to 
the research questions posed in the introduction. The wider utility of Europeanisation is 
also discussed along with the challenges for future research on the Europeanisation of 
national foreign policies, more generally, as well as outlining specific challenges and 
future research priorities for those working in the field of Portuguese foreign policy 
analysis.  
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 1.1.4 The original contribution to knowledge of this thesis 
 
This thesis makes a significant and original contribution to knowledge in several areas. 
Firstly, in the realm of Portuguese foreign policy studies, this thesis offers an account of 
how European integration has affected the foreign policy-making process and how the 
transformative effects of EU membership on Portugal’s core foreign policy priorities are 
in fact limited, by examining case studies on Portuguese security policy and Portuguese 
policy towards African development. There is a paucity of comprehensive studies of the 
foreign policy-making process in Portugal and this thesis provides an in-depth, up-to-
date, account of the key ideas, pressures and motivations shaping Portuguese diplomacy 
at present; it analyses the key institutional actors involved, as well as contextualising 
how Portuguese foreign policy priorities respond to the challenges of membership of 
international multilateral organisations and the emergence of new economic powers. 
 
Portuguese foreign policy is, first and foremost, concerned with exploiting the unique 
links it has with different parts of the world, be they based upon colonial legacies, or 
long-standing military alliances, or in more recent times, forged by the notion of 
European unity and the recognition of common challenges facing states in Europe. The 
latter, has led to Portugal developing a stronger bilateral relationship with Spain in the 
European context and overcoming historical tensions to create unity between the two 
Iberian countries (Seabra, 2000: 199). This is because the two countries simultaneously 
experienced democratic transition and European integration in the final quarter of the 
twentieth century; although this does not, necessarily, translate into a new 
‘Europeanised’ approach to broad foreign policy problems. 
 
Secondly, this study of contemporary Portuguese foreign and security policy informs 
the wider literature on European integration, Europeanisation, and the EU’s role as an 
international actor. This case study of Portugal finds that the degree to which European 
integration has forced a fundamental reappraisal of the country’s foreign policy 
priorities is limited. EU integration is a priority for Portugal, and this orientation is a 
novel one. It has been the main focus since the fall of the dictatorship in 1974. 
Nevertheless, Portugal’s interests in the Lusophone world are increasingly being 
reconstructed as being complementary to Portugal’s broad foreign policy priorities and 
something which Portugal can, uniquely, bring to the international organisations of 
which it is a member, most notably the EU and NATO. Therefore, while EU 
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 membership has brought about processes of institutional adaptation, policy co-
ordination and political integration, painting a picture of the absolute Europeanisation of 
Portuguese foreign policy to reflect an abandonment of its links to its former colonies, 
or its Atlantic orientation, would be a grave distortion of reality. Portugal is keen to play 
a significant role in the EU, NATO and the Lusophone world. In spite of European 
integration and the end of the Cold War, Portuguese foreign policy-makers conceive 
that this multiple set of roles is possible by stressing the complementarity of these 
organisations, the wider internationalisation (as opposed to merely Europeanisation) of 
the country’s foreign policy, and the increasing multilateralisation and inter-
connectedness of international politics in the twenty-first century. 
 
Finally, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the understanding of foreign 
policy-making and challenges how this process has been theorised and represented in 
the wider literature. Namely, it is argued here that foreign policy-making is an 
inherently social process and that foreign policy priorities are essentially social 
constructs based upon perceptions of national identity and conceptualisations of foreign 
policy roles for states interacting in the international system. This is due to the social 
construction of the national interest and foreign policy instruments to achieve certain 
goals. The social construction of the ‘Other’ comes to define what constitutes the 
national interest, and plays a part in moulding national identities and foreign policy 
roles, because it is through “…the Other that the Self sees itself” (Wendt, 1999: 236). 
While there are objective features which will limit a state’s ability to influence 
international politics, perceptions of self and other, ultimately, determine how effective 
a country’s diplomacy will be. It is the “functional role of the Other in promoting 
cohesiveness…” that helps states to formulate their diplomatic priorities and ultimately 
their identities (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 329). This offers a useful perspective in 
accounting for the paradox of small state power and how Portugal is able to affect 
international politics in a meaningful way, despite it being a materially weak power. 
 
While adopting a broadly sociological institutionalist posture, this thesis accepts that 
there are limits to the social constructivist argument. Rather than blindly accepting that 
this is the reality in the Portuguese case, this thesis ultimately strengthens the social 
constructivist argument by positing and testing alternative ways of understanding 
foreign policy phenomena. However, while the assumptions here are fundamentally 
interpretivist and non-positivist, to take the argument to the other end of the scale, and 
 10
 to embrace a poststructuralist understanding of international politics, is also 
problematic. The constructivist position contends that ideas, belief systems and 
institutional cultures breed social structures which can be readily identified. Given that 
constructivism occupies the middle ground between rational choice positivism and 
postmodernism and poststructuralist arguments (Checkel, 1998: 327), the viewpoint 
embodied in this thesis is one which rejects the poststructuralist notion of a world 
without meaningful social structures, where social interactions are located in 
individuals, rather than in a social context, and where a multitude of different, but 
equally valid, realities compete for attention, in a sea of discourse and agenda-driven 
politics. 
 
 
1.2 Why Portugal? 
 
Portuguese foreign policy is an under-researched subject. It is both interesting in itself, 
and offers valuable lessons to understanding how other states in the international system 
might behave when faced with similar challenges. This section sets out the justification 
for studying the Portuguese case by citing five specific aspects of contemporary 
Portuguese foreign policy that make it especially fascinating. Firstly, Portuguese foreign 
policy is interesting to study because of the unique interplay between two important 
historical legacies that determine the country’s foreign policy interests and 
fundamentally shape political cultures and, ultimately, Portuguese national identity. 
These legacies are: Portugal’s status as an Atlantic country, through which it built an 
empire and forged strategic alliances; and Portugal’s transition to democracy and 
European integration since the Carnation Revolution of 1974. Secondly, Portugal is an 
example of a country that is firmly anchored in international organisations. Its foreign 
policy is characterised by increasing multilateralism through active participation in the 
EU and, crucially, a number of other international organisations. Thirdly, Portugal is an 
important country to understand within the European context. Its foreign policy is one 
which prioritises both Atlanticism and a commitment to Europe, and its foreign policy-
making structures have had to adapt to the realities of EU membership. Fourthly, the 
Portuguese case study provides a window onto the Lusophone world, particularly useful 
for understanding how Brazil’s emergence as a global power could affect the Euro-
Atlantic region. Finally, Portugal is an instructive case study of a state which has 
undergone revolution, democratic transition, and rapid regional integration. As was 
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 shown in the wave of democratisations during in the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, 
authoritarian regimes continue to fall and new democracies are being born. Therefore, 
the Portuguese experience could offer some useful lessons to these countries; and the 
historical legacies which shaped this experience are discussed next. 
 
 
1.2.1 Historical legacies that shape Portuguese foreign policy priorities 
 
Two important historical legacies impact upon how contemporary Portuguese foreign 
policy priorities are defined and shape the political context within which decision-
making takes place. The first is the Atlantic, which has been the focus of Portugal’s 
outward facing foreign policy for centuries. It is through the Atlantic that Portugal built 
an empire. Preserving that empire, and indeed the country’s very survival, meant 
constructing strategic alliances with key maritime powers in the Atlantic in order to 
mitigate Portugal’s weaknesses. The second important legacy stems from the Carnation 
Revolution of 25 April 1974. Portugal’s transition from dictatorship to democracy was a 
significant break from the past and allowed for a multi-party political system to be 
established. This meant that debates surrounding Portugal’s foreign policy orientation 
and strategic priorities became framed in ideological terms, and that political decisions 
needed at least some wider public support in order to be justified. These legacies are 
particular to the Portuguese case and illustrate that each country brings its own 
experiences and historical baggage to EU membership. Such baggage may provide 
opportunities for national foreign policies to become rejuvenated in the EU context, but 
it may also promote resistance to institutional change and limit the opportunities for 
wholesale change to foreign policy outputs. 
 
– The Atlantic: strategic alliances and colonisation – 
During the latter half of the fifteenth century, Portuguese seafarers began to explore the 
Atlantic. Fishing around the Azores and Madeira, gave Portuguese sailors vital 
knowledge about the Atlantic and its wind systems, which enabled them to first land in 
Newfoundland and Greenland, and then to explore down the West African coast, 
marking Portuguese sovereignty over these new lands as they navigated southwards 
(Newitt, 2005: 48–50). Pedro Álvares Cabral’s ‘discovery’ of Brazil, while en route to 
India, meant that by 1500 Portuguese expansion now encompassed parts of the 
Americas, Africa and India (Newitt, 2005: 64–65). What followed through the sixteenth 
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 century was the creation of a commercial empire under Portuguese control, with 
outposts as far apart as Brazil and the China Sea, including Angola and India in 
between. This maritime empire changed Europe’s relationship with the world and 
initiated a process of globalisation which was to become embedded in the centuries 
which followed (Newitt, 2009: 67). Portugal’s place at the centre of Europe’s global 
dominance remained unchallenged until the early seventeenth century, when the Dutch 
and the British emerged as commercial and naval powers to rival Portugal (Newitt, 
2009: 81).  
 
The pact of mutual friendship between Britain and Portugal, which dates back to a 
series of treaties sealed in the fourteenth century, helped to mitigate external threats to 
Portugal, from Spain and other European aggressors over the centuries. For example, 
Lisbon was highly sought after by Napoleon. He saw that controlling Lisbon would not 
only deny Britain a port before its ships entered the Mediterranean, but it would reduce 
British dominance in the Atlantic and open up the possibility of exploiting the riches of 
Brazil (Newitt, 2009: 155). As the British built their empire, the military support they 
offered Portugal was crucial in repelling these threats. However, as the balance of 
power in the Atlantic shifted away from Britain and towards the United States in the 
mid-twentieth century, the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance morphed into a transatlantic one 
under NATO. Portugal was invited to co-found the Atlantic Alliance largely on the 
strength of the strategic importance of the Azores bases it possessed in bridging North 
America and Western Europe (Teixeira, 1998: 78–80). 
 
The strategic relationship with Portugal was of benefit to the United States, to the extent 
that the State Department tolerated the fact that Portugal was not part of the wave of 
democratisations post-World War II. This was because the authoritarian regime in 
Portugal (Salazar’s Estado Novo, 1933–1974, see below) brought stability to the 
relationship, and was prepared to emphatically crush any pro-Communist movements 
developing in the country (Schmitz, 1999: 164). However, this tolerance on the part of 
the US was short-lived, as President Eisenhower joined the growing international 
opposition to Portugal’s colonial policy (Teixeira, 1998: 81), at a time when other 
European imperial powers began to let go of their colonies. While the Kennedy 
Administration strongly condemned Portuguese colonialism, the US recognised that 
openly supporting the African liberation movements against Portugal damaged its Cold 
War interests in Africa. Consequently, Portugal’s ‘pluricontinentalism’ was recognised 
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 as an asset to NATO. Therefore, by extension, Portugal’s allies tacitly sanctioned the 
colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau (Costa Pinto and Teixeira, 
2002: 16–18; Maxwell, 1995: 47), not least because, if Communist-backed forces 
gained control of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, it would pose a major threat to 
NATO’s command of the Atlantic (Kay, 1970: 269). 
 
In sum, constructing alliances and colonising new lands through the Atlantic has been a 
way of preserving the uniqueness of the Portuguese nation-state in the European 
context. Consequently, centuries of Portuguese Atlanticism have meant that having a 
foreign policy that looks outward, rather than into continental Europe, has become the 
natural position. This has allowed NATO to become a central tenet of Portugal’s foreign 
policy identity, as it preserves national sovereignty and enabled Portugal to be 
differentiated from Spain in the international context. Furthermore, Portugal’s maritime 
exploration of the Atlantic Ocean, and beyond, has left a legacy of eight states that have 
Portuguese as their official language. These countries, scattered across four continents, 
occupy 7.2 per cent of the world’s total land mass. The endeavours of Portugal’s 
Atlantic navigators meant that today Portuguese is the seventh most widely spoken 
language in the world (Newitt, 2009: 220). 
 
– The Carnation Revolution and democratisation in Portugal – 
In addition to Portugal’s status as an Atlantic country, another important aspect of 
Portuguese politics was the coup d’état of 1974 and the subsequent transition to 
democracy. The Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 initiated three historic socio-
political and economic processes in Portugal: the transition to democracy; the rapid 
decolonisation of Portugal’s Overseas Territories in Africa; and economic development 
through European integration. While this was a turning-point in Portuguese history, the 
potential for Portugal to abandon its status as an Atlantic country and NATO ally, 
although briefly in doubt, was never realised. Consequently, there are echoes of the 
traditional Portuguese emphasis on the Atlantic in contemporary Portuguese foreign 
policy.  
 
The Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 brought about the demise of Europe’s oldest 
empire and to over forty years of dictatorship in Portugal (Maxwell, 1976: 250). The 
years of authoritarian rule began with a coup d’état in 1926. The military dictatorship 
was unstable and relied upon the economic stewardship of Dr António de Oliveira 
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 Salazar, who, while serving as Minister for Finance (1928–1932), was able to build up 
support and credibility to be elevated to the position of Prime Minister in 1932 (Magone 
1997: 18; de Figueiredo, 1975: 9). While the 1926–1933 period was dubbed a 
“dictatorship without a dictator” (Costa Pinto, 1998: 22), the 1933 Constitution 
established the conservative, pro-Catholic, anti-Communist, corporatist regime known 
as the Estado Novo (New State), of which Salazar was the central figure (Costa Pinto, 
1998: 22; Magone 1997: 18). The Estado Novo was in place for decades under Salazar 
until he stepped aside due to ill-health in 1968, to be succeeded as Prime Minister by 
Marcelo Caetano, who ruled until the fall of the regime in 1974. 
 
The foreign policy of the Estado Novo was characterised by intransigence with regard to 
the colonial question. This was based upon Salazar’s optimistic view of the contribution 
of the Overseas Territories to the Portuguese economy, which led to the decision to 
initially reject aid under the Marshall Plan. The change of heart that led to Portugal 
applying to be part of the second wave of Marshall Aid in 1948–1949 reflected 
Salazar’s recognition of the importance to Portugal of building a strong transatlantic, 
anti-Communist, relationship with the United States. This paved the way for Portugal to 
be invited to join NATO upon its creation in 1949 (Teixeira, 1998: 78; Andersen-
Leitão, 2001: 26–27). Despite Portugal’s strategic alliance-building in the Atlantic, 
Salazar remained committed to the colonies in Africa to the point where Portugal faced 
international condemnation. As the fight against the independence movements in the 
colonies dragged on through the 1960s and into the 1970s, Salazar’s belief that Portugal 
should resist decolonisation, and continue “proudly standing alone”, led to Portugal 
becoming steadily more isolated in the international community (Teixeira, 1998: 83). 
 
However, the middle-ranking military officers engaged in Angola, Mozambique and 
Guinea-Bissau knew that the colonial wars could not be won, and formed a protest 
organisation, the Armed Forces Movement, which instigated the coup d’état of 25 April 
1974. The Movement aimed to resolve the colonial question through political means 
and its programme was summarised by the three Ds: decolonisation; democratisation; 
and development (Magone, 1997: 20–21; Teixeira, 1998: 84). While this priority was 
clear-cut, the period 1974–1976 was characterised by identity crisis, ideological 
disagreements between those vying for power, and factionalism within the Movement 
itself. While there were radical ideas from left-wing elements, the ‘Cuba in Europe’ 
course was never followed and Portugal remained in NATO. Instead, the social-
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 democracy model advocated by the Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) leader 
Mário Soares was adopted (Magone, 2004: 27). 
 
The Carnation Revolution allowed Soares, and Álvaro Cunhal, the leader of the Partido 
Comunista Português (PCP – Portuguese Communist Party), to return to Portugal from 
exile to establish a multi-party system. Under the democratic system, the centre-left PS 
and the centre-right Partido Social Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party) 
emerged as the main two parties of government in Portugal (Royo and Manuel, 2003: 
10–11; Magone, 1997: 45).  These parties along with the more right-wing, traditionalist, 
Centro Democrático e Social–Partido Popular (CDS–PP – Social and Democratic 
Centre–People’s Party) recognised that Portugal is both an Atlantic and a European 
country (Royo and Manuel, 2003: 10–11). Today, the PS, the PSD and the CDS–PP 
receive widespread public support and account for 206 of the 230 current deputies in the 
Portuguese unicameral legislature – the Assembleia da República (Assembleia da 
República, 2012). The CDS–PP is more Eurosceptic than the two main parties. In 
addition to the Euroscepticism of the CDS–PP, the parties of the far-left in Portugal 
have voiced opposition to Europe and NATO over the years. The PCP and the Bloco de 
Esquerda (Left Bloc) represent the remnants of the radical left-wing politics that 
characterised the immediate post-revolutionary, anti-Salazarist, period of the mid-1970s 
(Magone, 2004: 70). Consequently, these, along with the Greens (who campaign in an 
electoral pact with the PCP to, more or less, guarantee representation) constitute the 
minor parties, holding just 24 seats between them in the current parliament (Assembleia 
da República, 2012). 
 
The victory of the moderate centrism advocated by Mário Soares in 1976 allowed for 
the exploration of the ‘European option’ to become the defining feature of Portuguese 
politics post-Salazar (Teixeira, 1998: 87; Maxwell, 1995: 177). The shift from the 
‘African Vocation’ of Salazar’s Estado Novo, to the ‘European Vocation’ of the post-
1974 era, sought to consolidate democracy, foster economic development and bring 
Portugal in from the periphery of Europe (Seixas da Costa, 2000: 7). The transition 
period was completed ten years after the democratic constitution was passed in 1976, 
when Portugal acceded to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. In the 
same year Mário Soares’ election as President of the Republic completed the 
civilianisation of Portugal’s political elite (Braga da Cruz, 1998: 124). This meant that 
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 the military were now removed from political life, signifying the end of the 
revolutionary process instigated by the middle-ranking officers on 25 April 1974. 
 
 
1.2.2 The multilateral context of contemporary Portuguese foreign policy 
 
Since 1974, Portugal has had to reconcile European integration with a commitment to 
participate actively in a number of international multilateral organisations. Maintaining 
the transatlantic link, through NATO, and deepening integration with the EU, 
characterises the broad multilateral balancing-act of contemporary Portuguese foreign 
policy. With ties to the United States (US) enshrined in the Atlantic Alliance, and with 
the emerging global reach of the EU as an international actor, Portuguese foreign policy 
is given greater strength and its traditional, cultural ties to its former colonies are further 
enhanced. Overall, the aim is for Portugal to have “a universalistic foreign policy” that 
builds upon the country’s active participation in international organisations (Interview 
3, Lisbon, 2010). This makes assessing the ‘Europeanisation’ of Portuguese foreign 
policy especially interesting: while European integration has transformed elements of 
Portuguese foreign policy-making processes, the emphasis on participation in 
multilateral organisations other than the EU suggests that the ‘Europeanisation’ of the 
domain is somewhat incomplete in the Portuguese case. 
 
Portugal is a member of approximately eighty international organisations and has non-
regional or observer status in a further seven (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 
2010a). It is also a Member State of the EU and was a full member of the Western 
European Union (WEU) before it became subsumed by the EU’s security and defence 
functions and formally closed in June 2011 (Council of the European Union, 2011). 
Portugal is also a member of the various organisations which comprise the United 
Nations (UN). In addition to these, Portugal is in the Council of Europe, the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and Portugal has been 
part of NATO since it was founded in 1949. Portugal is also an observer at the African 
Union and maintains ties to its former colonies through the CPLP and the Ibero-
American Summits (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2010a). 
 
Portuguese foreign policy in the twenty-first century can be characterised as being one 
which is committed to multilateralism and for Portugal to be actively participating in all 
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 of the international organisations of which it is a member. Europe, the Atlantic and the 
Lusophone world constitute the three pillars of Portuguese foreign policy. This 
“trilemma” means that there is no single clear course for Portugal to navigate towards 
(Interview 10, Lisbon, 2010). Instead of trying to choose between these three options, it 
is sensible for Portugal to look to maintain strong relations with each and to maximise 
its influence in various international organisations. The motivation being that 
strengthening Portugal’s position in one organisation, enhances its position in all three 
areas (Interview 10, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
Portugal’s bilateral relations with other countries are now heavily located in the 
multilateral context. In Europe, Portugal’s bilateral relations with individual Member 
States cannot be divorced from the frameworks of international organisations, in 
particular the EU and NATO, but also the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Stronger 
bilateral ties between Lisbon and Madrid have largely been a consequence of both Spain 
and Portugal emerging from dictatorships and embarking on European integration. 
While Portugal can pursue bilateral relations with China, it tends to hide behind 
international organisations, particularly the EU, in doing so. However, the EU is not the 
only international organisation that gives Portuguese diplomacy a platform. Portugal has 
mobilised its ties to Macau, through the CPLP, as a means of developing a Lusophone-
based relationship with China. The CPLP is an important focus for Portuguese foreign 
policy, but Lisbon also benefits from strong bilateral relations with the countries of the 
Lusophone world. Nevertheless, the dominant position for contemporary Portuguese 
foreign policy is to favour effective multilateralism and joined-up diplomacy that, rather 
than operating in a vacuum, links important bilateral relations with the activities of key 
international organisations. 
 
 
1.2.3 The importance of Portugal in the European context  
 
Portugal is firmly anchored in the EU, but has important links beyond that. 
Understanding how the Portuguese State, in particular, relates to Europe, serves as a 
window to comprehend how other EU Member States with an Atlanticist posture, or 
states which have been forced to find a new role in international affairs, frame their 
behaviour and justify their actions. Since 25 April 1974, Portugal has had to reconcile 
its imperial past, international isolation and under-developed economy and become part 
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 of the EU. Despite building an Atlantic empire, it is the novelty of the ‘European 
option’ that holds the key for Portugal’s success in contemporary global politics. The 
Atlantic is engrained in the national psyche and holds cultural significance in foreign 
policy terms, but it is Europe where Portugal’s new destiny lies. Indeed through Europe 
it can better address the challenges in the Atlantic arena in the post-Cold War era 
(MacDonald, 1993: ix). As Bermeo highlights, Portugal’s ability to overcome the 
challenges of decolonisation and development, and eventual European integration, 
offers useful lessons to policy-makers, political actors and scholars in other states 
(Bermeo, 1998: 274). For these reasons, the Portuguese case study is both fascinating in 
itself and serves as a useful historical reference point when considering the European 
integration paths available to other states in Europe, especially weak or young 
democracies such as Poland, Croatia, and the Ukraine.  
 
In terms of its size and the experiences the governing elite have had during the last 
thirty years of European integration, Portugal is highly representative of many of the 
current and future EU Member States and its economy and political system are 
comparable to other countries. The similarities between Portugal and other countries 
must, therefore, not be downplayed. The Portuguese case study can be used as an 
empirical and theoretical platform to explore continuities and changes in other national 
political systems that have had to respond to the EU. By examining Europeanisation in 
terms of the socialisation of national politicians and bureaucrats, the Portuguese 
experience is able to illuminate research on European integration more broadly; it can 
improve the understanding of how national interests and identities across Europe 
evolve, and help to define transnational norms and wider ‘European’, as opposed to 
merely ‘national’, interests. This is especially relevant to states that, like Portugal, have 
gone through the conditioning of the pre-accession process and been forced to adjust 
their domestic structures to align with Europe. The socialisation of politicians and 
bureaucrats in Portugal has been a constant process since the 1970s, where Portuguese 
foreign policy-making has evolved and built upon experiences such as the crises in East 
Timor and the Balkans. As such, over the past few decades Portuguese political elites 
and the domestic policy-making apparatus in Portugal have had to adapt to the realities 
of being in the EU (Magone, 2000a: 165–166). 
 
Despite these transformations, Portugal’s geopolitical context has meant that the 
country has sought to maintain a balance between relations with Europe, maintaining 
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 good relations on the Iberian Peninsula primarily, and alliances forged through the 
Atlantic gateway (Teixeira, 1998: 60). Under Salazar and during the colonial wars, 
Portugal’s Atlanticism was portrayed as incompatible with Europe. Today, the two are 
not regarded as incompatible, but there is still a tension between Europe on the one 
hand, and the Atlantic on the other. This is because the Atlantic has shaped Portugal’s 
foreign policy identity over many centuries, particularly with reference to the era of 
discoveries and colonisation, the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, and being a founder-
member of NATO (de Vasconcelos, 1996: 269). Portugal, therefore, embodies the 
European–Atlantic tension, a tension which runs deep into the fabric of Portuguese 
national identity of being simultaneously Atlantic and European. The Europeanisation 
of Portuguese foreign policy has not made this tension disappear, but it has allowed 
Portuguese foreign policy-makers to live with this reality more comfortably by 
embracing the complementarity of NATO and the EU. 
 
Another noteworthy dimension to the Portuguese case is that the Europeanisation of 
Portuguese foreign policy has opened up the Mediterranean as a potential new strategic 
priority for democratic Portugal, after being chronically neglected for centuries, not 
least during Salazar’s rule. Faria (1996) argues that the Mediterranean and North Africa 
have played a crucial role in the development of the Portuguese nation, blurring the 
differences between being Atlantic and European (Faria, 1996: 212–230). Portugal is 
well-placed, therefore, to act as a bridge between Europe and the North Atlantic area, 
the Mediterranean (especially the Maghreb), Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, East 
Timor and, because of colonial links with Macau, China. Lesser (2006) argues that, with 
globalisation, strict geographic definitions are less relevant (i.e. it does not matter that 
Portugal, in fact, has no Mediterranean coastline); what matters is that Portugal can be 
central in the process of linking the Mediterranean and the Atlantic as well as satisfying 
important national interests in North Africa by promoting stability and co-operation 
between Europe and the Maghreb (Lesser, 2006: 14). 
 
Portugal has had to adapt to the realities and challenges of being in the EU, which could 
provide lessons for other states embarking on European integration projects. Embracing 
Europeanisation and implementing domestic reforms characterised the early years of 
Portugal’s European integration. Major structural improvements were made to the 
Portuguese economy, which led to Portugal being lauded as the ‘good student’ of 
Europe by the European Commission (Goucha Soares, 2007: 465). However, the 
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 underlying truth was that, because the ‘good student’ did not need to undertake major 
fiscal reforms in order to qualify for the Euro, the country’s chronic budgetary 
overstretch was not addressed (Braga de Macedo, 2003: 192–193). When confidence in 
the Eurozone evaporated, the weaknesses of the Portuguese economy were exposed. 
This not only reflected badly on the Portuguese, but also the EU institutions which 
praised it.  
 
Other European countries must be wary of falling into the same trap as Portuguese 
elites, for whom the ‘good student’ badge fuelled a certain degree of self-congratulatory 
ardour. However, the lessons from the Portuguese experience seem not to have been 
learned. The Slovenian Finance Minister, Janez Šušteršič, admitted that the same fate 
befell his country:  
We were the good pupil of euro entry, also of entry into the E.U., so there 
was a lot of self-satisfaction that probably made us unaware of the 
underlying [economic and fiscal] problems (Šušteršič, 2012: 16). 
The Portuguese and the Slovenian experiences illustrate how easily national elites can 
be seduced by positive words from Brussels about how well their country is adapting to 
the realities of EU membership. Unlike Slovenia, other countries can learn from both 
the successes and the mistakes of how Portugal has responded to pressures from 
Brussels and Europeanised its public policy-making structures. 
 
 
1.2.4 The importance of understanding the Lusophone World  
 
Understanding Portuguese foreign policy provides a window onto the CPLP and its 
constituent countries, not least Brazil. Brazil is Latin America’s largest economy and, 
because of its abundant natural resources, including sizeable off-shore oil deposits, the 
country has started to emerge as a major economic player. It is also one of the world’s 
largest democracies (in terms of population size and geographic area). Consequently, 
understanding Brazilian foreign policy will become increasing important, especially as 
it pushes for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (BBC News, 
2012). Brazil, therefore, is a significant player in the Lusophone world, and this affects 
the balance of power and could weaken Portugal’s position with regard to its former 
colonial possessions in Africa. Furthermore, the growth of Brazil could alter the 
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 established order so that Europe’s influence in Africa diminishes over the course of the 
century, weakening Portugal’s and the EU’s influence in the Southern Hemisphere. 
 
While Brazil is undoubtedly the economic and political powerhouse of the Lusophone 
world, the majority of the CPLP member countries are in Africa. Understanding the 
Lusophone world, allows for a better understanding of how European countries, like 
Portugal, and emerging economic powers, like Brazil, approach relations with African 
states. When, upon gaining independence from Portugal in the 1970s, Portuguese was 
proclaimed as an official language of Portugal’s five former colonies in Africa, known 
collectively as the ‘PALOPs’ (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa – African 
Countries where Portuguese is the Official Language: Angola; Cape Verde; Guinea-
Bissau; Mozambique; and São Tomé and Príncipe), it was done so as an instrumental 
way of uniting diverse peoples into a state structure (Cahen, 2003: 86). This led to the 
creation of a somewhat neo-colonial global Lusophone community when the CPLP was 
formed in 1996, along similar lines to General António de Spínola’s original vision for 
how Portugal should separate from its African colonies in 1974 by creating a 
“Portuguese Community” (de Spínola, 1974: 28; Wheeler, 2003: 120). 
 
The Portuguese language forms the basis for co-operation between Portugal and its 
former colonies, but it remains to be seen whether this will be a lasting and effective 
way of bringing diverse and dispersed states together. Portugal’s efforts to strengthen 
the CPLP reveal some of the difficulties in building post-colonial relationships with 
independent states upon notions of a shared history and common language imposed by 
imperialism. Embracing the CPLP as a neo-colonial project makes Portuguese elites 
more likely to confuse ‘Lusofonia’ (being Portuguese-speaking) in the PALOPs with 
‘Lusitanidade’ (Portugueseness); consequently, Lisbon cannot ignore the sensitivities 
that surround African ‘non-Portugueseness’ and risk destroying the delicate equilibrium 
in the CPLP organisation (Cahen, 2003: 87–88). Nonetheless, Portugal being the 
invisible centre of the Lusophone world is heavily implied, but this is something, as 
Santos (2003) argues, that “…can seldom be either flattering or beneficial to members 
other than Portugal” (Santos, 2003: 75). The Portuguese experience, therefore, provides 
a useful insight into how European countries have managed their relations with their 
former colonies and offers a portal to understand the politics and interests of the 
Lusophone world more generally.  
 22
 1.2.5 The wider applicability of the Portuguese case to states undergoing democratic 
transition processes 
 
The events of 25 April 1974 signalled the start of what became known as the “third 
wave” of democratisations in the twentieth century (Huntington, 1991: 3). The ‘Arab 
Spring’ of 2011 instigated a new wave of democratisations in the world, which the 
Portuguese experience can provide some useful insight on. Understanding how Portugal 
dealt with the challenges of democratic transition, makes it possible to appreciate the 
potential for the ‘Arab Spring’ states, and their foreign policies, to shrug off their pariah 
status, to become integrated into regional security co-operation mechanisms, and to 
contribute actively to the international community. The Portuguese case illustrates that 
empowering civil society to formulate political preferences, and establishing a 
functioning democracy, allows states to overcome their past and enables them to 
establish new foreign policy options, in order to further consolidate the nascent 
democratic government and to differentiate it from the policies of the previous regime. 
While the specific internal factors and external pressures differentiate the democratic 
transitions of the ‘Arab Spring’ states from the Portuguese experience, these should not 
limit the possibility for comparison, as useful parallels can potentially be drawn to help 
those in the present learn from the past.  
 
The Portuguese experience offers three lessons to countries that have recently 
experienced democratic transition. Firstly, it demonstrates how a country can be 
revitalised after prolonged decline and isolation. Secondly, it shows how a small state 
actor can retain its political independence and strengthen its domestic political 
institutions through integration with a powerful regional bloc such as the EU. And 
thirdly, the Portuguese case can be used to assess the scope for successful integration 
and democratic transition in other countries (MacDonald, 1993: 23–24). As a small state 
in a world of larger powers, Portugal has renewed its national foreign policy by making 
use of its historical and cultural legacies in the former colonies and the Atlantic and by 
firmly anchoring itself in the EU’s emerging foreign policy mechanisms in order to 
amplify its influence in global politics (MacDonald, 1993: 28). These kinds of options 
are now open to states like Libya and Egypt, now that their people have shaken off 
decades of authoritarian rule. 
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 1.3 Portuguese Foreign Policy Analysis and Studies on the Europeanisation of 
the Portuguese State 
 
Scholarship on Portuguese foreign policy since 1974 reflects the centrality of the EU to 
Portugal’s foreign policy presence in Europe, as well as its broader global standing. 
Within this discipline, many studies have used Europeanisation to ground their research 
in the prevailing discourse of Portugal’s exploration of the ‘European option’ post-
1974. However, while some scholars have identified this as the Portuguese State’s 
recent Europeanisation, they qualify this with references to the Atlantic, Africa and the 
Lusophone world as other strategic priorities for Portugal, which seem to undermine, 
contradict, or confuse the Europeanisation narrative. This paradox in the literature is 
telling because it reflects the current practice in Portuguese foreign policy-making 
circles to emphasise complementarity in global affairs, and to view European 
integration as something which enhances Portugal’s position in the Lusophone world, 
and its place in the international community more generally.  
 
Exploring the ‘European option’ was undoubtedly the principal priority of Portuguese 
external policy under the democratic regime, but contemporary Portuguese foreign 
policy is also concerned with matters beyond Europe. Studies have shown that Portugal 
is attempting to re-engage with its former colonies and has used the EU foreign policy 
apparatus to pursue this, most notably by drawing attention to the crisis in East Timor 
during the 1990s (Magone, 2004: 241–260; de Vasconcelos, 1996: 276–278; de 
Vasconcelos, 2000: 29–32). 
 
Prior to 1974, choosing Europe meant a rejection of the African colonies. In the 
aftermath of the Carnation Revolution, decolonisation and European integration were 
the immediate foci. However, since then, Portuguese foreign policy has sought to 
balance its strategic interests in a more inclusive foreign policy, which simultaneously 
prioritises the Atlantic Alliance, seeks to enhance Portugal’s unique ties to its former 
colonies, especially those in Africa, and aims to preserve Portugal’s status as a well-
integrated EU Member State. Contemporary Portuguese foreign policy has overcome 
this “false dichotomy” of choosing between the Atlantic (NATO, and the colonies – the 
prime focus of Salazar’s foreign policy) and Europe (de Vasconcelos, 2000: 30). 
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 Leaving Portugal’s persistent Luso-Atlantic tendencies aside, exploring the ‘European 
option’ has had an impact on Portuguese foreign policy, but this does not equate to a 
case of foreign policy ‘Europeanisation’. This is due, in part, to the varied definitions of 
Europeanisation in the literature; Europeanisation encompasses the ideas of national 
adaptation, national projection, modernisation, policy learning, identity reconstruction 
and elite socialisation (Wong, 2011: 154).  
 
The literature on Portugal predominantly uses Europeanisation, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, to denote top-down transformations of the Portuguese State as a consequence 
of pursuing European integration. Corkhill (1999) uses Europeanisation to account for 
the modernisation and restructuring of the Portuguese economy since joining the EEC 
in 1986. The economic institutions in place in Portugal during the dictatorship were not 
suited for the new era of the European Single Market, and broader globalisation, so 
needed to be reformed in order for Portugal to achieve greater economic development 
(Corkhill, 1999: 50). Inextricably linked to this quest for development, Europeanisation 
was marked by Portugal’s enthusiasm for Economic and Monetary Union, as to be 
excluded from the process would have kept Portugal on the periphery of Europe 
(Corkhill, 1999: 227).  
 
A more explicit treatment of the Europeanisation of the Portuguese State is provided by 
Magone (2004). This work addresses some major gaps in the study of Portugal’s 
European integration process, but predominantly focuses on top-down processes of 
national adaptation to Europe, because Portugal’s smallness and peripheral nature have 
meant that opportunities to project onto Europe (bottom-up Europeanisation) are limited 
(Magone, 2004: 20). Like economic institutions, political institutions have undergone 
considerable restructuring as a result of Portugal’s European integration, with the MNE 
becoming Europeanised because of the requirement to implement effective national co-
ordination strategies with the EU (Magone, 2000a: 169–170).2 
 
The exploration of the ‘European option’ meant that Portugal was forced to abandon its 
outward-facing Atlantic foreign policy orientation in favour of a broader focus, 
prioritising NATO and the Lusophone world with the pursuit of relations closer to home 
in Europe and the Mediterranean. The aspect of Europeanisation which represents the 
                                                 
2 For more information on the specific reforms undertaken to improve how Portugal handles EU policy 
since its accession, see Magone (2000b) for the domestic level, and Magone (2001) for the Brussels level. 
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 starkest contrast to the foreign policy of the Estado Novo is the Mediterraneanisation 
and Iberianisation of Portuguese foreign policy. Improved relations with Spain, 
especially in terms of trade and enhanced economic co-operation, have been in no small 
part due to the fact that both Iberian countries have undergone considerable 
Europeanisation since their respective democratisations in the 1970s (Hibou, 2005: 
236–237). Partly as a concomitant of Portugal’s new-found friendship with Spain, 
Mediterranean issues, especially co-operation with the countries of the Maghreb, have 
been high on the agenda, especially during the early years of Portugal’s European 
integration project (de Vasconcelos, 1996: 274–275). Thus, the Mediterraneanisation of 
Portuguese foreign policy reflects its broader Europeanisation (Magone, 2004: 250).  
 
However, Europeanisation in this sense is more specific to the Portuguese experience of 
prioritising the Atlantic over Europe for many centuries. Mediterraneanisation, as a 
form of Europeanisation, is more about the recognition that European issues are relevant 
to Portugal. Despite not having a Mediterranean coastline, Portuguese policy-makers 
are now aware that issues in the Mediterranean basin affect Portugal, both directly and 
indirectly. If Portuguese policy-makers adopt the wrong strategy towards the 
Mediterranean, Portugal would not only have to deal with the direct consequences of 
that, but it could risk becoming isolated in the European context, the latter being 
potentially catastrophic for Portuguese diplomacy. Therefore, Europeanisation as 
Mediterraneanisation encompasses the general notion of Portugal’s increasing 
awareness of Europe as a way of maintaining the country’s influence in European and 
international decision-making processes on key issues of strategic importance. 
 
As Magone rightly observed, there is a paucity of studies on Portugal. Many of the 
existing studies do not provide a thorough and effective treatment of Europeanisation as 
a concept and do not examine its (un)suitability to explaining dynamics of change in the 
Portuguese case (Magone, 2004: 16). The concept has potential but is weakened by the 
fact that it has been used as a synonym for European integration. The Europeanisation 
of institutions in the Portuguese State, the political exploration of the ‘European option’, 
economic development, democratisation, and modernisation are all intertwined in the 
Portuguese case. Europe has been a focus for Portugal since 1974, but that does not 
mean that Europeanisation pressures are solely responsible for changes which have 
occurred. 
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 The adaptation of national institutions, in the face of EEC accession in 1986, means that 
the Europeanisation of the Portuguese State is more obviously evident in the economic 
sphere. The regulatory powers of the EU, rather than legislation from the European-
level, are the most relevant dynamics in the Portuguese case (Jalali, 2007: 190). This 
reveals the weakness of Europeanisation as a concept when examining foreign policy, 
as Europeanisation is much more likely to be visible in the economic realm than in 
foreign policy. This is because the EU’s regulatory power is limited to Single Market 
issues and is weak on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This was 
shown when de Vasconcelos (1999) attempted to apply the Europeanisation narrative to 
Portuguese defence policy. He argued that Portugal’s response to the crisis in Bosnia in 
the 1990s gave a new European dimension to its previously staunchly Atlanticist 
defence policy, which it did. But the ‘European’ response was led by NATO, which was 
itself searching for a new post-Cold War role. Consequently, to assert that Portugal’s 
participation in the NATO intervention in Bosnia was a case of Europeanisation is 
problematic, not least because, at that time, the EU’s lack of security credentials were 
being exposed and European states relied heavily on US military support in the Balkans. 
In foreign and security affairs, less so than in the economic domain, the external 
pressures for change are intertwined with other factors, and international organisations 
other than the EU can play an important role in shaping norms at the national-level. 
 
In integrating with the EU, Portugal has succumbed to Europeanisation pressures and 
undertaken wide-ranging reforms to its economy and bureaucracy. However, this does 
not, necessarily, translate into policy outputs reflecting a more Europeanised national 
interest. Adding a European dimension to a traditionally Atlanticist foreign and security 
policy, and using Portugal’s EU membership to promote its interests in the Lusophone 
world, could well be labelled the ‘Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy’, but 
other concepts such as internationalisation and multilateralisation could also encapsulate 
these processes. The challenge of this thesis is to address these conceptual issues. What 
is required is to develop a theoretical framework that can evaluate the concept of 
Europeanisation against potential alternatives. This will allow research on Portugal, and 
other national case studies, to move away from using Europeanisation in imprecise 
ways, as a catch-all term for various complex processes, and as a synonym for European 
integration. While the exploration of the ‘European option’ has been critical for 
Portuguese foreign policy since 1974, the tendency to overstate the role of the EU in 
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 prescribing change at the national level needs to be addressed, and this thesis aims to do 
that with regard to Portugal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
 Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Assessing the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy requires the unpacking of 
key concepts and ideas in order to determine the precise nature of the processes at work 
and to explain the phenomena observed. Having a robust theoretical framework allows 
for the specific factors that shape Portuguese foreign policy to be identified and, more 
generally, enables a workable set of criteria to be developed and applied to other 
European states. Consequently, this chapter has three principal goals: to evaluate the 
various ways of understanding national foreign policy-making; to survey the terrain of 
theoretical explanations of Europeanisation; and to develop a general framework to 
assess the degree to which Europeanisation has transformed national foreign policy 
outputs and formulation processes. 
 
 
2.1 Theorising Foreign Policy-Making 
 
2.1.1 Levels of analysis problems in foreign policy-making 
 
All states, whether rich or poor, strong or weak, big or small, address foreign policy 
matters. Small states as well as big states in the international system have to manage 
their linkages with the outside; this constitutes foreign policy as a concept, broadly 
defined. Rosenau (1980) offers a more precise definition of foreign policy, as something 
more than a state simply responding to what is “foreign”, and instead seeing it as how 
“…governments relate themselves to all or part of the international system through the 
adoption of purposeful stances toward it…” (Rosenau, 1980: 88). Therefore, foreign 
policy-making is an internal process of reflection and making sense of the world. This 
requires an internalisation of the motivations of others and developing policy responses 
accordingly, in order to maximise national influence or minimise the influence of 
external forces. 
 
If the interests and identities of states are not set in stone and are not created in 
isolation, but instead are formed as part of a socially constructed interaction with the 
international system (Wendt, 1992: 182), then states alone are not the only relevant 
units of analysis when investigating foreign policy. Foreign policy analysis is, therefore, 
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 typified by its multi-level character, as explanatory variables are present across macro 
and micro levels (Hudson, 2005: 2). Consequently, the goal of foreign policy analysis 
should be as much about understanding processes as it is about accounting for outputs 
and events (Hudson and Vore, 1995: 214). 
 
Studying both processes and outputs requires taking a cross-section of foreign policy-
making and examining multiple levels of analysis in order to build a full picture. 
Foreign policy-making processes, the focus of chapter 3, are conducted in institutions, 
where pressures to change policy-making norms and procedures stem from meso-level 
and micro-level influences and become transferred and embedded through socialisation 
and institutionalisation processes. Foreign policy-making processes also have to react to 
various macro level influences; therefore, they are located at the intermediate and lower 
levels of analysis. On the other hand, examining policy outputs, the function of the case 
studies in chapters 4 and 5, requires more of a macro-level focus to determine whether 
the changes at the institutional-level feed back to the broader political level, and force 
substantive changes to foreign policy outputs. 
 
Understanding and theorising foreign policy-making involves making core assumptions 
about human behaviour. Understanding how foreign policy is made is rendered difficult 
by the fact that national foreign policy is the product of both internal and external 
influences on a state. This reality makes isolating causality and identifying the precise 
role of actors and structures in the policy-making process extremely complex 
(Carlsnaes, 2008: 86). This analysis embraces these inherent complexities and seeks to 
draw out the underlying motivations which guide behaviour in foreign policy-making 
and have shaped the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy.  
 
 
2.1.2 Structure and agency in foreign policy-making: a constructivist perspective 
 
– Structure, agency and the theory of structuration – 
The Wendtian approach to constructivism recognises the ‘mutual constitution’ of, rather 
than the ‘interaction’ between, structure and agency (Wendt, 1999: 171). This allows for 
potentially problematic choices about the ontological and epistemological nature of the 
roles of structures and agents to be, effectively, sidestepped. Constructivism, 
encompassing sociological institutionalism as a more specific approach within it, 
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 emphasises the importance of norms and how behaviours can become embedded in 
social structures (Wiener, 2006: 38–39). Constructing foreign policy is a process where 
both individual agency and social structures matter and the precise nature of the two 
cannot be sufficiently unravelled and individually assessed. Green (2002) posits that 
rather than being a system where insular states interact, international politics is best 
viewed as a “global social system”, where international organisations have a significant 
role to play in ordering the system by deeming what is appropriate behaviour (i.e. a 
system governed by norms of behaviour) (Green, 2002: 5). This view not only departs 
from more rationalist assumptions about international politics and foreign policy 
analysis, but emphasises the fact that foreign policy-making is a process heavily 
grounded in the social realm, largely because the construction of state/national identity 
comes from the beings which inhabit that space and how they categorise threats, build 
common bonds and how the people (masses and elites) perceive reality. 
 
Thus, state/national identity can be derived from primordial elements, such as homeland 
or kinship, but much of what constitutes a nation’s identity is constructed and 
instrumental in nature, and, therefore, is open to political manipulation by elites (Green, 
2002: 32). The very essence of state/national identity is constructed or “imagined”, 
simply because the vast majority of a state’s population will never meet, so the bonds 
between them are invented (Anderson, 1991: 6). Furthermore, the process of national 
identity construction is one in which elites have a considerable role to play in the 
establishment of official languages, official ideologies, public education and military 
conscription (Green, 2002: 33). In addition to this, not all aspects of national identity are 
generated internally. Instead, national identities are often formed as a reaction to 
external forces, by defining the self in contrast to an external other (Green, 2002: 34).  
 
In addition to this, constructivism recognises that state identity and policy outputs are 
subject to revision, reproduction and reconstruction over time. Shifting to multiple 
identities, embracing particular norms, and making certain policy choices, further 
concretise the state’s identity through processes of institutionalisation and reproduction 
of norms. As these variables are constantly evolving, they constitute an on-going 
process, meaning that cultural and institutional structures cannot be isolated for 
analytical purposes (Jepperson et al., 1996: 62–63). Consequently, core aspects of 
foreign policy outputs are wrapped up in institutional cultures and national/state 
identities which are constantly shaping themselves and are being shaped by the social 
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 world. Socially constructed, or “imagined”, national identities are difficult to pin down 
and analyse but by focusing on important ideas and symbols, which have a power over a 
society, it is possible to unpack the key features of a state’s foreign policy personality.  
 
Constructivist approaches were founded upon the basic premises of symbolic 
interactionism outlined by Blumer (1969). Where symbols enshrined in an institution 
are particularly pervasive, such as symbols of national identity, then the individual can 
identify with the institution’s beliefs more strongly, and this is reinforced through social 
interaction. Symbols can be abstract concepts rather than being merely physical objects. 
Socially meaningful symbols can, instead, take the form of ideas, traditions and ways of 
seeing the world. The importance of institutions, and the interpretive nature of human 
beings’ relationship with them, is outlined in Blumer’s first premise, “that human 
beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them. 
Such things include…institutions…” (Blumer, 1969: 2). Therefore, symbolism, national 
identity and the institutionalisation of ideas and their translation into actions and 
policies, have a profound impact on both individual actors and social structures and on 
how foreign policy roles are constructed. 
 
Constructivism differs from neorealism and neoliberalism in that it sees international 
politics as an arena where social, not just material, forces interact. This allows scholars 
to break through the methodological individualist assumptions of more rationalist 
models, challenging the belief that agents act to achieve their goals in instrumental, 
utility-maximising ways (Checkel, 1998: 325). “Constructivists thus occupy a middle 
ground between rational choice theorists and postmodern scholars” (Checkel, 1998: 
327). Whereas neoliberals and neorealists agree, broadly speaking, on the materialist 
features of power, interest and institutions in international politics, Wendt argues that 
constructivism brings a fourth factor to the table: “ideas” (Wendt, 1999: 92). Although 
both neoliberalism and neorealism are premised upon ideological interpretations of the 
world, they regard ideas as being fixed products of interests and mind-set, rather than 
being fluid. For Wendt, ideas can serve as tools, helping to bridge the gap between 
agency and structure, contributing to the formulation of actors’ interests. He describes 
constructivism, therefore, as a kind of “structural idealism” (Wendt, 1999: 1).  
 
Embracing Giddens’ (1979) theory of “structuration” allows for the behaviour of 
individuals to be properly located in the social context. For the purposes of analysing 
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 policy outputs, structuration theory sees the individual and collective inputs as a whole, 
allowing for attention to be directed towards understanding and explaining the 
motivation behind specific outputs, while, at the same time, keeping in mind the 
specific context from which the outputs originated. Structuration accepts that social and 
institutional structures are important, but that individual agency is also important in the 
policy-making process. Actors define themselves according to an institution’s dominant 
beliefs. They institutionalise and internalise dominant norms and goals, and these shape 
their individual rationality. An institution is defined by the people who operate within 
its formal and informal structures. Therefore, this research makes the assumption that 
Giddens’ theory of structuration holds true, that structure is the outcome of individual’s 
practices but at the same time conditions them (Giddens, 1979: 69). Structures matter 
and individual rationality cannot be separated from the collective rationality (or 
irrationality) of the institution’s overall goals.  
 
Rather than focusing on individual agency in foreign policy decision-making processes, 
Carlsnaes (1992, later redeveloped in 2007) offered an approach which explains foreign 
policy actions by unravelling the three constituent factors which shape them: what he 
termed the ‘intentional’; ‘dispositional’; and ‘structural’ dimensions (Carlsnaes, 1992: 
254). Focusing on the first dimension builds a rational framework for understanding 
foreign policy, the second dimension then provides dominant ideas and worldviews 
which shape foreign policy, and the third dimension outlines how the international 
system constrains or allows for the policy to be put into practice (Carlsnaes, 2007: 16–
17).  
 
This framework is useful as it is neutral to particular state characteristics, i.e. it is 
applicable to small states as much as it is to more powerful states (Carlsnaes, 2007: 17–
19). This has utility as a tool to analyse Portuguese foreign policy in particular, as 
Portugal’s influence is constrained due to various geopolitical, material and historical 
factors. It is especially important for any analysis of the behaviour of small states in the 
international system, such as Portugal, to avoid overreliance on structural explanations, 
as these favour the powerful in the international system. However, it is also necessary to 
avoid explanations which are too agency-centred as these tend to downplay the 
important structural factors which constrain small states in the international system 
(Carlsnaes, 2007: 16). 
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 Carlsnaes’ model allows for a deeper understanding than more rationalist models, which 
only address intentional factors concerning the behaviour of individuals or groups. 
Although the three dimensions are separated for analytical purposes, the various strands 
are interrelated. The model appears to be a useful step towards a better understanding of 
the structure–agency issue in foreign policy decision-making. It does, however, 
reinforce the view that structure is often a negative, constraining, force on actors 
(Carlsnaes, 1992: 254–256). 
 
As the ‘intentional’, ‘dispositional’ and ‘structural’ are in practice interrelated, they all 
can be said to contribute to a state’s foreign policy character. Structures are meaningful, 
they exert pressures on individual agents and shape societal milieux. This makes the 
three strands essentially all about disposition, as neither the individual nor the structural 
offer any firm portal to reality beyond what is socially constructed. Consequently, 
disposition, and ultimately output, is set by the “habitus” – “a system of dispositions” or 
“structuring structures” (Bourdieu, 1977: 72, 214). Ideas, roles, identities, and the 
context in which to enact them, are all subject to interpretation and institutionalisation. 
However, the interwovenness of human agents and the social structures in which they 
inhabit makes assigning causality especially difficult (Carlsnaes, 1992: 245). This 
interwovenness presents a problem for foreign policy scholars, as demarcating the units 
of analysis and separating the dependent and independent variables, is near impossible 
in a system where multiple external, as well as internal, factors influence decisions 
(Carlsnaes, 1992: 247). 
 
– Foreign policy role conceptions – 
Foreign policy is not made in isolation; individuals are guided by how they believe it 
best to behave in a certain situation. Policy-making is shaped by how individuals relate 
to their institutional surroundings, how they define their identity and they perceive the 
intentions of others. During the “Cold War”, the shared belief between the foreign 
policy elites of the United States and the Soviet Union that they were enemies helped 
constitute their identities and interests and governed their behaviour towards the 
“Other”; this had the effect of forging the Cold War and making it politically real 
(Wendt, 1999: 186–187). Any national foreign policy role that has been adopted is no 
longer in the mind of individuals, or a limited group of elites, it becomes part of the 
fabric of the nation’s identity and is legitimised and reinforced by state institutions and 
the political class. Additionally, a national foreign policy role identity can only be 
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 sustained by relating it to an external force, and cannot exist outside a social structure 
that allows agents to enact their respective roles (Wendt, 1999: 227). Role identities, 
therefore, require a social structure for ideas and identities to be sustained and 
internalised by actors, in both the national and the international context. 
 
Portugal, as a founder-member of NATO, had its main defining role during the Cold 
War, alignment with the United States, enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Portuguese foreign policy elites, therefore found a role for the country within NATO 
and, thus were able to justify its role in the wider global context (Holsti, 1970: 241). 
This external, structural role made domestic actors adjust Portuguese foreign policy in 
order to chime with this worldview. By the same token, the self-perceived role for 
Portugal as interlocutor between Europe and its former colonies cannot exist without the 
mutual recognition of Portugal’s role by both the EU and the Lusophone countries, and 
the structural forum to facilitate the interaction between the various actors. Therefore, a 
defined role identity needs to be located in some kind of interstate framework, in order 
for the interaction between actors, fulfilling their given roles, to take place. This then 
allows the national role to gain significant meaning in foreign policy terms, as it has 
been recognised by the wider international community. As Le Prestre (1997) illustrates, 
a defined role “…reflects a claim on the international system, a recognition by 
international actors, and a conception of national identity” (Le Prestre, 1997: 5; see also 
Hyde-Price, 2004: 109–110). 
 
As national role conceptions encompass the nation/state in its entirety (so are best 
examined on a macro level of analysis), it is often remarked that the construction and 
manipulation of national roles is an elite-driven process, with little or no input from the 
masses. As Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) rightly observe, the assertion of a particular 
national role by a single actor does not necessarily deem that the said role is universally 
accepted to be the national role, as sanctioned by the nation as a whole (Cantir and 
Kaarbo, 2012: 6). However, as elites occupy a privileged position in domestic politics, 
they have the power to place ideas about national roles into the debate, and these ideas 
will have resonance with the wider population because national role conceptions are 
inextricably linked to core aspects of national history, culture and identity. Therefore, 
while there is a lack of rigorous analyses of polling data to confirm or refute this, this 
constitutes the bridge between elites and the masses, and hence how role conceptions 
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 can come to reflect national/state identity and be representative of the nation as a whole 
(Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012: 7). 
 
While national role conceptions, because they are embedded in society, can be 
representative of a nation’s foreign policy personality, Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) are 
right to highlight that it is unclear how popular dissent can feed into the formulation of 
national role conceptions. On the one hand, national role conceptions receive their 
legitimacy from the social reality that it reflects or echoes, but, on the other hand, there 
is no systematic process of evaluating alternatives or engaging in open discussion about 
roles and policies to adopt. National leaders, therefore, require a considerable body of 
popular opinion to be in favour of (or at least unopposed or indifferent to) any proposed 
national role (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012: 7–8). Cantir and Kaarbo clearly posit a more 
agency-centred explanation to the use of national role conceptions, based around the 
power of elites and the lack of wider public participation, rather than recognising the 
cultural context and the structuring effects of national identity, which provide the 
guidelines for elites to develop and manipulate national foreign policy roles. 
 
National role conceptions are not, however, set in stone and are subject to modification, 
interpretation and reinterpretation by key actors involved in the foreign policy-making 
process. While the bulk of what constitutes a foreign policy role is derived from “self-
representations” and “self-identities”, socialisation processes and “international 
learning” can also have an effect on shaping a national foreign policy role. This view on 
foreign policy learning in the international context illuminates how particular foreign 
policy roles come to be established, and shows that a foreign policy role is not just 
derived from political rhetoric based upon notions of national identity (Harnisch, 2012: 
47–48). This is because international institutions, as social environments, create the 
necessary conditions for the moulding of diplomats’ ideas and worldviews to take place 
through socialisation, learning and emulation (Johnston, 2001: 498).  
 
Such social learning in international institutions tends to flourish when officials find 
themselves in a “novel and uncertain environment”, as agents become mentally geared 
towards absorbing and processing new information and being open to alternative 
perspectives (Checkel, 1999: 550). Generally, socialisation implies an asymmetrical 
relationship of a “novice and a socializer” or taking cues from “significant, organized or 
even generalized others” (Harnisch, 2012: 57). The socialiser often, although not 
 36
 always, takes the form of a particularly strong and powerful international organisation, 
within which norms of behaviour are heavily codified and/or historically engrained 
(Thies, 2012: 26–27). Then socialisation happens predominantly through persuasion 
rather than coercion (Flockhart, 2006: 96). Therefore, national roles can be moulded 
from the outside as well as modified internally to conform to what is appropriate in the 
international context. 
 
The constructivist view of national role conceptions differs from the more conventional 
approach of foreign policy analysts. While the latter focuses on the behaviour of 
individual agents and the cognitive factors which influence decision-making, the former 
(because of the influences of Wendtian constructivism in International Relations theory 
and new institutionalism in EU studies) recognises the importance of structures in 
making national role conceptions politically real (Thies and Breuning, 2012: 2). 
Therefore, from a constructivist perspective, national foreign policy role conceptions are 
products of national identity, rather than being seen as rational calculations designed to 
achieve a specific goal. Structures limit how individual actors can behave as they are 
forced to conform to existing cultures and belief systems. Therefore, the social context 
of national policy-making institutions means that a state is disposed to behave in certain 
ways. Consequently, foreign policy-making, particularly for weaker states in the 
international system, is shaped by dispositional rather than intentional factors. This 
means that structure predisposes actors to behave in certain ways as their individual 
agency is limited by the realities of their situation, i.e. it is indicative of the inability of 
the nation-state to make its mark on the international system, because its foreign policy 
character reflects the state’s inherent relative weaknesses. 
 
Structures impact upon the behaviour of policy-making agents and shape national 
foreign policy roles. The constraining effects of structures and the need for national 
roles are especially relevant when examining foreign policy-making in small states, as 
systemic factors make smaller states predisposed to make certain foreign policy choices. 
This is because, for small states, the structures of the international system are harder to 
break down, because their administrative systems lack the capacity to be able to impose 
themselves on the world unilaterally (Thorhallsson, 2004: 162). As such, foreign policy-
makers in small states are more likely to look to international organisations, and thus, 
open themselves up to socialisation. This makes foreign policy roles, institutions and 
belief systems of smaller states more malleable, as ideas are more easily absorbed by 
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 agents, because they cannot, so readily, resist the pressures of international norms. 
Through socialisation processes, social interactions and framing ideas and discourse 
into a meaningful form, conceptions from outside can become reified in political 
institutions and, ultimately, shape foreign policy outputs.  
 
 
2.1.3 Foreign policy-making in ‘small states’ 
 
While foreign policy is something which can be identified and analysed across all states 
in the international system, it is lamentable that scholarship tends to focus on the big 
and the powerful states, most often the United States. The unique, sui generis, 
characteristics of the European Union, and the diverse nature of the states which 
comprise its membership, mean that any analysis of European foreign policy requires a 
distinctive approach in order to break free of analytical frameworks too tightly built 
around understanding US foreign policy (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 4–5).  
 
Given that the EU shapes, simultaneously, both the external and the internal policies of 
its Member States, Manners and Whitman are right to highlight the importance of its 
uniqueness and to assert that this brings something else to the table when seeking to 
understand and account for the foreign policy actions of its Member States. Aside from 
addressing the potential distinctiveness of European foreign policy and the role of 
Europeanisation processes in shaping national foreign policy-making, the other 
necessary action to take, in order to develop the tools of foreign policy analysis to better 
explain states other than the United States, is to rigorously analyse the foreign policies 
of small states in the international system. 
 
The arguments for a better understanding of ‘small’ states in the discipline of 
International Relations (IR) are compelling. The vast majority of states in the United 
Nations can be considered ‘small’ powers. However, in a discipline driven by power 
politics, the study of small states has been relatively neglected. As such, IR scholarship 
would benefit greatly from taking small states seriously, as concentrating on powerful 
states in the international system provides an unbalanced account of how states operate 
and what drives foreign policy-making. Investigating the many small states in the 
international system would unearth rich and varied data which could enable a 
reappraisal of how IR understands state behaviour (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006: 3–4). 
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 Portugal is one such example. It is a ‘small’ state in the international system and is even 
considered ‘small’ in the EU context. Kassimeris (2009) and Bunse et al. (2005) define 
a ‘small’ EU Member State as a country with a population of less than 40 million. This 
means that of the 27 Member States, Portugal and twenty others are regarded as ‘small’ 
(Bunse et al., 2005: 8–9; Kassimeris, 2009: 88). As a single criterion, population size 
alone is not a reliable measure of a state’s capacity to influence world affairs. This 
rather arbitrary definition is, however, useful as it includes states generally considered 
to be ‘small’. If states perceive themselves as small, or are perceived to be small by 
other states, then this is generally a reliable indication of ‘smallness’. States are defined 
by their perceived position in the international hierarchy (Hey, 2003a: 3). 
 
Portugal chose to ally itself with the West post-World War II. This is interesting 
because Portugal was formally neutral during World War II and thus clearly perceived 
itself as weak and small in the immediate post-war period.3 This motivation supports 
Rothstein’s (1966) assertion that small partners in the Alliance relied on the bipolar 
conflict to sustain their place in the world (Rothstein, 1966: 403). The lack of capacity 
for guaranteeing national security is a major characteristic of ‘small’ states, they can be 
said to be “net importers of security” (Knudsen, 2002: 187). ‘Great powers’, on the 
other hand, can “…exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact on the international 
system…” (Keohane, 1969: 296). For small powers, it is this ability to withstand the 
pressure of other states, which is the default position.  
 
However, even small states can pursue an active role in world affairs, but, usually, by 
adopting a predominantly defensive posture. Small states need to be mindful of their 
weaknesses, and thus avoid situations where their weaknesses may be exposed. A small 
state must know how to make the best of its limited resources (Vital, 1967: 87). In lieu 
of economic power and military might, diplomacy represents a potent tool which small 
states can use in relation to the major powers. 
 
Small states are particularly able to punch above their weight in the EU context. Such 
states approach the EU institutions in different ways to the more dominant Member 
                                                 
3 Government propaganda during the Estado Novo era in Portugal (1933–1974) declared that the country 
was not small. The ‘Portugal não é um país pequeno’ map creatively presented Portugal (the ‘Metropolis’ 
plus the ‘Overseas Territories’) as a country which, in terms of area, would cover the whole of Western 
Europe. With the amputation of Portugal’s colonial possessions during the 1970s, Portugal became, very 
definitely, a small country in the European context. The map is illustrated on p. 28 of Magalhães and 
Alçada (2007) and on the front covers of de Figueiredo (1975) and Aires Oliveira (2007). 
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 States. Limited administrative capacity forces small Member States to prioritise. While 
they may become passive in some policy areas, they can be highly active in areas they 
deem as important (Thorhallsson, 2006: 218). It has been observed that small states 
have particularly valued relations with the Commission and have used the rotating 
Council Presidency as a platform to increase their influence (Bunse et al., 2005: 44).  
 
Coalition-building has helped small states to maximise their influence within the EU, 
working closely with the Commission or neighbouring countries, an example of this 
would be Finland’s efforts to raise Nordic issues (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006: 660). 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009, the institutional 
framework of the EU allowed small states the privilege of setting the EU’s foreign 
policy agenda. The rotating Presidency of the Council has been used by small states, 
such as Portugal, to raise issues of particular interest, such as Mediterranean policy, 
Latin America, and African affairs, as well as to enhance national prestige from hosting 
a successful Presidency (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006: 662; see also Edwards and 
Wiessala, 2000; Ferreira-Pereira, 2008).  
 
Small Scandinavian states have managed to influence the EU agenda by being ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’. By promoting a normative agenda, in the institutional setting where such 
a normative stance would be consistent with the overall purposes of the EU (namely, 
acting on climate change, conflict prevention, human rights etc.), Sweden, in particular, 
has been able to gain considerable prestige. By being a committed advocate of a given 
norm or policy stance, a small power is able to exert greater influence on the EU 
intergovernmental system, particularly if support for the normative stance is mirrored 
by the Commission or a coalition of other Member States (Björkdahl, 2008: 135–154; 
Ingebritsen, 2006: 273–285). The success of Scandinavian norm entrepreneurship is 
leading to a shift in the way these states are categorised, instead of thinking in terms of 
‘big’ and ‘small’, norm entrepreneurs are increasingly being considered as ‘smart’ states 
(Browning, 2006: 669). 
 
The behaviour of small states in foreign policy can, generally, be attributed to the 
importance of systemic, as opposed to domestic or individual factors. However, the 
charisma of leaders with particular ideas and the (in)stability of the domestic political 
regime, tend to play a greater role in influencing less economically developed small 
states’ foreign policies. The international system permits states to behave in certain 
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 ways and small states tend to respond to the international system in similar ways (Hey, 
2003b: 185–195). Observable characteristics of small states’ foreign policies include: 
high levels of activity in international intergovernmental organisations; strong support 
for international law and the promotion of moral and normative values in international 
politics; concentrated foreign policy interests (“a narrow functional and geographic 
range of concern”); and the avoidance of the use of military force and a reluctance to 
alienate more powerful states in the system (East, 1973: 557). Certain characteristics of 
Portuguese foreign policy fit this model of small state behaviour. 
 
Smallness is an identifiable characteristic of states, and shapes behaviour and political 
choices. Smallness cannot, per se, explain how and why states behave in certain ways, 
but it does provide some useful context to understanding how choices are framed. The 
relative smallness of certain states is something that is both objectively present in the 
international system and, equally, subjectively present in the minds of key actors. 
Therefore, small state foreign policies are a useful way of identifying common 
characteristics which shape the behaviour of states. However, the motivations behind 
foreign policy outputs, and the ways in which states and policy-makers perceive the 
world and interact with international organisations, require further unpacking. 
 
 
2.1.4 Institutional approaches, elite socialisation, and social learning 
 
National foreign policies are made in an institutional context. Consequently, in order to 
understand how foreign policy is formulated, and what motivates Portuguese foreign 
policy-makers to make certain choices, it is necessary to consider in detail the precise 
nature of how political institutions function day-to-day, how they are organised, and 
what goes on inside them. Institutions provide norms and rules to guide political actors 
to behave in appropriate ways in given situations. These norms are embedded in 
structures and identities which give these actions meaning. Institutional approaches to 
the study of politics, therefore, emphasise the role that institutions play in shaping 
human actions and determining political outcomes and how, through institutionalisation, 
these roles and norms of behaviour become reinforced and embedded (March and 
Olsen, 1998: 948).  
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 An example of a “thin” conception of institutions is that of rational choice 
institutionalism, which sees institutions as “a structure that actors run into, go ‘ouch’, 
and then recalculate how…to achieve their interests…” (Checkel, 1999: 546). Then 
there is a “thicker” view of institutions: historical institutionalism. This approach takes 
into account the longer-term structuring effects of institutions on rational agents. 
Historical institutionalism is, essentially, a short-term rationalist perspective balanced 
by an awareness of long-term patterns of institutionalisation (Checkel, 1999: 546–547). 
Finally, sociological institutionalism represents an “unabashedly thick” view of 
institutions, which sees that institutions constitute actors and shape their interest 
formulation processes (Checkel, 1999: 547). Each brand of institutionalism offers a 
perspective on Portuguese foreign policy-making processes and the merits and 
limitations of all three require further elaboration and discussion. 
 
Historical institutionalism takes a long-term view of organisational behaviour, which 
means it is able to account for continuities and changes over time. Instead of 
understanding decision-making in a purely short-term, rationalist manner, historical 
institutionalism accepts that behaviour is constrained by institutional rules, both formal 
and informal, which shape policy outputs (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 7). In order 
to better understand European integration, historical institutionalists were responsible 
for offering a ‘thicker’ understanding of how institutions operate and how this can 
explain patterns of continuity and change over time. Pierson (1996) challenged 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist analytical model (1993) and rational choice 
institutionalism by emphasising the importance of studying effects on institutions over 
time. Whereas intergovernmentalist theories tend to treat state preferences as fixed, 
Pierson, by taking a more long-term view, accepts that national preferences can change. 
As governments change frequently, or new information may force a reappraisal of the 
initial position, the institutional arrangements are unlikely to reflect the intentions of 
those who founded it. Therefore, the evolution of political institutions, such as the 
European Union, means that Member States are unable to directly influence the actions 
of the institution they created (Pierson, 1996: 139–140). 
 
In terms of domestic institutional change, Pierson argued that political institutions are 
often “sticky”, i.e. “…specifically designed to hinder the process of institutional and 
policy reform” (Pierson, 1996: 143). To illustrate this stickiness, Pierson used European 
social policy as an example of ‘path dependency’, where Member States are 
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 “…prohibited from pursuing a range of social policy options because their actions 
would be incompatible with the [pre-existing] single-market project” (Pierson, 1996: 
156). This shows how policy can go through periods of considerable stability and that 
practices can become accepted and institutionalised over time (Greener, 2002: 164). 
Related to the path-dependent argument, ‘lock-in’ occurs when a particular path is 
chosen and momentum gained in this direction. Once the policy gains momentum, the 
previously viable second option becomes totally implausible, the point of no return is 
reached and the new policy is locked into the new trajectory. Lock-in results in the 
absence of conflict. In other words, a given policy becomes accepted because the 
alternative is deemed to be ludicrously implausible, despite it being perfectly feasible at 
the previous decision-point (Pierson, 1996: 146). 
 
Pierson’s conclusions raise interesting questions when considering how changes in 
foreign policy priorities may, or may not, occur. The ‘lock-in’ of traditional Portuguese 
foreign policy priorities into the foreign policy-making apparatus may well have 
occurred, despite national political elites (and European elites indirectly through 
socialisation) seeking to change the principal foreign policy foci. The stickiness of 
foreign policy-making institutions may force elites to adhere to traditional foreign 
policy priorities against their short-term rational judgement. This logic presents a 
challenge to Moravcsik’s (1993) liberal intergovernmentalist model, in that institutions 
are active players in the system (Pierson, 1996: 130). Longer-term perspectives can 
offer more, and often better, explanations of causality and can give more detailed 
accounts of underlying motivations for particular policy outcomes which are ‘off the 
radar’ of more rationalist approaches. In defence of rationalist models, Moravcsik 
(2005) argues that path dependence can, in fact, be used as an extension of rational 
choice institutionalism. Rather than being inconsistent with rationalist assumptions, 
‘path dependence’ and ‘lock-in’ can be utilised, so long as intended, rather than 
unintended, actions are given greater priority (Moravcsik, 2005: 24). While historical 
institutionalism offers useful insights, the fact that many of its features overlap with 
those of rational choice institutionalism means that it could go further in being able to 
account for underlying motivations, especially those closely wrapped up in matters of 
identity and dominant institutional belief systems, which can be more fluid over time. 
 
Nevertheless, historical institutionalism is able to shed light on both continuities and 
changes. It is a framework for understanding long-term organisational permanence and 
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 cultural persistence, as well as accounting for radical changes at times of upheaval. As 
Bulmer and Burch (2009) point out, the process of Europeanisation is iterative and 
involves institutional adaptation spanning several decades (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 
28). While Bulmer and Burch hold that institutional change is usually an incremental 
process, Streeck and Thelen (2005) are careful to point out that processes of 
institutional change can also be ‘abrupt’ and result in wholesale institutional changes 
and the ‘breakdown and replacement’ of institutional norms and values (Bulmer and 
Burch, 2009: 29; Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 8–9). Bell (2011) argues that tailoring 
historical institutionalism allows for agency-centred constructivist thinking to be 
brought in. This reinforces Streeck and Thelen’s argument that, historical 
institutionalism, while better at explaining institutional stasis, has the tools to account 
for micro-level changes which can lead to macro-level institutional transformation over 
time (Bell, 2011: 885–886).  
 
The constructivist view of institutions and structuration theory also regards institutions 
as being malleable and “not permanent for-now-and-all-time” solid objects. Institutions 
are considered to be “habits”, which still possess structuring properties through the 
reification of discourses and the institutionalisation and formalisation of norms of 
behaviour. This conception of institutions is very different to the Weberian ideal type of 
a rigid bureaucracy that subjugates those who work within it (Fox and Miller, 1996: 91–
92). Proponents of constructivist institutionalism, as an approach, tend to focus on 
individual agency to explain institutional changes, citing the importance of ideational 
and discursive processes such as learning, emulation and socialisation (Bell, 2011: 894). 
It is the actions of agents that reinforce structures and create stable institutional norms 
of behaviour, yet, conversely, the institution is not reducible to the sum of the agents 
which inhabit it (Bell, 2011: 899). 
 
Beyond the rather nebulous view of institutions sketched out by constructivist 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism takes the ‘thickest’, most holistic, 
understanding of institutions:  
Constructivists [in political science, using sociology’s institutionalism] have 
taken the notions of history, institutions, norms, ideas and culture well 
beyond the point at which historical institutionalists are willing to 
go…problematizing a number of key concerns that rationalists take for 
granted (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 19).  
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 From this perspective, culture, values and beliefs are central to understanding European 
integration and how national and supranational institutions evolve (Aspinwall and 
Schneider, 2000: 21).  
 
Sociological institutionalism adopts a much broader view of institutions than 
mainstream political science does, and includes formal rules as well as informal norms 
which provide the ‘frames of meaning’ which shape actor behaviour. This breaks down 
the divide between an institution and the broader culture in which it is located (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 947). Sociological institutionalism emphasises the mutually constitutive 
nature of the relationship between institutions and human action. Therefore, the 
relationship between the individual and the institution can be understood as a type of 
‘practical reasoning’. This does not mean that actors do not act ‘rationally’ when faced 
with a problem. Merely, that the ‘rationality’ itself is a social construction, actors aim 
instead to express their identities in socially meaningful ways (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 
949). 
 
Börzel and Risse (2000) argue that sociological institutionalism has considerable 
application to understanding European integration as it provides two explanations for 
domestic adaptation in response to Europeanisation. Firstly, ‘institutional isomorphism’, 
the gradual homogenisation of national and European political structures, becomes 
increasingly widespread as institutions interact more frequently. Secondly, actors are 
socialised into new ‘European’ norms and social learning leads to redefined national 
interests in light of European integration (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 8). 
 
In addition to this potential contribution to the study of European integration processes, 
sociological institutionalism offers tools which would be of use to scholars in the field 
of International Relations. Finnemore (1996) argues that sociological institutionalism 
differs strongly from the realist and liberalist traditions of IR, in that social structure 
exists prior to political agents. Political agents are defined by their social context and 
not the reverse. Sociological institutionalism challenges the rational assumptions which 
are simply taken for granted by the traditional views within IR theory (Finnemore, 
1996: 333). 
 
The position of sociological institutionalism is one in stark contrast to that of rational 
choice institutionalism, which views actors as having a set of fixed preferences and 
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 suggests that they behave in a calculated way to achieve their intended goals. Strategy, 
as opposed to impersonal historical forces, accounts for an actor’s behaviour. A rational 
choice view of how institutions are created and sustained does, however, rest on one 
dangerous assumption, that political institutions are the product of a logical, rational 
creation and have always served the purpose for which they are currently used (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 944–945). This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the assumption of 
the logical and rational creation and utility of political institutions cannot be justified in 
the real world, where irrational behaviour is rife and flawless rationality is a 
considerable improbability. Secondly, because rational choice institutionalism draws 
heavily from game theory approaches that view “…politics as an arena in which 
individuals try to maximize their personal gain” (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000: 11), 
political decisions are, therefore, taken with no reference to the social world that 
decision-makers inhabit and are constantly interacting with. There is no place in the 
rational choice institutionalist model to consider role conceptions, formal and informal 
rules, norms of behaviour, ideas and identities. In contrast, sociological institutionalism 
prioritises these issues and frames institutional behaviour in the longer-term, social 
context. 
 
Deciding between the two brands of institutionalism involves making choices about 
epistemology and ontology and how best to capture and account for social phenomena. 
As Héritier points out, it is important to be explicit about how theoretical assumptions 
attribute causality, as competing theoretical explanations may also be able to attribute 
causality within their own paradigm. For example, this ‘subsumption’ of theory means 
that a sociological institutionalist assertion that explains an event by attributing 
causality to the logics of conforming to norms and values, could be successfully 
challenged by rationalists who can logically justify that acting in such a way is 
consistent with the individual’s rationality and anticipated gains from acting with that 
particular strategy (Héritier, 2008: 66). Making theoretical assumptions requires 
epistemological and ontological justification but also an awareness of other theoretical 
approaches and their potential utility. 
 
Essentially, the rational choice institutionalism versus sociological institutionalism 
debate can be reduced to a discussion about whether agents conform to the “logic of 
expected consequences” or, alternatively, act according to the “logic of appropriateness” 
(March and Olsen, 1998: 949–952). The former is a rationalist perspective, the latter 
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 accepts the normative role of institutions as a result of social construction and 
interaction. Explanations based upon the “logic of appropriateness”, such as normative 
or sociological institutionalism, therefore, place considerable emphasis on identities, 
roles, rules, cultures and senses of belonging (March and Olsen, 1998: 952). For March 
and Olsen it is the unpredictability of identities, and their impact on actions, which 
shapes their view of politics so as to bestow normative superiority upon the “logic of 
appropriateness” over the “logic of expected consequences” (Goldmann, 2005: 45–46). 
 
To accept that the logic of appropriateness is intrinsically superior to the logic of 
expected consequences is problematic. However, the nature of formulating a theoretical 
standpoint from where to observe social phenomena requires making choices, and 
deciding which ontological and epistemological avenues to take. The sociological 
institutionalist perspective, embodied by the logic of appropriateness, offers a holistic 
view of the policy-making process, which allows room for both rational and irrational 
behaviour to be justified. For this reason it is right to prioritise this approach as being 
more useful for an analysis of Portuguese foreign policy-making because it recognises 
the social context within which ideas, identities and interests are formulated; it captures 
the nuances between structures and agents, which is central to the argument of 
structuration; and it offers a workable, socially grounded, framework for the analysis of 
the behaviour of both individuals and policies over time.  
 
Sociological institutional analysis is useful because it accepts that formal and informal 
organisational rules and structures should not be separated from each other. Informal 
social relations, or unofficial belief systems, can be as pervasive as formalised goals and 
structures in helping to construct institutional cultures. In reality, as Hill (1972) argues, 
organisations often lack rigid structures and a clear set of goals and objectives. An 
organisation can only be partially understood by reference to its formal rules and 
procedures, if indeed there are any, as the term ‘informal organisation’ emerged to 
address the incompleteness in accounting for the formal. The informal organisation is 
the reality, it is the space where actors within the institution operate, and where social 
forces interact. Where organisational goals are disputed or unclear, as is often the case 
as organisations avoid over-formalising their business, it is through social relations that 
meaningful beliefs are developed and engrained (Hill, 1972: 35–36). 
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 Sociological institutionalism takes a thick understanding of foreign policy-making 
organisations, prioritising the belief systems and key ideas which organise institutions 
and govern how they behave. The emergence of national cultures, beliefs, rituals and 
worldviews (and by extension national foreign policies) stem from institutionalised 
ideas about identity. Cultures, norms and identities cannot survive (or even exist) 
without being institutionalised, in one way or another. Goldstein and Keohane (1993) 
argue that such “conceptions of possibility”, or worldviews, are embedded in national 
cultures and identities (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 8). This means that the formation 
of foreign policy preferences is driven by ideas. Worldviews govern how choices are 
made and how situations are interpreted, even if the actors are motivated purely by self-
interest (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 13). The institutionalisation of ideas within the 
bureaucracy, as well as the wider national culture, is the crucial determinant of policy 
outcomes (Jepperson et al., 1996: 50). Institutionalised ideas which serve the interests 
of those making policy, i.e. ideas which are deemed to be useful or have been proven to 
be successful, become embedded as norms. The reverse is also true, policy norms can 
be given renewed legitimacy by being redefined in ideological terms (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993: 21–22).  
 
The ideas and beliefs of individuals, once formed, can become concretised and guide 
future decisions. However, these beliefs need not, necessarily, be based upon anything 
more considered than a fleeting, immediate, impulse to do something. Yet when 
internalised and rationalised post hoc the beliefs become the basis for dealing with the 
same problem, or a similar one, in the future (Jervis, 2006: 656–657). Ideas are part of 
the process of constructing and selecting political problems to be addressed and can be 
used to enforce permanence and to justify a long-established policy paradigm, as well as 
be imported to be a new weapon on a problem to make institutional change and 
modernisation possible (Béland, 2009: 704–705). 
 
Institutions are historical and cumulative; they build upon the experiences of those who 
work within them. Where historical institutionalism accepts that behaviour can become 
embedded over time, sociological institutionalism is able to balance institutional 
change, fluidity and evolution on the one hand, and the persistence of institutional 
norms, values and cultures on the other. Institutions therefore can be “…seen as 
redefining themselves as well as reflecting their past” (Peters, 1999: 104). The process 
of ‘sedimentation’ builds new symbols that are not incompatible with those that were in 
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 place before, but reflect the new situation. This has particular utility when thinking 
about national responses to European integration.  
 
‘Sedimentation’ is a useful way of thinking about how the institutionalisation of new 
practices and beliefs has varying degrees of impact within an organisation. For instance, 
older members of an organisation may be more culturally resistant to changes because 
of their historical experiences. Other groups may be more involved in socialisation 
processes and thus mould their beliefs accordingly. In other words, some people have 
dissolved into the institutional solution; others remain undissolved as sediment and 
cloud what exactly the institution stands for. There are, therefore, identifiable strata of 
different beliefs within an organisation (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996: 184). Cultural 
persistence is central to conceptions of institutions, and is generally based upon shared 
norms (Zucker, 1991: 84). An institution needs, therefore, to be understood as a whole, 
where beliefs and norms are shared and define the institution’s goals (formally or 
informally) and how, over prolonged periods, dominant beliefs can evolve or be 
influenced by external factors. 
 
Understanding policy-making processes, the work of political institutions and 
governments, requires engaging with what constitutes the state and what shapes the 
national interest. Hall (1993) argues that because roles and ideas are central to 
constructing, institutionalising and reconstructing policy paradigms, policy-making is a 
social learning process, where societal pressures compete with state structures (Hall, 
1993: 276). Building upon Hall’s work, Peterson (1997) offers a more precise 
conceptualisation of the social learning processes, outlining its internal components as 
well as the external influences on the system. He outlines two conceptually distinct 
types of social learning, “substantive learning” and “situational learning”. While the 
former is concerned with processes of experimentation, observation, analysis and 
adjustment as a reaction to dealing with the facts as they emerge, the latter accounts for 
changes which occur as a reaction to the social environment and the wider political 
context of what is deemed acceptable and permissible behaviour (Peterson, 1997: 1087–
1089). In addition, Peterson argues that politicians, as key participants in the learning 
process, can be decisive in implementing major reforms, as opposed to overseeing mere 
routine changes, to the policy-making process (Peterson, 1997: 1084–1085).  
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 Checkel (1999) outlines four instances where such social learning is likely to flourish, 
two of which are especially relevant in the EU context. One of these is where a group 
meets repeatedly with considerable interaction between the members. Another condition 
is where a group is detached from direct political exposure (Checkel, 1999: 549). Both 
these scenarios occur frequently within the EU context and, consequently, suggest that 
the EU is a potential locus for socialisation processes to take hold. The frequency and 
duration of meetings at the EU-level matters in both quantitative and qualitative terms 
and socialisation in the EU context is more likely because of the small size and expert 
focus of committees, so that “common puzzling” occurs, which promotes enhanced co-
operation and norm-sharing (Checkel, 2005: 807–808).  
 
In spite of multiple opportunities for social learning existing, and the increasingly 
blurred boundaries between the national and European spheres of foreign policy, 
national interest in CFSP still prevails. European foreign policy is still conceptualised in 
terms of national preferences and ideas about roles within the CFSP. There remains a 
tendency among foreign policy elites in France and Britain, in particular, to 
conceptualise foreign policy objectives in national, self-interested, ways. This stems 
from the intergovernmental nature of CFSP, which has resulted in the legitimisation of 
European foreign policy actions resting with the nation-state (Aggestam, 2004: 97). 
However, this could be overcome and the harmonisation of national and European 
identities could be achieved, as Aggestam argues, through actors being socialised and 
learning to play certain ‘roles’ (Aggestam, 2004: 86). 
 
Socialisation, in the same way that it solidifies national identities until they are simply 
taken for granted, can construct European identities when “…actors thoroughly 
internalize them, as “their own,” and gradually take them for granted” (Risse, 2001: 
203). Deepening European integration, i.e. more ‘top-down’ Europeanisation, could 
have the effect of socialising individual agents’ conceptualisations of national foreign 
policy roles and their broader national identities, so that they appear to be more similar 
to European norms and become increasingly tuned into a sense of the European interest 
and the EU’s role in international affairs.  
 
There is some room for the convergence of European and national roles to occur, and 
Europeanisation processes and social learning can contribute significantly to this, 
however this is limited and difficult to pin down empirically. This is largely due to the 
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 fact that European identities are subject to multiple interpretations and are “plastic” in 
form, “…neither defined primordially from within, nor simply imposed politically from 
without” (Katzenstein and Checkel, 2009: 226). It can be argued that European state 
identities can be “nested” and layered like an onion (Risse, 2009: 153). Akin to Russian 
matryoshka dolls, national identities can be nested inside a broader sense of 
Europeanness, i.e. the “country first, but Europe, too” outlook (Risse, 2009: 152). 
However, this is difficult to analyse empirically and begs the question: Do national 
representatives working in Brussels, in close proximity to the EU institutions and 
representatives from other Member States, really see themselves as being less national 
than officials back in their national capital? 
 
Isolating a causal relationship between the EU and a reappraisal of national foreign 
policy roles and interests is difficult because of this problem of blurred 
national/European identities, and the persistence of the intergovernmental decision-
making system. Another issue is to attribute transformations in the European context to 
the EU, where other international organisations play a similar socialising effect. It is 
important to remember that not just the European Union but other international actors 
(both sovereign states and international organisations, such as NATO) have a similar 
capacity to act as forces for international socialisation (Ferreira Nunes, 2007: 45; 
Boekle et al., 2001: 111). 
 
International organisations are social environments, within which socialisation 
processes can modify perspectives and behaviours of elite actors and states. 
Consequently, this means that engaging with international organisations has the 
potential to transform national policy-making processes because, as Johnston (2001) 
argues, “…actors who enter into social interaction rarely emerge the same” (Johnston, 
2001: 488). The European Union is not the only such social environment. In the realm 
of science policy, UNESCO “taught” states and opened the eyes of national polities and 
bureaucracies (Finnemore, 1993: 565–566). This outlines how international 
organisations can influence how states behave through normative actions and 
socialisation (i.e. influencing sovereign states through the framing and teaching of 
certain norms of behaviour). In the realm of security and defence, socialisation through 
NATO has resulted in the transformation of political and military elites in the former 
Communist states of Eastern Europe, making them redefine their national identities and 
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 foreign policy interests, and, through systematic practices of teaching and persuasion, 
make them better placed to absorb core ‘Western’ values (Gheciu, 2005: 1009). 
 
Despite the contributions of scholars, most notably Gheciu (2005), who highlight the 
potential role of international organisations other than the European Union to act as 
socialising forces, the vast majority of scholars tend to focus on the EU and its power to 
transform its constituent Member States. Consequently, given the popularity of 
constructivism in the fields of International Relations, Comparative Politics and 
European Studies, accounts of socialisation processes tend to overlap with European 
integration scholarship, resulting in the Europeanisation literature having a firm focus 
on elite socialisation within the context of the EU institutions. This is the reality of the 
situation, which is largely due to the fact that the EU has considerable political power, 
global reach and competences across the policy spectrum backed up by a credible legal 
personality. 
 
Consequently, elite socialisation and Europeanisation are often conflated in the 
literature. Nonetheless, socialisation is a fundamental element of how the European 
political space has come to be transformed since the end of World War II, and shapes 
how “national” national representatives in Brussels are (Beyers, 2005: 899–900). 
Socialisation processes in the EU institutions have forced national representatives to 
develop a dual loyalty and even a “Janus Face” dual personality looking towards both 
the national and the European levels simultaneously. These perceptions, when 
combined with a strong will to conform to ‘logics of appropriateness’ in the institutional 
setting, result in national representatives at the EU level evolving into an embodiment 
of both national and European values (Lewis, 2005: 939–940). 
 
A national delegation to the EU is not only exposed to frequent opportunities for 
socialisation processes to occur, but is also sufficiently detached from national political 
realities, i.e. traditions or ‘national interests’, for a reconstruction of their own ‘national’ 
interests to take place. For EU Member States, the interactions between politicians, 
diplomats and government institutions take place predominantly in meetings in 
Brussels, making establishing norms and shaping belief systems a social process 
happening away from national centres of government. The sociology of the decision-
making process brings in important considerations of how elites interact with each 
other, particularly with their counterparts from other nations. While Brussels is the hub 
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 of the network, the epicentre of actor socialisation, the communications revolution has 
changed this. Through email, officials in national foreign ministries are in constant 
contact with their representatives in Brussels and their counterparts in other EU 
Member States (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 107–108). It is through frequent interactions 
that social learning and socialisation takes place, which makes the blurring of national 
and European interests all the more likely.  
 
However, it has also been observed that the behaviour of officials in Brussels tends to 
reflect the overall domestic political consensus towards Europe. So representatives of 
Member States whose elites are broadly in favour of the EU, seek to fulfil this role in 
Brussels and, as a consequence, they tend to favour more supranational, as opposed to 
vehemently intergovernmentalist, decision-making (Beyers, 2005: 932). Portugal is one 
such example, where elites strongly believe in the benefits of European integration and 
there is a relatively low level of Euroscepticism, more generally, in the country (Goucha 
Soares, 2007: 474). In fact Council officials from Greece, Spain and Portugal tend to 
reflect supranational values (Beyers, 2005: 932), which suggests that transformation 
through socialisation was rapid and consensual.  
 
The immersion of officials into the EU and the socialisation processes which went on, 
in the case of Portugal and Spain, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, is central to the 
argument that these countries have undergone a rapid Europeanisation of their domestic 
policy-making processes. European integration, Europeanisation dynamics, pressures to 
change working practices and react to the novelty of EU membership, and the 
socialisation pressures on politicians and officials, mean that institutional approaches 
offer a way into understanding and contextualising Europeanisation dynamics in 
specific cases. More generally, institutional approaches offer a way of gauging how 
European integration takes place by focusing on the pressures and processes which are 
at work, and what motivates and constrains actors to behave in certain ways with regard 
to policy-making at the European level. 
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 2.2 Theorising Europeanisation and European Integration 
 
2.2.1 European integration theories and the Europeanisation literature 
 
One of the main theoretical explanations for European integration, and the 
transformation of national politics at the hands of the EU, is neofunctionalist spillover. 
While socialisation processes could account for a reappraisal of national norms and an 
acceptance of European ways of doing things, the spillover of political integration from 
economic co-operation is not, necessarily, inevitable (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009: 
50–51). Furthermore, the ‘high’ politics nature of foreign policy and security matters is 
different from economic co-operation, where the functional spillover argument is best 
placed to account for transformations over time. However, Moravcsik’s response to 
neofunctionalism, the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, is also problematic, 
premised as it is on the assumptions that state behaviour is rational and that national 
preferences are fixed and clear (Moravcsik, 1993: 480). 
 
In response to these issues, there was a shift towards understanding European 
integration by using mid-range theories. Whereas neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism sought to explain European integration by focusing on the polity, 
other theories, such as social constructivism, neo-institutionalism, policy networks and 
governance approaches, focused their attentions on policies and politics in the EU, in 
order to understand and describe the processes and underlying motivations which are 
responsible for European integration (Wiener and Diez, 2009: 245). A product of this 
shift is the proliferation of studies on the Europeanisation of policy-making processes 
across the Member States. Equally, Europeanisation is a conceptual device which lends 
itself to mid-range theories because it seeks to capture dynamics in the policy-making 
process, dynamics which are usually located in institutional settings. Nevertheless, like 
the ‘grand’ theories of European integration, there is much debate about the precise 
nature of the concept of Europeanisation, as well as disagreement about its effectiveness 
and wider utility in understanding European integration more generally. 
 
– Conceptualising Europeanisation – 
‘Europeanisation’ is a contested concept, and research, to date, has not yielded a 
parsimonious, universally applicable, theory of institutional change. Contested concepts 
spark strong academic debate, thus there is a rich and varied literature on 
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 Europeanisation, which can be drawn upon for the development of a theoretical 
framework to analyse the impact of Europe on Portuguese foreign policy in recent 
years. However, the overuse of the term and sloppy conceptual application of the 
concept have undermined existing scholarship and could derail future research on the 
issue. As Featherstone (2003) argues, Europeanisation “…is not a simple synonym for 
European regional integration or convergence…”, but encompasses these aspects 
together with a less specific notion of a “…response [by political actors, not just 
Member States] to the policies of the European Union…” (Featherstone, 2003: 1). 
 
The key features of Europeanisation, which appear to be generally agreed upon, include 
processes of construction, diffusion, institutionalisation, and a notion of pressure being 
exerted by ‘Europe’ (or ‘Brussels’) which results in domestic adaptation to European 
‘ways of doing things’ (Radaelli, 2006: 59). Europeanisation often occurs over long 
periods, with political elites being socialised towards European norms (Radaelli, 2004: 
9). The effect of Europeanisation is, therefore, “…typically incremental, irregular, and 
uneven over time and between locations…” (Featherstone, 2003: 4). Typical features of 
Europeanisation explanations include a complex account of how causality can be 
attributed and the qualitative effects of time in transforming politics (Exadaktylos and 
Radaelli, 2009: 507). 
 
Europeanisation can be seen as the adaptation of relatively stable national institutions 
(domestic political and societal structures) towards European ways of doing things 
(Risse et al., 2001: 4–5). Domestic structural change is, therefore, dependent on the 
degree of “misfit” between European institutions and the national level. The more 
incompatible the two levels are (i.e. the higher the degree of “misfit” between them), the 
greater the “adaptational pressures” on the domestic structures. Mediating institutions 
are sandwiched by the two structures, the adaptational pressure from the European level, 
on the one hand, and the structural change at the domestic level on the other. The 
mediating role of the institutional actors provides the interaction which defines what 
precise forms of structural adaptation occur and can modify the convergence processes 
to make the national fit better with the European (Risse et al., 2001: 6–9). At the same 
time, the EU can be the root cause of the institutional misfit and, potentially, threaten 
notions of national identity because of the supranational role it has created for itself 
(Börzel, 2005: 50–51). 
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 Broadly speaking, Europeanisation is observed to have had a more consistent impact on 
the policy level, rather than more generally on macro-level domestic politics and 
political organisation in European states (Radaelli, 2000: 26). To take the United 
Kingdom (UK) as an example, practices and policies reflect a long-standing interaction 
with Europe, but this does not translate, more broadly, into the complete 
Europeanisation of the UK polity, because overarching political and historical factors 
and specificities remain in spite of the influence of Brussels (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 
18). Identifying the Europeanisation of a particular policy, or policy-making process, of 
a given country must, therefore, assess multiple levels of the policy-making process 
(micro, meso and macro), in order to analyse the interaction between the levels. 
 
This is possible, as Radaelli argues, by making sure that policy dynamics and a state’s 
political structures are treated separately analytically. This will allow for the interaction 
to be seen and, from there, the transformative effects of Europeanisation on the given 
country’s policy-making processes can then be examined (Radaelli, 2000: 26). Whether 
Europeanisation produces substantial convergence in public policy, Radaelli argues, 
remains to be seen. However, the Europeanisation literature raises important questions 
about how the EU impacts upon its Member States. An important final consideration is 
that most studies on Europeanisation do not, rigorously, consider alternative 
explanations of causality, such as domestic influences or globalisation (Radaelli, 2000: 
25–26). Radaelli’s contribution is important because it highlights the conceptual 
weaknesses of Europeanisation, the inconsistencies in how Europeanisation is applied, 
and sets up a research agenda to gather more empirical evidence to examine the true 
effects of Europeanisation on various policy areas.  
 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether Europeanisation has made the EU’s Member 
States more similar. Has ‘Europe’ changed the domestic political structures and public 
policies? To answer this, Radaelli (2000) considered the concept carefully and discussed 
the weaknesses in the definition outlined in previous studies. Such ‘concept stretching’, 
the imprecise or ill-defined use of the term, can weaken the empirical research in the 
area and result in an increasingly confused research agenda. Radaelli, building upon 
Morlino (1999), highlighted the problems of defining Europeanisation too narrowly, but 
can Europeanisation really take place outside the EU? Clearly, misapplication of 
Europeanisation is an issue and using the concept in imprecise ways can be problematic. 
By thinking of Europeanisation as a continuum, where Member States become 
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 “…‘increasingly’ penetrated by EU policy…” is too vague and can result in ‘a certain 
degree of Europeanization’ being identified in practically every situation (Radaelli, 
2000: 5).  
 
With the increasing popularity of Europeanisation in academic studies, a more precise 
definition of what constituted the exact dynamics attributed to Europeanisation was 
needed. The recognition of the power of “misfit” and adaptational pressures, and the 
delineation of multidimensional (bottom-up and top-down) processes, have contributed 
to this improved definition of what constitutes Europeanisation in practice. Taking the 
best features of top-down and bottom-up explanations was useful as it alleviated the 
need for examining the same problem from multiple perspectives (Sabatier, 1986: 37), 
and so, provided a more rounded account of the power dynamics in play.  
 
Recognising the potential power of a multidimensional analytical framework to explain 
the complexities of European integration, Börzel (2002) was able to synthesise ‘bottom-
up’ Europeanisation (‘uploading’), where the Member States set the parameters for the 
new European-level institutions, with ‘top-down’ Europeanisation (‘downloading’), 
where the impact of the European-level institutions on domestic structures is measured. 
“Member States have an incentive to ‘upload’ their policies to the European level to 
minimize the costs in ‘downloading’ them at the domestic level” (Börzel, 2002: 193). 
This two-dimensional conceptualisation recognises that Member States both shape and 
adapt to policy at the European level and have a vested interest in projecting key 
national ideas and interests onto the emerging European ones (Börzel, 2002: 194). 
 
Börzel’s (2002) dimensional approach to Europeanisation was designed for the analysis 
of European environmental policy and assessed Member State responses to 
Europeanisation by categorising them as ‘pace-setting’, ‘foot-dragging’ or ‘fence-
sitting’. A ‘pace-setting’ Member State is pro-active in attempting to shape European 
policy and so the Member State’s interests shape and mirror the European-level policy, 
making it easier to be ‘downloaded’ onto the domestic level. A ‘foot-dragging’ Member 
State blocks policy developments which are inconsistent with national interests (i.e. 
there is a great degree of policy ‘misfit’) in the hope that the proposals will be 
abandoned and never needing to be implemented. A ‘fence-sitting’ Member State is 
non-committal but constructs ‘tactical coalitions’ with each side (Börzel, 2002: 194). 
These categorisations, and the recognition that shaping policy at the EU level requires 
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 some degree of domestic adaptation (i.e. accepting that there are both top-down and 
bottom-up dynamics going on simultaneously), have the potential to be used in 
analysing other policy areas beyond environmental policy. This work enabled the 
literature on the Europeanisation of national foreign policy to move forward, as the two 
dimensions allowed for the intergovernmental, bottom-up, nature of the CFSP to be 
incorporated into the analysis. This advancement meant that studies of foreign policy 
Europeanisation could be incorporated with sociological or historical institutionalist 
accounts, rather than being confined to intergovernmentalist bargaining explanations. 
 
– Europeanisation and institutional approaches – 
Europeanisation can explain various mechanisms of change well and is particularly 
suited to studies of political institutions. However, this does not rule out the potential 
for applying the term to analyse public policy sectors and even more abstract concepts 
such as the Europeanisation of cultures and national identities (Olsen, 2002: 922). 
Nonetheless, the academic climate within which the concept has evolved means that 
proponents of neo-institutionalism, particularly historical institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism, are particularly predisposed to recognise the explanatory 
power of Europeanisation processes and to utilise the concept in their research in order 
to account for continuity and change in political institutions in Europe in recent decades 
(Hix and Goertz, 2001: 18). 
 
In addition to being consistent with neo-institutionalist approaches, Europeanisation is 
also congruous, more broadly, with constructivism and is, therefore, suited to qualitative 
case study research (Haverland, 2008: 60–61). This means that Europeanisation 
research has potential beyond merely analysing institutions and organisational processes 
in isolation; through the constructivist agenda, it can also be used to assess changes in 
cultures, ideas, identities and norms of behaviour. Risse et al. (2001) examined the 
impact Europeanisation has had on national political structures and how on-going 
European integration impacts upon institutions and cultures in EU Member States. They 
define Europeanisation as “the emergence and the development at the European level of 
distinct structures of governance” (Risse et al., 2001: 1). However, as shown in the 
substantive chapters of their volume, although Europeanisation matters, it has not 
resulted in “wholesale convergence nor continuing divergence of national policy 
structures…” or identities. Instead, the authors suggest that “domestic adaptation with 
 58
 national colors” has occurred, in which national identities remain a key factor in 
influencing policy outcomes (Risse et al., 2001: 1). 
 
Recognising the pivotal influence of neo-institutionalism makes understanding how 
Europeanisation is theorised much easier. Europeanisation research chimes well with 
the various strands of neo-institutionalism and thus makes Europeanisation an attractive 
tool to use when studying the domestic impact of European integration on political 
institutions (Bulmer, 2008: 50–51). Europeanisation encompasses institutional 
adaptation in EU Member States along with processes of elite socialisation, making it 
consistent with the sociological institutionalist paradigm (Denca, 2009: 390). 
Europeanisation can lead to domestic institutional adaptation, when the norms, rules and 
common practices on the European level are at odds with established norms of 
behaviour at the national level. The difference between the two levels creates the 
pressure to conform according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’, as discussed above 
(Börzel, 2005: 56–57; Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 27–28). 
 
– Europeanisation and intergovernmentalist theories – 
Ideas about Europeanisation pressures and mid-range institutional explanations do, 
however, represent a credible challenge to the grand theories of European integration. 
Europeanisation approaches, because they draw upon constructivist thinking and 
sociological institutionalism, offer a starkly contrasting view to the short-term, 
rationalist, ‘thin’, conception of institutions proposed by Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalist model. As Moravcsik argues, the historical evidence consistently 
confirms intergovernmental, as opposed to supranational, bargaining processes as being 
more dominant in EU negotiations (Moravcsik, 1998: 479). While this statement should 
not be ignored, Moravcsik’s own evidence to support this argument has been challenged 
(see Lieshout et al., 2004), which undermines the broader point that intergovernmental 
bargaining processes are the default position in the EU. 
 
However, given Milward’s (2000) assertion that European integration, rather than being 
a response to external economic pressures or a change in cultural perceptions, was, in 
fact, a “diplomatic manoeuvre” which was, in the French case, based upon ambitions to 
assert the country’s dominance in post-World War II Europe (Milward, 2000: 17), then 
it is worth considering Moravcsik’s theory. Milward’s view of European integration 
seems consistent with Moravcsik’s intergovernmental approach and views the European 
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 integration project as “…the creation of the European nation-states themselves, for their 
own purposes, an act of national will” (Milward, 2000: 18).  
 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach puts states at the heart of the 
integration process. This model integrates two types of general international theories, 
which are generally regarded as being contradictory: a liberal theory of national 
preference formation; and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate bargaining. 
Outcomes at the European level are constrained by power politics and the success of a 
proposal during the international negotiation process. States enter the bargaining game 
with a pre-determined set of objectives (“National Preferences”) rationally formulated 
with the constraints of national pressures (economic and societal interests) in mind 
(Moravcsik, 1993: 482). This view differs starkly from the long-term, sociological, 
processes which Europeanisation draws upon. If Europeanisation is an effective 
concept, with unique processes which can be isolated and analysed, then it should be 
able to offer a strong critique of Moravcsik’s model. 
 
While, as Milward (2000) reflected, the nation-state has enjoyed priority status in 
Western Europe for over two hundred years, the changes to the political structures in 
Europe since 1945 have seen the emergence of supranational power centred in the 
European Community’s institutions in Brussels (Milward, 2000: 1–2). This may well 
threaten the priority status of the nation-state. If Europeanisation can be described as ‘a 
political unification project’ (Olsen, 2002: 924), then does it spell the end of the nation-
state, where specific national interests become homogenised into a European interest? 
 
For the moment, the nation-state remains an important factor in European integration. 
Additionally, Europeanisation is not yet sufficiently developed as a concept to be 
deployed without using established theories of interstate interaction, such as liberal 
intergovernmentalism, as possible alternative explanations. Radaelli and Pasquier 
(2008) outlined two “classic problems” in Europeanisation research. Firstly, that many 
studies are guilty of “prejudging the impact of the EU on domestic politics and policy” 
(Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008: 40), overstating the socialisation effects of the EU, 
discounting the impact of other international organisations in shaping how states 
behave, and understating the role of national political structures to be willing 
participants in processes of change and modernisation. The second problem was that 
many studies jump to the conclusion of attributing change to Europeanisation where 
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 changes resemble something of which Brussels might approve, overlooking perhaps 
more potent domestic factors. By failing to consider the specific national factors, there 
is a danger of assuming that “if they do something similar to what Brussels want, they 
must be doing it because of Brussels” (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008: 40). Similarly, 
Featherstone emphasises the role of globalisation and how this can distort the picture of 
Europeanisation in accounting for domestic change (Featherstone, 2003: 4).  
 
While a broader European interest may emerge over time, at the moment the EU’s 
foreign policy armoury is more of a patchwork of different Member States bringing 
with them different historical and geographic relations with different parts of the world. 
Maintaining national legacies in the EU context is what drives and defines a common 
European foreign policy and gives it scope, but at the same time will mean that the total 
convergence of the EU27’s individual national foreign policies is impossible. This 
further illustrates the weakness of Europeanisation in the domain of foreign policy and, 
consequentially, it demonstrates the relative strength of intergovernmental decision-
making in the EU and how foreign policy still remains, at its heart, driven by national 
governments acting according to national interests. 
 
These observations highlight the importance of building research methodologies which 
are able to account for other factors. Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, for 
example, might challenge conventional assumptions that Europeanisation is taking 
place, when instead national governments are pursuing a particular rational strategy. 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism serves as the most effective counter-argument 
to Europeanisation explanations. If Europeanisation as a theory is able to stand up to 
critical examination from a rationalist, intergovernmentalist perspective, then it clearly 
has considerable utility as it is able to shed new light on the motivations behind 
European integration processes. As Moravcsik (1993) argues, the EU is best understood 
as a product of rationalist bargaining between sovereign states. Therefore European 
integration can be explained in terms of intergovernmental negotiations stemming from 
rational, short-term, national preferences formulated by each Member State at the 
domestic level (Moravcsik, 1993: 474). If testing Europeanisation convincingly 
challenges this view when applied to understanding foreign and security policy, then the 
concept has some potential. However, if not, then the null hypothesis, that foreign 
policy in the EU is still in the domain of sovereign, self-interested, Member States 
which act according to calculated national interests, cannot be rejected. 
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 As a check to Europeanisation explanations, more rationalist intergovernmental theories 
could be brought in order to account for more instrumental changes in Portuguese 
foreign and security policy in recent years. Where longer-term socialisation accounts 
struggle, short-term rational choice accounts may be able to step in and provide a more 
convincing explanation. Therefore, it is important to bring in these kinds of 
explanations as they have something to offer the development of Europeanisation as a 
conceptual tool. Milward’s work on The European Rescue of the Nation-State (2000) 
portrays European integration as a process engineered for the benefit of sovereign 
European states in an intergovernmental fashion. As there are elements of this work 
which chime with Europeanisation scholarship, it is not, however, sufficiently distant 
from Europeanisation processes to serve as a formal null hypothesis. This is partly 
because Major (2005) convincingly employed ‘Europeanisation’ together with the 
notion of it ‘rescuing’ the nation-state, in her analysis of CFSP. 
 
 
2.2.2 Assessing the Europeanisation of national foreign policy 
 
Building upon Börzel’s initial two-dimensional conceptualisation of Europeanisation 
dynamics, Major and Pomorska (2005) examined the Europeanisation of foreign and 
security policy and, in doing so, added a third dimension. For them, Europeanisation is 
an on-going process of change between the increasingly interwoven national and 
European levels. They broke this down into three complementary dimensions: 
‘uploading’ – the projection of national preferences onto the EU level; ‘downloading’ – 
the acceptance of EU norms at the national level; and ‘crossloading’ – the mutual 
exchange of ideas and ‘ways of doing things’ between the EU and the Member State 
(Major and Pomorska, 2005: 1–2). 
 
This three-dimensional conceptualisation of Europeanisation reflects the influence of 
neo-institutionalist and constructivist thinking in European integration studies and the 
emergence of the EU as a credible foreign and security policy actor. It remains to be 
seen how useful superimposing a theory tailored for environmental policy onto EU 
foreign policy might be, as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are less supranational and are more 
solidly based upon intergovernmental co-operation. However, this visualisation 
emphasises the dialectical nature of the relationship between actors and the system, 
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 between the EU’s institutions and its common policies (CFSP and CSDP), on the one 
hand, and the foreign and security policies of its constituent Member States, on the 
other (Major and Pomorska, 2005: 1–2). The notion of ‘crossloading’ appears to be 
consistent with that of increasing ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’ in CSDP and 
CFSP, which reflects the significant influence of the Brussels-based supranational 
institutions (Howorth, 2000: 36), and the lack of intergovernmental leadership in EU 
foreign policy. 
 
Applying the Europeanisation framework, an analysis largely developed for Community 
(first pillar) policy studies, to foreign and security policy (second pillar) is fraught with 
difficulties. One methodological problem of particular note is the difficulty in 
establishing the ‘missing link’. It is difficult to isolate the ‘EU effect’ when there are a 
myriad of other influences on domestic foreign policy-making structures stemming 
from domestic factors, as well as wider international pressures (particularly 
globalisation and NATO) (Major and Pomorska, 2005: 2–3). 
 
Where Major and Pomorska apply Europeanisation to European foreign policy in a 
more general sense, Tsardanidis and Stavridis (2005) take the three-dimensional 
approach and apply it to critique the widely-held view in the academic literature that 
Greek foreign policy has become Europeanised. They argue that the three-dimensional 
approach confirms some aspects of foreign policy Europeanisation as being ‘visible’ in 
the Greek case. However, other evidence points towards the Europeanisation of Greek 
foreign policy being somewhat incomplete (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005: 217). The 
importance of special relationships or on-going disputes between nations can reduce the 
capacity for foreign policy Europeanisation (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 11). By 
applying such ‘difficult cases’ to the Europeanisation framework, the scope for nations 
to pursue foreign policy interests outside of the Europeanised foreign policy framework 
can then be explored. One such ‘difficult case’ is how to reconcile a ‘Europeanised’ 
Greek foreign policy with the on-going dispute with FYROM/Macedonia (Tsardanidis 
and Stavridis, 2005: 220, 235). This has considerable potential for Portugal as an 
example of an EU Member State which has other significant foreign policy interests 
going on, most notably pursuing relations within NATO and enhancing its position 
amongst the CPLP countries. 
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 Tsardanidis and Stavridis see ‘crossloading’ as an ‘outcome’, rather than, as Major and 
Pomorska posit, as part of a ‘process’. Tsardanidis and Stavridis argue that this third 
dimension is the reconciliation of ‘extreme’ views from both the national and the 
European levels. The resulting ‘outcome’ of the ‘pendulum test’ helps to bridge the gap 
between those who see CFSP as an extension of national interest with those who see it 
as being about European common interests. European and national foreign policy 
mechanisms are forced by Europeanisation to harmonise, resulting in more consensual 
priorities being formulated, which reflect common goals and externalised national 
interests (Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005: 223–224). In practice, however, this is 
difficult to unravel as the two strands, if identified, tend to merge and the patchwork of 
different national interests in EU foreign policy tends to persist. 
 
Wong (2008) builds upon both Tsardanidis and Stavridis’ (2005) and Major and 
Pomorska’s (2005) three-dimensional conceptualisations of foreign policy 
Europeanisation. The first dimension, ‘Adaptation and Policy Convergence’ 
(‘downloading’), includes the ‘top-down’ elements of Europeanisation, particularly 
national convergence, harmonisation of policies, and increased emphasis on common 
foreign policy outputs. The second dimension, ‘National Projection’ (‘uploading’) 
explains how Member States can maintain their traditional foreign policy interests but 
need to redefine them into the new CFSP framework. This is characterised by Member 
States using EU foreign policy mechanisms as a “cover” for maintaining traditional 
foreign policies. The third dimension, ‘Identity Reconstruction’ (‘crossloading’), is the 
result of the previous two dimensions and explains the development of shared European 
and national interests and the emergence of norms among foreign policy-making elites 
(Wong, 2008: 326). 
 
Given the complex nature of European foreign policy, which Wong defines as the sum 
of “three strands” of Europe’s external relations: the Member States’ own national 
foreign policies; the EU’s external trade and development policies; and the formal 
CFSP agreements (Wong, 2008: 322), this framework is particularly useful. Whereas 
intergovernmentalists would argue that foreign policy is the domaine réservé of 
sovereign nation-states, and that the EU has no real foreign policy competence, a 
Europeanisation approach emphasises socialisation processes, which have had the effect 
of changing the domestic “procedures” of foreign policy-making, and, in some cases, 
changing the actual “substance” of national foreign policies (Wong, 2008: 323–324).  
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 As Wong argues, the projection of national foreign policies onto the EU level 
(Europeanisation by ‘uploading’) has the potential to give the state greater international 
credibility. By externalising their national foreign policies onto the EU’s emerging 
external policy, Member States are also protected when pursuing a negative policy 
towards an extra-European power. This is because Europeanising the policy effectively 
multilateralises the relationship, offering individual foreign policies of the Member 
States safety in numbers, so long as the national foreign policy is broadly consistent 
with European norms, in order to give it greater credibility (Wong, 2008: 328).  
 
This approach has considerable potential, as it can help measure the extent to which 
Europeanisation reduces the meaning of nation-states in European and global politics. It 
also offers a space where the EU’s influence on intergovernmental relations can be 
tested and contextualised by using national case studies. Wong’s multidimensional 
approach allows for socialisation processes to challenge a rationalist bargaining view of 
interstate relations, but this does not go far enough in fully contextualising the 
intergovernmental nature of national foreign policy in a global context, as it limits the 
room for international organisations, other than the EU, to be analysed as variables. The 
two poles can be accommodated, but developing a theoretical framework which locates 
socialisation processes in the context of foreign policy-making performed in an 
intergovernmental setting in various international organisations is a challenge. The aim 
of this chapter is to bridge this gap and develop a conceptual framework to 
operationalise elite socialisation and policy transformations in the wider 
intergovernmental multilateral context. In doing so, it is important not to accept that 
Europeanisation is going on without examining potential alternative explanations, such 
as the influences of other international organisations. 
 
Wong’s framework challenges short-term rationalist analyses of foreign policy outputs, 
but does not provide the longer-term, holistic, institutional view that sociological 
institutionalism offers to assess socialisation processes and the nuances of identity 
reconstruction and changing ways of perceiving ‘Europe’ (not just the EU) and the 
pressures to change which stem from it. There is no room in this model to evaluate 
potential alternative explanations. Instead, there is a chance of over-attributing causality 
to the EU, via one or other of the top-down/bottom-up dynamics, when the reality is 
more nuanced and less clear-cut. Additionally, the third dimension, ‘crossloading’, adds 
little of analytical value, as the definition of identity reconstruction is too vague.  
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 As Europeanisation is about changing national role conceptions and the norms of 
national foreign policy-making to reflect ‘European’ norms, processes of national 
preference formation are, in the longer-term at least, open to being moulded by forces 
above the nation-state. The formulation of ‘national’ foreign policy interests at the 
domestic level may, in fact, subconsciously reflect international norms as the 
multiplicity of actors engaged in foreign policy-making, at various levels (national, 
European and global), do not operate in isolation. This makes defining quite what the 
‘national’ interest should be rather difficult (Sjursen and Smith, 2004: 128–129). The 
foreign policies of European countries increasingly reflect the reality that the EU and its 
Member States are intertwined. As such, actors are becoming increasingly integrated 
and socialised towards more ‘European’ norms (Mérand, 2008: 75–76; see also 
Hocking and Spence, 2002).  
 
Europeanisation may, alternatively, ‘rescue’ the nation-state from declining global 
influence. This stems from the fact that: 
the growing interwovenness of national and European levels in the 
area of foreign and security policy does not necessarily equate [to] a 
loss of sovereignty…for the nation state concerned (Major, 2005: 
188).  
Conceiving the two levels to be complementary, rather than competing, seems more 
reflective of the situation in post-Cold War Europe (Major, 2005: 188). This could have 
a significant impact on national identity and how, in a Europeanised context, the 
national interest is perceived, debated and framed. Given the way that Europe is 
legitimised in some national cultures with reference to identity constructions; can 
Europeanisation mould national identities towards a more common outlook? Marcussen 
et al. argue that, contrary to the prevailing views in the literature, Europe has developed 
some kind of collective identity, and that this identity was not formed by a convergence 
of national identities (Marcussen et al., 1999: 631).  
 
The gradual process of remoulding national identities has resulted in Europe being 
embraced and legitimised but ultimately painted in national colours, as a way of 
confronting a state’s “decline as a world power” (Major, 2005: 188), and changing its 
foreign policy orientation away from its colonies and towards ‘Europe’. French foreign 
policy elites came to accept Europe because it was constructed as being the embodiment 
of the ‘French’ values of national sovereignty, enlightenment, republicanism and the 
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 mission civilisatrice (Marcussen et al., 1999: 621). ‘Frenchness’ and ‘Europeanness’ 
have co-evolved to reflect similar values, so that the two are now not viewed as being 
inconsistent. However, the EU model for security and defence that has emerged is not a 
mirror-image of the French model, hence France’s recent reintegration with NATO. 
Painting ‘Europe’ in national colours is a way to legitimise a more integrationist 
strategy, but this does not automatically mean that a Member State can build the EU’s 
CFSP and CSDP in its own image as Europe’s priorities are diverse, and decisions are 
made through intergovernmental means, largely through building consensus.  
 
In a similar vein to France, Portuguese foreign policy can be argued, to have been 
revitalised by Europeanisation as this provided a platform for a re-engagement with the 
former colonies and renewed confidence on the world stage. Portuguese foreign policy 
has weathered the storms of the loss of its colonial possessions, the post-Cold War 
identity crisis and its chronic small state weaknesses, which all threatened its extinction. 
Today, the ‘uploading’ of national interests onto the EU system, means that Portuguese 
foreign policy has, indeed, been ‘rescued’ by Europeanisation. Portuguese national 
priorities have become part of the broader embodiment of the ‘European’ interest in 
which Portuguese diplomats have externalised (‘uploaded’) their priorities onto the 
system, making them easier to ‘download’. However, it is difficult to determine whether 
this process represents ‘bottom-up’ Europeanisation or national self-interest in an 
intergovernmental framework. 
 
Further problems with Europeanisation arise when attempts are made to apply it to the 
study of foreign and security policy, especially when utilising the multidimensional 
conceptualisations of Europeanisation dynamics and reconciling convergence with the 
predominance of intergovernmental decision-making in this realm. The status of foreign 
policy as ‘high’ politics has stalled the conceptual development of Europeanisation in 
foreign policy studies, limiting it to national foreign and security policy case studies, 
rather than allowing for a general conceptual approach, applicable across the discipline, 
to be developed. This is due to the “unique characteristics of foreign and security 
policy” (Major, 2005: 182).  
 
Any Europeanisation explanation of foreign and security policy must reconcile the fact 
that intergovernmentalism is enshrined in the Treaties as the default setting for EU 
foreign and security policy co-operation. This makes engaging with mid-range theories, 
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 such as sociological institutionalism, more difficult, because rationalist, liberal 
intergovernmentalist, perspectives will be ready to take issue with any theory that 
rejects absolute state-centrism. However, the reality is more ambiguous as EU foreign 
policy is “less than supranational but more than intergovernmental” (Smith, 2004: 99). 
Particularly given the institutional changes in the Treaty of Lisbon, with the launch of 
the European External Action Service, CFSP and CSDP have evolved to be less than 
purely intergovernmental in nature. These developments enhance the position of mid-
range theoretical standpoints, such as historical institutionalism, sociological 
institutionalism, and social constructivism, in being able to challenge the predominance 
of intergovernmentalist theories. 
 
A constructivist approach to assessing Europeanisation in the domain of foreign policy 
is centred on the development and evolution of norms, rhetoric, roles, identities and 
ideas, rather than viewing it as a situation where national interests are bargained. 
Constructivism expects actors to feel a strong compulsion to consult European partners 
and to conform to logics of appropriateness in order to build consensus. This works in 
practice by actors seeking to internalise the viewpoints of others and changing their 
behaviour so as to complement, rather than conflict with, other representatives around 
the table. This is possible, but is made increasingly difficult as the EU expands and 
when national interests become severely jeopardised, i.e. consensus is much easier to 
achieve if there is little at stake. Regardless of the extent to which national 
representatives and domestic foreign policy processes have become Europeanised, in 
times of crisis, such as the wars in Yugoslavia and Iraq, Europe can still find itself 
divided and unable to construct a consensus (Tonra, 2001: 11–12). 
 
Sociological institutionalism, as a specific approach within constructivism, allows for 
top-down Europeanisation pressures on national foreign policy-makers to be explored. 
It illuminates how Europeanisation encompasses processes of elite socialisation and 
how national and European norms and preferences are fluid and subject to change and 
modification according to the social context of day-to-day foreign policy-making 
(Denca, 2009: 390). However, to exclude bottom-up Europeanisation, ‘uploading’, from 
the analysis, as Denca does, is a puzzling move. He argues that ‘bottom-up’ 
Europeanisation is problematic because it “conflates…Europeanisation…and 
intergovernmentalism” (Denca, 2009: 393). While ‘bottom-up’ processes complicate the 
Europeanisation narrative, and have a certain similarity with liberal inter-
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 governmentalist explanations of Member State participation in the EU, it is the role of 
Member States and their ability to colour EU foreign policy and leave their own imprint 
on the emerging EU level that is most interesting. As Moumoutzis (2011) points out, the 
ability for Member States to ‘export’, ‘project’ or ‘upload’ has been observed but this 
has brought with it conceptual problems, as it introduces confusion to the direction of 
causality for change (Moumoutzis, 2011: 616). 
 
Process tracing may make it possible to identify the root cause of bottom-up 
transformations, be they instrumental and calculated, or the product of socialisation 
processes (Moumoutzis, 2011: 621), however in practice, given that Europeanisation is 
about changing behaviours, isolating underlying motivations could be difficult as actors 
could be socialised into framing their instrumental behaviour in a ‘European’ way 
which would also reflect a bottom-up, ‘uploading’, form of Europeanisation. 
 
The difficulty faced by scholars in trying to apply Europeanisation analysis to national 
foreign policies stems from the influence of globalisation processes on the foreign 
policy-making systems of European states, which makes Europeanisation processes 
difficult in practice to isolate and analyse. While globalisation itself encompasses a 
multitude of processes, the institutionalisation of interdependence through international 
organisations helps to make this process real, “…undermining the autonomy of states 
over an expanding range of issues” (Hurrell and Menon, 2003: 403). Europeanisation 
could be a manifestation of the globalisation process, as globalisation promotes 
increased regionalisation (Hurrell and Menon, 2003: 404), and hence the emergence of 
the European bloc and its nascent foreign policy actorness. 
 
However, part of the problem is that there is a lack of any grand unifying force to 
accelerate convergence between European states and to break away from a ‘patchwork’ 
mentality of foreign policy priorities. Nevertheless, the constructivist perspective is 
better placed to assess the impact of European integration on national foreign policies 
and the gradual convergence of foreign policy priorities, than rationalist accounts of 
institutional transformation through participation in CFSP. The institutional context of 
CFSP remains intergovernmental and any communitarisation of this domain will occur 
only gradually over a long period. However, political integration and increased 
interaction between European foreign policy-makers has gradually, through long-term 
socialisation processes, fostered a ‘communauté des vues’, which may eventually lead to 
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 an increased convergence of foreign policy priorities among EU Member States 
(Wagner, 2003: 590).  
 
It should be noted that the idea of ‘nations’ in Europe is no more natural than the idea of 
‘Europe’ itself, so differences between the peoples and states of Europe are to be 
expected (Dunkerley et al., 2002: 122). A patchwork of European foreign policies has 
emerged through historical factors, and the long-standing power of sovereign states in 
Europe, and will be perpetuated so long as there is a lack of power on the supranational 
level to make Europe speak, genuinely, with one voice. As yet European foreign policy 
priorities remain abstract and normative in nature, rather than being concrete and 
binding common interests.  
 
Understanding Europeanisation, and engaging with alternative explanations in order to 
better account for European integration processes, is necessary in order to properly 
contextualise Portuguese foreign policy. This is because Portugal is an EU Member 
State and this brings responsibilities and opportunities for the country’s foreign policy. 
However, the emerging ‘Europeanness’ of Portuguese diplomacy is not the only 
systemic factor which could account for changes at the domestic level. As outlined 
above with regards to foreign policy-making in small states, size also impacts upon 
Portuguese diplomacy, and predisposes Portugal to adopt certain strategies when 
dealing with other states or with international organisations. Therefore, a framework for 
analysis of Portuguese foreign policy must take into account other factors. Adopting an 
institutionalist perspective offers considerable insight into how Europeanisation 
pressures manifest themselves. However, the predominance of intergovernmentalism, 
combined with the fact that many other systemic factors other than Europeanisation 
could potentially explain the same phenomena, mean that a clear and flexible 
conceptual framework needs to be developed. This framework must be able to evaluate 
the concept of Europeanisation more broadly, as well as examining its specific 
applicability to the Portuguese case. 
 
 
2.3 Conceptualisation, Explanation and Analysis 
 
For every Europeanisation explanation there are other potentially valid alternatives 
which should not be ignored for the sake of convenience or theoretical elegance. 
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 Refuting the notion that Portuguese foreign policy is subject to Europeanisation requires 
systematically evaluating whether Europeanisation is found on multiple levels in the 
Portuguese foreign policy-making process. To do this, it is necessary to evaluate 
Europeanisation indicators against possible alternative explanations, across multiple 
analytical levels from macro to micro. Delineating the features of the various levels of 
analysis of the policy-making process will allow for the indicators of Europeanisation, 
and the alternative explanations, to be presented in a form that will guide the analysis in 
the substantive chapters on Portuguese foreign policy institutions, Portuguese African 
policy and Portuguese security policy.  
 
Before building this framework fully, however, it is worth reflecting further on the 
literature on Europeanisation and considering whether the concept is able to account for 
processes of change which are unique. In other words, what scope is there for 
Europeanisation to explain processes which cannot be subsumed by other theories? The 
conceptual weaknesses of Europeanisation, when applied to foreign policy, suggest that 
alternative explanations, might be more appropriate ways of accounting for the patterns 
of change observed in case studies that are often attributed to Europeanisation. 
 
 
2.3.1 Europeanisation: unique processes of change? 
 
Studies on the Europeanisation of the public policies of EU Member States have been 
numerous and have provided a genuine insight into how the EU and its constituent 
Member States interact. Europeanisation is consistent, broadly speaking, with the 
assumptions of constructivism, historical institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism. This makes it an especially appealing concept to use, as it brings 
socialisation processes and adaptational/transformative pressures to the fore. Whether 
Europeanisation research isolates genuinely unique processes of change, however, still 
remains to be seen. This uncertainty stems from conceptual ambiguity and a willingness 
by scholars to overlook other, quite plausible, explanations. 
 
Europeanisation analysis is, predominantly, focused on assessing institutional change by 
following constructivist assumptions that actors conform to the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. However, more rationalist explanations centred on the assumption that 
actors set out to achieve their goals in strategic and instrumental ways, conforming to 
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 the ‘logic of consequences’, may be able to explain the same phenomena as 
Europeanisation. It is, therefore, difficult to attribute changes in the policy-making 
process to Europeanisation factors without sufficiently engaging with the more 
rationalist alternative explanations, and the null hypothesis that actors behave in a 
strategic, utility-maximising way and are not socialised to view their national interest in 
anything other than zero-sum terms.  
 
The definition of Europeanisation, as it stands, allows for the concept to be used 
unnecessarily to account for dynamics of change which upon first glance seem to be 
caused by European integration but, instead, stem from much broader processes of 
internationalisation and multilateralisation. These processes seem to have been confused 
with Europeanisation, as an unrelated consequence of the multilateralisation of national 
foreign and security policy is to focus on the EU because of its rapid evolution into a 
security actor in recent years. Multilateralisation has been a trend in recent years 
because legitimacy for military interventions and security missions is derived from the 
support of international organisations, such as the UN, NATO, the EU and the African 
Union. In a similar way to the enabling powers of Europeanisation, multilateralisation is 
something that appeals to both small states and great powers. Small states can use 
multilateralism to amplify their voice in global affairs, whereas more powerful states 
can mobilise multilateral organisations in order to gain legitimacy and share the risk and 
blame for interventions (Matlary, 2009: 7–8). Therefore, Europeanisation could be one 
element of a broader multilateralisation of national foreign policy-making. 
 
In addition to this, internationalisation and elite socialisation processes shape political 
institutions and national foreign policy-makers over time. Integration in international 
organisations creates an opportunity for such processes to take place. Institutional 
approaches offer an analytical focus on the specific locations where socialisation will 
have a significant impact on the policy-making process, where norms of behaviour are 
subject to change over time. While socialisation processes form a central part of 
Europeanisation explanations, a fault of much of the scholarship on the Europeanisation 
of national political systems has been to over-attribute transformations to socialisation 
processes which originate from the European Union and to overlook the influencing 
role of other international organisations in shaping behaviours, transforming policy 
practices and moulding identities. As Johnston (2001) argues, and Gheciu (2005), 
Finnemore (1993), Gross (2007), Major (2005) and Mérand (2008), demonstrate 
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 empirically, international politics is a social arena and the EU is not the only 
organisation which has the potential to transform the behaviours of national actors and 
to shape national policy-making structures. The Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the Council of Europe and the UN could all 
contribute to processes of internationalisation which would have similar features and 
effects to Europeanisation. These considerations are especially important when, as in 
the case of Portugal, a state’s reintroduction to international affairs after a long period of 
diplomatic isolation coincides or overlaps with a clear European integration project. 
Therefore, in the interests of analytical rigour, before attributing changes to the EU (i.e. 
Europeanisation or ‘EU-isation’) other potential explanations which shape national 
policy-making processes must also be examined fully. 
 
Europeanisation, as a concept, is not without its weaknesses and these present 
methodological challenges to research which utilises Europeanisation as its central 
guiding narrative. An encyclopaedic definition of Europeanisation would have to make 
reference to more than just the EU, as other integration paths in the continent, such as 
the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE, are potentially valid in terms of 
promoting a transformation of norms. Otherwise, Europeanisation would have to be 
adapted to be ‘EU-isation’, as opposed to ‘European-isation’ (Major, 2005: 178–179). 
The latter, as a variable, either openly encompasses more than simply the EU, or 
deliberately remains a vague notion of ‘Europe’, and all that that entails. However, to 
reduce Europeanisation to the “Europe of Brussels” could be misleading in practice and 
could lead to further over-attribution of domestic transformations to the EU when other 
organisations have made a significant impact (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008: 36).  
 
The imprecise definition of Europeanisation and the complexities of these analytical 
problems mean that any theoretical framework, which is designed to assess the 
Europeanisation of foreign and security policy-making processes, must be prepared to 
acknowledge alternative explanations. Only with rigorous scrutiny of the concept vis-à-
vis potential alternatives can the definition of Europeanisation be improved and clarified 
for future research, or else it should be abandoned entirely as unreliable. 
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 2.3.2 Conceptual operationalisation and analytical deployment 
 
– Levels of analysis – 
From synthesising the literature, it is possible to identify the various aspects of the 
foreign policy-making process. However, these processes take place simultaneously and 
can be difficult to unravel. It is possible to separate these processes and analyse 
different phenomena according to whether they occur on the micro levels, by 
individuals, or at the more macro end of the scale, i.e. actions by institutions and states. 
This framework identifies seven levels upon which to analyse foreign policy processes 
and outputs. These levels provide multiple insights into the processes which influence 
Portuguese foreign policy, spanning the effect of transnational norms and cultures in 
shaping policy, to the imprint individual politicians and officials can leave on a 
country’s foreign policy outlook. The effectiveness of Europeanisation explanations, 
and the power of alternatives to the Europeanisation thesis, can be assessed and tested 
on multiple levels if the indicators are sufficiently unpacked to be identified on each of 
the seven levels outlined here. Table 2.1 represents the first strand of the analytical 
framework. From there, with each of the seven levels of analysis sketched out, the 
strand detailing the alternatives for each level of analysis can then be added along with 
the strand outlining the various indicators of Europeanisation at each level, from the 
macro level down to the micro level. 
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 Levels of Analysis 
Macro Level 
 
1.
 
Transnational Cultures 
 
 
2.
 
National Identity 
 
 
3.
 
Foreign Policy Purpose and Statecraft 
 
 
4.
 
Policy Instruments and Processes 
 
 
5.
 
Institutional Cultures 
 
 
6.
 
Social Groups 
 
 
7.
 
Behaviour of Individuals 
 
Micro Level 
Table 2.1: Delineation of the various levels of analysis. 
 
The first level of analysis lies above that of the nation-state and encompasses cultures 
and aspects of identity which span across countries (‘transnational cultures’). At this 
level it is possible to identify worldviews, norms of behaviour, assumptions about the 
world, and ideational and ideological beliefs which bind together governments, 
economies, polities and societies. There is considerable interconnectedness between 
states, and understanding the reasons for this interconnectedness is best done by 
assessing behaviour at this level. Exploring beyond the limits of the nation-state makes 
it possible to begin to understand what reinforces and perpetuates these transnational 
shared belief systems and cultures. 
 
Beyond considering transnational cultures, accounting for foreign policy outputs 
requires a thorough understanding of the behaviour of states in the international system. 
Foreign policy is an instrument of sovereign national governments, and consequently is 
shaped by conceptions of a nation’s role in the international system. As such, national 
foreign policy priorities can be designed to be congruent (or at odds) with the 
international system, but intrinsically there is some notion of the uniqueness of the 
particular state in shaping its foreign policy. This uniqueness is derived from the shared 
historical experiences, fears and aspirations of a nation and the glue that binds a society 
together to act as one unit in the international system (‘national identity’). Playing upon 
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 national identity sensitivities, allows for foreign policy priorities to be conceived, 
understood and perpetuated as being, not just in the national interest, but fundamental to 
the nation’s survival or part of its wider destiny. 
 
Beneath the level of national identity and national role conceptions, yet above policy-
making units and institutional processes, lies the general orientation of a state’s foreign 
policy (‘foreign policy purpose and statecraft’). This level outlines a state’s drive and 
sense of purpose in foreign affairs. At this level notions of a perceived national role are 
developed from the worldviews of institutions involved in the policy-making process. 
The preferences of the elite also feed into this and shape the overall purpose of a state’s 
external policy. At this level, national role conceptions based upon accepted political 
rhetoric and policy goals (drawn from the levels immediately above and below this 
level) shape diplomacy and statecraft. In sum, this level is where national roles gain 
policy substance and policy instruments gain political credibility. 
 
The tools and processes of foreign policy-making (‘policy instruments and processes’) 
constitute a level of analysis which is distinct from the institutions which handle, draft 
and define policy, and is also distinct from the political elites who bring the policy to 
life. At this level, precedent is vitally important. Rather than policy-makers defining the 
realms of possibility, the policy itself has a personality and a power over institutions 
because the norm is not only accepted but historically engrained. This level of analysis 
chimes with historical institutionalist accounts of policy-making processes where 
changes in behaviour tend to be imposed by a higher authority. Consequently, at this 
level, it is often the case that a considerable amount of friction between the accepted 
norms of behaviour and new ideas, approaches and responsibilities can be found. This is 
largely because foreign policy worldviews are culturally embedded, but are also shaped 
by the two levels of analysis above this one, which put aspects of national identity at the 
heart of foreign policy-making deliberations. 
 
During the policy-making process, any given policy, or set of policy instruments, is 
shaped by the organisational unit which handles it. Organisational perceptions of the 
world reflect the limits of possibility, the accepted norms of behaviour and the internal 
justification of outputs and processes. Therefore, understanding the level at which 
policy-making is shaped by those whose perceptions of self and other define it, 
according to the shared knowledge of their organisation (i.e. reflecting ‘institutional 
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 cultures’ in the policy-making process), is essential. This level of analysis is an 
important one to consider, given the importance ascribed above to sociological 
institutionalism and the social construction of the foreign policy-making process. 
Institutional cultures which emerge, and become embedded, set the context for small 
groups, networks and individuals to operate, but also put pressure on bureaucratic 
systems and the structures of government to behave in certain ways. This level of 
analysis could, potentially, be where the most change and malleability might be 
observed, as institutional norms and cultures can become influenced and moulded by 
outsiders and evolve through socialisation processes.  
 
However, institutional cultures do not emerge out of thin air. They may evolve into 
guiding principles that define the institutions, but people within the institution have a 
fundamental role to play in the construction of institutional cultures. Individuals 
interacting with each other, coming together, sharing opinions, building an 
understanding and communicating via networks (‘social groups’) is a level of analysis 
which lies towards the micro end of the scale. This level of analysis focuses on the 
dynamics and actions of specific groups of people, but also how webs of different 
groups are linked together and interact with one another. Focusing on this level allows 
for policy networks and peer-to-peer relationships between politicians, diplomats, 
officials and advisors to be explored. The literature on network theory, epistemic 
communities and groupthink, deals with phenomena occurring on this level of analysis. 
 
Progressing further down through the levels of analysis, the most micro level is the 
analysis of the actions of specific people (‘behaviour of individuals’). Given the 
assumptions made above about the role of structure and agency, it is difficult to 
disaggregate the behaviour of individuals from their social milieux. In the field it may 
be difficult to isolate precisely what behaviour can be said to have originated from an 
individual, as the actions of agents are contingent on their perceived role in the social 
world. However, continuing down to this the most micro of the levels of analysis is 
logical and prepares the overall analysis for eventualities where the behaviour of 
individuals has had a discernible impact on social groups, institutions, policies, and 
shared perceptions of self and other.  
 
One such example of how the behaviour of an individual may be able to make an 
impact, albeit in the context of social relations, is by bringing in experiences from 
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 outside. If an individual comes into a group with particular experiences and views on an 
issue, when combined with considerable skills to educate, convince and coerce other 
group members, then an individual’s behaviour could potentially have the power to 
transform the actions of others. Under these circumstances, it is clear that individuals 
can have a dramatic impact. Therefore, this eventuality needs to be covered in the 
theoretical framework by continuing the levels of analysis right down to the level of 
individuals. 
 
– Indicators of Europeanisation – 
Corresponding to each of the seven levels of analysis outlined above, there are seven 
indicators of Europeanisation. Table 2.2 lists the different indicators, beginning at the 
level of transnational cultures and ending at the level of assessing the behaviour of 
individuals. An explanation of each of the indicators is then given.  
 
Indicators of Europeanisation 
Macro Level 
 
1.
Normative adaptability and 
convergence with core ‘European’ 
values 
 
2. 
 
Externalisation (‘uploading’) of core 
national foreign policy  
priorities onto the EU Level 
 
3.
Recognition of Europe as a way to 
preserve national influence and 
enhance state sovereignty 
 
4. 
 
Institutional adaptation to the 
requirements of EU membership  
(‘top-down’) 
 
5. 
 
Elite socialisation, learning and 
absorbing European  
‘ways of doing things’ 
 
6. 
 
 
Brussels-based Networks 
 
7. 
 
 
Exposure to Brussels 
Micro Level 
Table 2.2: Delineation of the various indicators of foreign policy Europeanisation. 
 
If national foreign policy-making mechanisms are able to shift over time and evolve to 
become symbiotic with emerging European norms, then it can be said that 
Europeanisation exists. Europeanisation can be attributed to the emergence of European 
norms and values (i.e. where ‘normative adaptability and convergence with core 
‘European’ values’ is present). Europeanisation forces transnational cultures and belief 
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 systems to develop in such a way, that pressure is applied on states to behave in 
different ways in international affairs. European norms and values have the potential to 
Europeanise national political processes by prescribing ‘ways of doing things’ and 
imposing foreign policy priorities on EU Member States. For example, the accepted 
notion that democracy and the rule of law are good things, creates a norm of behaviour 
which unites the 27 EU Member States, as there is no room for dissent and dialogue as 
such core values have come to define ‘Europe’ in international affairs. 
 
At the level of analysis of national identity, Europeanisation can be identified even 
where core national foreign policy priorities are being pursued. The ‘externalisation 
(‘uploading’) of core national foreign policy priorities onto the EU level’ is the 
recognition that the EU can be used as a vehicle to pursue national foreign policy 
interests and provides Member States with greater legitimacy and reach in achieving 
core foreign policy goals. 
 
This attitude can also be identified at the level beneath national identity which deals 
with foreign policy purpose and statecraft. However, at this level of analysis, the 
process of externalisation is more instrumental, a means to achieving an end, rather than 
being bound in the fabric of national identity. Nonetheless, the ‘recognition of Europe 
as a way to preserve national influence and enhance state sovereignty’ constitutes the 
Europeanisation of national foreign policy as Europe (the EU) is seen as being able to 
rescue the nation-state and to reinvigorate national foreign policy priorities. 
 
At the level of policy-making (‘policy-making instruments and processes’), 
Europeanisation can be identified by assessing the adaptational pressure on institutions 
to respond to the EU. Hence the pressure on Member States to adapt national 
institutions stems from ‘top-down’ pressures and ‘misfit’ between the European and the 
national levels, forcing national institutions to adapt to the requirements of EU 
membership. ‘Institutional adaptation to the requirements of EU membership (‘top-
down’)’, therefore, is most prevalent where a strong direction comes from the EU level, 
such as new practices as a concomitant of new treaties being signed. 
 
Europeanisation can also be identified to have a profound effect on institutional 
cultures. The effect of elite socialisation on national policy-making institutions, in 
promoting the absorption of European ‘ways of doing things’, could result in these 
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 institutions both actively adjusting norms of behaviour, but also passively accepting the 
European way to be naturally consistent with national, pre-existing, practices. In fact, at 
this level ‘elite socialisation, learning and absorbing European ‘ways of doing things’’ 
could have a huge impact on institutional practices and, if the effect is deep and 
meaningful, could feed into the transformation of the other levels both above and below 
that of institutional cultures. 
 
While institutions can create pressure to change and perpetuate Europeanisation, 
adaptation to European ‘ways of doing things’ can happen on a more informal level 
through the interaction of social groups in and around the EU institutions (‘Brussels-
based networks’). Brussels gives diplomats from Member States, as well as politicians 
in the Council and in the upper echelons of the Commission, the opportunity to forge 
relations with counterparts from other Member States. Creating a transnational network 
in Brussels may accelerate the process of seeing the wider European interest and help 
with constructing a common European response to any given problem. It may also 
eventually lead to the fostering of notions of broader European identity. At the level of 
analysis of ‘social groups’, small Brussels-based networks can Europeanise national 
foreign policy-making by providing an access point for national foreign policy-making 
institutions, but also by transmitting European norms of behaviour back to the national 
capital. 
 
Working at the heart of the EU institutions in Brussels is an experience like no other. 
National representatives and officials on secondment to the EU institutions will build 
social networks within which they operate on a daily basis. The experience of living and 
working in Brussels, and being separated from the national capital, is, therefore, sure to 
leave its mark. Spending an extended period working at the EU institutions and 
interacting with counterparts from other Member States on a daily basis (‘exposure to 
Brussels’) is likely to socialise individuals so much so that upon their return to their 
national capital, they approach problems of national foreign policy-making in a new 
way, recognising the European context to national decision-making and thus quietly, 
subtly, even subconsciously, Europeanising national policy-making institutions. 
Therefore, politicians and diplomats whose careers have included a lengthy stay in 
Brussels have the potential to Europeanise their colleagues upon their return to the 
national foreign policy-making realm. Individuals can, clearly, play a significant 
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 intervening role in shaping political institutions and moulding behaviours (Bulmer and 
Burch, 2009: 31). 
 
– Foreign policy beyond the EU context: internationalisation, multilateralisation and 
the complementarity of international organisations – 
Acting as a counterpoint to each of the seven indicators of Europeanisation outlined 
above, there a seven alternative explanations, each one corresponding to a different 
level of analysis. Table 2.3 lists the different alternative indicators, beginning at the 
level of transnational cultures and ending at the level of assessing the behaviour of 
individuals. An explanation of each of these alternative indicators is then given.  
 
Alternative Explanations 
Macro Level 
 
1.
Globalisation and the  
construction of ‘Western’ values 
during the Cold War 
 
2. 
 
Projecting national influence and 
finding a role since decolonisation 
 
3.
Instrumental manipulation of 
international organisations  in order to 
maximise national influence 
 
4. 
 
Balancing bilateral relations with 
multilateral commitments to maximise 
effectiveness 
 
5. 
 
Readiness to deal with a  
multitude of complementary 
international actors 
 
6. 
 
 
Diplomatic Connections 
 
7. 
 
 
Exposure to the world 
Micro Level 
Table 2.3: Delineation of the various alternative explanations to the Europeanisation of 
national foreign policy. 
 
Potential alternatives to the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy thesis can be 
found on each of the seven levels of analysis, from providing an alternative 
interpretation to the behaviour of individual diplomats and institutions, to an alternative 
understanding of the formation and characteristics of transnational cultures. Whether the 
EU is principally responsible for the promotion and acceptance of certain norms and 
values in the international community is open to discussion. Norms of behaviour are 
common across national boundaries and groups of states are united in international 
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 politics by common norms and shared interests. However, historical and political 
developments other than European integration could explain the emergence of 
transnational cultures, norms of behaviour and international consensus (e.g. processes 
such as ‘globalisation and the construction of ‘Western’ values during the Cold War’). 
Therefore, potentially, it is not just European integration and EU membership that has 
the power to build consensus, commonality and convergence among sovereign states in 
the international order, and, consequently, these other factors must not be overlooked. 
 
In the same way that relations beyond the level of the nation-state have developed 
without the EU playing a direct intervening role, aspects of national identity remain 
national, but have also become more broadly internationalised. The globalisation 
process, the internationalisation of security relations, and the forging of transnational 
relationships and alliances, mean that national identity is often deployed to accomplish 
foreign policy tasks by constructing role conceptions for the state’s external affairs. 
Constructing a national role in international politics (by ‘projecting national influence 
and finding a role since decolonisation’) allows states such as Portugal the room to link 
core foreign policy interests and priorities by playing to unique strengths and historical 
connections that can feed on aspects of national identity in order to gain legitimacy, 
without needing to be externalised exclusively onto the EU’s foreign policy apparatus. 
 
By the same token, the recognition that the EU is a means to preserve national 
influence, and is a vehicle for enhancing national sovereignty, limits the realms of 
possibility and could automatically lead to the Europeanisation of national foreign 
policy being identified because other factors are not, sufficiently, considered. Instead, 
behaviour at the level of foreign policy purpose and statecraft could be less deeply 
involved in the EU than it would first appear. It could be the case that national foreign 
policy outputs, and even the recognition of the importance of building strong EU 
foreign and security policy co-operation, are the result of the state engaging in the 
‘instrumental manipulation of international organisations in order to maximise national 
influence’ rather than passively succumbing to pressures exerted by the EU. 
  
Europeanisation pressures (‘misfit’) may also be identified on the policy-making level, 
shaping the policy process at the domestic level. However, Europeanisation is not the 
only potential explanation for changes at this level. For example, a state may actively 
reorganise its foreign policy-making process in order to be more effective in the 
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 multilateral context. While the EU is a priority, it is not the only area of focus for the 
foreign ministries of its constituent Member States. Constructing effective foreign 
policies in the twenty-first century requires ‘balancing bilateral relations with 
multilateral commitments to maximise effectiveness’. This means that foreign policy 
instruments and institutions must be able to respond to the challenges of bilateral 
relations with countries outside of Europe, as well as, playing a strong role in 
international organisations and recognising the dynamics between multilateral foreign 
policy and bilateral diplomacy. 
 
Foreign policy institutions need to be able to respond to the challenges of dealing with 
various international actors. The EU is not the only locus for social learning, other 
international organisations, such as NATO, may have a significant role to play in 
shaping institutional cultures in the domestic policy-making realm. Therefore, the 
‘readiness to deal with a multitude of complementary international actors’, rather than a 
limited focus on the EU, would illustrate that there is more to be learned from 
international organisations in general, than what the EU has to offer. This promotes the 
mentality that international organisations should be viewed as being complementary 
rather than contradictory.  
 
The alternative explanations to Europeanisation on the final two levels of analysis 
(social groups and the behaviour of individuals) challenge the notion that the 
transformative power of Europeanisation is something distinct from the realities of 
being a diplomat. Diplomats are quite used to being away from the national policy-
making sphere and will naturally come to interact with locals as well as their 
counterparts from other states during the course of their stay in a particular country 
(‘diplomatic connections’). Brussels-based networks, therefore, need to be properly 
contextualised. If there is nothing unique about building informal relations between 
diplomats in Brussels than anywhere else, then it becomes difficult to assert that 
Europeanisation is a distinct phenomenon from the internationalisation of public 
servants. 
 
Similarly, on the level of the behaviour of individuals, is exposure to the way things are 
done in Brussels genuinely different from exposure to the world more generally? Living 
and working as a diplomat on various overseas placements during a career will result in 
considerable internationalisation, prolonged separation from the national capital, and 
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 may foster a general sense of cosmopolitanism, or, at the very least, an appreciation that 
different cultures may offer valuable lessons and have different perspectives on issues 
(‘exposure to the world’). To accept that the Brussels experience offers something that 
directly leads to the Europeanisation of national foreign policy becoming more likely, 
means that there must be something unique, i.e. qualitatively different, about the 
Brussels bubble which sets it apart from other diplomatic placements. 
 
– Assessing the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy: a 
framework for analysis – 
Table 2.4 outlines the framework for analysis to be used to assess the Europeanisation 
of Portuguese foreign and security policy. The complete analytical framework draws 
together the various strands outlined in tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 above, showing how each 
of the levels of analysis has one Europeanisation indicator and one alternative 
explanation. This table will be the main reference point for the assessment of the 
Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy through the substantive 
chapters on the institutions of Portuguese foreign policy, Portugal’s African vocation, 
and Portuguese security policy. This table will inform the conclusions of the thesis in 
order to respond to the research questions. 
 
The presence of Europeanisation at any given level of analysis does not confirm that the 
entire policy-making process has been subject to Europeanisation. However, if 
Europeanisation were shown to be present in certain key areas, not necessarily all levels 
but ones directly relevant to the formulation of national foreign policy priorities (such as 
levels 2–5), then the argument that Europeanisation has occurred in this instance would 
be difficult to ignore. The alternative explanations may be persuasive in particular 
circumstances, on some or many different levels of analysis, but if overwhelming 
evidence in favour of the Europeanisation argument is found, occurring on multiple 
levels, then the ability of the counter arguments to challenge this would be limited. 
However, refuting the Europeanisation argument is not impossible as the alternative 
explanations may be highly qualitatively persuasive. The aim is to present a conceptual 
framework that is not automatically predisposed to identify transformation processes 
stemming from Europeanisation, and their frequency in the policy-making process, but 
to assess the qualitative merit of the indicators.  
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 Table 2.4: An analytical framework for assessing the Europeanisation of Portuguese 
foreign policy. 
Indicators of Europeanisation Levels of Analysis Alternative Explanations 
 Macro  
Normative adaptability and 
convergence with core ‘European’ 
values 
 
1. Transnational 
Cultures 
Globalisation and the construction 
of ‘Western’ values during the Cold 
War 
Externalisation (‘uploading’) of core 
national foreign policy priorities 
onto the EU Level 
 
2. National Identity 
 
Projecting national influence and 
finding a role since decolonisation 
Recognition of Europe as a way to 
preserve national influence and 
enhance state sovereignty 
 
3. Foreign Policy 
Purpose and Statecraft 
Instrumental manipulation of 
international organisations in order 
to maximise national influence 
Institutional adaptation to the 
requirements of EU membership 
(‘top-down’)  
 
4. Policy Instruments 
and Processes 
Balancing bilateral relations with 
multilateral commitments to 
maximise effectiveness  
Elite socialisation, learning and 
absorbing European ‘ways of doing 
things’ 
 
5. Institutional Cultures 
 
Readiness to deal with a multitude 
of complementary international 
actors 
 
Brussels-based Networks 
 
6. Social Groups 
 
 
Diplomatic Connections 
 
Exposure to Brussels 
 
7. Behaviour of 
Individuals 
 
Exposure to the world 
 Micro  
 
While this framework attempts to separate the different levels of the policy process for 
analytical purposes, in reality the levels are not mutually exclusive and a certain degree 
of interaction and mutual constitution will occur. Institutional approaches, particularly 
sociological institutionalism, offer a persuasive account of organisational continuity and 
change and the processes which lead to the construction of national interests and foreign 
policy outputs. As such, meso-level accounts offer a useful way of capturing the 
presence of Europeanisation processes and are more generalisable to wider policy 
processes. If institutions reflect Europeanisation, then the political context which 
created them must have been infiltrated to a certain degree, and by the same token, 
those who inhabit the institution will have been exposed to Europeanisation pressures 
through socialisation. Therefore, if Europeanisation can be identified in the institutional 
levels (particularly levels 3, 4 and 5) these would carry more weight, because of the 
potential for these levels to feed both up and down the chain, permeating down to the 
micro levels and projecting up to the macro levels to shape the broader political context.  
 
However, identifying whether Europeanisation is present at any given level is not 
enough; a judgement has to be made as to whether the Europeanisation effect is 
significant enough to refute the alternatives. Although the alternative explanations to 
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 Europeanisation may be identifiable, to some degree, at every level of analysis, if 
Europeanisation appears to be the more dominant trend on a particular level then that 
would suggest a causal relationship. However, the onus is on Europeanisation to show 
that the processes it explains cannot be captured by the alternatives, i.e. that the 
Europeanisation effect is something unique. Establishing the dominant explanation 
requires reflecting on the penetration of Europeanisation pressures and contextualising 
the situation with regard to the alternatives. Essentially, there are three possibilities, 
which are outlined in figure 2.1. If the burden of proof lies with Europeanisation, 
Europeanisation cannot be concluded if the analysis resembles either situation A or B. 
Europeanisation can only be concluded where the analysis is similar to situation C, 
where the indicators show significant evidence of Europeanisation penetrating multiple 
levels that cannot be qualitatively challenged by the alternatives. This would point to a 
transformation in the mind-set of domestic actors and institutions, where Portuguese 
foreign policy priorities are channelled through EU institutions, and hence become 
Europeanised, rather than being internationalised or multilateralised more generally. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Europeanisation dominance indicators. 
Europeanisation?  
 
There are alternative perspectives present, but these have 
been qualitatively outweighed by the Europeanisation 
argument. The Europeanisation indicators are persuasive 
and reveal unique processes of change. 
B 
C 
Europeanisation?  
Europeanisation?  
 
There are arguments on both sides.  
 
The alternatives serve as a check to Europeanisation, 
which means that Europeanisation cannot be asserted. 
 
The alternative explanations (represented in black) capture 
the situation well and suggest that, while Europeanisation 
can be identified, other processes are going on too. 
A 
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 Chapters 4 and 5, the mini-case studies of Portugal’s attitudes towards Africa and its 
security policy, will test how Europeanisation impacts upon Portugal’s substantive 
foreign policy priorities. In other words, these chapters examine the effectiveness of 
Europeanisation pressures to transform core foreign policy outputs. The degree to which 
there is resistance to Europeanisation in these domains would signify whether 
Portuguese foreign policy outputs have indeed been Europeanised. However, this would 
amount to only a partial representation, as it would say nothing about the effects of 
Europeanisation on the policy-making process itself and individual institutions within it. 
Therefore, attention needs to be paid to this in the next chapter, which examines 
Portuguese foreign policy-making institutions and assesses the degree to which the 
pressures of EU membership have transformed the nature of foreign policy-making 
itself. Only examining either outputs or processes is not sufficient, especially if 
Europeanisation is identified in the policy-making process but is not revealed in the core 
policy outputs. Such a finding would suggest that there are patterns of resistance going 
on. 
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 Chapter 3 
The Institutional Context of Portuguese Foreign Policy-Making  
 
3.1 Challenges for Contemporary Portuguese Foreign Policy-Making 
 
In order to have a better understanding of how the more detailed case studies of 
Portugal’s African vocation and Portugal’s involvement in security co-operation 
mechanisms impact upon its overall Europeanisation, the institutional processes, and 
actors which shape foreign policy-making in Portugal, must be examined first. 
However, as Carlsnaes (2008) points out, foreign policy straddles the domestic and the 
international spheres, actors and structures; the analytical task is to see how these 
variables interact (Carlsnaes, 2008: 86). This chapter aims to expose the continuities 
and changes in Portuguese foreign policy-making processes and to assess the powers, 
roles, and responsibilities of the various institutional actors who contribute to its 
construction. The extent to which Europeanisation has shaped these processes and the 
impact it is having on Portugal’s wider foreign policy priorities is assessed in order to 
determine how Portugal’s diplomatic modus operandi functions in the context of 
multilateral organisations in the twenty-first century. 
 
Two challenges form the backdrop to day-to-day foreign policy-making in Portugal at 
this time; both ultimately stemming from the fact that Portugal is a committed Member 
State of the European Union. This section addresses these challenges in order to set the 
context of how these external influences might have a considerable impact on 
Portuguese foreign policy-making processes in key institutions, such as the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The first is the effect of Europeanisation on the foreign policy-making 
institutions and how national governments are being forced to adapt to the EU’s 
increasing breadth of policy competences and influence in global affairs. The second is 
the effects of slimming down the core central administration of the Portuguese State, a 
reality of the austerity measures brought about by the Eurozone crisis. As the challenges 
outlined above ultimately stem from Europe, the principal goal of this chapter is to 
assess whether the EU has had a profound impact on foreign policy-making in Portugal. 
The objective of this chapter is to focus on the processes of foreign policy-making and 
whether Europeanisation pressures have had a discernible influence on the institutions 
of diplomacy. If foreign policy processes reflect the impact of Europe, then it is 
reasonable to expect that core foreign policy outputs might also be affected. Therefore, 
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 understanding the dynamics of Europeanisation in terms of foreign policy processes in 
this chapter, allows for foreign policy outputs to then be assessed in the specific case 
studies which follow in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
Dictated by the fact that this chapter is focusing on processes rather than outputs, the 
analytical goals of this chapter differ from chapters 4 and 5. While, like chapters 4 and 
5, this chapter aims to assess the effectiveness of Europeanisation indicators versus 
potential alternatives, the emphasis here is on the institutional and procedural analytical 
levels. As such, the principal focus of this chapter is to measure how external influences 
shape the meso and micro levels of Portuguese foreign policy and, from that, to 
determine whether the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy-making has 
occurred. Nevertheless, macro level influences will, of course, shape the broad context 
of foreign policy-making, but the challenges outlined above constitute major macro-
level influences on the process. Therefore, in order to assess the degree to which the 
policy-making process is being subjected to change, assessing the institutional-level 
responses to these external challenges is key. 
 
Institutional analysis of foreign policy-making is made more difficult in the European 
context because it occurs in two different locations, in the national capital and in 
Brussels. The indicators of Europeanisation, in this instance, need to take into account 
this spatial element to decision-making. As such, the analysis here requires accounting 
for the precise role of Brussels in domestic foreign policy-making processes. If 
Brussels-based policy-making norms are transmitted back to the national capital, then it 
can be argued that these norms are indeed Europeanisation pressures. However, a 
rigorous assessment of how the meso and micro levels are being transformed by 
external forces, such as being in contact with Brussels, must not jump to the conclusion 
that these forces are indeed Europeanisation pressures without first comprehensively 
examining potential alternative explanations. 
 
 
3.1.1 Adapting to Europe: the Europeanisation of policy-making processes  
 
Domestic administrative systems have had to take EU business “in their stride” by 
finding “translator devices” which enable them to enact European norms or to carry out 
EU policies within existing national norms and routines (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 21). 
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 Therefore, being in the EU requires adaptability, and for the political and administrative 
systems of the Member States to accept the fact that important policy-making and 
policy co-ordination occurs above the level of the nation-state. The Europeanisation of 
national civil services can occur in three ways: absorption; accommodation; and 
transformation. Absorption represents the most modest change and transformation 
signifies more fundamental change in light of European integration (Bulmer and Burch, 
2009: 26). One example of considerable change domestically, as a consequence of 
European integration, is that national administrative systems have had to deal with 
policy outputs from the EU and to co-ordinate them effectively at home. This can be 
described more accurately as the “domestication” of EU processes, rather than the 
Europeanisation of national systems (Kassim, 2003: 154). 
 
The Europeanisation of national administrative systems does not lead, automatically, to 
the homogenisation of domestic bureaucracies across Europe, as Page (2003) 
convincingly argues. Specific national practices, traditions, and beliefs tend, still, to 
persist. “Ideas and slogans can travel, but once they disembark that is only the 
beginning of the story”, they need to be adapted and operationalised domestically in 
order to work (Page, 2003: 175). This is consistent with a more historical institutionalist 
outlook, which Bulmer and Burch (2009) effectively combine with Europeanisation to 
assess long-term change in the British civil service. Europeanisation is concerned 
primarily with change and adaptation, whereas historical institutionalism focuses on 
resistance to change and continuity of behaviour because of embedded norms, lock-in 
and path-dependence. Where change does occur it tends to be fundamental upheaval, 
which does not reflect the gradual incremental change represented by the 
Europeanisation of national bureaucratic structures over many years (Bulmer and 
Burch, 2009: 27–28). 
 
The potential for Europeanisation processes to shape domestic administrative systems 
means that foreign policy-making in Portugal is both a political process and a 
bureaucratic one. Foreign policy actions can be seen as outputs of organisational 
processes. As Allison (1971) argues, organisational norms are reinforced by 
socialisation processes and day-to-day activities form part of pre-established routines, 
where bureaucrats conform to standard operating procedures (Allison, 1971: 81). The 
institutionalisation of organisational norms and belief systems is further reinforced by 
the recruitment process. As Hill (1972) argues, bureaucrats are self-selecting, insofar as 
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 that “certain types of people choose to embark on bureaucratic careers”, and, when 
combined with a selective recruitment process to choose candidates who ascribe to the 
existing norms of the organisation, a somewhat predictable “bureaucratic personality” 
then emerges (Hill, 1972: 130). 
 
Foreign policy-making is a web of interpersonal relations between the various actors in 
the system, both domestically and externally at the international (European) level. With 
particular application to the role of diplomats at the EU level, Blau (1963) argues that 
interaction and co-operation between individuals within organisations creates 
favourable conditions for closer integration, as they tend to spend enjoyable time 
together, particularly over lunches etc. (Blau, 1963: 149). Formal organisations tend to 
be rigidly structured in order to establish clear lines of authority. However, 
communications are not restricted to follow the structure of the hierarchy, so 
information can, in practice, flow more freely between levels through both informal and 
formal channels (Downs, 1967: 55–56). The core belief systems involved in the 
Portuguese foreign policy-making process, in the context of Portugal’s participation in 
multilateral organisations (particularly the EU), are constantly being moulded and 
shaped by socialisation processes. The multiple communications, on multiple levels, of 
the multiple institutional organisations involved in the process, mean that there is ample 
room for Europeanisation pressures to penetrate national foreign policy-making 
institutions. 
 
The scope for Europeanisation pressures to penetrate national administrative systems, 
and produce change, is more pronounced in smaller states with smaller bureaucracies. 
With 2,038 officials in the MNE, the Portuguese diplomatic service cannot be described 
as tiny in the European context (Thorhallsson, 2004: 164). However, Portuguese foreign 
policy-makers openly recognise that Portugal is a small country and this does constrain 
its diplomatic activities. This makes its smallness both an objective feature, when 
comparing its bureaucracy to other states, and a self-fulfilling prophecy as policy-
makers adopt stances to minimise the impact of the country’s perceived smallness. 
Small foreign policy-making administrations are forced to prioritise because of a lack of 
capacity, and are characterised by informal communications, flexible decision-making, 
and manoeuvrability of officials in negotiations (Thorhallsson, 2004: 162). These all 
combine to provide an entry point for Europeanisation pressures and a recognition that 
small states’ interests are best served by working closely with the EU.  As Tonra (2001) 
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 argues, locating their foreign policy in the EU context (i.e. allowing it to be 
Europeanised) means that small states can “pursue their foreign policy objectives at a 
more effective level than as lone actors…” (Tonra, 2001: 46). 
 
In addition to there being more opportunity for Europeanisation to transform the 
national bureaucracies of small states, the negotiation processes at international 
meetings, principally in the Council of the EU, tend to give a greater role to civil 
servants from smaller countries. Whereas the political masters of the larger EU Member 
States often set the direction, the civil servants of the smaller EU Member States enjoy 
greater freedom to establish the official national line, and are well-integrated into the 
upper echelons of the ministries in their national capitals (Thorhallsson, 2000: 84–85). 
 
As such, Europeanisation can be argued to have had a profound impact on Portuguese 
elites and by extension the institutions of national policy-making. National 
representatives (politicians and officials) perform a dual-role, making and shaping 
policy at both the national-level and the EU-level, although because of how legitimacy 
is derived, these elites are produced at, and accountable to, the national-level (Conti et 
al., 2010: 5). The Member States of Southern Europe, particularly Greece, Portugal and 
Spain during the 1980s, recognised the importance of the supranational in rejuvenating 
the national, consequently, a consensus among the political elites of these countries was 
established that European integration was a beneficial venture (Conti et al., 2010: 6–7).  
 
Survey data confirms that political elites view the EU as at least instrumentally useful to 
Portugal, if not overwhelmingly beneficial to the country (Moreira et al., 2010: 73). 
Pockets of dissatisfaction with Europe, and ideological detachment from the EU, can be 
found in Portugal, but these are confined to those with left-wing political allegiances, 
i.e. representatives of the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc) and the Partido Comunista 
Português (Portuguese Communist Party – PCP) (Moreira et al., 2010: 62). All the 
other main political parties have served in the government in the last twenty-five years, 
so have had first-hand contact with the EU and thus undergone at least some form of 
socialisation at the European-level. This has helped to construct a positive consensus 
among the main political parties towards Europe. This political consensus has shaped 
political debates in Portugal and, ultimately, has provided a pro-EU context for the 
development of policy strategies, injecting impetus into reforms of domestic political 
and administrative processes as a direct reaction to EU membership. 
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 While socialisation processes may have been significant in the Portuguese case, 
changing attitudes with regard to Europe in the upper echelons of the Portuguese 
administrative and political systems could be attributed to Europeanisation or, more 
broadly, to a willingness to embrace modernisation as a means to fostering economic 
development. Europeanisation can be said to include a notion of political modernisation 
of state structures with a view to achieving economic prosperity (Wong, 2011: 153). To 
that end, the Europeanisation of the Portuguese economy, i.e. “[c]atching up” with 
Europe, has been a priority for successive governments since the mid-1980s (Corkhill, 
1999: 3). Europeanisation pressures clearly shape, however subtly, the reasoning to 
accept that the modernisation of public administration is necessary and desirable. But as 
they occurred simultaneously, it is hard to separate top-down Europeanisation pressures 
from the recognition of the need for the modernisation of Portuguese bureaucracy once 
the democratic regime had become stabilised post-1974, with major restructuring 
beginning in 1987, the year after Portugal’s accession to the EEC (Magone, 1997: 54).  
 
Therefore, European integration and reform of the public sector in Portugal are 
inextricably linked. Modernisation pressures and socialisation processes have had an 
influence on Portuguese administration through the EU Structural Funds Programme 
and the EU Public Administration Network (Magone, 2011: 778). Stemming from these 
pressures, and the urgent need for austerity in response to the Eurozone crisis, the 
strategy is to implement reforms of the Portuguese public administration so that it is 
slimmed down, more flexible, and increasingly decentralised (Magone, 2011: 770). 
These cues have clearly been taken from Europe, so reflect the Europeanisation of the 
Portuguese civil service. Foreign policy-making institutions are not excluded from this 
process of modernisation/Europeanisation. 
 
 
3.1.2 Streamlining Portuguese public administration: foreign policy implications 
 
Portugal’s European integration path and the modernisation of the structures of the 
Portuguese State have gone hand-in-hand in the last three decades. Europeanisation and 
the streamlining of Portuguese public administration will undoubtedly have an impact 
on foreign policy-making, probably a restricting one, because the government is under 
considerable pressure to make public administration more efficient and cost-effective. 
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 Europeanisation pressures, as well as scrutiny from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), have put Portugal under considerable pressure to 
reform its administration in recent years. Pressures from the EU, the effects of the 
financial crisis, budgetary overstretch, and the limits of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
forced the government led by José Sócrates to implement bold and radical reforms 
under the Programa de Reestruturação da Administração Central do Estado (PRACE – 
Restructuring Programme of the Central Administration of the State) from 2005 
(Magone, 2011: 756–757). The fall of the Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) 
government in 2011 was triggered by Sócrates losing a crucial vote over austerity 
measures. This meant that, despite these efforts to stabilise the economic situation, 
Portugal was forced to apply for a European bailout and early elections were called 
(Schultz, 2011). 
 
In the elections which followed in June 2011, the Partido Social Democrata (PSD – 
Social Democratic Party) failed to win an out-right majority and formed a coalition 
government with the Centro Democrático e Social–Partido Popular (CDS–PP – Social 
and Democratic Centre–People’s Party). The coalition government put economic 
stability at the heart of its programme, pledging to renew the PRACE, as they were 
dissatisfied with progress on the reforms and felt that the PRACE could go much further 
in reforming public administration (Borja-Santos et al., 2011; Presidência do Conselho 
de Ministros, 2011: 15). Instigated by the PSD/CDS–PP coalition, the resulting new 
framework for slimming down Portuguese public administration is the Plano de 
Redução e Melhoria da Administração Central (PREMAC – Plan for the Reduction and 
Improvement of the Central Administration).  
 
The PREMAC aims to reduce the number of roles of senior and middle-ranking 
officials and to reduce the number of new appointments to the central administration 
(Secretário de Estado da Administração Pública, 2012: 3). To date, the implementation 
of the PREMAC programme has been wide-ranging and has impacted upon all 
government departments. Implementing the PREMAC will mean a reduction of roles in 
the MNE by 34 per cent and a slimming-down of the MDN by 29 per cent (Secretário 
de Estado da Administração Pública, 2011: 9). As such, there has been a raft of new 
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 legislation passed since 2011 to set about achieving these targets for the MNE and the 
MDN.4  
 
It should be noted that the number of officials in the Armed Forces and those on 
diplomatic postings abroad are excluded from the PREMAC’s considerations 
(Secretário de Estado da Administração Pública, 2012: 2). In 2011, the PREMAC 
reforms instigated a rapid reduction of 19,000 public servants, in the second-half of the 
year (Secretário de Estado da Administração Pública, 2012: 1). Budgets have also been 
affected by the PREMAC, with the MNE seeing a cut in its budget for 2012 of 10.6 per 
cent, €40 million less than it received in 2011 (Lusa, 2011). 
 
The reduction of the MNE’s budget to €334 million in 2012 means that departmental 
mergers have occurred in order to reduce overlap and to concentrate resources on 
programmes of fundamental importance. A particularly noteworthy reform is the merger 
of Portugal’s development co-operation with its language and culture programmes; the 
‘Camões – Institute for Co-operation and Language’ has now been formed from the 
Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento (IPAD – Portuguese Institute for 
Development Assistance) and the Camões Institute (Lusa, 2011; Decreto-Lei 21/2012, 
of 30 January 2012). Another important reform, which reflects the wider political 
impetus to promote economic diplomacy, concerns the MNE’s foreign policy 
department, with the reorganisation of the units in the Direcção-Geral de Política 
Externa (DGPE – Directorate-General for External Policy) to emphasise Portugal’s role 
in international economic organisations. The importance ascribed to economic 
diplomacy and streamlining under the PREMAC is further illustrated by the transfer of 
the Economic and Technical Affairs remit to the MNE’s senior foreign policy-making 
unit, the DGPE (Governo de Portugal, 2012a; Governo de Portugal, 2012b; Decreto 
Regulamentar 11/2012, of 19 January 2012; see also figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
 
                                                 
4 For PREMAC legislation relating to the MNE see: Decreto-Lei 121/2011, of 29 December 2011; 
Decreto-Lei 21/2012, of 30 January 2012; Decreto Regulamentar 8/2012, of 19 January 2012; Decreto 
Regulamentar 9/2012, of 19 January 2012; Decreto Regulamentar 10/2012, of 19 January 2012; Decreto 
Regulamentar 11/2012, of 19 January 2012; Decreto Regulamentar 12/2012, of 19 January 2012; Portaria 
29/2012, of 31 January 2012; Portaria 30/2012, of 31 January 2012; Portaria 31/2012, of 31 January 
2012; Portaria 32/2012, of 31 January 2012; and Portaria 33/2012, of 31 January 2012. For PREMAC 
legislation relating to the MDN see: Decreto-Lei 122/2011, of 29 December 2011; Decreto Regulamentar 
3/2012, of 18 January 2012; Decreto Regulamentar 4/2012, of 18 January 2012; Decreto Regulamentar 
5/2012, of 18 January 2012; Decreto Regulamentar 6/2012, of 18 January 2012; Decreto Regulamentar 
7/2012, of 18 January 2012; Portaria 86/2012, of 30 March 2012; Portaria 87/2012, of 30 March 2012; 
Portaria 92/2012, of 2 April 2012; Portaria 93/2012, of 3 April 2012; and Portaria 94/2012, of 4 April 
2012. 
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 The global economic downturn and the crisis of confidence in the Eurozone have 
brought contentious political debate about managing budget deficits to the fore. 
Portugal conforms to the Southern European model of welfare spending and, when 
combined with limited economic growth and stagnation in recent years, maintaining 
high levels of government spending is no longer sustainable (Magone, 2011: 765–766). 
Therefore, the economic problems in Portugal, like Greece, were exacerbated by 
specific domestic factors, such as mounting sovereign debt and widespread 
inefficiencies in public administration (Featherstone, 2011: 195; Magone, 2011: 767). 
Implementing reforms and reducing national budgets (and eventually reducing the 
levels of sovereign debt) is a challenge for Portugal, but it is a challenge which is very 
much located in the European context. Europeanisation is seen as part of the solution, as 
a means to renew Portugal’s economic modernisation project and restore the country’s 
standing within the Eurozone. As such, Europeanisation pressures are at the heart of the 
current programme of reforms aimed at making Portuguese public administration more 
efficient.  
 
In order to establish whether Europeanisation has been the dominant force for change in 
Portuguese foreign policy in recent years, it is necessary to examine the core foreign 
policy-making institutions, and to understand the bureaucratic processes that shape 
foreign policy outputs, as well as, appreciating the broader political context. Therefore, 
it is necessary to examine closely the institutions which are active in formulating 
Portuguese foreign policy priorities. It is logical to begin by examining the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for two reasons. Firstly, it is the government department which handles 
Portugal’s external policy, and is central to managing Portugal’s relationship with 
international organisations. Secondly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the government 
department which co-ordinates the government’s position with the EU, consequently it 
has more contact than most with the EU institutions. Therefore, it is the institution 
where Europeanisation is most likely to have had a deeper and more meaningful effect 
on policy-making processes. 
 
 
3.2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MNE) 
 
The Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros – 
MNE) is the principal actor in Portuguese foreign policy-making. Other governmental 
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 actors have roles to play in the process, particularly the Prime Minister and the Ministry 
for National Defence, but the MNE is very much at the centre. In addition to managing 
Portuguese diplomacy, the MNE is the co-ordinating link between the Portuguese 
government and the European Union institutions in Brussels. In order to consider the 
impact of Europeanisation on the domestic policy-making process, special attention 
needs to be paid to the departments of the MNE which interact with the EU institutions 
on a daily basis, particularly the Directorate-General for External Policy (DGPE) and 
the Directorate-General for European Affairs (DGAE). It is also important to consider 
how Portugal’s membership of the EU affects the operations of the Portuguese Institute 
for Development Assistance (now amalgamated with the Camões Institute), Portugal’s 
overseas embassies and missions, the Secretariat-General, the Diplomatic Institute and 
the training of officials and the ministerial team. Figure 3.1 below, outlines the 
organisation of the Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, with these departments 
marked.  
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Figure 3.1: Snapshot organogram of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012 
(adapted from Governo de Portugal, 2012a; Decreto-Lei 121/2011, of 29 December 
2011).5  
                                                 
5 IPAD (the Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance) and the Camões Institute were 
amalgamated in 2012 to form ‘Camões – Institute for Co-operation and Language’, unifying cultural 
diplomacy with development aid programmes (see Decreto-Lei 21/2012, of 30 January 2012; Lusa, 
2011). Also, as part of the reforms, the Economic and Technical Affairs remit was moved to within the 
purview of the DGPE (Governo de Portugal, 2012a; Governo de Portugal, 2012b; Decreto Regulamentar 
11/2012, of 19 January 2012). 
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 3.2.1 The Directorate-General for External Policy (DGPE) 
 
The Direcção-Geral de Política Externa (DGPE – Directorate-General for External 
Policy) is the branch of the MNE which deals with political and diplomatic affairs and 
manages Portugal’s relations with foreign governments and international organisations. 
The DGPE is organised into eight specialised units (‘Direcções de Serviços’). There are 
four departments responsible for bilateral relations and these are organised according to 
global regions: the Americas (DSA); Middle East and the Maghreb (MOM); Sub-
Saharan Africa (SAS); and Asia and Oceania (SAO). The other four departments are 
responsible for Portugal’s relations with the EU, NATO, and other international 
organisations: the International Political Organisations Directorate (SPM); the 
International Economic Organisations Directorate (SEM); the Security and Defence 
Directorate (DSD); and the European Political Affairs Directorate (APE), which handles 
EU CFSP business and is where the European Correspondent, who reports directly to 
the Director-General, works. The Director-General for External Policy, presently Rui 
Macieira, heads a department that is comprised of career diplomats and is located in the 
main building of the MNE, the Palácio das Necessidades, in Lisbon (Governo de 
Portugal, 2012b). The organisational structure of the DGPE is outlined in figure 3.2 
below. 
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Figure 3.2: Snapshot organogram of the Directorate-General for External Policy in 2012 
(adapted from Governo de Portugal, 2012b; Decreto-Lei 121/2011, of 29 December 
2011, Article 9; Decreto Regulamentar 11/2012, of 19 January 2012; Portaria 31/2012, 
of 31 January 2012). 
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 As stated on the official website, the DGPE’s mission is: 
to ensure co-ordination and decision-making on political diplomatic affairs, 
including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as well as affairs in the 
areas of security and defence, and to implement Portuguese external policy 
at bilateral and political multilateral levels (Ministério dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros, 2010b). 
In addition to managing Portugal’s relations with NATO and the EU’s security 
elements, the DGPE co-ordinates Portugal’s participation in other organisations with a 
defence and/or security brief such as the United Nations, the OSCE, and the CPLP. 
 
While the DGAE handles most aspects of Portugal’s relations with the EU, the DGPE 
retains control over the foreign, security and defence policy areas. The ‘Direcções de 
Serviços’ ‘DSD’ and ‘APE’ (concerned with, respectively, security and defence, and 
European political affairs, primarily issues relating to the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy) handle Portugal’s security relations with the EU and NATO and liaise 
with the Ministério da Defesa Nacional and Portugal’s delegations in Brussels. While 
there is no overlap, the demarcation lines are clear, it is rather inconsistent to have a 
dedicated European affairs department and then to deal with certain EU policies outside 
of this department. Nevertheless, overseeing the highest of high politics remains the 
responsibility of the DGPE, co-ordinated by the senior administrative hierarchy, 
working closely with the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Interview 3, Lisbon, 2010; 
Interview 9, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
The DSD directorate, which handles the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP, formerly ESDP) as well as relations with NATO and disarmament and non-
proliferation issues, has to gather information from various sources, co-ordinate the 
Portuguese position for CSDP matters and advise other actors, particularly those on the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels, on what the official Portuguese line 
is. The DSD must liaise with other ministries, particularly Finance and Defence, and 
must consult the regional desks in the DGPE to make sure that political and diplomatic 
aspects of security missions are handled with appropriate care and sensitivity. In 
practice, discussion of security matters between actors inside the Portuguese 
government occurs on three levels: the unit level; the director level; and the political 
level (Interview 9, Lisbon, 2010). Where security policies are co-ordinated at the top-
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 level between ministries, there will be problems in filtering information down to 
directorates-general and policy units. The DSD and APE directorates, alongside the 
SPM unit, have to maintain communications between Portugal’s delegations to the EU 
and NATO in Brussels and Portugal’s UN Mission in New York, and the various 
government departments in Lisbon. This is a considerable co-ordination task for so few 
officials. 
 
The European Political Affairs Directorate of the DGPE is headed by the MNE’s 
European Correspondent who reports directly to the Director-General. The 
responsibilities of this directorate and the European Correspondent do not overlap with 
those of DGAE officials, as security matters fall firmly within the purview of the 
DGPE. Nonetheless, the role of the European Correspondent helps sharpen the focus of 
Portuguese foreign policy-making on what is happening within Europe (i.e., the EU and 
NATO as the principal security actors) and reveals the importance of European 
institutions to Portuguese national security and foreign policy (Interview 3, Lisbon, 
2010; Decreto-Lei 204/2006, of 27 October 2006, Article 10). 
 
The European Correspondent in the MNE is not only the linchpin in the domestic co-
ordination of the EU’s CFSP but is a crucial advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
In days of yore, the European Correspondent would handle COREU telex messages 
emanating from Brussels on the subject of CFSP, and its precursor European Political 
Co-operation. The European Correspondent would have to digest this information and 
then advise the minister and formulate the national position accordingly (Tonra, 2001: 
13). The European Correspondent in the MNE, because information is power, gained 
considerable influence from 1988 onwards. It was recognised that the European 
Correspondent, as someone in the Minister’s “entourage”, could be relied upon to 
provide up-to-date information and analysis, bypassing the Director-General (da Costa 
Pereira, 1996: 212–213). Today, this remains the principal role of the European 
Correspondent; however, with modern technology, communications between Brussels 
and Lisbon are quicker and more frequent. 
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 3.2.2 The Directorate-General for European Affairs (DGAE) 
 
Since Portugal’s accession in 1986, the national administration has had to adapt to the 
realities of being in the EU. Portuguese foreign policy-making and the wider national 
public administration have needed to develop a system to manage how Portugal deals 
with legislation emanating from Brussels and how it seeks to influence the EU 
institutions. The Direcção-Geral dos Assuntos Europeus (DGAE – Directorate-General 
for European Affairs) acts as the principal interface between the EU institutions in 
Brussels and the Portuguese government in Lisbon. The DGAE has experienced gradual 
changes since its creation which reflect the growing influence of the EU on national 
policies and the importance to Portugal’s foreign policy interests of being an active 
participant in the EU. The organisational structure of the DGAE is outlined in figure 3.3 
below. 
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Figure 3.3: Snapshot organogram of the Directorate-General for European Affairs in 
2012 (adapted from Governo de Portugal, 2012c; Governo de Portugal, 2012d; Decreto-
Lei 121/2011, of 29 December 2011, Article 11; Decreto Regulamentar 12/2012, of 19 
January 2012; Portaria 32/2012, of 31 January 2012). 
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 As stated on the official website, the DGAE’s mission is: 
to guide Portuguese action in the EU’s own institutions and the country’s 
bilateral relations with individual member states and candidate countries, 
and to supervise and co-ordinate the definition of Portugal’s position on EU 
policies, jointly with the competent sectoral ministries and the bodies of the 
autonomous regional governments of the Azores and Madeira (Decreto-Lei 
204/2006, of 27 October 2006, Article 12, N.º 1; Ministério dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros, 2010c). 
 
The DGAE’s roles and responsibilities have not changed markedly since Portugal’s 
accession in 1986. However, the department has evolved over the years in order to make 
the most efficient use of Portugal’s limited resources. The MNE has, therefore, had to 
respond to the fact that the scale of the task of co-ordinating EU business since 1986 has 
increased significantly. While the broad brief of being the department responsible for 
handling EU affairs and co-ordinating Portugal’s official line towards Europe with other 
government departments have remained constants, the DGAE has existed in several 
different guises over the years.  
 
Established on the eve of Portugal’s accession to the EEC, on 31 December 1985, the 
Direcção-Geral das Comunidades Europeias (DGCE – Directorate-General for the 
European Communities) was the DGAE’s first incarnation (founded by Decreto-Lei 
526/85, of 31 December 1985). The original DGCE, like the present DGAE, was 
organised into various ‘Direcções de Serviços’ to handle the key activities of the 
Community from research and technology to agriculture and fisheries (Decreto-Lei 
526/85, of 31 December 1985, Article 3). The main duty of the DGCE (and this remains 
the case for its later guises) was to assist in Portugal’s participation in European Council 
and Council of Ministers meetings, sending instructions to Portugal’s Permanent 
Representation in Brussels (Decreto-Lei 344/91, of 17 September 1991, Article 2). 
 
In 1994, as part of José Manuel Durão Barroso’s wide-ranging reforms of the MNE, the 
DGCE became the Direcção-Geral dos Assuntos Comunitários (DGAC – Directorate-
General for Community Affairs) (Decreto-Lei 48/94, of 24 February 1994, Article 28; 
Matos Correia, 2002: 196). Increasing EU competences through the Treaty of 
Amsterdam required the governing laws of the DGAC to be further adapted in 1999. 
These improvements were consistent with the ambitions of the Portuguese Presidency 
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 of the EU Council in 2000 and served to strengthen the EU’s role as a global actor 
(Decreto-Lei 408/99, of 15 October 1999). Reforms of the MNE are about adapting its 
organisation and routines to deal with the challenges of EU membership, and the 
international political situation more generally. When the powers and relevance of the 
EU increase, as was the case with the Maastricht Treaty, then there is a clear need to 
implement such reforms. Magone (2004) calculated that the DGAC had some 165 
members of staff, one-third of which were career diplomats and many of the remaining 
technical staff were on secondment from other ministries (Magone, 2004: 144). 
 
Up until recently the DGAE was organised into units based open the various EU 
policies with affairs being handled by specialists in that area; for example, Agriculture 
and Fisheries had its own unit within the DGAE and was staffed by technical experts 
who have handled this policy area for many years (Interview 4, Lisbon, 2010). Given 
the pressures to make administration more efficient, the DGAE has had to adapt again, 
the experts still remain, but the units are broader in focus, for example agriculture and 
fisheries are now handled in the Internal and Sectoral Policies unit with other Single 
Market issues (Governo de Portugal, 2012d). However, not all the units are staffed by 
technical experts. The INS directorate, which handles relations with the EU institutions, 
is mostly comprised of career diplomats. Crucially, the structure of the DGAE in Lisbon 
is designed to “mirror” that of the Permanent Representation in Brussels (REPER) 
(Interview 4, Lisbon, 2010).  
 
There are opportunities for both career diplomats and technical experts to be exposed to 
socialisation processes at the EU level, and all officials are susceptible to the evolution 
of belief systems within the Portuguese foreign policy-making institutions. In particular, 
technical experts at the DGAE and REPER are more likely to be exposed to 
socialisation over time. This is because such experts remain in their roles for long 
periods and, consequently, are exposed to European ‘ways of doing things’ for years, 
potentially, decades. However, the CFSP and CSDP policy areas, handled by Portugal’s 
representatives on the Political and Security Committee in Brussels, are not dealt with 
in the DGAE and remain under the domain of the DGPE (Ministério dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros, 2010b), meaning that that those handling Portuguese security policy are 
more sheltered from socialisation pressures at the EU level than their colleagues 
handling, for example, trade policy.  
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 The DGAE, as outlined above, is the principal body for dealing with EU affairs in 
Portugal and co-ordinating with other government departments and the EU institutions 
and Portugal’s Permanent Representation in Brussels. Central to this co-ordination 
mechanism is the Comissão Interministerial para os Assuntos Europeus (CIAE – 
Interministerial Committee for European Affairs), and the DGAE hosts these meetings, 
with the CIAE being chaired by the Director-General for European Affairs in the 
absence of government ministers. The CIAE brings together the various ministries in 
Lisbon (particularly Finance and Defence) and the autonomous regional governments of 
the Azores and Madeira to agree common guidelines and Portugal’s broad position vis-
à-vis the EU’s institutions and policies (Interview 4, Lisbon, 2010; Magone 2000b: 
153–154; Decreto-Lei 204/2006, of 27 October 2006, Article 12, N.º 3).6 EU policy co-
ordination occurs also at the highest levels of the Portuguese government. The Conselho 
de Ministros para os Assuntos da União Europeia (Council of Ministers for EU 
Affairs), presided over by the Prime Minister, sets Portugal’s political orientation with 
respect to the EU (with particular importance in the run-up to Portuguese EU Council 
Presidencies) by bringing ministers together to discuss EU affairs and to seek to 
overcome any internal or external difficulties with respect to Portugal’s relations with 
the EU (Decreto-Lei 474-A/99, of 8 November 1999, Article 33; Magone, 2004: 148). 
 
As well as handling EU business, the DGAE is responsible for managing bilateral 
relations between Portugal and the other 26 EU Member States and the official 
candidate countries (Decreto-Lei 204/2006, of 27 October 2006, Article 27, N.º 3, 
subsection b). In practice it is very difficult to divorce EU matters from purely national 
matters and in some cases, such as with Scandinavian and Eastern European countries, 
Portugal has no interests in these countries beyond the common interests which bind 
them together as EU partners, so there is less need to develop bilateral relations 
(Interview 11, Lisbon, 2010).  
 
While there are some EU Member States with which Portugal has more historical and 
geographical links, the ‘EU’ and the ‘national’ are now so intertwined it is difficult to 
have a bilateral relationship where the EU’s politics, policies and institutions do not 
play a role. Establishing negotiating positions in the EU Council chamber form the bulk 
of the DGAE’s bilateral work. According to officials involved in this process, it is only 
                                                 
6 The DGAE is highly active in interministerial co-ordination with respect to internal market issues. In 
2006, the DGAE held over forty meetings on a single issue (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2008: 
357). 
 107
 natural to look to see what Portugal’s partners or rivals are saying, and this is based 
upon diplomatic intelligence accumulated by the MNE and co-ordinated in the DGAE: 
“We could Google them, but is that the way to build a foreign policy?!” (Interview 11, 
Lisbon, 2010). 
 
As an official in the DGAE said, the behind-closed-doors nature of EU decision-making 
allows Portugal to build up a more-rounded understanding of the positions of other EU 
Member States. This is important because negotiating positions may differ starkly from 
a country’s ‘official line’ on an issue. In the case of attitudes towards Iran:  
if we [Portugal] were working outside the European Union context, we 
wouldn’t know what they [Portugal’s EU partners] thought, because things 
said in secret Council meetings may reveal something that they otherwise 
would not say in public, as it could be politically incorrect or damaging 
(Interview 11, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
This information is collected by those at the meetings and transmitted to Lisbon via 
REPER, but the DGAE has the crucial job of acting upon it and sharing this new 
information with other government departments which may force a reappraisal of the 
Portuguese position on any given issue. In sum, being part of the EU gives Portuguese 
foreign policy strength because it does not work in isolation and diplomats do not have 
to feel around in the dark to know where countries stand on an issue. In negotiations, 
Portugal’s allies are principally the Mediterranean countries (Interview 11, Lisbon, 
2010), but the classic maxim of Portuguese diplomacy still remains relevant today: “in 
case of doubt, you vote with the British” (Interview 14, Lisbon, 2010). This illustrates 
that, while Europeanisation has presented Portugal with opportunities to build new 
alliances, the centuries-old Atlantic maritime alliance with Britain remains so firmly 
embedded in the national psyche, that old diplomatic axioms still guide the behaviour of 
Portuguese diplomats today.  
 
Officials inside the DGAE, whether career diplomats or technical experts, clearly value 
how European integration has opened up new opportunities for Portuguese foreign 
policy. As an obligation of EU membership, Portugal has had to open embassies in the 
new accession states. Now Portugal has embassies in Tallinn, Vilnius and Riga for the 
first time, but it is questionable whether this is a sensible way of targeting Portugal’s 
limited resources in foreign affairs. While officials in the DGAE who deal with Eastern 
 108
 Europe and non-EU countries see the positives of broadening the reach of Portuguese 
diplomacy, they are equally aware that it has resulted in no tangible improvement in 
relations between Portugal and Eastern Europe beyond better political dialogue. In their 
view, concentrating on the Atlantic and Africa still represents Portugal’s best 
opportunity to make a positive impact in international affairs (Interview 5, Lisbon, 
2010).  
 
Nonetheless, Portugal and Eastern European countries are bound by their common 
interests in the EU and NATO and this is a useful foundation upon which to build 
cordial relations for the future and to build new alliances with countries during key 
negotiations. An example would be Romania, if it were not in the EU, would Portugal 
ever discuss agricultural issues with them? If it were not for the EU, Portugal would not 
have had the opportunity or inclination to learn more about Eastern European states, and 
the reverse is also true. “Belonging to the EU is a way of deepening and strengthening 
our understanding of others” (Interview 11, Lisbon, 2010). An enlarged EU gives 
Portuguese foreign policy-makers greater knowledge in formulating the national 
position, but at the same time, it means that there are more countries to keep a constant 
track of. 
 
 
3.2.3 The Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance (IPAD) 
 
The Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento (IPAD – Portuguese Institute for 
Development Assistance) is the arm of the MNE which deals with overseas aid. IPAD 
focuses particularly on promoting the economic and social development of the 
Lusophone countries, especially the PALOPs. IPAD’s role is to propose and implement 
Portuguese overseas co-operation policy and to co-ordinate with other public bodies 
which are involved in this process (Decreto-Lei 204/2006, of 27 October 2006, Article 
18, N.º 1). IPAD is based in Lisbon, but not located near the main MNE buildings, and 
employed 181 people in 2010 (IPAD, 2010: 7). 
 
As outlined above, IPAD merged its activities with the Camões Institute in 2012 to 
create a new body for development co-operation and language promotion called 
‘Camões – Institute for Co-operation and Language’ (Lusa, 2011; Decreto-Lei 21/2012, 
of 30 January 2012). This decision was part of the government’s PREMAC programme, 
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 aimed at reducing inefficiencies in the central administration. In addition to the 
PREMAC restructuring, the OECD has suggested how IPAD can set about to address 
some of the inefficient ways in which Portugal’s development assistance programme is 
handled. Portugal has been urged by the OECD to undertake fewer small-scale projects 
and to organise its interventions under larger, more comprehensive, projects (OECD, 
2010). It would appear that combining aid and language promotion can go some of the 
way towards linking up Portugal’s activities and providing a more efficient delivery of 
services with, given the goals of the PREMAC, a more streamlined administration in 
Lisbon. 
 
Part of the reasoning behind this decision, why the Camões Institute and IPAD make 
such natural bedfellows, is that IPAD was already an organisation which was heavily 
geared towards playing an active part in the Lusophone world and the Camões Institute 
is all about promoting the Portuguese language, especially in Africa (see chapter 4). 
Both the Camões Institute and IPAD’s activities are centred upon the Lusophone world, 
but both organisations recognised the importance of the EU and have co-ordinated their 
activities at the European-level. The Camões Institute has latched onto European Union 
strategies to promote language learning and cultural policy and co-operates with the 
European Union National Institutes for Culture (Instituto Camões, 2011: 5). Similarly, 
IPAD has effectively pursued relations with the PALOPs and East Timor by making use 
of EU development aid resources (Interview 8, Lisbon, 2010).  
 
It is worth noting that the organisational structure of IPAD reflects the priorities of 
using Europe as a source for development aid resources on the one hand, while on the 
other hand, being focused on prioritising Lusophone African countries as the aid 
recipients. As such, there is a European and Multilateral Affairs unit in IPAD and two 
African Co-operation units (one for Angola and Mozambique, the other for Cape Verde, 
Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe) (IPAD, 2010: 6–7). 
 
IPAD has recognised the importance of Portugal’s privileged relations, but also that it is 
a small and relatively poor player and that its limited resources must be targeted in order 
to maximise returns and achieve the best possible outcome for development, in order to 
enhance Portugal’s standing in the Lusophone world. In addition to working positively 
during Portuguese Council Presidencies to achieve Portugal’s foreign policy aims in 
Africa, IPAD is also committed to working through the Commission. In the immediate 
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 aftermath of the Treaty of Lisbon coming into force, it was unclear which of the EU 
institutional actors would take the lead in development policy, it was a complete “grey 
zone” (Interview 8, Lisbon, 2010). In uncertain times, with various EU institutions 
vying for supremacy, it was, therefore, important for IPAD to cast a wide net in Europe 
for support in achieving its aims. 
 
Portuguese development policy is now firmly located in the EU context. In practice, this 
involves seeking to bring matters relating to the Lusophone world to the attention of the 
EU. The floods in Mozambique in 2000 illustrate this clearly. The story, widely covered 
in Lusophone media, took some time to break into mainstream European news 
coverage. Led by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama, Portugal flew the 
European Commissioner for Development to Lisbon and then on to Mozambique to 
witness the crisis personally. This resulted in an increase of EU aid to help deal with the 
humanitarian crisis from €100,000 to €25 million (Interview 13, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
According to a Secretary of State in the XVIII Constitutional Government, if the budget 
for development assistance could have been increased, even by 10 per cent, then 
Portugal could have done a lot more (Interview 13, Lisbon, 2010). While Portuguese 
development policy-makers recognise that the country’s aid budget is severely limited, 
if IPAD did have more money at its disposal, the tendency would still be to focus on the 
Lusophone countries and to do more for them and to target Portuguese aid on the former 
colonies, rather than to cast a wider net in Africa (Interview 8, Lisbon, 2010). This is 
because development aid is central to Portugal’s foreign policy objectives in the 
PALOPs, alongside increasing business investment and enhancing political co-
operation. The centrality of the Lusophone agenda to IPAD’s operations is explored in 
greater depth in the next chapter, which considers Portugal’s renewed African vocation. 
 
 
3.2.4 Portugal’s overseas embassies, consulates and permanent missions 
 
In 2010, Portugal had embassies in seventy-five countries and consular officials in fifty 
cities worldwide. In addition to these, Portugal has eight permanent missions and 
another two temporary missions (located in Sarajevo and Ramallah). Consular activities 
are concentrated mainly in Europe, North America and the Lusophone world and 
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 Portugal has an embassy in each member country of the EU and the CPLP (Ministério 
dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2010d; Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2010e). 
 
Table 3.1 below shows the distribution of Portuguese embassies across the globe and 
compares the situation in 2010 with 1997. Since 1997, Portugal has lost two embassies 
in Africa but managed to maintain its presence in the Middle East and the Americas. 
Portugal gained an embassy in Asia, when East Timor achieved its independence. 
However, between 1985 and 1997 Portugal withdrew several of its embassies in Latin 
America (for the full list of embassies in 1985–1986 see Decreto-Lei 529/85, of 31 
December 1985). This freeing-up of resources, and the obligation to open embassies in 
the newly-independent countries beyond the Iron Curtain when they acceded to the EU 
in 2004, explains the increase in the numbers of embassies in Europe from 27 in 1997 to 
35. Latin America is a strong interest for Portuguese foreign policy, although in 
practical terms this is mostly confined to Brazil. The opening up of embassies in the 
2004 accession countries reflects how the EU is at the centre of Portugal’s foreign 
policy and the broader Europeanisation of the MNE. However, the realities of a reduced 
budget for the MNE in recent years, a trend that is likely to continue, could mean that 
resources are concentrated on regions that reflect the country’s foreign policy interests. 
Consequently, Portugal’s over-representation in Europe, with embassies in every capital 
of every EU Member State, could be addressed in the longer-term (Gorjão, 2010a: 1–2). 
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 Region Number of 
Embassies 
1997 
Number of 
Embassies 
2010 
Change 
 
Europe 
 
 
27 
 
35 
 
+8 
 
North America 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
No Change 
 
Latin America 
 
 
9 
 
9 
 
No Change 
 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
14 
 
12 
 
−2 
 
Maghreb and Middle East 
 
 
8 
 
8 
 
No Change 
 
Asia and Oceania 
 
 
8 
 
9 
 
+1 
Table 3.1: The distribution of Portuguese embassies across the globe (adapted from 
Matos Correia, 2002: 208; Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2010d). 
 
Portugal’s eight permanent missions also play a vital role in the country’s foreign policy 
and how Portugal pursues its interests in multilateral organisations. In addition to the 
permanent missions to the United Nations in New York, and NATO and the EU in 
Brussels, the MNE has permanent delegations to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, 
the OECD and UNESCO in Paris, the OSCE in Vienna and to the United Nations and 
other international organisations based in Geneva. The importance ascribed to 
maintaining Portugal’s constant participation in these organisations highlights how keen 
Portuguese foreign policy-makers are to ground the nation’s external policy in 
multilateral institutions.   
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 – The Portuguese Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York – 
Portugal’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations (UN) in New York co-ordinates 
the country’s position in the General Assembly and was instrumental in promoting the 
successful Portuguese bid for a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) for 2011–2012. Working alongside the international political 
organisations section of the DGPE in Lisbon, the Permanent Mission in New York 
handled all aspects of Portugal’s candidacy for election to the UN Security Council, 
from sounding out members for votes and support, to formulating the priorities of the 
bid. A particular tactic employed by diplomats in New York and Lisbon was to play on 
Portugal’s size (or lack thereof) and to sell the Portuguese candidacy as being 
representative of the smaller and medium-sized powers who comprise the lion’s share of 
the General Assembly. Portugal actively sought to represent weaker powers, countries 
not in the G20. Portugal positioned itself as a champion for small states and distanced 
itself from its larger rivals Germany and Canada (Permanent Mission of Portugal to the 
UN, 2010; Interview 12, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
Portugal was also acting as a Lusophone representative, so relied on the active lobbying 
of its CPLP partners to drum up support for Portugal’s bid. By drawing upon CPLP 
support, the Portuguese bid made use of diplomatic networks in Africa and Latin 
America, and playing the ‘reform the process for the benefit of small states’ card had 
the potential to attract a lot of votes as smaller states tend to find themselves chronically 
on the periphery of international security matters. Portugal also campaigned alongside 
Brazil to lobby for Portuguese to be made an official UN language (Gorjão, 2010b: 4, 
7). The member states of the CPLP officially backed the Portuguese bid in Praia in July 
2009, where the Lusophone countries also supported Brazil’s candidature for the 2010–
2011 term (CPLP, 2009). 
 
The importance of the DGPE as the main hub for domestic foreign policy, particularly 
with international organisations such as the CPLP, NATO and the EU (all crucial for 
managing the security and interventional aspects of the UNSC bid), mean that the 
Permanent Mission to the UN in New York is able to construct Portugal’s negotiating 
position based upon good communications and co-ordination of various different 
positions within other organisations and other partners in multilateral institutions. The 
Permanent Mission used diplomatic means to gather support for Portugal’s bid by 
pledging support to other UN members in different ways in order to secure the 129 
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 votes required to be elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC (Interview 12, 
Lisbon, 2010).  
 
This reflects the broader multilateralisation of Portuguese foreign policy and the need 
for small and medium-sized states to be recognised in multilateral fora in order to give 
their foreign policy credentials greater credibility and legitimacy. The Portuguese 
Mission in New York is a major overseas delegation that operates outside of the 
European context and, as a consequence, its focus on exploiting diplomatic relations in 
Africa and Latin America, demonstrate the scope for Portuguese foreign policy to be 
internationalised outside of the European context. 
 
– Portugal’s Permanent Representation to the European Union (REPER), Brussels –  
The Portuguese Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels 
(Representação Permanente de Portugal junto da União Europeia – REPER) was 
created upon Portugal’s accession in 1986 and was very much modelled on existing 
national representations in Brussels, principally those of France and the UK (Magone, 
2001: 170). With the establishment of the DGCE, on the eve of Portugal’s accession to 
the European Communities, the Portuguese mission in Brussels which was detailed with 
participating in the accession negotiations became, formally, a part of the MNE, 
effectively the mirror-image of the DGCE in Brussels (Decreto-Lei 526/85, of 31 
December 1985; Magone, 2001: 172). Moving to its current premises on Avenue 
Cortenberg from Rue Marie-Thérèse not only signalled Portugal’s intention to be closer 
to the EU decision-making process but the MNE’s willingness to purchase and renovate 
the six-storey building to create a national mission fit for that purpose (Magone, 2001: 
170–171). 
 
REPER is a vital part of the co-ordination process of EU policy and deals with business 
in the Council of the European Union through the Committees of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER I and COREPER II), the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC), and various other working groups and intergovernmental committees.7 The 
official head of REPER, the Portuguese Permanent Representative to the EU at the 
present time, i.e. the Portuguese representative to COREPER II, is Domingos Fezas 
Vital (REPER Portugal, 2012). While, as Magone (2001) rightly argues that, the 
                                                 
7 For further detail on these committees, and the various configurations of meetings in the Council of the 
European Union, see Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006). 
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 “…flexible, non-hierarchical structure [of REPER] prevents the establishment of an 
organogram…” (Magone, 2001: 171), the lines of authority and division of labour are 
clear enough and are summarised in table 3.2 below, which provides a snapshot of how 
REPER was organised in September 2010.  
 
The Ambassadorial Level 
COREPER I   COREPER II   PSC 
Ana Paula Zacarias  Manuel Lobo Antunes António de Almeida Ribeiro 
 
The Co-ordination Level 
Mertens   Antici    Nicolaidis 
Maria Morais e Silva  Ricardo Victória  Miguel Abreu e Brito 
 
The Policy Expertise Level 
Education, Energy,  External Affairs,   Security and Defence,  
Employment,   Economic and   Civilian Aspects of  
Internal Market,  Financial Affairs,  Crisis Management, 
Agriculture and  Justice and Policing,  Some policing overlap 
Fisheries, etc.   Institutional Affairs      
Table 3.2: The Portuguese Permanent Representation to the EU, organisation and 
structure: snapshot of ambassadors, co-ordinators, and policy experts posted to Brussels 
in 2010 (adapted from Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 71; REPER Portugal, 2010). 
 
The three ambassadorial level representatives handle different policy areas within EU 
decision-making, with COREPER I focusing mainly on internal market issues, 
COREPER II handling economic affairs and external relations, and the PSC handling 
aspects of EU security and defence policy. Beneath the ambassadorial level lie the three 
officials who sit on the preparatory bodies and are the linchpins in policy co-ordination 
in Brussels. These top two levels are literally situated at the top of REPER, occupying 
offices on the sixth floor of the building. The majority of officials in REPER occupy 
specialised positions and serve as experts on the multitude of policy issues handled at 
the European level, from pharmaceuticals to shipbuilding, fisheries to crisis 
management. While the policy expertise is vital to the work of REPER, it relies upon 
the team of career diplomats in the Council’s preparatory bodies to put that expertise 
into action (Interview 17, Brussels, 2010). 
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 The three officials at REPER at the co-ordination level attend the Council preparatory 
mechanisms: the Mertens group prepares the agenda for COREPER I; the Antici group 
prepares for COREPER II; and Nicolaidis prepares for the PSC. Antici assists the 
Permanent Representative in making preparations for European Council meetings, in 
particular, as well as in the substantive work of COREPER II. Mertens, the equivalent 
group for COREPER I, does the same preparatory tasks and both groups meet on a 
weekly basis ahead of the meetings at the COREPER level, or ahead of Council of 
Ministers meetings (Interview 16, Brussels, 2010; Interview 17, Brussels, 2010; Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 71, 75). The Nicolaidis group, formally enshrined in 2003, 
is the equivalent preparatory body for the PSC and meets twice weekly on the days 
before the PSC meets (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 85; Swedish Presidency of 
the European Union, 2009a). “The PSC can be compared to the UN Security Council” 
(Swedish Presidency of the European Union, 2009b), and the Nicolaidis group meetings 
are the opportunity for Member States to raise particular issues of concern to the PSC 
(Howorth, 2007: 72). 
 
The role of the Antici, Mertens and Nicolaidis co-ordinators at REPER is to act as 
intermediaries between the EU institutions and the MNE, as well as to organise and co-
ordinate the various sections of the permanent representation in order to conduct the 
negotiations to achieve the best possible outcome for Portugal. These bodies serve to 
both internally co-ordinate the Portuguese position, and operate externally, gauging 
opinion among EU partners. REPER will then report back to Lisbon, where the 
interministerial co-ordination process continues, spearheaded by the MNE, so that 
politicians are given the clearest, most informed set of policy choices possible ahead of 
top-level Council meetings (Interview 16, Brussels, 2010).  
 
The distance between Lisbon and Brussels is one of the reasons why REPER is a 
comparatively large organisation, it needs to support ministers visiting Brussels from 
Lisbon and have officials based permanently in Brussels rather than flying them in as 
required (Magone, 2001: 174). However, the distance between Lisbon and Brussels 
does not hinder the day-to-day activities of Portuguese foreign policy, or handling EU 
policy, as communications between the MNE and REPER are constant. Formal 
telegrams will be sent to Brussels expressing Portugal’s negotiating position. Officials 
in Lisbon and Brussels can also communicate quickly and directly with one another via 
email or mobile telephone. In fact, representatives in Brussels meetings will frequently 
 117
 pop out to check the official line with the national capital on the issue in question 
(Interview 16, Brussels, 2010; Interview 19, Brussels, 2010). As outlined above, 
communications between the MNE and Brussels are constant, particularly between 
officials in the DGAE and their opposite numbers in REPER. 
 
While Lisbon sends the “instructions” to REPER on an issue, there is a great degree of 
trust and flexibility vested in those acting on Portugal’s behalf in Brussels. The implicit 
trust Lisbon shows in those in REPER to have a firm understanding of the issues and to 
be aware of particular difficulties or obstacles on a given issue, signals that the MNE is 
quite prepared to defer to those better-placed to make an assessment of the situation 
(Interview 16, Brussels, 2010). Nonetheless, Lisbon will often instruct REPER to take a 
firm line in negotiations and protect matters of national interest. But with this trust 
vested in REPER, and the constant communications flows between Brussels and 
Lisbon, “red lines are not always red, sometimes they are pinky” (Interview 19, 
Brussels, 2010). This interview evidence, gathered from talking to officials at REPER 
about their working practices, supports Magone’s assertion that Portuguese negotiators 
are pragmatic and can use the “margin of manoeuvre”, signalled by Lisbon, to achieve a 
realistic outcome for Portugal (Magone, 2001: 180–181). 
 
REPER is a diplomatic mission, a tool in Portuguese foreign policy, and a mechanism 
through which the MNE deals with the EU institutions and its policies, those that relate 
to external relations and those that do not. All aspects of Portugal’s relationship with the 
EU go through the MNE and are handled by REPER. Therefore, EU affairs broadly are 
a foreign policy matter, and this stems from when the ‘European option’ was a foreign 
policy goal for Portugal post-1974. However, because Portugal is already well 
integrated on ‘Community’ matters handled through COREPER I, EU fisheries policy, 
for example, can no longer be designated a foreign policy matter as national policy has 
simply migrated to the European level. The fact that it is European fisheries policy does 
not, any longer, make it an aspect of foreign affairs. For the purposes of contemporary 
Portuguese foreign policy, and the EU’s external relations, it seems more appropriate to 
attribute foreign policy actorness to those with briefs relating to COREPER II and PSC 
matters, rather than COREPER I briefs, which represent the domestic implementation of 
EU-wide policy, rather than a foreign policy-making process.  
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 In sum, Portugal’s European integration is complete, but only in areas where the EU has 
firmly established its policies at a supranational level. Where the EU’s competences are 
still emerging, and national governments retain control over matters of high politics and 
work through the mechanisms of the PSC and COREPER II, Portugal continues to play 
a more traditional foreign policy game. That means that the foreign and security policy 
briefs at REPER are the more important, but these are not where instructions are sent 
from the DGAE, but instead emanate from the European Correspondent at the DGPE. 
Nonetheless, European integration and EU affairs remain, justifiably, part of Portugal’s 
foreign policy. However, the distinction between European affairs and national affairs is 
becoming increasingly blurred and this makes it difficult to isolate the precise role of 
REPER in the Portuguese foreign policy-making process. 
 
– The Portuguese Delegation to NATO (DELNATO), Brussels – 
The Portuguese Delegation to NATO (DELNATO – Delegação Portuguesa junto da 
Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte) in Brussels, is de jure an arm of the MNE, 
rather than the MDN (Decreto-Lei 38:728, of 24 April 1952). However, appointing 
officials to DELNATO with experience of both ministries is clearly preferable. The 
current Portuguese Permanent Representative at NATO Headquarters is João Mira 
Gomes, the former Secretary of State for National Defence and Maritime Affairs, who 
replaced Manuel Tomás Fernandes Pereira in September 2010. Mira Gomes, a career 
diplomat, has served in Brussels before, at REPER as Portugal’s representative on the 
PSC (Lusa, 2010a). This shows that the Portuguese foreign and security policy-making 
elite recognise the complementary roles of NATO and the PSC and saw fit to appoint 
someone who has been socialised in both pro-NATO and pro-EU environments. Mira 
Gomes’ experiences of both the MDN and the MNE, and the EU and NATO, make him 
well-placed to be able to see the various perspectives of the key national and 
international actors in security policy and to emphasise the complementary roles of 
NATO and the EU’s CSDP. 
 
 
3.2.5 The Secretariat-General 
 
The Secretariat-General (Secretaria-Geral) of the MNE provides technical and 
administrative support to the Ministry as well as being the centre for planning, resource 
management, public relations and legal affairs. It also controls the purse-strings of 
 119
 Portugal’s diplomatic operations overseas and the day-to-day logistical running of the 
MNE in Lisbon. The Secretaria-Geral consists of the following services: State 
Protocol; the Department of General Administration; the Legal Affairs Department; the 
Press and Information Office; and the Diplomatic Institute (Instituto Diplomático – see 
below). The State Protocol section is the unit of the MNE which oversees the diplomatic 
establishment and the etiquettes, traditions and practicalities of Portuguese foreign 
diplomacy (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2010f; Decreto-Lei 204/2006, of 27 
October 2006, Article 9).  
 
The head of the Secretariat-General is the most senior official in the MNE, Ambassador 
António de Almeida Ribeiro (Governo de Portugal, 2012e). António de Almeida 
Ribeiro has served as Portugal’s Ambassador to the PSC in Brussels and as Director-
General for External Affairs in the MNE in Lisbon as well as being posted overseas to 
locations including Praia, Buenos Aires and Cairo (Despacho 16826/2011, of 15 
December 2011: 48763–48764). As outlined in table 3.2, the current Secretary-General 
of the MNE, before he was posted back to Lisbon to head the DGPE in 2011, served in 
Brussels at REPER as the country’s PSC Ambassador. This suggests that only the 
cream of Portuguese diplomats are posted to the senior ambassadorial roles in Brussels. 
 
It is interesting to consider further the career trajectory of diplomats so senior that they 
have been appointed to this role, as it reveals much about Portugal’s foreign policy 
priorities and the opportunities for socialisation and Europeanisation of the diplomatic 
corps. To take the example of one of Ambassador António de Almeida Ribeiro’s 
predecessors, Ambassador Vasco Valente, it is not surprising that such a senior 
diplomat had a long and distinguished career with time served in London and Africa. 
However, it should be noted that Ambassador Vasco Valente had served as Deputy 
Permanent Representative (1987–1993) and as the Permanent Representative (1997–
2002) to the EU in Brussels (Despacho 19377/2008, of 22 June 2008; Magone, 2001: 
176–177). The fact that someone who rose to the top of the Portuguese diplomatic 
service had a pedigree in the EU institutions reveals two crucial aspects of the broader 
Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy. Firstly, as a response to the importance of 
the EU to Portuguese foreign policy interests, particularly in the run-up to and during 
Portuguese Council Presidencies, it was vital that the most talented people in the 
diplomatic service were appointed to REPER in Brussels. Secondly, the fact that 
someone who became Secretary-General of the MNE had spent so much time working 
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 in Europe, and interacting with EU institutions, demonstrates that there are 
opportunities for elite socialisation to penetrate the upper echelons of the Portuguese 
diplomatic service. The experiences of senior diplomats through their careers, and their 
exposure to European ways of doing things, may well have impacted on Portuguese 
national foreign policy priorities subtly over time. 
 
 
3.2.6 The Diplomatic Institute and the training of officials 
 
The Instituto Diplomático (Diplomatic Institute) of the MNE is charged with promoting 
the study of International Relations and academic debates surrounding aspects of 
Portuguese foreign policy. The Instituto Diplomático organises research programmes, 
seminars, lectures, publications (most notably the periodical Negócios Estrangeiros), 
training for MNE officials, and manages the Ministry’s library and archival resources 
(Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2010f). 
 
The training of new Portuguese diplomats is organised through the Instituto 
Diplomático and this programme changes significantly from one year to the next. In 
previous years the Curso de Política Externa Nacional (National Foreign Policy 
Course) has focused more on the academic aspects of Portuguese foreign policy rather 
than on practical skills required in the modern diplomatic service such as management, 
team work, knowing how to write a brief and successfully managing a budget. The 
emphasis for the 2010 programme was much more on the practical side of diplomatic 
life, largely because graduates leave university already with a thorough understanding 
of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis (Interview 2, Lisbon, 2010). 
While graduating in law is still commonplace for trainee diplomats, the increase in 
recent years in graduates of international relations entering the service forced this 
change. 
 
The training of new Portuguese diplomats includes a considerable European component 
which contributes to the broader socialisation of Portuguese diplomats and the 
Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy more generally. All new Portuguese 
diplomats get, as part of their training, a trip to Brussels to take a course on the EU 
institutions. New recruits to REPER have to undergo their own internal training 
programme (and placements in Brussels are done through the INS directorate of the 
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 DGAE). It is important for Portuguese diplomats to be familiar with Brussels; with time 
they will be moulded by processes of socialisation and will be able to build networks in 
the EU institutions. In general, the training programmes for Portuguese diplomats vary 
over time and are designed on an ad hoc basis. This flexibility means that the Instituto 
Diplomático, and the MNE more generally, is able to respond well to changes in 
policies and institutions at the European level (Interview 2, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
The Europeanisation of the training of Portuguese diplomats occurs less through the 
imposing of norms of behaviour on Member States from the supranational institutions 
but instead is driven by the Member States and how they communicate and exchange 
information along intergovernmental lines. The European Diplomatic Programme 
(EDP), although overseen by the European External Action Service (and previously 
overseen by the Commission), is driven by the Member States who set the priorities and 
direction of the training programme. Every six months the representatives of the MNE 
meet with their European counterparts to discuss the programme; however, in reality the 
Instituto Diplomático enjoys good relations with its equivalents in other Member States 
and officials there revealed that there is a constant flow of ideas and information 
between national governments (Interview 2, Lisbon, 2010). An integral part of the EDP 
is the Council decision-making simulation (European Commission, 2008a: 9); this 
further underlines the focus on understanding the day-to-day functioning of the EU 
institutions from the perspective of national governments interacting through 
intergovernmental negotiations. 
 
 
3.2.7 The ministerial team 
 
There are five political appointments in the MNE. Paulo Portas, the Minister of State 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs, is the most senior of the ministerial team. Directly 
responsible to him is his assistant Vânia Dias da Silva, the Deputy-Secretary to the 
Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is 
supported by three Secretaries of State: Miguel Morais Leitão is Secretary of State for 
European Affairs; Luís Brites Pereira is Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-
operation; and José Cesário is Secretary of State for Portuguese Communities (Governo 
de Portugal, 2012f; Governo de Portugal, 2012g; Governo de Portugal, 2012h; Governo 
de Portugal, 2012i; Governo de Portugal, 2012j). 
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 The current ministerial team reflects the fact that the incumbent government is a 
PSD/CDS–PP coalition. The CDS–PP is represented by Miguel Morais Leitão and 
Vânia Dias da Silva, alongside the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paulo Portas, who is the 
party’s leader. Luís Brites Pereira and José Cesário are affiliated to the PSD (Governo 
de Portugal, 2012f; Governo de Portugal, 2012g; Governo de Portugal, 2012h; Governo 
de Portugal, 2012i; Governo de Portugal, 2012j). With the CDS–PP heavily represented 
in the MNE, political rhetoric could be at odds with accepted norms of behaviour in the 
MNE. It remains to be seen whether the Euroscepticism of the CDS–PP will have an 
impact on the priorities and functioning of Portuguese foreign policy. Nevertheless a 
more Atlanticist posture and an emphasis on economic diplomacy are to be expected 
from the current coalition, given the political orientations of the parties involved. 
 
In terms of departmental responsibilities, the overall MNE is the responsibility of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and various organs within it are the responsibilities of the 
respective Secretaries of State. The Secretary of State for European Affairs presides 
over the DGAE, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation is 
responsible for IPAD and Portugal’s UNESCO committee, and the Secretary of State 
for Portuguese Communities is responsible for consular services and for supporting 
expatriate communities overseas. With the exception of the Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, who is based in the DGAE’s offices in the nearby Palácio da Cova da 
Moura, the offices of the ministerial team are in the main building of the MNE, the 
Palácio das Necessidades. 
 
 
3.3 The Ministry of National Defence (MDN) 
 
The Portuguese Ministry of National Defence (Ministério da Defesa Nacional – MDN) 
is an important actor in the process of formulating Portuguese security policy, and this 
has obvious implications on Portugal’s broader external policy. According to Article 1 
of the Ministry’s Lei Orgânica (Decreto-Lei 122/2011, of 29 December 2011), the 
MDN is charged with the duty of proposing, and implementing, a policy for national 
defence and is responsible for the Armed Forces (in terms of administering and 
financing them) in accordance with the Law of National Defence (Lei 31-A/2009, of 7 
July 2009). 
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 Defence and security policy are inextricably linked to Portugal’s broader foreign policy. 
However, Portuguese territory is not under a direct threat; the Overseas Territories are 
no more, the traditional Spanish threat has diminished, and the Cold War has ended. 
Therefore, the role of a national defence policy has had to change to reflect this, and 
Portugal has looked to participate in international peacekeeping missions (Freitas do 
Amaral, 2001: 206). It can be described as an “essential pillar” of Portuguese defence 
policy, to contribute to international security missions through active participation in the 
United Nations, NATO and the European Union (Teixeira, 2009: 21). 
 
This section is divided into three parts. The first outlines the organisational structure of 
the MDN including the ministerial offices, the bureaucratic support services, and how 
the Armed Forces fit into the overall structure. The second part gives an account of the 
role of the Armed Forces, both in modern Portugal, and how this has evolved since the 
Carnation Revolution of 1974 and influenced the situation today. Finally, the defence 
establishment in Portugal, and how it fits into the wider policy-making framework, is 
discussed, with special attention paid to the domestic and international co-ordination of 
defence and security policy. The MNE’s significant role in managing Portugal’s 
security relations with the EU has some notable implications for the MDN and causes 
some significant institutional disconnects. 
 
 
3.3.1 The organisational structure of the Ministry of National Defence 
 
The MDN can be divided into three central bodies, the political offices of the Minister 
for National Defence and the Secretary of State for National Defence, the Armed Forces 
and chiefs of staff, and various directorates, inspectorates and institutes which comprise 
the central support services, as outlined in figure 3.4 below. The current Portuguese 
Minister for National Defence, under the XIX Constitutional Government, is José Pedro 
Aguiar-Branco of the PSD (Governo de Portugal, 2012k). His junior minister at the 
MDN, the Secretary of State for National Defence, is Paulo Braga Lina, who is also 
affiliated to the PSD (Governo de Portugal, 2012l). 
 
The most senior official, and head of the bureaucratic side of the MDN, is the Secretary-
General. Aside from the Secretariat-General, there are three other directorates-general in 
the MDN, as well as the General-Inspectorate for National Defence, the National 
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 Defence Institute and the Armed Forces Social Support Institute. The body in charge of 
strategic planning of Portugal’s national defence policy is the Direcção-Geral de 
Política de Defesa Nacional (DGPDN – Directorate-General for National Defence 
Policy). The DGPDN co-ordinates Portugal’s participation in multilateral security 
organisations, such as the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE, the EU, and the CPLP, 
with the MNE (Decreto-Lei 122/2011, of 29 December 2011, Article 13; Governo de 
Portugal, 2012m). 
 
The Portuguese Armed Forces, although ultimately responsible to their Supreme 
Commander the Presidente da República, are integrated into the structure of the 
government here in the MDN, and report to the Minister for National Defence. The 
organisation of the Armed Forces, outlined in the ‘LOBOFA’ (Lei Orgânica 1-A/2009, 
of 7 July 2009), comprises the three strands of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and Air 
Force) and the EMGFA (Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas), the chiefs of 
staff. The current Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces (CEMGFA – Chefe do 
Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas) is General Luís Evangelista Esteves de 
Araújo from the Air Force (EMGFA, 2012a). 
 
Below the CEMGFA, each service has its own respective chief of staff and 
commanding body (Chefe do Estado-Maior do Exército – Chief of Staff of the Army; 
Chefe do Estado-Maior da Armada – Chief of the Admiralty; Chefe do Estado-Maior 
da Força Aérea – Chief of the Air Force Staff) (Lei Orgânica 1-A/2009, of 7 July 
2009). The functioning of the EMGFA, and each strand of the Armed Forces, is 
outlined in the relevant decree laws: the Army is currently governed by Decreto-Lei 
231/2009, of 15 September 2009; the Air Force by Decreto-Lei 232/2009, of 15 
September 2009; the Navy by Decreto-Lei 233/2009, of 15 September 2009; and the 
EMGFA by Decreto-Lei 234/2009, of 15 September 2009. 
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Figure 3.4: Snapshot organogram of the Portuguese Ministry of National Defence in 
2012 (adapted from Governo de Portugal, 2012m; Decreto-Lei 122/2011, of 29 
December 2011; Decreto-Lei 234/2009, of 15 September 2009; Resolução do Conselho 
de Ministros 39/2006, of 21 April 2006). 
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 3.3.2 The role of the Armed Forces in Portugal: past and present 
 
The role of the Armed Forces in bringing about an end to the dictatorship and the start 
of a new era of democratic government on 25 April 1974 means that the military was 
strongly linked to political processes in Portugal. In the immediate aftermath of the 
Carnation Revolution, the Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement) 
was a key stakeholder in the establishment of the new regime and overseeing the 
decolonisation process. The military remained a central instrument in the government of 
Portugal, through the Conselho da Revolução (Council of the Revolution), until the 
constitutional revision of 1982 (Carrilho, 1998: 131). 
 
The MDN was founded after World War II by Salazar but it was not a formal ministry 
and did not possess any staff. It was not until 1980 that Portugal had a defence ministry 
that was both independent of military interference and not bound to submit to political 
pressures and the wishes of the dictatorship. Nonetheless, the civilianisation process 
was slow and it took many years for the MDN to change (Carrilho, 1998: 137). This 
was partly due to the fact that the Presidency of the Portuguese Republic was occupied 
by the military until the election of Mário Soares in 1986, nearly twelve years after the 
Carnation Revolution. The process of consolidating democracy and introducing civilian 
political participation could not have been said to have been completed until this point, 
and, reforming the MDN meant that it was then free from interference from Ramalho 
Eanes (the last military Presidente da República, 1976–1986) (Carrilho, 2005: 13).  
 
The Armed Forces and the MDN are important players in the formulation of Portuguese 
foreign policy today. As Nuno Severiano Teixeira argued, before he became Minister 
for National Defence, the traditional distinction between foreign policy and defence 
policy was based on the view that diplomacy was an instrument of peacetime, and 
military intervention was a means to resolving conflict, i.e. an instrument of war. This, 
he argued, no longer holds true in the current global climate. Portugal’s military 
personnel are much more likely to be deployed in response to an overseas crisis or to 
humanitarian and peacekeeping missions abroad, than they are to be called upon to 
defend Portuguese territory from a foreign aggressor (Teixeira, 2004: 221–223). Rather 
than being black or white, there is a “continuum” between foreign policy and defence, 
between the use of diplomacy and the deployment of military force (Teixeira, 2004: 
223). Recognising that the situation is nuanced has allowed the military to play a more 
 127
 enhanced role in supporting Portuguese diplomacy, as the country pursues its three 
principal foreign policy goals: integration into the EU; retaining the transatlantic link 
with the United States; and consolidating co-operation between the independent 
Portuguese-speaking countries (Mariz Fernandes, 2004: 245, 249). 
 
 
3.3.3 The Portuguese defence establishment in the wider context: institutional 
disconnects and relations with international organisations  
 
While administrative reforms and the tightening of budgets do impact the Portuguese 
defence establishment, the scope for Europeanisation in the MDN and the Armed 
Forces is much more limited. This is because significant institutional disconnects exist 
and the MDN and the Armed Forces have a very different relationship with the EU and 
other international political organisations than the MNE does. Portuguese defence and 
security policy is co-ordinated with all the concerned domestic actors and relevant 
international organisations at the top-level of the government, led by senior officials in 
the MNE’s DGPE (Interview 3, Lisbon, 2010; Interview 9, Lisbon, 2010). At the 
highest levels, diplomatic, political and military, there is co-ordination of Portuguese 
defence and security, but that does not mean that NATO and the EU are given the same 
priority by the MDN and the MNE or that the MDN and the EMGFA have the same 
levels of access to the EU’s institutions, or indeed the same preferences and views, as 
the MNE. 
 
One notable disconnect in the defence policy co-ordination framework is in the area of 
defence procurement and weapons policy. The European Defence Agency (EDA) in 
Brussels is the organisation responsible for Europe-wide defence procurement, ordering 
military hardware and promoting co-ordination and co-operation of military capabilities 
and capacities of EU Member States. As such, officials at the EDA are concerned that 
the department of the MDN responsible for weapons procurement, the Direcção-Geral 
de Armamento e Infra-Estruturas de Defesa (DGAIED – Directorate-General for 
Armaments and Defence Infrastructure) has not put in place a formal system to co-
ordinate its activities with the EDA in Brussels (Interview 24, Brussels, 2010). This 
disconnect is represented in figure 3.5 below by a faint dotted line between the 
DGAIED and the Armed Forces and the EDA.  
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 While it would seem that the EMGFA and NATO are satisfied, with the operations of 
the DGAIED, the EDA has heard little from them and this reflects the culture within the 
majority of Portugal’s defence establishment to ignore the EU and the EDA as an 
irrelevance. While top-level co-ordination of EU security missions does occur with the 
MDN, it is a concern that the activities of actors further down the chain, such as the 
day-to-day functions of the DGAIED, appear to be disconnected. This illustrates the 
indirect nature of Portugal’s defence policy co-ordination with the EU, where the MNE, 
not the MDN, acts as the principal intermediary between Lisbon and Brussels. 
Furthermore, it appears that there is little co-ordination between the EMGFA and the 
DGAIED (again indicated by a faint dotted line in figure 3.5 below), which suggests 
that the co-ordination processes in Portugal are, in the view of a senior official at the 
EDA, less centralised than in other EU Member States (Interview 23, Brussels, 2010). 
 
This complex and diffuse co-ordination framework, where there appears to be no direct 
link between the DGAIED in Lisbon and the EDA in Brussels, is outlined schematically 
in figure 3.5 below. This partial Europeanisation of Portuguese security and defence 
policy can be accounted for by, what could be dubbed, the ‘MNE-isation’ of Portuguese 
security policy. 
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Figure 3.5: The ‘MNE-isation’ of security and defence co-ordination with the European 
Union (adapted from interview data). 
 
This institutional disconnect means that some of the Portuguese defence establishment 
are heavily geared towards NATO, whereas others see the benefit of exploring EU 
security and defence co-operation. In addition to this, tensions between the branches of 
the military may contribute to the Portuguese defence establishment not shunning the 
EU altogether. While the Army is very much inclined towards NATO, a position echoed 
throughout the MDN and the EMGFA because the Army holds key positions of power 
within the national defence establishment, the Portuguese Navy is looking to the EU 
and works closely with the EDA (Interview 20, Brussels, 2010; Interview 23, Brussels, 
2010). The Navy and the Air Force typically undertake smaller operations, compared to 
the Army, so are suited to EU missions and so actively participate in EDA programmes 
(Interview 21, Brussels, 2010; Interview 23, Brussels, 2010). On the one hand, this 
Europeanisation of certain parts of the Armed Forces is a recognition of the different 
tasks the EU and NATO perform. On the other hand, it would seem that the EU is a way 
for the Portuguese Navy, in particular, to move out of the shadows of the Army in the 
domestic defence establishment. 
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 The MDN and the EMGFA are, therefore, more orientated towards dealing with NATO 
day-to-day, and although the MNE does deal with other organisations, it is the principal 
conduit between the Portuguese security and defence policy-makers and the EU 
decision-makers in REPER and the PSC. As military and diplomatic appointments to 
NATO and the EU go through the MNE, i.e. Portuguese officials and military advisors 
sent to Brussels are there to act on behalf of the MNE and not, officially, the MDN 
(Interview 20, Brussels, 2010), there is considerable scope for the MDN to be eased out 
of the picture domestically. However, in practice military officers sent to REPER are 
there at the behest of the MDN as well as the MNE (Interview 21, Brussels, 2010). This 
works in practice so long as security and defence, a major policy area for any 
government, is dealt with at the highest levels of the decision-making process, and this 
requires top-level interministerial co-ordination. This, as outlined above, can mean that 
some departments further down the chain are not as linked-up with Brussels-based 
decision-making as they could be.  
 
Portugal’s long-standing membership of NATO is an important factor in understanding 
the limited scope for Europeanisation in the MDN. The opportunities for socialisation of 
the Armed Forces through military co-operation through the Atlantic Alliance mean that 
the MDN and the military are more integrated with NATO than the EU. As such some 
factions of the defence establishment are not as well-connected with EU security and 
defence decision-making matters as they are with NATO Headquarters or with bilateral 
security co-operation in the Lusophone world. The MDN sees NATO as the brightest 
star in the sky. Although the MNE is still strongly inclined towards NATO, because of 
the transatlantic link and Portugal’s history, it is, in the view of a military officer 
charged with representing Portugal in the EU’s military structure, nowhere near as 
geared-up towards NATO as the MDN (Interview 20, Brussels, 2010). These 
institutional preferences reflect embedded Atlanticist norms and embody the view that 
NATO remains Portugal’s most significant security and defence commitment. While 
NATO exists, there will be a significant portion of the Portuguese defence 
establishment who will see the EU as much more of an irrelevance in security terms, a 
view not embodied by foreign policy-makers in the MNE. The limited effects of 
Europeanisation in the MDN, with particular reference to current Portuguese security 
policy, are examined in chapter 5. 
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 3.4 The Wider Constitutional and Political Context of Portuguese Foreign 
Policy-Making 
 
3.4.1 The role of the President of the Portuguese Republic in national foreign and 
security policy 
 
The Armed Forces have a role to play in shaping Portuguese foreign policy, as, indeed, 
do other political actors aside from the MNE and the MDN. The President of the 
Portuguese Republic (Presidente da República), as head of state, has notable foreign 
policy powers and responsibilities. The present incumbent is the former Prime Minister, 
Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who was elected in 2006 and is currently serving in his second 
five-year term of office, after his re-election in 2011. The powers of the Presidente da 
República are enshrined in Article 133 of the Constitution. Among these, the Presidente 
da República must preside over the Conselho de Estado (Council of State) and the 
Conselho Superior de Defesa Nacional (Superior Council of National Defence) and has 
the power to appoint, upon the recommendation of the government, the head of the 
Armed Forces (CEMGFA), as part of his duties as Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces (Article 133, Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 1976, last revised 2005 – 
Lei Constitucional 1/2005, of 12 August 2005; Lei 31-A/2009, of 7 July 2009, Article 
10). 
 
Aside from these duties enshrined in the Constitution, the Presidente da República, 
performs several ceremonial duties at home and abroad, and is never too far away from 
prestigious events being hosted in Portugal, not least EU, NATO, and CPLP summits. 
As head of state, Cavaco Silva is protector of two of the major achievements which 
defined his decade in office as Prime Minister from 1985 to 1995 (known as the era of 
‘Cavaquismo’). The first major achievement was to oversee Portugal’s accession to the 
European Communities and the success of Portugal’s first Presidency of the Council in 
1992 (Goucha Soares, 2007: 465). The second notable foreign policy achievement 
during the era of Cavaquismo was the start of negotiations to establish the CPLP 
(although completed under the Guterres government in 1996) (Magone, 2004: 251). 
Cavaco Silva, therefore, has a deep personal vested interest in making sure that the 
successes which defined his premiership are not undone by the current government. As 
President of the Republic, he is, therefore, in a position to be able to offer the current 
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 government advice and can quietly steer them in the right direction, so as to protect his 
legacy. 
 
The various actors in Portuguese foreign policy-making are outlined in figure 3.6 
below, where the Presidente da República sits at the top. The superior advisory 
committee to the Presidente da República, the Conselho de Estado (Council of State), 
comprises representatives from both the government (i.e. the Prime Minister) and the 
unicameral legislature (the Assembleia da República), as well as the autonomous 
regional governments, legal experts, and the three former heads of state since the 1976 
Constitution was adopted. It is only the Conselho de Estado which has the power to 
declare war and proclaim peace (Article 145, Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 
1976, last revised 2005 – Lei Constitucional 1/2005, of 12 August 2005; Lei 31/84, of 6 
September 1984; Presidência da República Portuguesa, 2010). 
 
Although the Presidente da República sits at the top of the foreign policy-making 
process, and is head of the Armed Forces, it is the other members of the Conselho de 
Estado, most notably the Prime Minister (and his government), and the Assembleia da 
República (and its committees), which make the greatest day-to-day contribution to 
Portuguese foreign policy.  
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Figure 3.6: Actors involved in Portuguese foreign policy-making in the wider 
constitutional context. 
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 3.4.2 The Prime Minister and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
 
While the Presidente da República, as head of state, is an important actor in Portuguese 
foreign, security and defence policy, it should not be understated that formulating and 
executing Portuguese foreign policy is the responsibility of the government, led, of 
course, by the Prime Minister. Having already outlined the roles and responsibilities of 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for National Defence it is important 
not to overlook the most important member of the government. While the MNE carries 
out Portuguese foreign policy, the Prime Minister has a crucial role to play in setting the 
general course for the country’s foreign policy. As such, the Presidência do Conselho 
de Ministros (PCM – the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the Portuguese 
equivalent of the British Cabinet Office) must ensure that there is harmony between the 
MNE and the Prime Minister’s private office, so that the government speaks with one 
voice. 
 
The Prime Minister, as head of the government, has notable foreign policy roles, not 
least as Portugal’s representative on the North Atlantic Council and the European 
Council. The power is vested in the Prime Minister to appoint his Ministers of State and 
their respective juniors (Decreto-Lei 321/2009, of 11 December 2009, Article 6). 
Therefore, the most crucial foreign policy role for the Prime Minister is in choosing the 
ministerial posts for the MNE. In coalition government situations, the incumbent Prime 
Minister is compelled to offer the senior members of its coalition partner(s) prestigious 
posts within the government, such as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in return for their 
support in building a workable majority in parliament. The Prime Minister also sits as 
the representative of the government on the Conselho de Estado. 
 
The current Prime Minister is Pedro Passos Coelho. He led the Partido Social 
Democrata (PSD – Social Democratic Party) to victory in the legislative elections of 5 
June 2011. However, the PSD did not command an overall majority so formed the XIX 
Constitutional Government in coalition with the Centro Democrático e Social–Partido 
Popular (CDS–PP – Social and Democratic Centre–People’s Party) on 21 June 2011 
(Governo de Portugal, 2012n; Borja-Santos et al., 2011). Passos Coelho took over from 
José Sócrates, who had been in office since his Partido Socialista (PS – Socialist Party) 
was elected in 2005, ending the previous PSD/CDS–PP coalition led by Pedro Santana 
Lopes.  
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 The Presidência do Conselho de Ministros and the Prime Minister’s private office, 
together, form the life-support system for the Prime Minister and the cabinet. The PCM 
is charged with overseeing the smooth running of the government and the 
implementation of the government’s programme. To this end, it is central to the co-
ordination process between government departments (Decreto-Lei 202/2006, of 27 
October 2006, Article 2). Additionally, the government’s security services are co-
ordinated through the PCM, including the intelligence services (Decreto-Lei 202/2006, 
of 27 October 2006, Articles 25 and 26). 
 
When compared to the British Cabinet Office, the Presidência do Conselho de 
Ministros plays a relatively minor role in the domestic co-ordination of foreign policy 
and EU affairs. In Portugal, the MNE retains control over foreign policy and is the hub 
for the co-ordination of EU policies (Matos Correia, 2002: 207). In terms of foreign 
affairs, where co-ordination is required between government departments, the MNE, 
rather than the PCM takes the lead. Thus, the PCM does not have quite the same powers 
as the British Cabinet Office, which takes the lead in interministerial co-ordination of 
EU affairs in the UK system (Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 94). While in the Portuguese 
system the MNE retains considerable autonomy from political interference, the PCM is 
there to keep government departments in line, with its power stemming directly from 
the Prime Minister.  
 
 
3.4.3 Parliamentary scrutiny of foreign affairs  
 
Aside from the Presidente da República and the Prime Minister, and the government, 
the legislature has an important role in scrutinising Portuguese foreign policy. The 
President of the Assembleia da República automatically has a seat in the Conselho de 
Estado and several more deputies are elected to sit on this committee (as shown in 
figure 3.6 above). Members of parliament are, therefore, involved, to some degree, in 
major foreign policy decisions. There also are various permanent parliamentary 
committees which deal with foreign policy issues (Assembleia da República, 2010).8 
 
                                                 
8 The committees of the XI legislature of the Assembleia da República which were of particular relevance 
to Portuguese foreign policy were: 2.ª Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros e Comunidades Portuguesas – 
Foreign Affairs and Portuguese Communities Committee; 3.ª Comissão de Defesa Nacional – National 
Defence Committee; 4.ª Comissão de Assuntos Europeus – European Affairs Committee; 5.ª Comissão de 
Orçamento e Finanças – Budget and Finances Committee. 
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 The Foreign Affairs and Portuguese Communities Committee scrutinises the 
government’s broad foreign policy. The areas that this committee focuses on include the 
role of the CPLP and the Portuguese language in international affairs, economic 
diplomacy, and migration flows of Portuguese people (with the implications this has on 
the provision of consular services throughout the world). The parliament also watches 
closely the development of the EU’s new European External Action Service. Committee 
hearings include contributions from officials from the European Commission, 
committees of the European Parliament, as well as questioning the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the Secretary of State for European Affairs and Portugal’s Permanent 
Representative to the EU. The committee also goes on visits abroad to places of special 
interest to Portuguese foreign policy. Such as, in 2009–2010, when the committee 
visited Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angola, with a view to assessing the success of 
Portugal’s development policy in these countries. During this period, the committee also 
visited Venezuela to analyse bilateral relations between Lisbon and Caracas, the 
multilateral relationship in the context of the Ibero-American summits, and the 
substantial Portuguese community in the country (Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros e 
Comunidades Portuguesas, 2009; Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros e Comunidades 
Portuguesas, 2010). 
 
The activities of the European Affairs Committee are principally focused on scrutinising 
policies emanating from the EU, inviting officials from the institutions, bodies, and 
agencies of the EU to defend and/or explain policy developments. The European Affairs 
Committee also invites the ambassadors of the incumbent EU Council Presidency to 
present. In 2010, the committee received both the Spanish and the Belgian Ambassadors 
to Lisbon to set out their respective countries’ priorities, but also received the Croatian 
Ambassador to discuss his country’s eventual accession to the EU (Comissão de 
Assuntos Europeus, 2010). 
 
The National Defence Committee questions members of the government, particularly 
the Minister for National Defence and the Secretary of State for National Defence, the 
head of the Armed Forces (CEMGFA) and the heads of each of the services, and 
officials representing the various directorates-general of the MDN and the Portuguese 
Delegation to NATO. During the 2009–2010 session, the committee visited 
Afghanistan, Angola, East Timor, Lebanon and the Balkans. The committee also 
visited, and received deputations from, other parliamentary defence committees from 
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 countries such as Angola, Mozambique, the United Kingdom, Spain, Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Libya (Comissão de Defesa Nacional, 2010). The interest in speaking to 
delegations from the Lusophone countries and North African states reflects the strategic 
importance of these countries to Portuguese foreign and security policy. 
 
Finally, scrutiny of public finances and the budget in committee has an obvious impact 
on the resources available for the various government departments and may constrain 
Portugal’s diplomatic activities or military capacity. The Budget and Finances 
Committee scrutinises the Ministry of Finance, which has departmental responsibility 
for the reforms to the central administration (the PRACE and its successor the 
PREMAC) that, as discussed above, have had, and will continue to have, a considerable 
impact on the MNE’s and the MDN’s operations. 
 
The fortnightly debates also offer deputies an opportunity to question the Prime 
Minister directly on issues relating to Portugal’s place in the world. Although 
committees are the usual way for parliament to scrutinise foreign affairs, and Portugal’s 
participation in the EU, “[a] considerable number of the debates proposed by the 
[Guterres] government concern[ed] European Union affairs” (Leston-Bandeira, 2001: 
152). This illustrates the fact that the Assembleia da República must scrutinise both 
Portuguese foreign policy, in the general sense, and Portugal’s place in the EU. This is 
because, due to the Europeanisation and multilateralisation of the country’s foreign 
policy, the two areas often overlap. This was especially evident during Portugal’s 
Presidencies of the Council of the European Union in 2000 and 2007, when the country 
set the EU’s foreign policy agenda to reflect its interests in Lusophone Africa (discussed 
further in chapter 4). 
 
 
3.4.4 Party politics and Portuguese foreign policy 
 
Portuguese politics is dominated by the two parties of the centre, the centre-left Partido 
Socialista (PS – Socialist Party), and the centre-right Partido Social Democrata (PSD – 
Social Democratic Party). The two parties usually secure around 70 per cent of the 
overall vote, and are strongly pro-European (Moreira, et al., 2010: 59). Both parties 
have presided over key moments in Portugal’s relationship with the EU, with both PSD 
and PS prime ministers chairing the European Council. Ten years on from accession, 
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 and with the PSD’s gradual acceptance of the importance of the EU to Portugal under 
Cavaco Silva, the PS and PSD reached a consensus in the mid-1990s that Portugal had 
to play a central role in the EU. This then sought to marginalise the other parties in 
Portuguese politics, particularly the Communists (Interview 14, Lisbon, 2010). While 
the mainstream left and right in Portugal are pro-European, enthusiasm among political 
elites for a single European foreign policy is, however, rather limited, with the centre-
left being the more in favour of the idea (Moreira, et al., 2010: 71). 
 
In the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, key figures in the PS 
were fervently committed to European integration as a means to national salvation. 
Exploring the ‘European option’ was essential to the long-term consolidation of 
democracy and to foster Portugal’s economic and social development (Teixeira, 1998: 
83, 86–87). The PS, under Mário Soares’ leadership, made redefining the direction of 
Portuguese foreign policy towards Europe a fundamental plank of their 1976 manifesto, 
campaigning with the slogan “a Europa Connosco” (“Europe with Us”) (Royo and 
Manuel, 2003: 11). The PS commitment to Europe was further underscored during the 
Guterres administration (1995–2002). António Guterres was especially committed to 
enhancing Portugal’s role in the EU, believing that the country could aspire to be more 
than simply a mere recipient of funds from Brussels. He was determined to demonstrate 
that Portugal could fulfil a more prestigious role in the functioning of the EU, and could 
participate actively in a wide-range of co-operation mechanisms. This was concretised 
with the decision of Portugal to intervene in Bosnia in late 1995, where the previous 
PSD administration had been reluctant to get involved (Interview 14, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
The PSD’s attitudes towards Europe evolved during the decade of Cavaquismo. This 
was shaped by being able to see the economic benefits of Portugal’s membership of the 
EU, as well as Portugal gaining confidence on the European stage by hosting the 
Council Presidency in 1992. The gradual increase in enthusiasm of the PSD, and 
Cavaco Silva as leader, for the European Union sought to nullify strong, nationalistic, 
sentiments towards the centrality of the former colonies to Portuguese foreign policy. 
The Europeanisation of the PSD was a gradual process, but by the mid-1990s it had 
accepted the importance of Europe to Portuguese foreign policy (Goucha Soares, 2007: 
465). During this period of Europeanisation, Durão Barroso, was instrumental in 
helping reconstruct Portugal’s relations with its former colonies (Magone, 2005: 547–
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 548). However, by the time Durão Barroso became Prime Minister in 2002, the 
Europeanisation of his party, and his own beliefs, had sufficiently taken hold. 
 
While the PSD broadly accepted the importance of the EU, it never sought to downplay 
the importance of NATO and the CPLP to Portugal, partly because it is trying to attract 
support from the more conservative and traditional voters and differentiate itself from 
the PS, yet remain firmly in the centre-ground. During the 2009 election campaign, the 
PSD leader at the time, Manuela Ferreira Leite, tried to play on anti-Spanish sentiment. 
A decade previously it may have been possible to gain some political momentum from 
playing on these fears, but this tactic was miscalculated in this instance (Interview 14, 
Lisbon, 2010). Broadly speaking the political centre in Portugal, which the PS and the 
PSD occupy, accepts that the EU and good relations with Spain are central to realising 
the goals of Portuguese foreign policy in the twenty-first century. 
 
In the aftermath of the revolutionary period 1974–1976, the decision to look to Europe 
was the result of a consensus between the parties at the centre of Portuguese domestic 
politics. However, there remained dissenting voices that were sceptical of the new 
regime and were against Portuguese integration with Europe. As Bosco (2001) 
describes, the Partido Comunista Português (PCP – Portuguese Communist Party) 
opposed the establishment of western democracy in Portugal, advocating instead 
genuine socialism based upon its close links to Moscow. The PCP, therefore, became 
part of the domestication of a Cold War ideological struggle, resisting Portugal’s 
gradual adoption of ‘western’ democratic values by opposing the constitutional 
revisions of 1982 and 1989 and speaking out against Portugal’s accession to the EEC 
(Bosco, 2001: 336–337).  
 
Together with the PCP’s reluctance to support the “Europe of the Monopolies”, the 
centre-right CDS–PP (Centro Democrático e Social–Partido Popular – Democratic and 
Social Centre–People’s Party) was also considerably Eurosceptic (Magone, 2000a: 168; 
Moreira et al., 2010: 58–59). These parties, on the left and right, respectively, of the 
political centre in Portugal, have suffered declining electoral fortunes. It seems that 
these parties, which are not part of the broad consensus of the centre, are becoming an 
irrelevance in foreign policy terms and do not reflect credible alternatives for Portugal 
beyond Europe and the Atlantic (Magone, 2000a: 168). 
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 While the PCP is chronically excluded from government, the CDS–PP has twice joined 
the PSD to make up a right-leaning coalition (the first coalition was in office from April 
2002 until February 2005, and the second time was to form the current government in 
June 2011). During the 2002–2005 coalition with the PSD, the party was fervently 
committed to the Atlantic Alliance and this gave Portuguese foreign policy under the 
governments led by José Manuel Durão Barroso and Pedro Santana Lopes a distinctly 
Atlanticist flavour. This was largely because the key position of Minister for National 
Defence was occupied during this period by the leader of the CDS–PP, Paulo Portas. 
Portugal’s hesitancy towards moves to establish the European Defence Agency during 
2004 underscored how the parties of the right act cautiously towards anything which 
may undermine the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance (Interview 10, Lisbon, 2010; 
Dempsey and Spiegel, 2004: 4). In the current PSD/CDS–PP coalition government 
Paulo Portas occupies another, even more significant, foreign policy role as Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (Governo de Portugal, 2012f; see also pp. 122–123). 
 
Party politics clearly impacts upon the attitudes of political parties towards foreign 
affairs when in government. The PSD and the PS, the principal parties of government in 
Portugal, are firmly committed to the EU and recognise the importance of being an 
active participant in EU affairs. The parties outside of the centre-ground seek to 
differentiate themselves by, either being sceptical of the capitalist club that the EU has 
become, or fearing the loss of national sovereignty and Portugal’s unique relationship 
with the Atlantic and its former colonies. Of these parties, it is the CDS–PP that actually 
gets to influence Portuguese foreign policy directly, with the leader Paulo Portas 
receiving prominent posts in PSD-led administrations because of the parliamentary 
support his party brings to give a workable majority. While there have been moments 
were the Euroscepticism of the CDS–PP has been pandered to, at no point have the 
fundamental commitments of Portuguese foreign policy been put into jeopardy. The 
consensus between the parties of the centre towards the EU means that Portuguese 
foreign policy is not subjected to frequent changes in orientation and that key priorities 
are more likely to become institutionalised over time in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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 3.5 Assessing Portugal’s Foreign Policy-Making Institutions: What Impact has 
Europeanisation had on Domestic Processes? 
 
Since the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 many aspects of Portuguese life have 
changed irreversibly. While the foreign policy-making process has not been protected 
from fundamental change, there are some notable continuities. Where change has 
occurred, it can, generally, be attributed to the broad Europeanisation of Portuguese 
foreign policy, which has its roots in the political will to pursue the ‘European option’ 
post-1974. However, to categorically state that contemporary Portuguese foreign policy 
is formulated in a Europeanised institutional structure would be to overplay the 
influence of ‘Europe’. Pressures for change have come as much from within as they 
have from outside influences. There are four important distinctions that should be made 
when trying to establish any overall trend towards the Europeanisation of the foreign 
policy-making process in Portugal. 
 
Firstly, organisational structures, and the nature of public sector organisations, make 
change a slow and gradual process. Marked changes in light of European integration 
are, in practice, not easy to observe and it is even harder to determine causality for such 
changes. The creation of the DGCE, on the eve of Portugal’s accession to the EEC, is an 
example where the European effect on the domestic structure, and Portugal’s response, 
is more clearly evident. Since accession to the EEC, isolating the European effect is 
more difficult because of Portugal’s readiness to pursue its core foreign policy goals in 
a multilateral context. Secondly, the multilateralisation and Europeanisation of 
Portuguese foreign policy are aspects of the externalisation of traditional foreign policy 
priorities. Thirdly, Europeanisation is, in some areas, more accurately described as the 
domestication and co-ordination of EU business. Inevitably, this led to the creation of 
new mechanisms to deal with this burden, giving REPER an increasingly important role 
in setting out how Portugal defines its strategy on key negotiating issues. However, this 
has not resulted in a fundamental shift in priorities. Fourthly, Europeanisation can 
impact upon individual actors as well as institutional structures. Socialisation and 
increased communication flows mean that the Europeanisation of individuals makes 
change at the institutional level possible, but, at the same time, actors are constrained by 
the institutional framework. This moderates the impact of Europeanisation pressures on 
the more macro levels of the policy process that reflect aspects of national identity 
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 (namely levels 2 and 3), where the Atlantic and the Lusophone world are more firmly 
embedded as being distinct historical roles for Portugal. 
  
The broader multilateralisation of Portuguese foreign policy helps to preserve 
Portugal’s unique ties to its former colonies, and gives it greater legitimacy because it is 
advocating EU and international norms. The MNE has evolved to be able to deal with 
the changing climate of international affairs and the rise of international multilateral 
organisations in the latter half of the twentieth century, not least the emergence of the 
EU as an international actor. It is an organisation which is small enough to be flexible, 
but large enough to be independent and to continue to pursue Portuguese interests at a 
bilateral level, if multilateral relations flounder. Therefore, Portuguese foreign policy-
making is attuned to the emergence of shared political challenges and transnational 
cultures. These include: aspects of normative adaptability, stemming from pressure to 
converge with Europe; more general transnational bonds forged during the Cold War; 
and the interconnectedness of states due to increasing globalisation. With a myriad of 
external forces shaping Portuguese foreign policy-making it is difficult to isolate 
Europeanisation as a single factor in promoting a more European or international 
awareness in contemporary Portuguese foreign policy (on level 1 of the policy process), 
but Portugal wants to fit into the broader international community and to internalise 
external values in order to strengthen its diplomacy and to legitimise its actions. 
 
As with level 1, aspects of national identity that give Portuguese foreign policy its sense 
of purpose (levels 2 and 3) also do not reflect significant Europeanisation. This stems 
from the fact that Europe was not the only course available to Portugal during the 
twentieth century. The historical legacies, upon which Portuguese national identity is 
constructed, put the Atlantic, not Europe, at the centre of Portuguese foreign policy. 
Consequently, the Europeanisation of the policy-making process has not penetrated this 
level. With NATO and the Lusophone world still occupying prominent positions, the 
core pillars of Portuguese foreign policy remain centred on the Atlantic. European 
integration is not a contradictory path that undermines Portugal’s position in these 
Atlantic-centred priorities. The Europeanisation, or the broader multilateralisation, of 
Portuguese foreign policy is about externalising core national foreign policy interests. 
By going through international institutions, not least the EU, and aligning Portuguese 
foreign policy with the norms promoted by such bodies, i.e. the rule of law, human 
rights etc., Portuguese foreign policy-makers can use rhetoric to portray Portugal’s 
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 mission as being more legitimate, and consistent with the broader interests of the 
international community. This allows Portugal to act as a potential intermediary 
between African states and Brazil and the EU and NATO. It also suits Portugal’s 
strategy of seeking to serve as a champion of smaller states’ interests in international 
fora, such as the United Nations. Thus, the actions of ‘projecting national influence and 
finding a role since decolonisation’ and manipulating international organisations, 
suggest that the alternative explanations on levels 2 and 3 seem more convincing than 
the hypothesis of Europeanisation taking a hold on these levels.  
 
The changing roles and responsibilities of key actors in Portuguese foreign, security and 
defence policy had a lot to do with the Carnation Revolution and the transition to 
democracy, rather being a result of European integration as such, although exploring the 
‘European option’ was part of that process. The civilianisation of the Presidente da 
República, and public life more generally, took many years. The structures of ministries 
have evolved over time, with some new organs added, which reflect how Portugal’s 
broad place in the world changed over the course of the twentieth century. Portugal has 
to engage with the EU, but NATO remains central. Portugal still deals with Africa but 
in the context of postcolonial relations. The preservation and promotion of the 
Portuguese language is also a major factor in Portugal returning to a foreign policy 
focused on its former colonies, but very much centred on multilateral institutions in 
order to give it greater legitimacy. Therefore, to a degree, Europeanisation has 
facilitated the rescue of the Portuguese nation-state, but the myriad of other internal 
factors which have contributed to its transformation since 1974, mean that to conclude 
that Europeanisation was the single determining factor would be problematic. 
 
By conducting day-to-day business in the EU context, and by attending meetings in 
Brussels, Portuguese foreign and security policy-makers are now highly attuned to the 
European context within which contemporary national foreign policy-making takes 
place. Portuguese foreign policy elites now factor in the positions of European partners 
and, increasingly, the wider ‘European’ perspective when preparing for international 
negotiations. The Europeanisation of individuals and small diplomatic networks within 
Portugal’s foreign policy apparatus is not, necessarily, predetermined by socialisation 
and the fact that time is spent in Brussels. The EU is not the only organisation which 
could socialise Portuguese diplomats to change their behaviour. However, the fact that 
time in Brussels appears to be a prerequisite for progression through the ranks of the 
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 Portuguese diplomatic service, means that the experience of being on secondment to 
Brussels is likely to leave its mark with those powerful enough to be able to change 
institutional practices in response to the realities of policy-making within the EU 
context. This suggests that ‘exposure to Brussels’ has the potential to promote the 
Europeanisation of the policy-making process by virtue of the experiences of certain 
individuals. This has the potential to feed up the chain. This makes the more outward-
looking MNE, staffed by career diplomats who are more exposed to European ways of 
doing things than home civil servants, more susceptible to Europeanisation pressures. 
This is partly due to the MNE’s central role in co-ordinating EU business domestically 
and the fact that many senior positions in the MNE will be staffed by diplomats who 
have spent a prolonged spell of their careers interacting with the EU institutions, if not 
directly, by being posted to REPER, then indirectly, by sending instructions to the 
Portuguese delegation in Brussels from Lisbon. 
 
While exploring the ‘European option’ was a foreign policy goal in itself, the resulting 
integration process has meant that Portuguese administrative systems have had to adapt 
and respond to the demands of EU membership. This exposure, combined with the 
constant communications between various actors in the system, means that Portuguese 
national interests (the basis upon which a foreign policy is built) are more subject to 
change and adaptability than ever. This is because the Portuguese national position is 
calculated with constant reference to the positions of EU partners. As such, Portuguese 
foreign policy-making institutions have undergone considerable change since the end of 
1985. The creation of the DGAE and the mechanisms for handling relations with the EU 
(its institutions, policies and laws) have put EU affairs at the heart of Portuguese foreign 
policy. Therefore, the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy is partly a 
manifestation of the need to co-ordinate EU business at the national level. This 
Europeanisation as domestication idea is the most obvious and observable change in the 
domestic foreign policy-making process in the last quarter of a century, and reflects the 
need for Member States to respond to the requirements of being in the EU by adjusting 
their domestic policy-making structures accordingly. This means that Europeanisation 
has clearly penetrated the institutional and policy levels through socialisation, learning 
and top-down pressures. 
 
The foreign policy-making apparatus in Portugal has been subject to considerable 
pressures, and has had to adapt to reflect Portugal’s transformed place in the world. 
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 These pressures do not emanate solely from the EU, but the evidence presented in this 
chapter suggests that the Europeanisation of Portugal’s foreign policy-making 
institutions can be readily identified. The exploration of the ‘European option’ 
presented opportunities for elite socialisation and institutional change to take place, 
particularly between 1976 and the mid-1990s. Adapting to, and learning from, Europe 
was the default position for Portuguese elites during the early years of its integration. 
Consequently, institutions have evolved in ways that reflect Europeanisation. The EU’s 
impact is one that has changed the domestic policy-making environment. This is 
particularly evident on the levels of the policy process of institutional cultures, social 
groups, and the behaviour of individuals. Portuguese diplomats, politicians (of various 
political persuasions, but principally those in power between the late-1970s and the 
early-1990s), and the institutional belief systems and cultures within the MNE have 
been shaped by European integration and have evolved to recognise the fact that the EU 
is an integral part of political processes at the national level. Portugal has had to adapt 
its institutional structures to deal with the realities of being in the EU specifically, hence 
the evidence of Europeanisation found on levels 5, 6 and 7 of the policy process. 
  
The Europeanisation of the institutional structures which shape Portuguese foreign 
policy may create the conditions for policy outputs to reflect a more Europeanised 
attitude, but this is not guaranteed. Other factors may be at work, and external 
influences on Portugal, other than the EU, may have a significant impact in shaping 
policy outputs, despite the EU’s considerable impact on domestic policy-making 
processes. Portuguese foreign policy outputs may reveal less Europeanisation as such, 
and, instead, indicate a more general internationalisation and multilateralisation, of 
which accommodating the emergence of the EU as an international actor is only part of 
it. For example, even given the existence of increasingly Europeanised domestic 
structures, the continued importance of the Lusophone world and NATO in core foreign 
policy outputs would mean that the overall Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign 
policy is, in fact, rather limited. 
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 Chapter 4 
Portugal’s Renewed African Vocation 
 
Africa is fundamental to Portuguese foreign policy. While the EU is important, Africa 
and the former colonies are at the heart of Portuguese foreign policy, even nearly forty 
years after decolonisation. While it is a fair reflection of Portugal’s foreign policy 
interests to claim that “…the empire is dead, long live the EU” (de Figueiredo, 2003: 
143), Portugal’s relations with its former African colonies are of paramount importance. 
Portugal can use its membership of the EU as a platform to re-engage with its former 
colonies and could even use this to broaden its strategy towards the continent. The 
reality, however, is that, in Portuguese foreign policy, ‘Africa’ is almost always 
synonymous with Lusophone Africa. Indeed, through development aid and cultural 
policy, Portugal’s relationship with Africa, whether officially Portuguese-speaking 
states or not, reflects a neo-colonialist attitude where language promotion and expatriate 
communities are at the centre of its activities. 
 
Re-establishing Portugal’s ‘African vocation’ in the postcolonial era, after years of 
resisting the struggles for independence of its colonial subjects during the 1960s and 
1970s, is fraught with difficulties. The legacy of the Portuguese language is a major 
weapon in Portugal’s diplomatic armoury, but the nature of its postcolonial relationship 
with African countries is characterised by “…unstable relationships, changing 
objectives and uncertain rapprochements with the former territories, which have been as 
much psychological as political” (MacQueen, 2003: 182). 
 
Portugal’s renewed African vocation in the twenty-first century is centred on building 
and strengthening its relations with its former colonies by promoting development and a 
spirit of co-operation. This means that Portugal’s policy towards African development 
is mostly centred on its five former colonies (known collectively as the ‘PALOPs’, 
Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa – African Countries where Portuguese is 
the Official Language: Angola; Cape Verde; Guinea-Bissau; Mozambique; and São 
Tomé and Príncipe). This policy seeks to strengthen the historic and linguistic ties 
between Portugal and its former colonies through cultural policy, emphasising the 
Portuguese language. The shared heritage and the linguistic and cultural destiny 
(destino) between Portugal and the PALOPs and East Timor make these countries the 
central focus of the country’s development policy (de Almeida Sampaio, 2004: 119). 
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 Development policy, as part of Portugal’s broader foreign policy interests in Africa, is, 
therefore, hugely preoccupied with maintaining and strengthening the historic ties based 
upon a shared language and history. Such a philosophy cannot be easily disentangled 
from the civilising mission of Portugal’s involvement in Africa and the 
‘pluricontinentalism’ of Salazar’s policy towards the African colonies as part of the 
single and indivisible Portuguese State (MacQueen, 1999: 210). 
 
Assessing Portugal’s renewed interest in Africa in the last two decades presents several 
interesting questions and paradoxes, particularly, given the completion of Portugal’s 
European integration project and the current emphasis on playing a more visible role in 
international organisations by playing the Lusophone card (de Sousa, 2010). Does this 
renewed interest in Africa reflect an abandonment of European integration, in a similar 
vein to Salazar’s belief that Africa, rather than Europe, was Portugal’s true destiny? 
Does Europeanisation allow for the widening of Portugal’s sphere of influence in Africa 
and is this being resisted in favour of building an increasingly focused relationship with 
the PALOPs? Or, alternatively, is any kind of re-engagement only made possible 
because of Portugal’s place in the EU as a means of externalising Portugal’s interest in 
Africa, providing the financial resources to pursue its development policy objectives in 
the PALOPs, and showing to African states that Portugal has indeed ‘moved on’ from 
the Salazar era of clinging to its colonial possessions? To assess the impact of 
Europeanisation on Portuguese foreign policy it is, therefore, vital that Portugal’s 
relations with Africa are thoroughly examined.  
 
The principal analytical goal of this chapter is to assess whether Portugal’s membership 
of the EU has had a profound impact on a key output of Portuguese foreign policy, 
namely the country’s relationship with Africa. This case study analyses Portugal’s 
relations with Africa by assessing Portugal’s relations with, firstly, the Lusophone 
countries, and then the non-Lusophone countries, most notably South Africa and the 
Maghreb states. The emphasis in this chapter is on the macro and meso levels of 
Portugal’s foreign policy apparatus, building upon the assessment of the 
Europeanisation of the policy-making process. This chapter examines the extent to 
which the transformative effects of Europeanisation on Portugal’s foreign policy 
making institutions, as outlined in the previous chapter, have impacted upon Portugal’s 
relationship with Africa. Does the Europeanisation of policy-making processes translate 
into a more Europeanised policy output or are macro-level political rhetoric and national 
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 identity issues able to shape this policy area, meaning that the alternative explanations 
to Europeanisation are better placed to account for Portugal’s current African policy?  
 
In order to make a thorough assessment of Portugal’s contribution to African 
development and its efforts to construct a more cohesive Lusophone cultural 
community, the motivations which underpin Portugal’s renewed African vocation will 
be analysed in the context of international interdependence and the important role 
played by multilateral organisations, such as the EU, the CPLP and the AU. Finally, an 
assessment of the effectiveness of Portugal’s renewed African vocation will be 
presented as being both norm-driven and pragmatic, reliant on bilateral relations as well 
as, increasingly, on the EU and the CPLP to afford it greater legitimacy and strength. 
However, before assessing the role of Portugal in its relations in Africa, in the PALOPs 
and beyond, the nature of Europe’s relationship with Africa and Portugal’s place in it 
are analysed. Particular emphasis should be stressed on the role that the former colonial 
powers, such as Portugal, play in shaping African development, and the motivations 
behind both their own foreign policies and the EU’s external relations and development 
aid mechanisms. 
 
 
4.1 Cloaked Colonialism: Contemporary Europe’s Relations with Africa 
 
Historically, the relationship between Europe and Africa has been an imbalanced one, 
built upon colonisation, enslavement and exploitation. The nature of the contemporary 
relationship between the two continents is, on the face of it, more cordial and based 
upon the notion of partnership. However, beneath the surface, Europe’s dealings with 
Africa today reflect a neo-colonialist agenda on the part of European states and the EU. 
Europe’s relations with Africa are motivated by the desire to project European influence 
in Africa and to perpetuate the imbalanced nature of the relationship in order to serve 
Europe’s best interests. This section provides some context to Portugal’s renewed 
African vocation in the twenty-first century by outlining how European states and the 
EU attempt to maintain a significant influence in Africa, through projecting national 
influences, norms of behaviour, colonial languages, and by providing development 
assistance in order to secure preferential relations. 
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 4.1.1 Losing an empire and finding an acceptable new role: projecting national 
influence in Africa since decolonisation 
 
The principal strategy of making sure that Portuguese foreign policy is located firmly in 
a multilateral context brings two major strengths to Portuguese diplomacy with regard 
to Africa. Firstly, it allows Portugal to play a role in linking up the various organisations 
of which it is a member, most notably the CPLP and the EU but also the African Union 
(AU), in which Portugal holds observer status. Secondly, if Portugal is seen to be 
participating in an internationally sanctioned way, such as through the EU’s 
development aid framework with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, or in 
supporting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it gives greater legitimacy and 
more added value to Portugal’s relations with its former colonies. This gives Portugal’s 
interests in the PALOPs wider international legitimacy, whilst at the same time allowing 
Portugal to distance itself from its recent past, when it fiercely resisted the African 
independence movements and clung to its colonial possessions. This means that 
promoting multilateralism is actually a way of satisfying Portuguese national interests, 
and enhancing Portugal’s ability to influence African states, i.e. using the Lusophone 
link to improve bilateral relations between Lisbon and the PALOPs. 
 
The importance of Africa to Portuguese foreign policy stems from the deep historical 
and cultural ties to the continent, in particular with the PALOPs, and reflects a cross-
party consensus. Engagement with Africa is more than a tactical decision by successive 
governments to maximise Portuguese interests, it is the result of the recognition, across 
all levels of Portuguese society, of the importance of the relationship with Africa and 
the bond between Lusophone nations (Santos Neves, 1996: 137). Over time, and as 
Portugal’s European integration project progressed, there has been a shift from seeing 
the Africa or Europe dichotomy in “either/or” terms, to a recognition of the 
complementarity between strong relations with Europe and building effective ties with 
Africa, exploring a “both and” logic (Santos Neves, 1996: 141).  
 
This shift is particularly evident looking back at Portugal’s Presidencies of the EU 
Council in 1992, 2000 and 2007. In each case, Portugal made the most of the 
opportunity to promote relations between Europe and Africa, playing a central role in 
both the first EU–Africa Summit, in 2000, and the second, which was hosted in Lisbon 
in 2007. The fact that the second EU–Africa Summit did not occur until the rotating EU 
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 Council Presidency came around to Portugal again in 2007, reveals something 
significant. With no EU–Africa Summit for seven years, the Portuguese Prime Minister, 
at the time of the 2007 Presidency, dubbed it an “incomprehensible failing of European 
foreign policy” and outlined that Portugal was interested and determined enough to 
address this, stating that “[i]f there is one country that must take a stand against this and 
do everything to overcome the situation, it is Portugal” (Sócrates, 2007: 14). 
 
Portugal’s re-engagement with its former colonies and its interests in non-Lusophone 
Africa in the wider context, are driven by the processes of change which have gone on 
since 1974, namely the democratisation and modernisation of the Portuguese State, the 
globalisation, internationalisation and Europeanisation of Portuguese external policy 
and economic diplomacy, and the desire to construct a stronger Lusophone identity to 
give Portugal a more meaningful place in global affairs, allowing it to punch above its 
weight on the world stage. 
 
A major challenge facing Portugal is to reconcile its European integration project with 
the desire to rebuild relations with its former colonies and to be at the centre of a global 
Lusophone community. As part of the country’s obligations to the OECD and the EU, 
Portuguese foreign policy-makers regard “…development cooperation as one of its 
pillars of foreign policy, an indispensable tool in its relations with the world” (IPAD, 
2006: 12). Making a positive contribution to African development is, therefore, a way 
of not only enhancing Portugal’s relations with the PALOPs, but a vehicle to raise 
Portugal’s diplomatic standing, particularly in the EU context. This was recognised in 
the formulation of Portugal’s development co-operation strategy, outlined in 1999: 
The important challenge facing Portugal is to know how to link, at the 
political, economic and cultural levels, the dynamics of our European 
integration with the dynamics of the formation of a community, based 
on the relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries and 
communities around the world… (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros 
43/99, of 18 May 1999: 2636; English translation taken from IPAD, 
2006: 11). 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century, Portugal had a similar experience to 
France. Both countries pursued European integration projects, yet both resisted self-
determination for the people of their colonies for many years. The French experience of 
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 re-engagement with its former colonies in Africa since decolonisation, could, therefore, 
be instructive for Portugal. The cultural, linguistic and economic ties to Francophone 
African states, combined with occasional military interventions, allowed France to 
“exercise a ‘virtual empire’ in sub-Saharan Africa…” in the latter part of the twentieth 
century (Gregory, 2000: 435). This process has allowed France to create a niche for 
itself in Africa, to give grandeur to its broad foreign policy, to capture an exclusive 
sphere of influence for French culture and ideas and to access natural resources on 
privileged terms (Gregory, 2000: 436). It seems that Portugal is trying to emulate the 
French model for engaging with Africa. Similarly, the discourse in Portugal is centred 
on linguistic ties, but with Portugal it is only Lusophone Africa that is the focus. 
 
France’s African policy in the postcolonial era has enhanced France’s global standing 
and contributed to building French delusions of grandeur, as France’s special 
relationship with Francophone Africa demonstrates its ability to command influence in 
distant places. Francophone Africa has been the principal target for French development 
aid. As such, pursuing an attitude towards African development which is centred on the 
former French colonies has meant that France has been open to criticism (Chafer, 1992: 
40). Portugal’s attitudes towards Africa appear, at first glance, to be very similar. 
Lusophone Africa is the absolute priority for Portuguese development aid spending, 
which suggests that there could be similarities between the French and the Portuguese. 
 
Nevertheless, the French experience in Africa suggests that although links are strong, 
there has been a shift in recent years towards a more multilateral relationship between 
France and Africa. While France has not sought to fully disengage from Africa, a new 
style of neo-colonialist relationship has emerged (Chafer, 2002: 363). After the crisis in 
Rwanda, French policy shifted towards a more multilateral approach and although 
military involvement and co-operation remains significant, there has been a recognition 
that regional actors in Africa could play a significant role. This ‘Africanization’ of 
regional security policy has been recognised by France and has allowed it to ‘cherry 
pick’ its strategic alliances on the continent (Gregory, 2000: 442).  
 
This could be the formula for Portugal to adopt, given that Portuguese foreign policy 
has recently recognised the importance of hiding behind multilateral organisations in 
order to give its diplomacy greater legitimacy in dealing with its former colonies. 
Rather than it being a one-dimensional Europeanisation of its foreign policy which 
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 focuses on Europe, European integration has allowed Portugal to develop a multilateral 
foreign policy geared towards enhancing Europe’s (but really Portugal’s) relationship 
with Africa (principally the PALOPs). Therefore, locating relations with Europe in an 
international, Europeanised, and multilateral context, allows Portugal to pursue its 
national interests in the Lusophone world, to colour European policy to reflect its 
national interests and to engage with Africa with enhanced legitimacy through 
international organisations rather than just through bilateral means as a way to 
rejuvenate Portuguese foreign policy in the postcolonial era. 
 
 
4.1.2 Europe’s multilateral postcolonial relations with Africa: development aid in 
the context of the European Union’s external action 
 
Despite the lack of top-level summits between Europe and Africa, the European Union 
is a committed supporter of African development and is a major provider of 
humanitarian assistance and development aid to Africa as part of realising the 
Millennium Development Goals. This was initially done through trade and development 
policy handled by the European Commission, but is increasingly spilling over into the 
intergovernmental frameworks of CFSP and CSDP, especially with the creation of the 
European External Action Service. While the EU itself, as an international actor, is not 
held responsible for the actions of colonial European powers of years past, the stain of 
the slave trade and the exploitation of Africa by the colonial powers of Britain, France, 
Belgium, Portugal and others, gives considerable political impetus to the EU’s policy of 
supporting African development. To that end, the Cotonou Agreement, signed under the 
Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 2000, outlines a “contractual relationship” between 
the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states for the support of 
development programmes to complement national, bilateral, development policies 
(Cameron, 2007: 158–159). 
 
However, the Cotonou Agreement is the latest incarnation of a framework to give 
European states a preferential status with the ACP states, in return for development 
assistance. Indeed, EU development policy can be traced back to the 1950s where 
“…France insisted on preferential treatment for its ex-colonies…”, which gave former 
colonies privileged, often tariff-free, trading status with Europe (Cameron, 2007: 158; 
see also Woolcock, 2005: 381). EU–Africa relations in the twenty-first century are, 
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 formally at least, characterised by ‘equality’ (mutual respect and recognition of 
institutions), ‘partnership’ (developing political and commercial links), and ‘ownership’ 
(not imposing development strategies from the outside but making them country-
owned) (European Commission, 2008b). Yet despite the positive rhetoric, the 
contemporary relationship between Europe and Africa remains an asymmetrical 
partnership, with the EU using the Cotonou Agreement to impose less favourable terms 
on Africa, the weaker partner (Farrell, 2005: 280). 
 
The European Union helps to shape African development in two significant ways. 
Firstly, the EU supports aid and investment programmes in the continent, with a 
particular emphasis on enhancing skill development and promoting education. To that 
end, the EU set a target to contribute €25 billion in development aid to Africa in 2010 
(Cameron, 2007: 166). Secondly, the European integration project itself serves as an 
inspiration for African integration and development. Transfrontier regionalism, 
exemplified by the free movement of people within a transnational regional bloc 
associated with the European integration project, could be a model for Africa to follow 
in order to defeat nationalism, improve trade prospects (between African states and 
between Africa and the rest of the world) and to achieve economic prosperity through 
the free movement of people, goods and services. State borders in both Europe and 
Africa have a degree of artificiality about them; therefore, the European project has the 
potential to be an instructive experience for Africa (Asiwaju, 2004: 206–230). 
 
While the EU and multilateral agencies are important actors in providing development 
aid to Africa, the majority of Portuguese overseas development aid money is spent 
bilaterally. 60 per cent of Portugal’s overseas development assistance (ODA) is 
channelled bilaterally, with the main recipients being the five Lusophone countries in 
Africa (OECD, 2010). The remaining 40 per cent of Portugal’s ODA is channelled 
through multilateral agencies, the bulk of which goes through the EU (OECD, 2010). 
Both bilateral and multilateral development co-operation is co-ordinated by the Instituto 
Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento (IPAD – Portuguese Institute for Development 
Assistance) in Lisbon. IPAD has worked to improve the co-ordination of development 
aid programmes and recognises the important role the EU plays in supporting African 
development (OECD, 2010). 
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 In addition to Portugal’s and the EU’s involvement in the PALOPs, the wider 
international community (under the auspices of the United Nations, as well as countries 
like the United States and China acting independently) has an important role to play in 
supporting African development. In the context of the Angolan peace process, the 
United States had considerable interests in supporting development programmes in 
Angola and delivering humanitarian aid in the wake of the civil war (Minter, 1997: 52). 
This illustrates that both the EU’s and Portugal’s strategies for supporting African 
development must work in the multilateral context and complement, not conflict with, 
the actions of other interested parties in order to be effective. This may be difficult to 
achieve in practice as all international actors become involved in Africa for geopolitical 
reasons which are not entirely altruistic. The United States’ involvement in Angola was 
in response to its fears about the spread of Communism during the Cold War, and China 
is now using its economic power to gain political influence in Africa. 
 
 
4.2 Portugal’s Relations with Lusophone Africa in the Twenty-First Century 
 
Portugal channels most of its overseas aid to some of the world’s least developed 
countries. While the need for development assistance in the PALOPs is clear, it is 
Portugal’s historic ties to these countries which motivate its commitment to tackling 
poverty in Africa (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros 43/99, of 18 May 1999: 2648). 
Save for some minor funds available for other African states, Portugal’s contribution to 
African development assistance is limited to the PALOPs. This is because the 
Portuguese language plays a crucial role in facilitating co-operation between Portugal 
and the PALOPs and allows sectoral ministries, local authorities, civil society and 
development non-governmental organisations to play an active role in relations between 
Portugal and Lusophone Africa (IPAD, 2007: 16–17). 
 
While bilateral relations between Portugal and the PALOPs are important, the emphasis 
in recent years has been to make sure that bilateral development assistance complements 
the activities of multilateral organisations (particularly the EU, CPLP, OECD, United 
Nations) and regional organisations (such as the African Union) and is consistent with 
the Millennium Development Goals (IPAD, 2011a: 1). Portugal’s status as an EU 
Member State means that it has a role in shaping the EU’s relationship with the ACP 
states, but important emphasis is also given to other international organisations. This 
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 has meant that in recent years Portugal has sought to close the divide between bilateral 
and multilateral development aid. Consequently, the ‘bi-multi approach’ has become an 
important guiding principle of IPAD’s activities, citing the importance of providing 
effective and efficient development assistance in the context of contributing to the 
MDGs (IPAD, 2006: 31–32). 
 
The importance of locating Portuguese development assistance in multilateral 
organisations offers three advantages to Portuguese foreign policy, which reflect the 
Europeanisation of Portugal’s relationship with Lusophone Africa. The first advantage 
of the ‘bi-multi approach’ is to attach the relationship between the EU and Africa (and 
the additional funds it offers to support African development) to the existing 
relationship between Portugal and Africa, one which goes back several centuries. The 
second advantage of locating Portugal’s bilateral relations with its former colonies in 
the context of multilateral international support for African debt relief is that it gives 
Portugal’s renewed African vocation greater legitimacy. This is because by participating 
in a globally sanctioned endeavour backed by the United Nations, Portugal does not 
appear to be blatantly following a neo-colonialist agenda in its dealings with Africa. 
The third distinct advantage is that, by framing the importance of the Portuguese 
language in terms of education and development and contributing to achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals in the PALOPs, the Portuguese language is given 
greater importance in international affairs. This bolsters Portuguese diplomacy and the 
CPLP, but, as a consequence, strengthens Brazilian diplomacy also. The externalisation 
and multilateralisation of Portuguese development aid to Africa can, therefore, be 
argued to be an aspect of Portuguese foreign policy’s broader Europeanisation, as unlike 
Brazil, Portugal can feed off the global reach and wealth of the EU, giving it a distinct 
advantage in the Lusophone world. However, the promotion of the Portuguese language 
and investment by Portuguese companies does suggest that Portugal’s renewed African 
vocation amounts to a neo-colonialist agenda of privileged Portuguese access to the 
PALOPs. 
 
In order to assess the importance of Lusophone Africa to contemporary Portuguese 
foreign policy, it is necessary to examine three areas of engagement, which include both 
bilateral relations and the wider context of multilateral organisations. The first area to 
assess will be Portugal’s spending on development assistance programmes in 
Lusophone Africa by assessing each of the PALOPs in turn. The second important 
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 realm of Portuguese engagement is in cultural policy and the importance of the 
Portuguese language as a foreign policy instrument for Portugal. These two spheres are 
examined below. The third important aspect of Portugal’s relationship with the 
PALOPs, which is discussed in chapter 5, is in the realm of security policy, specifically, 
military interventions in Africa and Technical Military Co-operation programmes in the 
Lusophone world. These three areas of interest shape both Portugal’s bilateral relations 
with its former colonies and influence Portuguese behaviour in international multilateral 
organisations in drawing their attention to matters concerning Africa. 
 
 
4.2.1 Portugal’s development aid spending 
 
Portugal’s spending on development aid reflects its commitment to the Lusophone 
world. The IPAD budget and the funds available for development aid programmes are 
outlined in table 4.1 below. IPAD’s operational budget for development aid 
programmes is boosted by additional funds from the central administration budget as 
well as funds to support the Portuguese language and money from the European 
Commission. Overall, IPAD’s budget for 2010 was nearly €55 million, with 
approximately €28.5 million available to spend on supporting development bilaterally. 
The administrative costs of running IPAD (designated as ‘Activity 258’) are €7.6 
million (13.8 per cent of the overall budget), leaving €34.7 million to spend on 
international development co-operation (designated as ‘Activity 178’) (IPAD, 2010: 7, 
12, 36). 
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 Total IPAD Staff 181 
Operational Budget €42,270,000.00 
Administrative Costs (‘Activity 258’) €7,600,001.00 
International Co-operation Budget (‘Activity 178’) €34,669,999.00 
Additional Funds from PIDDAC (Programa de Investimentos 
e Despesas de Desenvolvimento da Administração Central 
– Programme for Development Investments and Expenses from 
the Central Administration) 
€450,000.00 
Other Funds  
(Portuguese Language Fund and the European Commission) 
€12,248,891.21 
Total Funds Available for Bilateral Development Programmes €28,492,777.47 
Contributions to Multilateral and EU Programmes €1,521.942.20 
Funds to Promote Efficiency in Humanitarian Aid €500,000.00 
Total IPAD Budget €54,968,891.21 
Table 4.1: IPAD budget and selected spending data for 2010 (adapted from IPAD, 
2010: 7, 12, 36). 
 
While Portugal is involved with multilateral development programmes, particularly 
through the EU, the bulk of IPAD’s development co-operation spending is done through 
bilateral programmes. Table 4.2 below outlines the money allocated to supporting 
development programmes by country. It is clear that bilateral development aid forms an 
important part of Portugal’s relationship with the Lusophone world, as that is where 
Portugal’s money is being targeted. It also reveals the centrality of the PALOPs to 
Portugal’s broader African policy, as the money spent on other countries is so meagre 
by comparison (IPAD, 2010: 36). 
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 Aid Programmes by Country
(Under ‘Activity 178’) 
Operational 
Budget Funds 
PIDDAC  
Funds 
Funds Available 
in Total 
Angola €3,772,939.79  €3,772,939.79 
Mozambique €5,508,720.99  €5,508,720.99 
Cape Verde €3,967,943.85 €300,000.00 €4,267,943.85 
Guinea-Bissau €4,836,924.85  €4,836,924.85 
São Tomé and Príncipe €2,768,387.38  €2,768,387.38 
East Timor €5,371,914.38  €5,371,914.38 
Other Countries €622,746.23  €622,746.23 
Management costs, 
associated sectoral, overlap 
and crossover costs of 
implementing programmes 
€1,343,200.00  €1,343,200.00 
Totals €28,192,777.47 €300,000.00 €28,492,777.47 
Table 4.2: Portugal’s bilateral aid spending for 2010 (adapted from IPAD, 2010: 36). 
 
As displayed in figure 4.1 below, the PALOPs are the main recipients of Portugal’s 
bilateral aid. The biggest single recipient is Mozambique with €5.5 million allocated to 
it. However, the second biggest recipient is East Timor, receiving 19 per cent of the 
total of Portugal’s bilateral aid spending. It is, therefore, worth remembering that 
although Portugal is committed to supporting Lusophone Africa, East Timor has been a 
pressing priority for Portugal during the past decade. Nevertheless, the fact that 
Portugal’s bilateral development aid is so focused on the Lusophone world (with 79 per 
cent of the money being targeted on the PALOPs), reflects a firm foreign policy 
commitment to the former colonies (IPAD, 2010: 36). This commitment to development 
in the Lusophone world was reaffirmed in 2011 under the XIX Constitutional 
Government, with the decision to fuse the promotion of the Portuguese language with 
Portugal’s development assistance programme by merging the Camões Institute’s 
operations with those of IPAD (Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, 2011: 107; see 
also Lusa, 2011; Decreto-Lei 21/2012, of 30 January 2012). 
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 Guinea-Bissau 
€4,836,924.85 (17%)
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
€2,768,387.38 (10%)
Cape Verde 
€4,267,943.85 (15%)
Management costs, 
associated sectoral, 
overlap and crossover 
costs of implementing 
programmes 
€1,343,200 (5%)
Other Countries
€622,746.23 (2%)
Mozambique 
€5,508,720.99 (19%)
Angola €3,772,939.79 
(13%)East Timor 
€5,371,914.38 (19%)
 
Figure 4.1: Portuguese bilateral aid spending by country for 2010, showing the 
percentage each country receives from the overall spending total (adapted from IPAD, 
2010: 36). 
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 While it is clear that Portuguese development aid spending is targeted almost entirely on 
the Lusophone world, it is useful to put this spending into context and to consider the 
amounts spent on particular countries against their need and respective population sizes. 
Table 4.3 below outlines this data in order to put the developmental status of the CPLP 
countries in context. It is interesting to note that Cape Verde is much higher up the 
Human Development Index than Mozambique, and has a fraction of the population, but 
receives almost as much aid from the IPAD budget. The other PALOPs and East Timor 
are placed much further down the ranking in terms of development and receive aid more 
proportionate to their developmental status. Although São Tomé and Príncipe receives 
the least money of the PALOPs, its aid per head of population is over seventy-five times 
that of Mozambique. This data raises serious questions about the motivation of 
Portuguese aid spending. Is it, perhaps, more about spreading wealth across the CPLP in 
order for Portugal to have influence in each of these countries, than it is about really 
targeting development aid to where it is needed most? Portugal’s strategy is about 
targeting aid where it can maximise its influence, this means not spending money on 
non-Lusophone countries further down the developmental index, such as Zimbabwe or 
Rwanda, and instead devoting a large proportion of its aid budget to less needy 
countries, for example Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
 
Member Country  
of the CPLP 
Population Size 
(‘The 2010 Revision’) 
Position on the 
Human 
Development 
Index 2011  
(out of 187) 
Aid Received 
from Portugal 
(as stated in 
table 4.2) 
Angola 19.1 million 148 €3,772,939.79 
Brazil 194.9 million 84 N/A 
Cape Verde 496,000 133 €4,267,943.85 
East Timor 1.1 million 147 €5,371,914.38 
Guinea-Bissau 1.5 million 176 €4,836,924.85 
Mozambique 23.4 million 184 €5,508,720.99 
Portugal 10.7 million 41 N/A 
São Tomé and Príncipe 165,000 144 €2,768,387.38 
Table 4.3: Portuguese development aid spending in context: population and 
development data for the CPLP countries (adapted from: IPAD, 2010: 36; United 
Nations Development Programme, 2011: 1–4; United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, 2010). 
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 In terms of the Europeanisation of Portugal’s development aid spending, it is apparent 
that, from the target countries for Portuguese development aid, the former colonies are 
the main priority. It is reasonable to assume that these would have been a priority 
regardless of Portugal’s European integration. However, the Europeanisation of this 
area is very subtly evident in the opening-up of Portuguese development aid. Firstly, the 
fact that any development aid at all is available to non-Lusophone countries is 
noteworthy. Although only €622,746.23 was budgeted in 2010 to be spent outside the 
Lusophone world, this, nonetheless, reflects Portugal’s awareness of the need to support 
African countries in need, however modestly, as part of reinforcing the EU’s external 
action. This money appears to be allocated on an ad hoc basis, with the only countries 
mentioned by name for the 2010 budget being Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (IPAD, 
2010: 107). These priorities reflect Portugal’s foreign policy interests in the Maghreb 
and the decision to allocate bilateral aid to Senegal from 2011 further emphasises the ad 
hoc nature of the allocation of additional development aid. However, this does not 
necessarily reflect Europeanisation, as Portugal was especially motivated to assist 
Senegal as the country is looking to embrace the Portuguese language (IPAD, 2011b). 
 
Regardless of this, the Lusophone world remains the express priority. If more money 
were available, Portugal’s strategy would be to spend more on the PALOPs and East 
Timor, rather than to broaden its interests in non-Lusophone Africa, as these countries 
have wider significance for Portuguese foreign policy and offer opportunities for 
business investment (Interview 8, Lisbon, 2010). The OECD regards this as a sensible 
strategy in order for Portugal to maximise its impact (OECD, 2010). In order to put 
Portugal’s relationship with the PALOPs in the broader context of Portuguese foreign 
policy it would be instructive to examine more closely Portugal’s support for 
development programmes in each of the five PALOPs. 
 
– Portuguese development aid spending on Mozambique – 
With over €5.5 million allocated to it for 2010, Mozambique tops of the list as the 
biggest single recipient of Portuguese bilateral development aid (IPAD, 2010: 36). 
Mozambique is in urgent need of international development assistance as the country 
was ranked in 184th place (out of 187) on the Human Development Index in 2011. 
While Portugal is committed to supporting its former colony, it is not among the major 
providers of development assistance to Mozambique. The United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and several Nordic countries, as well as international 
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 multilateral organisations, all make bigger contributions than Portugal (IPAD, 2011c: 
99). This illustrates that despite Portugal’s vocal commitment to supporting African 
development, especially with regard to its former colonial possessions, it lacks the 
economic capacity to make really substantial contributions to development assistance 
programmes bilaterally (although Portugal makes additional contributions through 
multilateral programmes). 
 
Portugal is heavily involved in the process of building political dialogue between the 
EU and Mozambique, as outlined in the Cotonou Agreement. This includes 
participating in weekly meetings between EU representatives and the Mozambican 
government in Maputo (IPAD, 2007: 37). The EU is a major donor to Mozambique and 
aims to provide assistance which is targeted to induce long-term sustainable 
development and tackles the root causes of poverty. Given the population’s dependence 
on agriculture for food and income, rural development and investing in agriculture are 
particular priorities for multilateral aid given the destruction caused by floods in the 
country in 2000 (EEAS, 2011a). 
 
Portugal’s intervention in Mozambique is split into three strategic axes, which reflect 
Portuguese comparative advantages in the area. The first is Institutional Capacity 
Building, which prioritises building the national administration, strengthening the police 
and offering Technical Military Co-operation. The second strategic axis focuses on 
Sustainable Development and Combating Poverty, with an emphasis on cultural 
projects, community building and education (IPAD, 2007: 49). The third strategic axis 
is the Mozambique Island Cluster, which seeks to promote the development of the 
island region, especially the coastal areas in the north of the country. Portugal’s 
particular interest in this area is motivated by a desire to develop long-standing 
connections built up since the sixteenth century (IPAD, 2007: 67). Most of Portugal’s 
bilateral aid is concentrated on improving education in Mozambique, with over half of 
the total aid spending for 2010 devoted to the education sector (IPAD, 2011c: 102). 
 
Despite Portugal’s historic and linguistic links to the country, Portuguese bilateral 
development assistance for Mozambique is located in the multilateral context and aims 
to fulfil the Millennium Development Goals. Achieving success in the MDGs 
concerned with combating killer diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS has been 
especially difficult, with HIV/AIDS infection rates increasing between 1999 and 2004 
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 (IPAD, 2011c: 97; IPAD, 2007: 22). Given the urgency in this area, and the fact that 
many countries and international aid bodies are devoting their attention to Mozambique, 
many development co-operation projects and inward investments seek to improve 
health care in the country. Particular interest has come from Brazil with Fiocruz 
building a plant in Mozambique to produce antiviral drugs to combat the HIV/AIDS 
problem (Thaler, 2010: 27; Biancalana, 2010: 3). This highlights that countries with 
commercial interests, particularly countries which are bigger economic players than 
Portugal, can adopt a development strategy which is mutually beneficial. 
 
Mozambique is also particularly susceptible to large-scale natural disasters, particularly 
floods, droughts and cyclones (EEAS, 2011a). Portugal has very little extra funds 
available to respond to humanitarian disasters. However, senior development policy-
makers are confident that, should a catastrophe affect a Lusophone country, the political 
interest would be so great that additional funds would materialise to allow Portugal to 
respond to a humanitarian crisis (Interview 8, Lisbon, 2010). Given Portugal’s limited 
economic resources, its strategy has been to raise awareness of issues which affect 
Lusophone countries. Portugal has tried to increase the amount of money international 
organisations, most notably the EU, are prepared to spend in response to humanitarian 
crises. The floods in Mozambique in 2000 illustrated this clearly. The story, which was 
widely covered in Lusophone media, took some time to break into mainstream 
European news coverage. Led by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jaime Gama, 
Portugal flew the European Commissioner for Development to Lisbon and then on to 
Mozambique to witness the crisis personally. This resulted in an increase of EU aid to 
help deal with the humanitarian crisis from €100,000 to €25 million (Interview 13, 
Lisbon, 2010). This was an example of Portugal using its connections to boost its 
standing in the Lusophone world. 
 
Portuguese foreign policy is so focused on the Lusophone world that it is not well 
placed to act if a catastrophe affects somewhere else in the world. The OECD believes 
that Portugal would benefit from having a more co-ordinated and effective programme 
for humanitarian interventions (OECD, 2010). With the Mozambique floods, the 2004 
Boxing Day tsunami, and the devastation of Lisbon’s own earthquake and tsunami in 
1755 in mind, Portugal called for a widespread and effective international response to 
the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010. However, given the lack of humanitarian aid 
money to assist the post-disaster response in Haiti, the strategy of Portugal was, again, 
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 to draw the attention of the international community to the problems and call for action, 
rather than to provide large-scale emergency humanitarian assistance (Interview 8, 
Lisbon, 2010; Interview 13, Lisbon, 2010; Lusa, 2010b). The situation in Mozambique 
was fundamentally different to the situation in Haiti. In the latter case, the onus was not 
on Portugal to co-ordinate the international community’s response to the emerging 
humanitarian crisis. However, for crises affecting Lusophone countries, such as the 
Mozambique floods, Portugal would readily assume that role. 
 
Portugal’s relationship with Mozambique is characterised by both bilateral and 
multilateral links. Portugal provides considerable, but limited, development assistance 
to the country and is visibly politically committed to offering humanitarian assistance 
and improving the health and educational prospects of ordinary Mozambicans. 
However, Portuguese development assistance in Mozambique is located within a 
multilateral framework, where several other countries are committed to providing 
assistance to this country, one of the least developed in the world. Portugal’s strength 
here is to be able to link its bilateral development assistance with projects under the 
auspices of the EU and the CPLP to maintain its presence and to provide additional 
financial support to help Mozambique move towards achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
 
– Portuguese development aid spending on Guinea-Bissau – 
The African country which receives the second largest amount of bilateral development 
assistance from Portugal is Guinea-Bissau. In 2010, €4.8 million was allocated by IPAD 
for bilateral development assistance in the country (IPAD, 2010: 36). Guinea-Bissau’s 
economy is made up of agricultural exports and fishing, which means that it is unable to 
sustain the wage costs and pensions of its civil servants and military personnel without 
international assistance. There are also low levels of education and vocational training 
and a weak private sector. In addition, the ravages of recent conflict have left the 
country as an ‘aid orphan’ (abandoned by international aid support), and the ethnic 
divisions there further undermine social cohesion (EEAS, 2011b). 
 
In 2011, Guinea-Bissau was ranked 176th (out of 187) on the Human Development 
Index, consequently, the country is in serious need of international development 
assistance. Portuguese aid is particularly focused on improving education, building local 
communities, strengthening the state’s capacity and fostering economic development. 
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 IPAD has supported a programme to improve the knowledge of Portuguese for teaching 
purposes, as part of the overall improvement of Guinea-Bissau’s education system. 
Closer co-operation between law faculties in Bissau and Lisbon has the double boon of 
improving education and teaching practices, as well as promoting the rule of law and 
strengthening Guinea-Bissau’s public institutions and juridical system for the future 
(IPAD, 2011c: 93). 
 
The effects of the country’s civil war present several key challenges for international 
donors, not least for Portugal as a member of the Lusophone group of nations. As 
Zounmenou (2010) outlines, several illegal activities threaten the stability of the country 
including high-level corruption and drug trafficking. Prioritising the production of 
narcotics could adversely affect the country’s food production, which could have 
serious humanitarian consequences. These activities, combined with the rise of militia 
groups, mean that there is considerable potential for the country to collapse into a 
‘failed state’. This puts greater pressure on the international community to provide 
development assistance in order to prevent a serious humanitarian disaster in the 
country (Zounmenou, 2010: 23). 
 
– Portuguese development aid spending on Cape Verde – 
Despite the considerable recent successes, which have seen Cape Verde graduate from 
the United Nations’ list of least developed countries into the middle-income category 
(IPAD, 2011c: 75), it remains an important priority for Portuguese overseas 
development co-operation. Cape Verde was the fourth highest recipient of Portuguese 
bilateral aid in 2010 and the third largest beneficiary in Africa with nearly €4.3 million 
allocated to it (IPAD, 2010: 36). In the 2010 IPAD budget for bilateral aid programmes, 
Cape Verde was the only country to directly receive money from the central budget for 
development investment (PIDDAC). In total €300,000 was allocated from the PIDDAC 
to spend on the construction of a haemodialysis centre in Cape Verde (Ministério das 
Finanças e da Administração Pública, 2010: 189). 
 
Portugal’s development aid programme in Cape Verde is focused on three main areas: 
governance (21.4 per cent); sustainable development and poverty reduction (58.6 per 
cent); and a cluster for information and communication technologies (10 per cent) 
(IPAD, 2011c: 79–80). Over the course of the period 2005–2010, the focus has shifted 
from promoting education programmes to providing credit lines and strengthening Cape 
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 Verde’s economic infrastructure (IPAD, 2011c: 81). Migration between Cape Verde and 
Portugal is also an important issue, especially reducing illegal migration flows from 
Africa into the European Union. For this reason, IPAD funds have been supported by €1 
million from the European Commission’s funds to educate potential migrants about 
living, working and studying in Portugal (IPAD, 2011c: 82). 
 
Portugal exploited its bilateral and CPLP connections with Cape Verde to press for the 
EU to create a Special Partnership between the Union and its former colony. This was 
formally adopted during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU Council in 2007. The 
Presidency was heavily concerned with raising awareness of Africa as an external 
relations priority for the EU (Guedes Vieira and Ferreira-Pereira, 2009: 44–45). The 
strategy for the EU partnership with Cape Verde complements Portugal’s bilateral 
development assistance programmes, and places particular emphasis on good 
governance, security and stability. The EU strategy also encourages integration between 
Cape Verde and the EU, as it confers upon the country the status as an ultra-peripheral 
area of Europe (effectively giving the islands the same status as peripheral regions 
within the EU, such as the Azores and Madeira archipelagos) (European Commission, 
2008c). The EU–Cape Verde Special Partnership is a privileged one, but represents the 
consolation prize, as Cape Verde, supported by Portugal, had ambitions of full 
membership of the Union (Diário de Notícias, 2005; Newitt, 2009: 218). 
 
As Portugal played a considerable role in making this partnership possible (IPAD, 
2011c: 75–76), it can be viewed as an externalisation of one of Portugal’s key foreign 
policy relations. Nevertheless, the bilateral ties remain strong, with the first Luso–Cape 
Verdean heads of government summit taking place in Lisbon in June 2010. Portugal’s 
overall strategy regarding Cape Verde is to examine the areas where co-operation is in 
the interest of both sides, particularly in locating relations within the context of 
international organisations, not least the CPLP and the EU (Ministério dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros, 2010g). The Exchange Rate Co-operation Agreement between the two 
countries, established in 1998, further underscores the desire to integrate Cape Verde 
with the EU. This programme guarantees parity between the Cape Verdean Escudo and 
the currency of Portugal (originally the Escudo but latterly the Euro) (IPAD, 2011c: 79). 
Therefore, ties between Portugal and Cape Verde are strong at the bilateral level, but 
increasing emphasis is being placed on locating the relationship in the wider multilateral 
context, and bringing the country closer to the EU. 
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 – Portuguese development aid spending on Angola – 
The fifth largest recipient of Portuguese bilateral aid (fourth on the list of PALOP 
recipients) is Angola, allocated €3.8 million in 2010 (IPAD, 2010: 36). Angola has a 
comparatively sounder economic foundation and, as such, is in less need of 
development assistance than its sister-country Mozambique. Angola is the second 
largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa. This has fuelled the country’s economic 
growth, which has in turn resulted in increased public spending and investment in 
infrastructure (EEAS, 2011c). Portuguese development aid has mainly focused on 
supporting the development of Angola’s infrastructure and improving basic social 
services such as health and education, as part of the Millennium Development Goals 
(IPAD, 2008: 22). Although funds declined steadily over the 2005–2008 period, 
education was the principal target of Portuguese bilateral aid spending, representing 30–
50 per cent of the total (IPAD, 2009). The Portuguese have been open in saying that 
Angola, given its natural resources, should seek to finance its economic recovery itself, 
as long-term sources of international development aid are far from guaranteed (IPAD, 
2008: 54). 
 
Under international commitments, Portuguese aid to the PALOPs should be untied. 
However, Portugal has recently signed several lines of credit with Angola, Mozambique 
and São Tomé and Príncipe which are tied, contravening the MDG of providing untied 
aid. The OECD has criticised Portugal for failing to provide genuinely untied loans to 
the least developed countries. Providing technical co-operation (which is essentially tied 
as such agreements are not open to tender and are often provided by Portuguese civil 
servants with specific expertise) suggests that Portugal is providing Angola with 
development aid with some considerable pre-conditions (OECD, 2010). 
 
In terms of education reforms, particular emphasis has been laid on higher education 
and developing links between universities in Portugal and Angola. This has been done 
by creating scholarships and ensuring the provision of more basic education to the 
population (IPAD, 2008: 12–13). Portugal’s investment in Angolan education, as a 
means to economic and social development, is aimed at cementing Portugal’s place in 
Angolan foreign policy by emphasising lusofonia. As Martins (2010a) points out, the 
Portuguese language is something which is familiar at all levels of Angolan society, but 
also has considerable importance to the ruling elites in the country (Martins, 2010a: 7). 
However, the Lusophone link in Angolan foreign policy is as much with Brazil as it is 
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 Portugal. There is considerable Brazilian investment in Angolan mining and 
construction, and Angola is a major destination for Brazilian exports (Biancalana, 2010: 
3). 
 
Given Angola’s natural resources, the Portuguese government recognises that the 
country could play an important role in Portugal’s economic recovery, as it offers 
opportunities for investment and profit outside the Eurozone. The current Portuguese 
government needs to promote a favourable climate for Luso-Angolan co-operation, as it 
is in Portugal’s economic interest. This is the principal motivation for Portuguese efforts 
to provide support, credit and investment in the country. The importance of Angola to 
Portugal cannot be understated, and this may explain why the Portuguese national 
broadcaster RTP has been accused of bowing to diplomatic pressure and presenting the 
Angolan regime in a favourable light, clamping down on journalists who are critical of 
the Portuguese cosying up to the Angolans. This came to a head when RTP’s Antena 1 
radio station terminated the contracts of, among others, the journalist Pedro Rosa 
Marques, a vocal critic of Portuguese state-sanctioned propaganda in favour of the 
Angolan regime. Rosa Marques viewed the Portuguese government’s actions as nothing 
more than a shameless attempt to curry favour with the oil-rich former colony in light of 
the Eurozone crisis (Knobloch, 2012). Portugal’s not inconsiderable development aid 
contributions to Angola, must, therefore, be seen in the wider context of economic and 
political interests and Portugal’s increasing dependence on its former colony. 
 
– Portuguese development aid spending on São Tomé and Príncipe – 
The smallest of the PALOPs by area and population is São Tomé and Príncipe. The 
country was earmarked for €2.8 million in aid in 2010, making it the sixth largest 
recipient of bilateral aid from Portugal (and the country which received the least amount 
of aid of all the PALOPs) (IPAD, 2010: 36). While it is logical that the smallest country 
should receive proportionally less from Portugal’s overseas development aid coffers, it 
is a country which has considerable need of international assistance as poverty 
indicators are “worrying”. In 2009, São Tomé and Príncipe was ranked 131st (out of 
182) in terms of development (EEAS, 2011d). By 2011 it had slipped down the Human 
Development Index to 144th (out of 187) (United Nations Development Programme, 
2011: 3). It is also regarded as one of the more corrupt states in Africa (Newitt, 2003: 
51). 
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 The flagship projects in reducing poverty and promoting sustainable development in 
São Tomé and Príncipe are concerned with improving the provision of education, health 
care, and enhancing community development. Education represented 42 per cent of the 
total bilateral aid spent in 2005–2010; with the ‘Healthcare for All’ programme the next 
highest sector, receiving 17 per cent of the funds available. Portuguese development co-
operation is also promoting effective governance in the country by supporting training 
for tax and customs officials, police, military personnel and coastguard personnel 
(IPAD, 2011c: 114–115). 
 
Portugal has committed considerable amounts of aid to São Tomé and Príncipe over the 
years, and relations have been cordial since 1975. The motivation for Portugal has been 
to promote political stability in its former colony to create the necessary conditions for 
the exploration of São Tomé and Príncipe’s oil reserves, with Portugal and Angola 
recognised as key strategic partners in this process. To enhance Portugal’s standing with 
its oil abundant former colony, the Portuguese government wiped São Tomé and 
Príncipe’s estimated €22 million debt and supplied €50 million in credit (Seabra and 
Monteiro, 2010: 8–9). Despite Portugal’s good will, the São Toméan government has 
played down the importance of Portugal to its broader foreign policy, instead citing 
neighbouring countries as more crucial to the country’s future than maintaining the 
bilateral relationship with Lisbon (Gorjão, 2010c: 3). 
 
 
4.2.2 Cultural policy and promoting the Portuguese language in Africa  
 
The promotion of the Portuguese language is a vital part of Portugal’s foreign policy 
towards Africa in the postcolonial era, particularly in anchoring its interests in the 
PALOPs, but also in raising the country’s profile in other parts of Africa. Portuguese 
cultural policy in Africa is as much about developing the future of the Portuguese 
language, and its presence in Africa, as it is about remembering the historical ties 
between Portugal and certain parts of Africa. The Portuguese language is seen by 
Portuguese foreign policy elites as an important historical contribution to the world and 
“a relevant asset in the era of globalisation” (IPAD, 2006: 12), which demonstrates the 
emphasis of placing Portugal’s bilateral relations with its former colonies in the context 
of globalisation and multilateral organisations. 
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 The Portuguese government recognises that the Portuguese language can be a unifying 
force throughout the world. Citing the recent spelling agreement between Lusophone 
countries in particular, a united Portuguese language creates opportunities for 
Lusophone countries in international organisations (Resolução do Conselho de 
Ministros 188/2008, of 27 November 2008: 8525). Accepting Brazilian spelling 
conventions as the norms for Portuguese used in Portugal (and by the Portuguese 
government and agents of the Portuguese State), however reluctantly, does offer 
Portuguese diplomacy the advantage of being able to exploit a more unified CPLP and 
to be able to sit in the slipstream of Brazil’s diplomatic activities, particularly as both 
countries sat on the UN Security Council in 2011 and pressed for Portuguese to be made 
an official language of the UN.  
 
In order to assess the precise nature of the relationship with Lusophone Africa in 
contemporary Portuguese foreign policy, it is necessary to examine three key areas 
more closely. The first focus is on the promotion of the Portuguese language in 
Lusophone Africa and how this is portrayed as an integral part of the broader prospects 
to improve the chances for economic development in Africa, and how this complements 
Portuguese bilateral development assistance programmes discussed above. The second 
important facet of the relationship between Portugal and Lusophone Africa is the scope 
for ‘soft diplomacy’. This is mainly done through the promotion of Portuguese culture 
through the Camões Institute and through Portuguese broadcasters and universities. This 
strengthens ties between Portugal and its former colonies. The third significant aspect is 
the relevance of the Portuguese language from the perspective of African countries. 
This highlights the opportunities and difficulties facing the CPLP in attempting to 
construct a meaningful transnational space united by a common language. 
 
– Promoting the Portuguese language as a key to fostering economic development in 
the PALOPs – 
The Portuguese language is an important foreign policy instrument and in recent years 
the emphasis has been to focus less on the role of language as an affirmation of a 
Portuguese/Lusophone global identity, but instead to be more concerned with using the 
Portuguese language as a tool to promote development in the PALOPs. In the eyes of 
Portuguese development policy-making elites, the Portuguese language is seen as “…a 
common heritage of four continents, and an instrument of capital importance for 
cooperation and development” (IPAD, 2006: 21). Despite the fact that Portuguese is a 
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 global language, with some 240 million speakers worldwide (Observatório da Língua 
Portuguesa, 2011), this seems like a slight delusion of grandeur on the part of the 
Portuguese. This is because Portugal can only hold a political and cultural influence 
over a fraction of the world’s Portuguese-speakers, as the reality is that the vast majority 
of those 240 million Portuguese speakers are in Brazil, and not in Africa. 
 
The promotion of Portuguese and the strengthening of relations between Portugal and 
the Lusophone world are key foreign policy priorities for Portugal. However, it is not 
viewed as acceptable by international organisations to promote the Portuguese language 
per se. Therefore, in recent years, Portugal has had to react to the criticism it received 
from the OECD for not making it clear “…that ODA which supports teaching and using 
Portuguese should be a means to achieve development in Lusophone countries, not to 
promote the Portuguese language as an end itself” (OECD, 2010). This was an exercise 
in Portugal reacting to international norms and modifying its behaviour accordingly, 
whilst still maintaining a grip on its strategic foreign policy priorities in the Lusophone 
world and promoting its own language and cultural heritage. 
 
As educational projects account for the lion’s share of Portuguese overseas development 
co-operation spending in the PALOPs, the promotion of the Portuguese language and 
the cultures and history associated with it form a considerable part of Portugal’s 
development interventions. At a practical level, improving the ease in which vocational 
training can be given in the Portuguese language promotes the improvement of basic 
skills and can be shared throughout the CPLP member countries, helping to strengthen 
the bond between the diverse nations in the organisation (IPAD, 2006: 22). It is clear 
that Portuguese development policy today is very much couched in terms of the value a 
knowledge of the Portuguese language can bring to people in the developing world and 
the contribution the Portuguese Language Fund can make in helping to realise the 
MDGs (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros 188/2008, of 27 November 2008; see also 
Resolução do Conselho de Ministros 196/2005, of 22 December 2005; IPAD, 2011c: 
47). The fact that it also strengthens Portuguese foreign policy’s unique Lusophone 
niche, and allows Portuguese vested interests in its former colonies to be exploited, can 
be considered a fortunate simultaneous benefit. 
 
As outlined previously in chapter 3, in 2012 IPAD’s activities were fused with those of 
the Camões Institute, creating a new body for development co-operation and language 
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 promotion called ‘Camões – Institute for Co-operation and Language’ (Camões – 
Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua, I.P.) (Lusa, 2011; Decreto-Lei 21/2012, of 30 
January 2012). This move highlights the linkages between development co-operation 
and cultural policy and offers explicit evidence to confirm that the Portuguese 
government sees development aid for Africa and promoting the Portuguese language in 
the continent as being two sides of the same coin in Portugal’s strategy towards the 
PALOPs. 
 
– Promoting the Portuguese language and Portuguese culture in Africa: the tools of 
‘soft diplomacy’ – 
Connected with the developmental objectives of promoting the Portuguese language in 
Africa, another dimension of Portuguese foreign policy action in the PALOPs is in the 
realm of cultural policy. The Camões Institute (Instituto Camões) is the arm of the MNE 
charged with promoting Portuguese language, literature and culture overseas (Instituto 
Camões, 2011: 8). Now unified with IPAD, the Camões Institute is responsible for 
Portuguese language and culture being taught in 72 different countries worldwide 
(Instituto Camões, 2011: 13). The Camões Institute was furnished with €41.7 million in 
2011 to fulfil its tasks (Instituto Camões, 2011: 20), which reflects the important role 
the organisation has in projecting Portuguese language and culture throughout the 
world, as part of the country’s broader foreign policy objectives. Actively promoting the 
Portuguese language, and Portugal’s historical presence in Africa, is an important way 
of cementing the sometimes fragile bond between Portugal and its former colonial 
possessions.  
 
Through the Portuguese Cultural Centres established by the Camões Institute, Portugal 
is playing an active role in the cultural development of African countries. In 
Mozambique, for example, there are Portuguese Cultural Centres and Portuguese 
Language Centres in Maputo and Beira and a further Language Centre in Nampula 
(IPAD, 2007: 62–63). Of the seventeen Camões Institute Portuguese Language Centres 
in sub-Saharan Africa, twelve installations are located in the PALOPs (Instituto 
Camões, 2011: 37–40), illustrating the importance Portugal ascribes to strengthening 
the use of the imperial language and the cultural heritage of Portugal’s past connections 
with the continent in the member countries of the CPLP. 
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 Aside from the active promotion of the teaching of the Portuguese language and 
Portuguese culture through the Camões Institute’s activities, another aspect of 
Portuguese cultural ‘soft diplomacy’ in the PALOPs is the emergence of Portuguese 
broadcasting in Africa. Projecting a Portuguese take on the world, and fostering a spirit 
of co-operation between Lusophone countries and communities, is a clear priority and 
has been realised through the development of television channels (RTP Internacional 
and RTP África) and radio platforms (RDP Internacional and RDP África) in Africa and 
elsewhere in the world (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros 188/2008, of 27 
November 2008). As Westmoreland (2011) argues, the Al-Jazeera network has been an 
important ‘soft diplomacy’ tool for the small state of Qatar, and Portuguese broadcasters 
could potentially aspire to have the same global reach, potentially broadcasting in 
different languages, especially given the absence of a collaborative CPLP broadcasting 
network (Westmoreland, 2011: 4). 
 
While Portugal is the ancestral home of the Portuguese language, the rise of Brazil as a 
major global player takes some of the gloss away from Portugal’s efforts to promote the 
Portuguese language as an integral part of its broader foreign policy objectives. To give 
an example, the Museum of the Portuguese Language is located in São Paulo, rather 
than in Lisbon (Moreira, 2009: 164). In addition, the popularity of Brazilian television 
programmes in Portugal (and the rest of the Lusophone world) is a “double-edged 
sword” from the perspective of Portuguese foreign policy-makers. While, on the 
positive side, it promotes a global Lusophone culture, it does, however, in the view of a 
senior official in IPAD, contribute to Brazilian cultural imperialism and reinforces 
Brazil’s de facto supremacy in the modern Lusophone world (Interview 8, Lisbon, 
2010). These examples suggest that efforts to promote the Portuguese language may 
give greater benefit to Brazil, because it is the bigger economic power, at the expense of 
Portugal. Therefore, the promotion of the Portuguese language is, in fact, a competitive 
business, which Portuguese development policy-makers do, at least tacitly, appear to 
accept. This means that the Portuguese government must target its spending carefully in 
order to fully capitalise on its Luso-African niche as part of its broader foreign policy 
interests in Africa. 
 
– The relevance of the Portuguese language and the CPLP to African States – 
For Portuguese foreign policy’s renewed African vocation for the twenty-first century to 
be successful, Portugal and the Portuguese language has to be relevant to African states 
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 in the contemporary global political order. The importance attached to the Portuguese 
language, which guides Portuguese cultural and development policy in Africa, 
therefore, requires a certain amount of reciprocal enthusiasm from African countries. As 
Cahen (2003) persuasively argues, someone who is “francophone” uses and understands 
French. They use it as a “tool” in everyday life, not as something which defines their 
identity in the way that a native French person uses the French language. Similarly in 
Lusophone Africa, people who are Lusophone often have a language other than 
Portuguese as their mother tongue. Therefore, to construct a sense of “community” and 
collective identity around the official languages adopted by various states is difficult 
(Cahen, 2003: 87). This argument suggests that the current position of Portuguese 
development policy, which emphasises the role of the Portuguese language as a vehicle 
to economic development, will not be met with hostility from African countries, but, at 
the same time, does not guarantee that the Portuguese language and culture will be 
warmly embraced and adopted by Africans either. 
 
Despite the fragilities of building a transnational socio-political community loosely 
premised on a shared language, the CPLP has a significant role to play in 
institutionalising a Lusophone identity in Africa. This was attempted when the 
organisation tried to create a ‘Statute of the Lusophone Citizen’ (O Estatuto do Cidadão 
Lusófono), which was adopted unanimously by the Cape Verdean parliament and also 
recognised by Guinea-Bissau (Jesus, 2001: 103; Gomes, 2008). However, despite the 
enthusiasm of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, the document is still yet to be adopted by 
the remaining CPLP countries. This highlights the fact that meaningful Lusophone 
citizenship cannot be decreed and that a common language is so far not enough to forge 
a more binding transnational Lusophone identity.  
 
Given that five out of the eight member countries of the CPLP are African states, it 
means that the Lusophone community (and implicitly the Portuguese language itself) is 
not an irrelevance in regional terms in Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea/South 
Atlantic region where four of the PALOPs are located. São Tomé and Príncipe’s close 
neighbour Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau’s neighbour Senegal are both official 
observer countries at the CPLP, along with the island of Mauritius (CPLP, 2011). The 
case of Equatorial Guinea is interesting as the former Spanish colony, led by President 
Teodoro Obiang, has pressed for admission to the CPLP in order to build relations with 
São Tomé and Príncipe and Angola in particular. In July 2010, Obiang decreed that 
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 Portuguese would be the country’s third official language, a move which was not 
supported by Portugal despite the historical connections which exist (Amnesty 
International, 2011; Gorjão, 2010c: 4; Martins, 2011a: 1).  
 
Equatorial Guinea’s candidature to the CPLP was formally rejected in 2010, with two 
reasons cited. The first was that it is not Portuguese-speaking. The decree issued by 
Obiang to make it the country’s third official language a few days prior to the decision 
being taken did not wash with the CPLP. The second reason provided for the rejection 
was the regime’s dismal record on human rights. Given the nature of the political 
regimes in place in the existing members of the CPLP, the organisation is prepared to 
overlook a certain amount of political intolerance and human rights restrictions. But 
abuses of basic freedoms on the scale of those occurring in Equatorial Guinea, 
combined with a lack of any real substance to its claims of having Portuguese as an 
official language, meant that the CPLP decided to reject the country’s bid, stating that if 
progress were made on addressing these issues then it would reconsider. In the same 
way that Portuguese can be proclaimed an official language without anyone actually 
speaking it, human rights are protected under the country’s constitution, but abuses 
occur on a daily basis (Costa Lobo, 2011: 2–3). 
 
The Equatorial Guinea case indicates that, so long as countries are willing to embrace 
Portuguese as an official language (major human rights abuses notwithstanding), then 
there is scope for the CPLP as an organisation to grow beyond what would appear to be 
its natural limit of eight member countries. It also demonstrates that the CPLP can be an 
important diplomatic network, both within Africa, and in connecting Africa to Brazil 
and the EU (via Portugal). 
 
Improving relations with Portugal and the wider Lusophone world would have some 
clear benefits for the PALOPs. However, demonstrating a commitment to embracing 
lusofonia, and building up strong relations with Portugal, does not limit their foreign 
policy options. Where Portuguese foreign policy-makers have been successful has been 
in building up a relationship between Portugal and Lusophone Africa that is consistent 
with the aims and objectives of multilateral organisations. Citing the developmental 
benefits of the Portuguese language, and multilateralising the relationship between 
Portugal and the PALOPs by bringing in the CPLP and the EU, has strengthened 
Portugal’s position. This also forced the PALOPs to embrace the Lusophone world as a 
 176
 diplomatic network, and to embrace the Portuguese language over their native tongues 
as a vehicle to development by attracting Portuguese, EU and Brazilian aid and 
investment.  
 
Therefore, states like Angola and Mozambique, although divided on tribal grounds, can 
mobilise the Portuguese language as a unifying force between the peoples within the 
territory of the state. Uniting under one language strengthens their prospects for 
achieving economic development. Multilingual states are more costly to administer than 
less linguistically diverse states, meaning that improved communication, both within 
states and in the wider world, increases the chances of realising economic development 
in Africa (Englebert, 2000: 165). Consequently, bilateral relations between the PALOPs 
and Portugal, and multilateral relations with other Lusophone countries through the 
CPLP, are important considerations for the Portuguese-speaking states in Africa. More 
importantly, however, the continued relevance of the Portuguese language in Africa in 
the twenty-first century cements Portugal’s interests in the PALOPs, and their 
neighbours, long into the future. This reflects the fact that there is increasing 
interdependence between Portugal and its former colonial possessions in Africa. In the 
postcolonial era, development aid, cultural diplomacy and investment are the weapons 
that Europe can use to maintain its influence on African countries. 
 
 
4.3 Portugal’s Relations with Non-Lusophone Africa in the Twenty-First 
Century 
 
The importance of Africa to Portuguese foreign policy stems from the particular 
connections to the former colonies. Nevertheless, Portugal has significant interests in 
African countries that do not have Portuguese as an official language and it is looking to 
strengthen its relations with Africa, both bilaterally and through international 
multilateral organisations. This section focuses on two areas of particular importance. 
The first part assesses the underlying Lusophone interests which underpin Portuguese 
foreign policy interests with non-PALOPs. While considerable importance is placed on 
pursuing relations at a bilateral level, particularly where there are sizeable Portuguese-
speaking communities in certain African countries, Lusophone and Portuguese interests 
in Africa are increasingly being addressed on a multilateral level. The second part 
examines more closely the prospect for the Europeanisation, multilateralisation and 
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 externalisation of Portuguese African policy and focuses particularly on the new 
possibilities for Portuguese diplomacy in Africa. In particular, it examines the 
increasing importance of the Maghreb, as opposed to sub-Saharan Africa, to Portuguese 
foreign policy and how this is being handled increasingly within the framework of the 
EU’s external action. 
 
 
4.3.1 The underlying Lusophone interests in Portugal’s relations with non-PALOPs 
 
Portugal’s long-standing historical connections with Africa, and its current economic, 
developmental and cultural interests in the PALOPs, frame Portugal’s relations with 
Africa as a whole. These underlying Lusophone interests, which guide Portuguese 
foreign policy interactions beyond the PALOPs, are evident in three particular areas, 
each one outlined in detail below. The first being the importance of the Portuguese-
speaking communities in guiding Portugal’s bilateral relations with countries such as 
South Africa and the importance of building up strong relations between Portugal and 
countries neighbouring PALOPs. The second area of interest to highlight is Portugal’s 
support for African development beyond the PALOPs. Within this, given Portugal’s 
limited bilateral funds available to support non-PALOPs, addressing wider Africa 
through multilateral organisations, particularly the EU, is a way of amplifying 
Portugal’s contribution to international development goals and boosting its overall 
impact on Africa. The third area of interest to focus on is Portugal’s efforts to raise 
awareness of Africa during Portugal’s Presidencies of the Council of the European 
Union. The persistence of Lusophone interests in Portugal’s relations with the whole of 
Africa, not just the PALOPs, have increasingly spilled over from building mostly 
bilateral relations with countries neighbouring former Portuguese colonies, and 
countries with sizeable Portuguese-speaking communities, to locating relations in the 
wider multilateral context. 
 
– The Portuguese-speaking communities in Africa outside of the PALOPs – 
As affirmed in the Council of Ministers Resolution 188/2008, of 27 November 2008, 
the Portuguese language is a fundamental element of Portuguese foreign policy, which 
reinforces Portuguese identity throughout the world. It is a duty of the Portuguese State 
to promote and preserve the distinctiveness of the Portuguese language. This means 
working with CPLP member countries, but also building relations with countries where 
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 there are sizeable expatriate Portuguese communities (Resolução do Conselho de 
Ministros 188/2008, of 27 November 2008: 8525). 
 
In Portuguese foreign policy terms, the Lusophone world, therefore, extends beyond the 
historical boundaries of the Portuguese State and beyond the member countries of the 
CPLP. There are significant Portuguese communities and diasporas of ‘Luso-
descendants’ in North America, Venezuela, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland and South Africa (Stock, 2004: 256). With a sizeable Portuguese 
community in Venezuela, Portugal has to tread carefully when confronting, or being 
openly critical of, regimes such as Chavez’s Venezuela. As a result of this, Portugal is 
open to accusations of being “soft” on such regimes. Portugal faced similar diplomatic 
difficulties during the apartheid regime in South Africa and had to be “pragmatic” but 
resolute in defending the interests of the resident Portuguese community in the country 
and managing the flow of Portuguese migrants from Angola and Mozambique into the 
country after decolonisation (Interview 3, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
In the eyes of Portugal’s foreign policy-making elite, South Africa is the most important 
country in sub-Saharan Africa outside of the CPLP, because of the million-strong 
Portuguese community in the country (Interview 3, Lisbon, 2010). But the wider 
importance of the Portuguese language in southern Africa, with Angola and 
Mozambique close neighbours and thousands of students learning Portuguese in South 
Africa (Gorjão, 2010d: 1; Público, 2004: 21), has seen South Africa become an 
important priority for Portugal. Partially because of the potential economic benefits of 
exploring the Portuguese community market in South Africa, relations between South 
Africa and Portugal have, in recent years, returned to be a more important priority at the 
bilateral level, rather than being handled at a multilateral level through the EU (Gorjão, 
2010d: 1). 
 
Lusophone motivations also underpin Portugal’s relations with other sub-Saharan 
African countries. As outlined above, the three countries with official observer status at 
the CPLP also have an important place in Portuguese foreign policy in Africa. These 
countries, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal and Mauritius, have recognised the importance of 
the Portuguese language. Senegal in particular is a growth area for the Portuguese 
language with approximately 17,000 students of Portuguese in secondary education and 
700 students enrolled on the Portuguese university course at UCAD in Dakar (Lusa, 
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 2008). For 2011–2013, Senegal was a recipient of Portuguese bilateral development 
assistance with the launch of a specific co-operation programme for the country, 
something which is normally reserved for full members of the CPLP (IPAD, 2011b). 
The country’s decision to embrace the Portuguese language is something mutually 
beneficial, but highlights the underlying Lusophone interests which motivate 
Portuguese development co-operation in Africa. At the same time, exploring relations 
and building strong ties in sub-Saharan Africa with countries beyond the PALOPs 
represents the ‘diversification’ of Portuguese foreign policy in Africa and this is linked 
up with international and regional multilateral organisations such as the Southern 
African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States, 
the African Union, the CPLP and the EU (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 
2011a). 
 
– Supporting development beyond the PALOPs: the motivations behind locating 
relations with Africa in the multilateral context – 
For Portugal, it is considered “only natural” to continue to focus its development 
assistance primarily on Lusophone countries. Yet in spite of this firm commitment, “the 
recent trend of allocating a part of development cooperation resources to other countries 
shall be continued” (IPAD, 2006: 31). Given the limited development aid budget for 
non-Lusophone states—IPAD’s 2011 bilateral assistance budget for ‘Other Countries’ 
was €622,746.23, which represents only 2 per cent of the total (see figure 4.1 and table 
4.2)—Portugal’s resources have been targeted on countries where Portugal has 
important historical and Portuguese-speaking connections, namely Senegal and South 
Africa (IPAD, 2006: 31). 
 
While the main focus of Portuguese development assistance for the PALOPs is through 
bilateral relations, development co-operation with other African countries is mainly 
located in the multilateral context. Portugal’s support for the wider European efforts to 
provide development assistance for Africa, under the Yaoundé Convention, the Lomé 
Convention and the Cotonou Agreement, demonstrates a commitment even to countries 
where Portugal has few historical connections (IPAD, 2006: 30). The ‘bi-multi 
approach’ of Portuguese development co-operation means that bilateral support for the 
PALOPs is protected. Yet, at the same time, multilateral support for development 
projects in Africa, under the auspices of organisations such as the United Nations, is 
encouraged where a multilateral approach would offer significant added value (IPAD, 
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 2006: 32). This approach suggests that Portuguese development co-operation is moving 
into a period of flexibility, partially in response to the challenges of globalisation and 
the strength of multilateral political organisations, but also because of an acute 
awareness of the country’s limited economic funds, particularly for non-PALOPs which 
are less of a priority. 
 
Portuguese bilateral aid is mostly concentrated on the Lusophone world. Therefore, it is 
logical that Portugal is most supportive of multilateral interventions which are targeted 
on these “priority countries” (IPAD, 2011d: 13–14). Portuguese multilateral 
development co-operation is guided by the three Cs: ‘co-ordination’; ‘coherence’; and 
‘complementarity’ (IPAD, 2011d: 10–11). This approach puts international 
organisations at the centre of the process and seeks to make sure that Portugal’s bilateral 
interests in the Lusophone world, and its efforts to improve the developmental prospects 
of its former colonies, are congruent with the objectives of the wider international 
community and the Millennium Development Goals. The multilateralisation of 
Portuguese development policy, clearly, does not translate into an abandonment of its 
foreign policy priorities in the Lusophone world. 
 
– Raising awareness of Africa: Portugal and its Presidencies of the EU Council – 
The rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union has been characterised by 
particular Member States using their six-month incumbency to raise ‘priority’ issues 
from their own national foreign policy areas of interest. A major criticism of the rotating 
Presidency system was that Member States did precisely this; hence the changes made 
under the Treaty of Lisbon to give the EU greater continuity in external affairs 
(Cameron, 2007: 47). For the Portuguese Council Presidencies of 1992, 2000, and 2007, 
Africa was a central theme and reflected its status as a ‘priority’ issue in Portuguese 
national foreign policy, mainly because of Portugal’s ties to its former colonies. 
 
Since the decolonisation process began after the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, 
successive governments in Lisbon have tried to maintain privileged relations with the 
PALOPs. These relatively cordial pre-existing relationships gave Portugal a useful 
niche to develop European relations with Africa in the EU context. This “comparative 
advantage” allowed Portugal to use its Council Presidencies to act as “a constructive 
bridge-builder between the two continents” (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008: 65). Portugal laid 
the foundations in its 2000 Presidency, overseeing the signing of the Cotonou 
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 Agreement and the first ever EU–Africa Summit in Cairo. Portugal built upon these 
successes when its turn to take the rotating Council Presidency came around in the 
second half of 2007, hosting the second EU–Africa Summit in Lisbon during December 
of that year (Sócrates, 2007: 14). 
 
In the view of Portugal’s foreign policy-making elite, the 2007 Presidency was 
successful as Portugal was able to “mobilise” the EU in order to move relations with the 
PALOPs forward (Interview 3, Lisbon, 2010). Together with the EU–Africa Summit in 
Lisbon, the Portuguese Presidency strengthened its bond with the PALOPs by 
externalising its bilateral relationship onto the EU level by signing agreements between 
the EU and the Lusophone world. The Portuguese Presidency of 2007 oversaw the 
signing of memoranda of understanding between the European Commission and the 
Lusophone ACP countries (namely the five PALOPs and East Timor) and between the 
European Commission and the Executive Secretariat of the CPLP (Ministério dos 
Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007: 196).  
 
Although Portugal’s national foreign policy interests in Lusophone Africa were clearly 
evident, the 2007 Presidency, crucially, revealed the Europeanisation and 
multilateralisation of Portugal’s relations with Africa. Portuguese political elites 
skilfully portrayed the country’s domestic priority of strengthening ties with Lusophone 
Africa as being in the wider European interest by framing the relationship with Africa in 
terms of the strategic interests for Europe as a whole, emphasising the globalised, 
multilateral, context (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008: 65). A key Portuguese foreign policy 
priority was, therefore, constructed to be part of common European foreign policy 
interests. 
 
The Council Presidencies were used by Member States to ‘project’ national priorities 
onto the EU, but were also loci for intense elite socialisation in Brussels, which, 
arguably, can contribute to officials shifting from thinking in terms of national foreign 
policy to thinking in ‘European’ terms (Wong, 2008: 328). Making the national and the 
European more symbiotic, by externalising national foreign policy in this way, reflects a 
social learning process, and that states increasingly know what national priorities can be 
projected onto the EU level. As Hayes-Renshaw (1999) argues, when it comes to 
managing a successful Presidency “experience counts” (Hayes-Renshaw, 1999: 35); 
building upon previous experiences each time the Presidency comes around is key. By 
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 building upon these experiences, and making progress in addressing national foreign 
policy priorities whilst chairing EU Council meetings, the importance of the EU 
Council Presidency as a platform has become engrained at the national level. Alongside 
this, there has also been a gradual recognition of the increased relevance of the EU more 
broadly as an international actor. These developments can be viewed, legitimately, as 
aspects of the Europeanisation of national foreign policy. 
 
Africa was, undoubtedly, Portugal’s foreign policy specialism. It was in Portugal’s 
strategic interests to maximise the rotating Council Presidencies to enhance its own 
relations with Africa. At the same time, Portugal used this opportunity to put its 
expertise and connections with Africa at the service of the EU. These actions reflect the 
Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy; the recognition of the role of 
international multilateral institutions as legitimate vehicles for enhancing co-operation 
(particularly enhancing co-operation between regional blocs and shifting from thinking 
in national/bilateral terms to thinking in terms of European Union and the African 
Union); but also, crucially, the persistence of Africa, principally Portuguese-speaking 
Africa, to Portugal’s core foreign policy interests. 
 
 
4.3.2 Locating the African vocation in the multilateral context: creating new 
possibilities for Portuguese foreign policy in Africa? 
 
Broadening Portuguese foreign policy beyond the PALOPs could, realistically, be 
achieved through a process of putting the African vocation more firmly in the 
multilateral context. While the EU will be a central vehicle through which to do this, 
partly because of its pre-existing relationship with Africa under the EU–ACP states 
framework, but also because of the growth of the EU as a global actor, there are other 
relevant organisations which could be of considerable importance. Europeanisation, 
therefore, represents a means of broadening Portugal’s African vocation and linking it 
with multilateral organisations. In addition to Europeanisation, the globalisation process 
and the growth of other multilateral organisations will also lead to significant 
developments in the twenty-first century and the possibility of diversifying Portuguese 
African policy beyond the PALOPs. 
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 Portugal is active in scores of multilateral international organisations and, equally, there 
are several international institutions which are involved in fostering integration between 
African states and between Africa and the wider international community. The 
European Union, the African Union, the CPLP, the United Nations, the African 
Development Bank, NATO (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2010a), as well as 
the Union for the Mediterranean, the Arab League, the Southern African Development 
Community and the Economic Community of West African States are all organisations 
which Portugal must interact with in order to pursue an effective policy towards Africa, 
be that in the multilateral context or with reference to strictly bilateral ties. 
 
Therefore, the scene is set for international multilateral institutions to play a significant 
part in global affairs in the twenty-first century, and for Portuguese foreign policy to be 
more orientated towards them in order to maximise its own global influence. Prioritising 
multilateral relations with international organisations over bilateral ties with specific 
countries, reflects the multilateralisation of Portuguese foreign policy and stems from a 
myriad of pressures, including globalisation and Europeanisation. 
 
In order to assess whether framing African relations in the multilateral context opens up 
more possibilities for Portugal, and will see it expand its interests in the continent, it is 
necessary to examine two areas in particular. The first being the impact of the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the emergence of the European External Action Service and Portugal’s roles 
and responsibilities in European delegations outside of the PALOPs. The second 
important area of interest, and potential new pillar of Portuguese foreign policy, is the 
Maghreb. While Europeanisation and European integration will open up possibilities for 
Portugal in African countries that are not Portuguese-speaking, this needs to be put in its 
proper context. Where Portugal has strategic interests, and underlying Lusophone 
motivations, these need to be properly taken into account before drawing any firm 
conclusions as to whether Europeanisation has the power to transform Portugal’s policy 
towards Africa. 
 
– EU foreign policy in the post-Lisbon context: a mechanism for broadening 
Portuguese interests in Africa through Europeanisation? – 
When Portugal held the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU in previous years 
it tried to, firstly, advance the general European interest on an issue, and secondly, to 
advance the national agenda to “colour” the European level with national priorities, as a 
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 former minister admitted (Interview 13, Lisbon, 2010). There has always been a 
considerable amount of overlap between the two; however, the move towards a more 
cohesive and co-ordinated common foreign policy could both restrict and enhance 
Portuguese national interests with regard to Africa. The adoption of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the creation of the role of High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and the end 
of the rotating Presidency on foreign and security issues, present considerable 
challenges for smaller Member States such as Portugal, states which previously relished 
the opportunity to influence the common EU agenda through the rotating Presidency.  
 
The emergence of the European External Action Service means that Portugal has been 
forced to use the EU’s diplomatic missions, rather than the Council Presidency, as a 
way of acting as interlocutor between the EU and the individual countries of the CPLP. 
Portugal managed to secure the role of heading the EU’s mission in Brazil, but was 
unable to secure a similar role in the PALOPs, with Spanish officials heading the EU 
delegations to Angola and Guinea-Bissau and an Irish official appointed as head of the 
EU’s mission in Mozambique. The only EU delegation to a country in Africa to be 
headed by a Portuguese diplomat is Gabon (Radio Renascença, 2010).  
 
With Portuguese officials heading the EU’s missions to the United States and Brazil, it 
would have been a lot to ask to get Angola and Mozambique as well. However, the 
preferment of a Portuguese official to head the EU delegation in Gabon has two distinct 
advantages for Portuguese diplomacy. Firstly, it shows an interest in a country that is 
not a PALOP and can be used as a platform from which to diversify Portugal’s African 
policy. Secondly, Gabon is very close to the PALOP São Tomé and Príncipe and the 
CPLP observer country Equatorial Guinea, and is not far from the Cabinda region of 
Angola. Therefore, while the Treaty of Lisbon opened up the possibility to diversify 
Portuguese foreign policy through deepening European integration, and building a more 
cohesive common European foreign policy (through Europeanisation), Lusophone 
interests still persist and guide Portuguese foreign policy. 
 
– The Maghreb: a new avenue for Portuguese foreign policy made possible by 
European integration? – 
The Mediterranean and North Africa have been largely absent from Portuguese foreign 
policy since the Portuguese king, D. Sebastião, was defeated in humiliating fashion at 
Alcácer-Quibir in 1578. Although, geographically, Portugal does not have a 
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 Mediterranean coastline, ‘Mediterranean’ is a term which is used interchangeably with 
the Maghreb. Therefore, for Portuguese foreign policy the ‘Mediterranean’ generally 
refers to the Maghreb, principally Morocco. This is important as Morocco is nearer to 
mainland Portugal than the Azores and Madeira (Faria, 1996: 213). Additionally, the 
distance from Lisbon to Rabat is not much further than the distance between Lisbon and 
Madrid. The Maghreb and the Mediterranean are, therefore, strategically important for 
Portugal, although ignored for many years because of the predominance of the Atlantic 
and the colonies in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The Europeanisation of Portuguese 
foreign policy can, therefore, bring with it the Mediterraneanisation of Portuguese 
foreign policy as the Maghreb and the Mediterranean basin are strategically important 
for the Union as a whole. 
 
Political instability in the Maghreb raises significant security concerns for Portugal 
because of its close proximity to North Africa, which makes it more of a priority than 
the Middle East. Portugal, motivated by economic and social interests in the Maghreb, 
has, therefore, needed to build stronger political ties with the countries in North Africa. 
The Maghreb is not a major market for Portugal, but Portugal relies on gas and oil 
imports from North Africa, which underpin economic relations between Lisbon and 
North Africa (Faria, 1996: 215–216). Portugal relies upon Algeria for 70–80 per cent of 
its natural gas supplies (Lesser, 2006: 38). These important strategic interests clearly 
motivated Sócrates’ governments (2005–2011) to pursue a much more active policy of 
engagement with the Maghreb and have seen it potentially emerge, as Gorjão (2010e) 
argues, as the “fourth pillar of Portugal’s foreign policy” (Noivo, 2010: 4; Gorjão, 
2010e: 7). 
 
The Portuguese Presidencies of the Council of the European Union have championed 
relations between Europe and Africa with both the first and the second EU–Africa 
Summits occurring while Portugal held the rotating Presidency. This shows the 
recognition of the importance of the two regional co-operation organisations and the 
framing of the relationship in terms of EU–AU.9 Furthering Portugal’s interests with 
                                                 
9 Of all the Maghreb countries, Portugal’s principal focus is on developing relations with its closest 
neighbour – Morocco. However, it should be noted that, Morocco left the African Union’s predecessor, 
the Organisation of African Unity, in 1984 because of other African states’ formal recognition of the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara). It was consequently excluded from the African 
Union upon its creation (Bamford, 2001). This meant that in order for Portugal to construct a meaningful 
relationship with Morocco it had to engage with the country both bilaterally and through Mediterranean 
co-operation mechanisms, such as the Barcelona Process, the 5+5 Dialogue and the Union for the 
Mediterranean. 
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 sub-Saharan Africa meant engaging with countries in North Africa also, and this gave 
the Maghreb increased significance alongside Portugal’s other, more traditional, foreign 
policy objectives in Lusophone Africa. For example, the Portuguese government 
delegation visited Libya in the run-up to the third EU–Africa Summit hosted in Tripoli 
in November 2010 (Noivo, 2010: 4). Although Portugal’s primary interest is in 
Lusophone Africa, the EU–Africa Summits have now twice been hosted in North 
Africa, which reinforces the sense of pan-Africanism created by the AU, and the need 
for Portugal to frame its African policy with reference to all countries in the continent, 
from the Maghreb to the Portuguese communities in South Africa. 
 
As Faria (1999) argues, Portugal’s recent attitude towards the Maghreb reflects the 
Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy. While, she argues that it is not at the 
expense of ‘traditional’ foreign policy priorities, (i.e. Lusophone Africa, Brazil and the 
Atlantic), it does represent the “enlargement of Portugal’s foreign and security 
priorities” (Faria, 1999: 121). The concerns over security in the Maghreb are legitimate 
concerns for a country, such as Portugal, in close proximity to such instability. 
However, Faria (1999) argues that because of its obligations under the Schengen 
Agreement, Portugal is more acutely aware of the need to make sure that this external 
southern border of the European Union is more tightly controlled. Portuguese policy-
makers, therefore, have a sense of duty to the whole of the European Union, not just to 
their own citizens, to ensure that this border is secure. This partially explains Portugal’s 
interest in the Maghreb in recent years (Faria, 1999: 121).  
 
There are, however, other key motivations which explain Portuguese policy towards the 
Maghreb, and these reflect the wider multilateralisation and globalisation of national 
foreign policy. In terms of multilateralisation, the foundations set by the Barcelona 
Process, of which Portugal was a keen advocate, have now been built upon by the 
Union for the Mediterranean (Rosa Lã, 2008: 118). Portugal made sure that its EU 
Council Presidency of 2007 focused on the security aspects of Mediterranean relations 
and supported efforts to create the Union for the Mediterranean (Santana Carlos, 2007: 
11). This development created an international institutional framework for dialogue 
between Europe and its southern neighbours, one which is institutionally distinct from 
the EU. Portugal’s long-standing membership of NATO may also explain the country’s 
interest in the Maghreb as part of the Atlantic Alliance’s efforts to construct the 
Mediterranean Dialogue (Rosa Lã, 2008: 118).  
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 In addition to the emergence of stronger multilateral political institutions, the 
globalisation process is also a valid alternative explanation. Globalisation, Lesser 
(2006) argues, makes “strict geographic definitions less meaningful in strategic terms”, 
which means that Portugal, a country “ambivalent” to Mediterranean identity because it 
is an Atlantic country, is able to play a greater role in Mediterranean affairs, and is free 
to pursue a more meaningful relationship with the Maghreb (Lesser, 2006: 14). This 
view challenges Faria’s assertion that Europeanisation and Mediterraneanisation are the 
driving forces behind Portugal’s interest in the Maghreb, an interest which was absent 
for so long. The situation is less clear-cut in reality; all these explanations have some 
credibility but no single one should be allowed to stand alone as the prime motivation. 
Nevertheless, processes of globalisation, Europeanisation, and Mediterraneanisation, 
allow for Portuguese foreign policy interests to be found in more diverse locations, 
because of the interconnectedness of international politics, particularly in Europe. This 
makes it easier for Portuguese foreign policy-makers to highlight potential linkages 
between traditional priorities, centred on the Atlantic, and novel areas of interest for 
Portugal elsewhere. 
 
 
4.4 Assessing Portugal’s Renewed African Vocation: Embracing European 
Neo-Colonialism and Promoting Lusophony in a Multilateral Context 
 
Portugal’s renewed African vocation is primarily focused on the five officially 
Lusophone states. These relations are not, however, limited to being strictly bilateral, 
and are increasingly being located in the multilateral context. The Portuguese language 
is central to Portugal’s relations with Africa, not just in the countries where it is an 
official language, but with countries, such as South Africa, with large expatriate 
Portuguese communities, and with states neighbouring CPLP states, such as Senegal 
and Equatorial Guinea, which recognise that the Portuguese language could be a useful 
asset to enhance their respective countries’ developmental prospects. Portuguese 
African policy is, therefore, not limited to the PALOPs, but is motivated by the desire to 
promote and preserve the Portuguese language, which gives Portugal a unique platform 
to be able to explore bilateral relations elsewhere on the continent, and through the EU 
and the CPLP, to contribute to effective multilateral partnerships. The Portuguese 
language is the glue that binds Portugal’s dealings with Africa as it allows for the 
promotion of developmental goals to be linked with education and cultural diplomacy. 
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 The fact that Portugal’s development aid programmes and its cultural policy have now 
been brought under one roof, with the establishment of the Camões – Institute for Co-
operation and Language, further highlights how the two strands, development aid and 
cultural policy, joined by the Portuguese language, form a double helix of Portugal’s 
interests in Lusophone Africa (see figure 4.2 below).  
 
 
Portuguese 
cultural policy 
Portuguese 
development 
policy 
The Portuguese 
language – the 
bond that joins 
development 
policy and 
cultural policy 
Figure 4.2: The Portuguese language double helix: the central role of the Portuguese 
language in Portuguese development and cultural policy in Africa. 
 
The significance of the Portuguese language and Portugal’s preoccupation with the 
Lusophone countries, mean that the impact of Europeanisation in this domain is limited. 
The Europeanisation of Portugal’s foreign policy-making structures, as outlined in the 
previous chapter, has not translated into the widespread Europeanisation of one of the 
key outputs of Portuguese foreign policy, namely Portuguese African policy. With 
regard to African policy, none of the analytical levels reflect Europeanisation. The 
Europeanisation evident on the lower levels of the policy-making process in the 
previous chapter (levels 4–7), is not reflected here because, although the EU is a 
consideration, there is insufficient evidence to assert Europeanisation over 
internationalisation and multilateralisation. If anything, IPAD’s relationship with the 
EU is one of strategic manipulation, with its rationale being to multilateralise Portugal’s 
development aid strategies in order to legitimise its narrow Lusophone focus. On the 
more macro levels Portuguese foreign policy reflects even less Europeanisation, at least 
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 with regard to African policy. This is because of the persistence of Lusophone interests, 
which invoke sentiments closely wrapped up in what it means to be Portuguese. The 
traditional, historically embedded links to Africa, especially when constructed as being 
inherently part of Portuguese identity, Portugal’s place in the world and its contribution 
to history, mean that the transformation of Portuguese African policy by an external 
force is difficult, as these legacies constitute considerable historical baggage. This 
means that the alternative explanations to Europeanisation are, on the whole, better 
placed to explain contemporary Portuguese attitudes towards Africa. As such, 
transformations cannot be attributed exclusively to Europeanisation. This is because 
developments in Portuguese foreign policy-making had more to do with the shift 
towards a more multilateralised relationship in order to legitimise Portugal’s selective 
engagement with Africa, than to European integration per se. 
 
Levels 2, 3 and 4 of the policy process show little evidence of Europeanisation. Rather, 
the alternative explanations seem to illuminate Portugal’s approach to its African 
policy, of which multilateralism and an instrumental manipulation of international 
organisations in order to pursue traditional foreign policy goals in Lusophone Africa are 
key features. Policy instruments are both bilateral and multilateral, rather being 
exclusively centred on the EU’s external action. Instead, Portugal is able to use 
international norms and European money as means of enhancing its relationship with 
the PALOPs and promoting the Portuguese language in Africa. This has allowed 
Portugal to renew its influence in Africa in the postcolonial era. While Portugal has 
been able to latch onto the EU’s relations with Africa in recent years, the motivation 
appears to be that this is a way of promoting its Lusophone niche, rather than that 
Portuguese African policy has been Europeanised to recognise that the EU is a vehicle 
through which Portugal can engage with Africa. This is reinforced by the fact that 
Portugal has strong bilateral relations with the PALOPs, and that multilateral 
organisations, including the UN, the CPLP, the AU and the OECD are important 
considerations in Portugal’s broader strategy towards Africa. 
 
Portugal has been under increasing pressure to provide development assistance to its 
former colonies through multilateral organisations. As such, Portugal has sought to 
align its development aid strategies with international norms and the Millennium 
Development Goals. This meant that, for example, promoting the Portuguese language 
is now framed in terms of its potential as a developmental tool, rather than serving as a 
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 neo-colonial cultural project of projecting Portuguese influence on Africa. Important 
bilateral relationships with the PALOPs remain intact, but the multilateralisation of 
Portuguese development assistance is emblematic of Portugal’s broader African policy 
and reflects the importance of international organisations to its foreign policy, 
something which is particularly evident since the Carnation Revolution of April 1974. 
This highlights how Portuguese foreign policy elites (on levels 2, 3 and 4) are striving 
to harmonise their policies with broader international norms (on level 1) in order to give 
their actions greater legitimacy. However, this could be misinterpreted as being 
Europeanisation, simply because it appears to be consistent with the EU’s position. 
Rather, multilateralisation and internationalisation have occurred, as the EU’s normative 
stance regarding African development is derived from the more widespread view in the 
international community, that promoting development is a noble goal. The EU’s 
position reflects wider international norms established by various other international 
multilateral organisations, such as the UN and the OECD, which together with 
‘Western’ countries, have established acceptable conventions and aid targets, such as 
the Millennium Development Goals. Although the EU supports these goals, supporting 
them does not constitute Europeanisation on the part of Member States. 
 
The Portuguese case, therefore, chimes with the French experience. Portugal, like 
France, has had to gradually multilateralise its relationship with its former colonies in 
Africa. Portugal’s special relationship with the PALOPs gives Portugal greater prestige 
and is an important sphere of influence for the country, allowing it privileged access to 
Africa. Akin to the French model, Lusophony in Africa has been used as a tool for 
enhancing African development, an attitude which has strongly neo-colonialist 
overtones. Portugal is open to accusations of being blatant and self-serving in this 
regard, with no real interest in the developmental prospects of Africa as a whole but, 
instead, maintaining strategic partnerships of benefit to Portugal first and Africa second. 
Portugal’s African vocation, therefore, reflects a strongly neo-colonialist attitude, where 
Lusophony is multilateralised in order to legitimise the Portuguese position. 
 
From the evidence presented in this chapter, it would be an overstatement of the impact 
the EU has had on this element of Portuguese foreign policy to assert that Portugal’s 
African policy has been Europeanised. The fact that the PALOPs are so central to 
Portugal’s African policy, and indeed to its broader foreign policy, means that the 
Lusophone world still constitutes a significant interest for Portugal. While Portugal’s 
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 Lusophone priorities can be externalised onto multilateral organisations and projected 
onto the EU’s external action, the fact that the PALOPs are such a major focus for 
Portugal signifies that the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy remains 
somewhat incomplete. The Lusophone world remains important to Portuguese bilateral 
diplomacy, but, more importantly, it is a feature of Portugal’s engagement with 
multilateral organisations. This complementarity allows Portuguese foreign policy to 
reach beyond the EU. This is a notable feature of Portugal’s renewed African vocation, 
but also of contemporary Portuguese security policy, discussed in the next chapter. This 
suggests that Portuguese foreign policy outputs are more resistant to Europeanisation 
pressures than the foreign policy-making processes, discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 192
 Chapter 5 
Portuguese Security Policy 
 
Defence and national security are firmly linked to the broader aspects of Portuguese 
foreign policy. Furthermore, Portugal’s active participation in multilateral security 
organisations can enhance its diplomatic presence on the world stage. As a 
consequence, Portuguese security policy warrants considerable attention if the broader 
Europeanisation of national foreign policy is to be assessed. In order to maximise its 
global influence, Portuguese security policy is orientated towards participating in 
security missions as part of NATO, the EU and under the United Nations. In addition to 
developing a solid base for co-operation with countries in the Lusophone world 
bilaterally, Portugal seeks to act as a link between the aforementioned security 
organisations and the member countries of the CPLP. This attitude is enshrined in the 
Conceito Estratégico da Defesa Nacional (National Defence Strategic Concept), which 
stresses Portugal’s capacity to act on multiple “frontiers”, as a Euro-Atlantic country 
with special links to Lusophone countries (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros 6/2003, 
of 20 January 2003: 283). 
 
In assessing the Europeanisation of Portuguese security policy, and the motivations 
which underpin Portugal’s participation in various security co-operation mechanisms, 
there are several themes and patterns which emerge. A key guiding theme is the 
emphasis on locating Portuguese security policy in the context of international 
multilateral organisations. This means that Portugal’s broader security policy rests upon 
the interdependence of international security organisations and attempts to link up the 
EU and NATO with the Lusophone world. 
 
These different security organisations are viewed by Portuguese security planners as 
being complementary, rather than competing. Therefore, if Portugal is able to enhance 
its position in one organisation, its position in all three is strengthened. This does not 
necessarily mean that all security organisations are treated equally by Portuguese 
military planners. Portugal’s security policy elites view the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) very differently; the more EU-focused branches of the Armed Forces, especially 
the Navy, see the EDA as an opportunity, whereas the Army is much more focused on 
enhancing co-operation through NATO, and regards the EDA as less relevant. This 
internal division leads to the different organisations being handled separately, rather 
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 than being part of a joined-up strategy, suggesting that the MNE and the MDN have 
different strategic interests when dealing with multilateral security organisations. 
 
Portuguese security policy is grounded in multilateral international organisations, 
largely to give Portuguese foreign policy greater legitimacy and influence on the world 
stage. This is not due to the presence of Europeanisation pressures in this domain. 
Rather, the internationalisation of Portuguese security and defence policy, which can be 
traced back to Portugal’s alignment with the West and the country’s long-standing 
participation in NATO, has facilitated an internationalised culture of Portuguese 
security policy where Portugal’s military action has become increasingly located in the 
multilateral context. Therefore, NATO should not be overlooked as a locus for the 
socialisation of Portuguese political and military elites. 
 
The key question to ask, in order to draw these themes together, is: To what extent has 
Europeanisation, and the emergence of the EU as a credible security actor, changed the 
parameters of Portuguese security policy and made NATO and the Lusophone world 
less relevant? By assessing Portugal’s role in each of these organisations in turn, it is 
easier to trace the patterns of overlap and complementarity which exist, and to chart the 
presence, or absence, of trends towards the Europeanisation of Portuguese security 
policy. 
 
The principal analytical goal of this chapter is to assess whether Portugal’s membership 
of the EU has had a profound impact on a key output of Portuguese foreign policy, 
namely the country’s security policy. The emphasis in this chapter is primarily on the 
macro and meso levels of Portugal’s foreign policy apparatus, building upon the 
assessment of the Europeanisation of the policy-making process in chapter 3. This 
chapter is interested in how the evolution of policy-making institutions in light of 
European integration has changed the parameters of Portuguese security policy. Have 
changes to the policy-making institutions brought about the Europeanisation of 
Portuguese security policy outputs, or have macro-level political rhetoric and national 
identity issues continued to have a discernible influence on the country’s security 
policy, making alternative explanations to Europeanisation better placed to account for 
the current state-of-play in this policy area? 
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 In order to explore these analytical problems more deeply, this chapter assesses 
Portugal’s roles in NATO, EU security and defence policy, and security co-operation in 
the Lusophone world. These three core elements of Portuguese security policy were 
boosted by Portugal’s possession of a non-permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council for 2011–2012. The contribution that Portugal’s privileged position on 
the UN Security Council has made to enhancing the country’s other security relations 
are discussed. Portugal’s seat on the UN Security Council further emphasises the 
multilateral context of Portuguese foreign and security policy, but it also allowed 
Portugal to enhance its position in the Lusophone world, and to a lesser degree, the EU 
and NATO for its brief tenure. 
 
Before assessing Portugal’s contributions to NATO, EU security and defence policy, 
and Lusophone security co-operation, it would first be useful to set the broad context of 
current Portuguese security policy and to outline its commitments to international 
organisations. Given Portugal’s limited economic resources, and its status as a relatively 
small player in Europe and globally, the country’s security policy must be firmly 
located in multilateral organisations. This means that Portugal can multiply its influence 
and spread its Armed Forces to be able to make a contribution to all of the international 
security organisations of which it is a member. Portugal has been relatively successful 
in doing this, and has a record of supporting international security missions. 
 
 
5.1 Portugal’s Security and Defence Capabilities and its Contributions to 
International Security Missions 
 
In 2012, Portuguese military personnel were engaged in numerous missions under the 
banners of various international organisations. Portuguese personnel have been 
deployed on EU missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Somali training 
mission in Uganda (EUTM Somalia), and the Atalanta anti-piracy mission off the 
Somali coast. Under the auspices of NATO, the Portuguese military have participated in 
Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, as well as serving in Afghanistan 
(ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR). In addition to participating in NATO operations in 
Afghanistan and Kosovo, Portuguese troops were also present under the UN banner 
(UNAMA and UNMIK respectively), as well as being deployed on UN missions in East 
Timor (UNMIT) and Lebanon (UNIFIL) (EMGFA, 2012b). On 3 March 2011, there 
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 were 668 Portuguese military personnel (634 male, 34 female) deployed to these 
theatres (EMGFA, 2011a). There were also a further 109 Portuguese military personnel 
stationed in Lusophone Africa and East Timor, involved in bilateral Technical Military 
Co-operation (TMC) programmes (EMGFA, 2010a; see also table 5.3). 
 
Portuguese military spending in 2009 amounted to €2.7 billion, 1.63 per cent of GDP 
(EDA, 2011a). In 2009, the Portuguese Armed Forces consisted of 49,000 people, of 
which 41,000 were military personnel, and of those 14 per cent were female (NATO 
Summit Lisbon 2010, 2010). Table 5.1 (below) presents some key data on Portuguese 
defence spending. Defence spending has remained relatively stable at 1–2 per cent of 
GDP. It should be noted that Portugal is not among the EU Member States with the 
largest military capacity. When compared to other European countries, Portugal can be 
placed in the medium-sized power category. The size of the Portuguese Armed Forces 
and the commitment to defence spending in the budget mean that, in the view of an 
official charged with co-ordinating Portuguese security policy, Portugal is well-placed 
to make a contribution to international security missions (Interview 9, Lisbon, 2010), 
although its defence spending is below the 2 per cent of GDP target set by NATO. 
 
Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 2005–2009 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
% 1.72 1.58 1.48 1.53 1.63 
 
Composition of the Portuguese Armed Forces in 2009 
Navy 28% of the total personnel 
Army 53% of the total personnel 
Air Force 19% of the total personnel 
Table 5.1: Key data on Portuguese defence (adapted from EDA, 2011a; NATO Summit 
Lisbon 2010, 2010). 
 
The composition of the Portuguese Armed Forces is, more or less, typical for a NATO 
member country. It is typical for the Army to comprise at least half of the overall 
personnel of the Armed Forces. In terms of personnel, the Portuguese Navy is relatively 
large when compared to other European NATO allies. An interesting observation can be 
made from this statistic, namely, that the relative size of the Portuguese Navy reflects 
 196
 the country’s maritime history and the importance of the sea to Portuguese national 
identity. The NRP Sagres III tall ship, the training vessel for the Portuguese Navy, is an 
instantly recognisable symbol of the current Portuguese Navy and plays an 
ambassadorial role for Portugal, and its seafaring heritage, internationally (Marinha 
Portuguesa, 2012). This ship can frequently be seen in the Portuguese media, in 
advertising, and around the coast and islands of Portugal. The prominence of the 
Portuguese Navy in the country’s popular culture must contribute to the relatively high 
numbers of Portuguese Naval personnel, as well as helping to secure the Navy’s 
importance to Portugal’s overall, broadly Atlanticist, defence policy. 
 
Despite changes of government, Portugal remains a “steadfast ally” to the United States 
and loyal to NATO as a vehicle for maintaining good relations between Europe and 
North America. This loyalty is reflected in the fact that Portuguese Armed Forces are 
currently engaged in missions in Afghanistan (ISAF), and Kosovo (KFOR), and until 
March 2009, were in Iraq (Stephenson, 2008; EMGFA, 2011b; EMGFA, 2009a). Since 
1992, Portuguese forces have participated in 56 NATO missions across the world, 
mostly in the Mediterranean and the Balkans (EMGFA, 2010b: 5; United Nations, 
2011). 
 
While NATO was still active in the 1990s, despite the end of the Cold War, the 
European Union gradually looked to develop a security and defence capacity to 
complement NATO. Atlanticist countries, such as Portugal, remained loyal to NATO, 
but the Saint Malo defence agreement between the UK and France made developing EU 
security policy possible (Howorth, 2007: 36–37). The watershed moment for Portugal 
came at the end of 1995 when it chose to commit troops to the NATO intervention in 
Bosnia (IFOR and its successor SFOR).  
 
This decision was momentous because it was such a major commitment. Portugal’s 
participation in the NATO ground intervention was much larger than its role in the 
years immediately prior to IFOR/SFOR, where Portugal contributed only modestly to 
the policing of the no-fly zones over Bosnia. The decision also marked a new phase in 
Portugal’s position within NATO. Until this point, Portugal’s membership of NATO 
was not orientated towards continental Europe, but instead was Atlantic-facing. This 
stems from the fact that the rationale for including Portugal in NATO was that it was a 
provider of bases to enable the United States to gain access to Europe. The importance 
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 of the Azores and the base at Oeiras, near Lisbon, as refuelling and command posts, 
meant that until the mid-1990s Portugal’s role in NATO was in facilitating the 
transatlantic link, rather than directing its attentions towards the Iron Curtain (Bruneau, 
1997: 176–177). This was especially important as Spain did not join the Alliance until 
1982, so Portugal’s patch within NATO was the Eastern Atlantic, encompassing the 
Iberian Peninsula, Morocco and the Atlantic islands. After Spain joined, Portugal 
remained under Atlantic command (SACLANT), rather than being under European 
command (SACEUR), which reinforced Portugal’s Atlantic-facing orientation within 
NATO (Bruneau, 1997: 178; Magone, 2004: 246).  
 
Although it was officially a NATO mission, the intervention in Bosnia marked the 
beginning of the EU’s development of a security role, as it exposed Europe’s 
weaknesses and inability to deal with crises on its doorstep and provided an opportunity 
for the EU to play a role in post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans (Peterson, 1998: 
13). The decision by Portugal to participate in helping to secure continental Europe 
opened up the possibility of engaging in security missions led by both NATO and the 
EU (as it looked to develop a Common Security and Defence Policy from the late 1990s 
onwards). It was the recognition of the importance of intervening in Bosnia, at a time 
when Angola was also in crisis, that cemented this new European outlook (de 
Vasconcelos, 2000: 34). Given that very few Portuguese troops were deployed in this 
instance, the significance of the intervention in Bosnia was, however, largely symbolic. 
It was a recognition of the new situation in Europe and an opportunity for Portugal to be 
seen to be playing a greater role on the world stage by broadening its horizons 
(Interview 13, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
As the EU’s security capacity has developed, Portugal has been actively involved in 
supporting its interventions. Portugal is currently participating in the EU’s Somali 
training mission in Uganda (EUTM Somalia), the EU security reform mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) and the anti-piracy mission off 
Somalia (Atalanta). As of December 2010, a total of 22 Portuguese military officers 
were involved in these missions. Portugal has also contributed to the EU’s mission to 
Bosnia (EUFOR Althea BiH) as well as the Union’s mission to Chad and the Central 
African Republic (which complements the UN’s MINURCAT mission to Chad and the 
Central African Republic, which Portugal is also currently participating in). Portugal 
also contributed two officers (one from the Navy, the other from the Army) to the EU 
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 Security Sector Reform mission in Guinea-Bissau, which ended on 30 September 2010 
(EMGFA, 2009b; EMGFA, 2010c; EMGFA, 2010d; EMGFA, 2011b; EMGFA, 2011c; 
EMGFA, 2012b; EEAS, 2011e; EEAS, 2011f; EEAS, 2011g).  
 
Portugal’s motivations for participating in these EU security missions, especially those 
to African countries, are two-fold. Firstly, participating in international interventions in 
Africa demonstrates, to African states, EU partners and the broader international 
community, Portugal’s commitment to peacebuilding and stabilisation in the continent. 
Secondly, it is important for Portuguese diplomacy to be seen to be making a positive 
contribution to the EU’s interventions abroad. This two-pronged attack is aimed to give 
Portugal greater legitimacy should it need to convince its European partners of the 
necessity to intervene in Lusophone Africa in the future (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007b: 222).  
 
Portugal has also contributed to 28 United Nations peacekeeping operations since the 
UNOGIL mission to Lebanon in 1958, as well as contributing 1,500 troops and three 
ships to the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (EMGFA, 2010e: 3, 22; 
EMGFA, 2010b: 11). As outlined in table 5.2, Portugal has been particularly active in 
support of UN missions in East Timor and in sub-Saharan Africa as a part of its broader 
commitment to Lusophone countries. 
 
Portugal’s participation in UN-led missions, and its current deployment in Lebanon and 
East Timor, combined with its active participation in NATO and EU-led missions 
elsewhere, strengthened the country’s bid for a non-permanent seat at the UN Security 
Council for 2011–2012. In addition, Portugal is consistently ranked in the top fifty 
nations in terms of the number of military and police personnel it contributes to 
international missions (EMGFA, 2010e: 20), so it has been able to position itself as a 
reliable and willing contributor to global peacebuilding. Under Article 23 of the UN 
Charter, countries aspiring to be elected to the Security Council must have the capacity 
to be able to act as peacekeepers. The fact that Portugal could point to both an 
impressive record of participation in UN missions, and the military capacity to carry out 
UN security objectives, clearly boosted its candidacy considerably (Interview 12, 
Lisbon, 2010; Charter of the United Nations 1945, as amended 1963: Article 23). The 
principal motivations behind the bid were, however, to enhance Portugal’s broader 
foreign policy credentials and to elevate its status in the world, especially among the 
Lusophone countries.  
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 Continent Mission Name and Location(s) Year(s) of Engagement 
UNTAG, Namibia 1989 
UNAVEM II, Angola 1991/1992 
UNOMSA, South Africa 1992/1994 
ONUMOZ, Mozambique 1993/1994 
UNAVEM III, Angola 1995/1997 
MINURSO, Western Sahara 1996/2002 
MONUA, Angola 1997/2000 
MINURCA, Central African Republic 1998/2000 
ONUCI, Ivory Coast 2003 
MONUC,  
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
2003/2004 
UNMIL, Liberia 2003, 2004/2005 
ONUB, Burundi 2004/2006 
Africa 
MINURCAT,  
Central African Republic and Chad 
2007– 
UNOGIL, Lebanon 1958 
INTERFET, East Timor 1999/2000 
UNTAET, East Timor 2000/2002 
UNMISET, East Timor 2000/2004 
UNOTIL, East Timor 2000/2004 
UNMIT, East Timor 2000– 
UNIFIL, Lebanon 2006– 
Asia 
UNAMA, Afghanistan 2008– 
UNPROFOR, Former Yugoslavia 1992/1996 
UNCRO, Croatia 1995 
UNPREDEP, FYROM 1995 
UNMOP, Prevlaka (Croatia) 1996 
Europe 
UNMIK, Kosovo 2005, 2007 
The Americas MINUSTAH, Haiti 2004/2005 
Table 5.2: Portuguese participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions (adapted 
from EMGFA, 2010e: 6, 10, 17, 19).  
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 Portugal’s contributions to UN missions over the years demonstrate that it is both 
interested in and able to respond to global security challenges. The fact that Portuguese 
foreign and security policy is grounded in a multilateral context means that the different 
frontiers are not contradictory but complementary. Playing an active role in the United 
Nations, the Lusophone world, NATO, and the EU, enhances Portugal’s position in 
each of these spheres. However, the Europeanisation of the policy-making process, 
combined with the emergence of the EU as a credible security actor, has the potential to 
change the parameters of Portuguese security policy and alter Portugal’s relationship 
with the Lusophone world and NATO. Despite this potential for transformation, the 
Lusophone world and NATO remain vital to Portugal’s multilateral security policy. The 
EU and the Lusophone world are hugely important, but NATO remains, arguably, 
primus inter pares in Portuguese security policy.  
 
 
5.2 Portugal’s Role in NATO 
 
Portugal has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for over 
sixty years, since its creation in 1949. NATO remains a vital element of Portuguese 
foreign, security and defence policy but in the post-Cold War era its precise role has 
become less obvious. This section examines the implications for Portugal of NATO’s 
New Strategic Concept, agreed at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. Then, 
NATO’s role as a force to internationalise Portuguese foreign and security policy will 
also be examined. The section continues by assessing the extent to which the Atlantic 
Alliance has been able to socialise Portuguese political and military elites, doing so over 
a much longer timescale than the EU. Is it in fact integration through NATO, rather than 
the EU, which has laid the foundations for the internationalisation and Europeanisation 
of Portuguese security policy? In order to answer this, it would first be useful to outline 
the historical context of Portugal’s place in the Atlantic Alliance in order to build upon 
its relevance to Portuguese security policy today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 201
 5.2.1 The historical and contemporary relevance of the Atlantic Alliance to 
Portugal 
 
Portugal was invited to join NATO upon its creation in 1949 largely because of the 
strategic importance of the Azores to the Americans. As a consequence of the strategic 
value of the Azores in the Cold War, the Americans were clearly able to tolerate 
Salazar’s rule, with the CIA describing his regime as a “comparatively benevolent 
dictatorship” (CIA, October 1949, cited in Schmitz, 1999: 163). Today, the foreign 
policy-making elite in Portugal still regard NATO as central to the country’s defence 
and security, as it is viewed as essential to preserving the link between Europe and 
North America (Interview 3, Lisbon, 2010).  
 
– Portugal’s shift towards alignment with NATO and the importance of the Azores – 
Immediately after World War II, Portugal’s foreign policy priorities were completely 
Atlantic-orientated. The main concern was to secure Portuguese sovereignty (in both the 
Metropolis and the African colonies) from threats stemming from continental Europe, 
namely the Soviet Union and fears of Spanish aggression. The main foreign policy 
achievement of the post-war Salazar dictatorship was to align Portugal with the West 
and be a founding-member of NATO in 1949. This move was in stark contrast to 
Salazar’s policy during World War II of vehement Iberian neutrality. As Teixeira 
(1998) argues, “continental neutrality” was successful for a number of reasons, 
including Salazar’s acumen as a statesman, as well as other more geostrategic factors 
which played their part as the war in Europe evolved. However, in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, neutral Portugal found itself isolated in the new world order, 
although the Salazar dictatorship survived the post-war wave of democratisations in 
Europe (Teixeira, 1998: 78–79). 
 
While Portugal remained officially neutral throughout the whole of World War II, the 
fact is that the conditions for Portugal’s eventual alliance with the West were set during 
the war years. Although Salazar’s Portugal was a right-wing dictatorship, Salazar was 
most careful not to appear to be siding with one side or the other. Salazar’s even-handed 
neutrality meant that he supplied Nazi Germany with tungsten, while at the same time 
believing that Britain would ultimately win the war (Herz, 2004: 21). As the war 
progressed, Salazar increasingly realised the importance of maintaining good relations 
with Britain and the United States. The “perpetual friendship” between Portugal and 
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 Britain, enshrined in the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1373, gave London a more 
privileged position in negotiating access to the Azores, based on a solid legal footing. 
This is in contrast to the United States, which had no legitimate basis to occupy the 
islands. This meant that Salazar would have been forced to view any occupation of the 
islands by the US military as an act of aggression on the part of Washington (Herz, 
2004: 67). 
 
In October 1943 Winston Churchill cited the Treaty of 1373 in order to legitimise 
British occupation of the Azores, making it clear that this would in no way undermine 
Salazar’s neutrality (Hansard, 1943: 716–719). The “succor” [sic], which Portugal was 
treaty-bound to provide Britain in its time of need, was the formal legal foundation upon 
which Allied forces could use the Azores for the remainder of the War and proved 
decisive in winning the U-boat war in the Atlantic (Herz, 2004: 141).  
 
Allied, principally American, interests in the Azores had been established long ago. 
During the early 1940s America saw the strategic importance of the Azores, and 
Portugal’s other Atlantic islands to a lesser degree (which at the time included Cape 
Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe). The importance of the Azores to the Americans 
increased as Germany’s expansion through Europe progressed, as the islands offered a 
much more favourable maritime and aerial route to Europe than going the northern 
route via Iceland, which was near impossible during the winter months. This route was 
essential in transporting troops and equipment to Europe in time for Operation Overlord 
(Herz, 2004: 4). By the end of 1941 a considerable body of opinion in American 
military strategy advocated occupation of the Azores. With the Azores being of “…vital 
strategic importance to the United States in the prosecution of this war…” America 
needed to get to the islands before the Axis as a matter of urgency and to “…not wait 
until they have struck their blow” (George Fielding Elliot, cited in ANTT, 1941).  
 
The air and naval bases on the Azores were vital in winning the war in the Atlantic and 
their strategic importance in countering the Soviet threat made them indispensable in 
the run-up to the Cold War. This resulted in the bilateral agreement between the United 
States and Portugal, signed in 1948. This agreement made Portugal’s invitation to join 
the founding of the NATO alliance the following year all the more likely and formally 
made the Azores America’s launch pad into Western Europe in the event of Soviet 
advances through the continent (Teixeira, 1995: 804). 
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 Portugal’s alignment with the West, with the geostrategic importance of the Azores 
central to this, had three significant effects. Firstly, it brought Portugal into a guaranteed 
mutual defence framework (one in which Spain was not yet involved, which was 
significant for Portugal as it afforded it some protection against the perpetual fears of 
Spanish aggression) and reduced the country’s international isolation. Secondly, it 
sealed Portugal’s (and the Azores’) role in Atlantic security and the new emphasis on 
relations with America, rather than Britain, reflected the change in the maritime 
superiority of the Atlantic. Thirdly, participation in the NATO alliance, and Portugal’s 
new relationship with America post-World War II, formed the basis for international co-
operation on not just a transatlantic basis but also Portugal’s renewed involvement in 
affairs in continental Europe under the Marshall Plan. This reflected a clear shift in 
Salazar’s strategy from the skilfully-managed Iberian neutrality of the war years. In 
short, joining NATO can be seen as the beginning of Portugal’s European integration 
process. 
 
– The continuing relevance of NATO to Portuguese security – 
Despite the end of the Cold War, NATO remains a vital element of Portuguese foreign 
and security policy today. NATO is the most important organisation to Portugal as it is 
the mechanism for maintaining good relations with the United States and serves to 
strengthen the relationship between Europe and North America (Interview 3, Lisbon, 
2010). For small and medium-sized European powers, such as Portugal, maintaining a 
presence in NATO is particularly important. Balancing a commitment to enhance the 
EU’s security and defence capabilities with support for NATO enlargement and its 
continued operations gives countries like Portugal “the advantage of not putting all their 
eggs in one basket” (Machete, 2009: 30). 
  
The accepted view in Portuguese policy-making circles is that NATO is still needed to 
take on the bigger operations, such as intervening in Afghanistan, because it has the 
resources to display ‘hard power’, whereas EU security interventions are relatively 
small-scale and embody a ‘soft power’ approach (Interview 9, Lisbon, 2010; Interview 
15, Lisbon, 2010). While the EU clearly has a role to play, and Portugal wants to be 
seen to be actively involved in CSDP, NATO is still regarded as the main defence actor 
able to intervene in major crises. Therefore, Portuguese Atlanticism is clearly 
embedded, but largely out of the necessity to maintain relations with the United States. 
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 This viewpoint positions Portugal closer to other Atlanticist states like the UK and 
Poland than to Germany.  
 
The Allied presence on the Azores (which remains until this day), together with the ‘old 
alliance’ with Britain, formed the basis for Salazar’s post-war foreign policy strategy of 
alignment with the West against the Soviet threat. During the Cold War period, and up 
to Operation Desert Storm in 1990, there was a steady increase in the number of 
American forces stationed in the Azores archipelago. In 1990, the total US military 
personnel stationed at the Lajes air base on Terceira island was 1,659 (Herz, 2004: 326–
329). The American Science Monitor of 16 April 1953 described Lajes as “Uncle Sam’s 
Biggest Gas Station” (cited in Telo, 1996: 118), yet despite the importance of the 
Azores as a refuelling stop, even during the 1990s, the growing long-range capacity of 
American aircraft has seen the US Air Force become less reliant on the Azores base in 
recent years (Magone, 2004: 247; MacDonald, 1993: 94–95). Nonetheless, it remains an 
important consideration in Luso-American relations and gives the United States an 
option when transporting heavy military equipment (Interview 15, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
The Lajes Airbase did, once again, come to prominence in March 2003 when the then 
Prime Minister José Manuel Durão Barroso hosted the Azores Summit which brought 
together the “coalition of the willing” of leaders keen to go to war with Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq (CNN, 2003; de Sousa, 2003). The principal motivation behind this was 
to avoid appearing less Atlanticist, and less close to America than Spanish Prime 
Minister Aznar, who was strongly in favour of the war (Interview 1, Braga, 2010). This 
was born out of necessity on the part of Durão Barroso, as Portugal needs the continued 
support of the United States and for the transatlantic link to remain strong in order to 
consolidate its own position within NATO. As Portuguese military planners are acutely 
aware, Portugal needs the United States as a strategic partner more than they need 
Portugal (Interview 15, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
The build-up to the Iraq War was a critical period for relations between Europe and 
North America, with several NATO partners, both old and new, choosing to support the 
United States without consulting key players such as France and Germany (Medcalf, 
2005: 38). Portugal’s decision to side with Britain and America revealed the country’s 
natural tendency towards the Atlantic. It also showed an intention to remain part of the 
process of bringing some, although in this instance not all, of NATO’s partners 
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 together. The next crucial moment for the Atlantic Alliance was to decide on the future 
role of NATO and to finalise the New Strategic Concept. This, again, was done on 
Portuguese soil at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. 
 
 
5.2.2 The Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept: implications for Portugal 
 
Agreed at the Lisbon Summit on 19–20 November 2010, NATO’s New Strategic 
Concept (NSC) was the opportunity for the organisation to address the key strategic 
challenges it faces in the post-Cold War era. The prime considerations were: relations 
with Russia; how to co-ordinate the Alliance’s role with the EU (‘hard power’ to 
complement the EU’s ‘soft power’); and how to adapt NATO to be a global, rather than 
merely a regional security force (Gaspar and de Sousa, 2010: 33). The NSC aimed to 
“…guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a 
changing world…” (NATO, 2010: 1). The Atlantic Alliance must, therefore, fulfil three 
core tasks: collective defence; crisis management; and co-operative security (NATO, 
2010: 2). While the NSC maintains the core principles upon which NATO was founded, 
it also sets out important new challenges that need to be addressed, including guarding 
against cyberattacks and dealing with energy security issues and the effects of climate 
change (NATO, 2010: 4). The NSC also prioritises working in partnership with Russia, 
promoting stability in the Partnership for Peace countries of the former Soviet Union, 
and seeks to develop the Mediterranean Dialogue (NATO, 2010: 10). 
 
For Portugal, the NSC had the potential to put the country at the centre of a dialogue 
between NATO and countries in the South Atlantic. This would have allowed Portugal 
to exploit its unique ties with CPLP countries, particularly Brazil and Angola, and to 
link up two key regional security arenas (Loureiro dos Santos, 2009: 178–179). To 
Portugal’s disappointment, the agreed NSC pays very little attention to the southern 
dimension and to forging meaningful co-operation with countries of increasing 
importance in the Southern Hemisphere such as Brazil and Angola. The, then, 
Portuguese Minister for National Defence, Augusto Santos Silva, was keen to highlight 
this apparent “gap” in NATO’s strategy (TVI24, 2010a; Seabra, 2010a: 2). 
 
Despite Portugal’s disappointment about the matters that were not addressed under the 
New Strategic Concept, the fact that the summit took place in Portugal offered some 
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 political capital to Sócrates’ government. In José Sócrates’ view, hosting the “historic” 
summit in Lisbon underlined the “prestige Portugal has on the world stage” (Lusa, 
2010c). Additionally, the importance ascribed in the NSC to working with partner 
organisations, which Sócrates was keen to emphasise (Lusa, 2010c), chimes well with 
Portugal’s own current security policy priorities. The strong emphasis laid on the 
complementary nature of the different security organisations that Portugal is involved in 
allows for Portuguese security policy to bridge the Lusophone world, NATO and the 
EU. 
 
While the political centre in Portugal is, however, broadly in favour of continued 
participation in NATO, recognising that the country is “simultaneously a European and 
an Atlantic country” (Teixeira, 2009: 219), there was some notable opposition to NATO 
at the time of the Lisbon Summit from the far-left. The Bloco de Esquerda took the 
opportunity to criticise NATO and to call for Portugal to leave the Atlantic Alliance, 
citing the need for a demilitarised path towards global peace and calling for an end to 
the American-led war in Afghanistan (Semedo, 2010). The considerable security costs 
involved in hosting such a major event (Público, 2010), at a time of economic crisis, 
added further momentum to the anti-NATO campaign. This anti-NATO stance is not, 
however, a viable one for Portugal to adopt and was probably motivated by the need for 
the Bloco de Esquerda to position themselves against the PS in order to gain support 
from the anti-war urban youth in Portugal. This tactic was ultimately unsuccessful, as 
the Bloco de Esquerda saw their share of the vote decline in the 2011 election (Alvarez 
and Pereira, 2011). 
 
Aside from agreeing the NSC, the major point of discussion for the Portuguese at the 
Lisbon Summit was the continued survival of the NATO Joint Headquarters Lisbon 
(TVI24, 2010b), which had been in some doubt in the run-up to the summit. The base 
located in Oeiras, on the outskirts of Lisbon, is currently involved in missions to support 
the African Union in Darfur and played a prominent role in supporting relief missions to 
Pakistan following the earthquake in 2005 (JFCL, 2011a).  
 
NATO’s anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa, Operation Ocean Shield, is also 
based at Joint Headquarters Lisbon (JFCL, 2011b). However, it is interesting to note 
that, although the operation is based at Oeiras, Portugal does not participate in this 
mission. Instead, the Portuguese Navy is involved in the EU’s Atalanta mission against 
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 the Somali pirates (EMGFA, 2011d). The Portuguese Air Force also contributed to the 
EU’s efforts with a P-3 Orion aerial detachment to assist in maritime surveillance 
operations (EMGFA, 2010f). 
 
Given the long-standing role of both Oeiras and Lajes in NATO’s organisational 
structure, Portugal has been integrated into the command structure of NATO for several 
decades. So long as these bases are useful to NATO, Portugal’s military and political 
commitment to the Atlantic Alliance is guaranteed, as these bases have come to define 
Portugal’s role in the organisation. The Europeanisation of Portuguese security policy 
makes this interesting as it presents Portugal with the opportunity to diversify and to 
participate in missions through the EU which do not rely on these bases. Portugal has 
attempted to maintain the difficult balance between loyalty to NATO and a keenness to 
participate in EU operations. As such, Lajes and Oeiras are symbolic of Portuguese 
Atlanticism and, therefore, carry huge political significance.  
 
Had NATO decided to put the writing on the wall for the Oeiras base at the Lisbon 
Summit, it would have been regarded as “impolite” to the Portuguese hosts. Such a 
public relations disaster certainly had to be avoided from the point of view of the 
Portuguese. Nonetheless, overcapacity in NATO needs to be addressed and Portugal, 
while keen to protect the Oeiras base, must concede that the matter needs urgent 
attention (Interview 15, Lisbon, 2010). In the end, Sócrates concluded the Lisbon 
Summit by hinting that the role of Portugal, and the use of the Oeiras base, could be 
further enhanced with the country playing a more prominent role in the Alliance’s naval 
command structure, using Oeiras as a key base. If successful, this would represent “a 
great victory for Portuguese diplomacy” (Sócrates quoted in Caetano, 2010). This 
victory was eventually realised in May 2012, when it was announced that Striking Force 
NATO’s Headquarters was to move to Oeiras from Naples in 2013, with seven 
Portuguese naval officers involved in the integrated command structure (Governo de 
Portugal, 2012o).   
 
Despite the question marks over the future of the Oeiras base, Portugal handled the 
November 2010 Lisbon Summit well. This underlines Portugal’s commitment to the 
Atlantic Alliance, which is reflected by the support of most of the political parties in the 
country. However, while the continued use of the Oeiras base was secured, the NSC 
does not formally offer Portugal the role as potential interlocutor between NATO and 
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 the South Atlantic. While NATO is an organisation driven by power and strategy, it is 
also a consensual operation that may afford Portugal some margin for manoeuvrability 
on the issue of Oeiras, but not with regard to the South Atlantic. Nevertheless, the 
Lisbon Summit, as a major event in NATO’s history, gave some prestige to Portugal in 
the international context, albeit not enough to see its South Atlantic interests pursued by 
the Alliance. 
 
 
5.2.3 The internationalisation of Portuguese security policy: the impact of elite 
socialisation through NATO as a challenge to Europeanisation narratives 
 
The Cold War was a unifying force in Europe and fostered a spirit of co-operation 
among the states of Western Europe in the face of a common existential threat. 
Nonetheless, the failure of the European Defence Community project helped to sharpen 
the focus on handling the Soviet threat through the Atlantic Alliance. This gave NATO 
greater legitimacy in Europe as a separate entity from the economic integration project 
of the EEC (Mérand, 2008: 2). Compared with Portugal’s relatively short time in the 
European Union from 1986 (although Portugal did have to respond to pressures 
stemming from Europe during its period of transition from the Revolution in 1974 to its 
full accession in 1986), NATO has clearly had much longer to influence the behaviour 
of Portuguese elites. The socialisation processes through NATO have undoubtedly had 
long enough to influence Portuguese political and military elites, and have a noticeable 
effect on norms of behaviour, military strategy and the policy-making process. 
However, because of the sheer breadth of the different policy areas handled at the EU 
level, it should be noted that socialisation processes in NATO are considerably less 
widespread than those occurring in the EU context. 
 
However, given that, according to the constructivist paradigm, states are “socially 
responsive entities” that are able to be socialised and moulded by international 
organisations and the global community to follow particular norms of behaviour 
(Finnemore, 1993: 593), the scope for the long-term socialisation of Portuguese elites 
through integration in NATO is considerable. As NATO is essentially a web of 
“transgovernmental elite networks”, where policy co-ordination processes foster 
relations between national policy-makers based upon common interests, shared ways of 
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 thinking, and personal friendships (Keohane and Nye, 1974: 46), NATO is, therefore a 
significant locus for elite socialisation to take place. 
 
As Kowert and Legro (1996) argue, “transgovernmental networks”, such as NATO, can 
contribute to the construction of a common identity to bind individual actors together 
(Kowert and Legro, 1996: 474). In the case of NATO, the institutionalisation of joint 
decision-making procedures is highly developed and responsibilities are shared between 
Alliance members. The internationalisation of the decision-making process in NATO 
allows the European countries in the Alliance to wield some influence over American 
foreign and security policy (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 396). This transnational collective 
decision-making process is the first instance of sophisticated and institutionalised 
foreign and security policy-making spanning beyond the Portuguese nation state and 
can be seen as the first step towards the Europeanisation of Portuguese security policy. 
 
Over time, NATO has eroded notions of national security, in favour of a more collective 
security culture and multinational co-operation. As Mérand (2008) argues, while there 
remains varied capacity among Europe’s armed forces, integration through NATO, and 
the internationalisation of state security, has seen a convergence of European militaries 
designed to be compatible within the NATO structure (Mérand, 2008: 59–60). The co-
ordination of national defence plans with NATO allies and the unified military 
command structure has made NATO a key locus for social learning and exchanging 
ideas, techniques and information between European militaries. Such socialisation, 
helps sustain NATO’s long-term goals and enhance interoperability between national 
militaries, but also contributes to the establishment of a specific transnational culture 
around the Alliance (Mérand, 2008: 60–61). In short, as much as the EU raises issues 
about what constitutes national sovereignty and the ‘national interest’, NATO has long 
since blurred the precise nature of national security by creating a transnational identity 
(Mérand, 2008: 156). 
 
Portugal’s participation in NATO, decades before its accession to the EU, has laid the 
foundations for a more internationalised process of identifying national interests and 
defining national security priorities. NATO is more than a traditional alliance, and can 
be better described as “an institutionalized pluralistic security community” (Risse-
Kappen, 1996: 397). As Adler argues (1997), building upon the work of Deutsch et al. 
(1957), such security communities are built around shared understandings between 
 210
 states and the construction of national and regional identities (Adler, 1997: 276). NATO 
can clearly be described in this vein, as a unifying force and an embodiment of a 
constructed Atlantic identity (of predominantly highly economically developed, 
‘Western’, states).  
 
The EU is the only organisation that can be compared to the levels of institutionalised 
and collective decision-making found in NATO. In the case of the EU, this has resulted 
in relative success in constructing notions of Europeanness, albeit stemming from socio-
economic integration, rather than by being a powerful global security actor (Risse-
Kappen, 1996: 397). Yet the construction of the identity of ‘the West’ during the Cold 
War, through interactions in NATO, helped concretise the emerging sense of 
Europeanness created by economic integration in the EEC. Therefore, NATO has 
clearly played its part in forging a shared transnational identity in Europe. 
 
Integration of the Portuguese Armed Forces through NATO has had an 
internationalising effect on military elites, as well as solidifying an Atlantic identity 
amongst government officials, particularly those inside the MDN. However, Portugal 
was only able to engage more in NATO’s activities in continental Europe after 1974. 
This was because prior to that date, Portugal’s role in NATO was to allow the United 
States access to the Azores, as the country’s military was heavily deployed in Africa 
fighting to retain the colonies (1961–1974) (Bruneau, 1997: 176). One notable 
transformation of the Portuguese Armed Forces since 1974, which can be ascribed to 
NATO participation, is the development of the country’s military. Portugal was able to 
benefit from NATO funds to strengthen its technical infrastructure and professionalise 
its military after the long colonial wars fought by conscripts. NATO, therefore, had a 
significant role to play in the development and democratisation of the Portuguese 
Armed Forces. This also helped to stem the revolutionary orientation of the Portuguese 
Armed Forces post-1974 and make the military more practically orientated towards 
working with NATO partners (Espírito Santo, 2009: 38–39; Rato, 2001: 132; Monteiro 
Portugal, 2005: 328). 
 
NATO remains central to Portuguese security policy. Portugal’s long-standing 
membership of the Atlantic Alliance has meant that the country’s Armed Forces and 
policy-makers have been involved in the creation of an internationalised collective 
security organisation. The practices of co-ordination between NATO members, and the 
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 institutionalisation of these practices over many decades, have contributed to the 
construction of norms and a common identity around the Atlantic Alliance. It is through 
the consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance that Portugal has been able to maintain and 
professionalise its Armed Forces in an internationalised and institutionalised context. 
The levels of interdependence and the developed co-operation and co-ordination 
mechanisms between NATO members put Portuguese political and military elites in a 
position to be more receptive to pressures to evolve and adapt because of the intense 
elite socialisation found in NATO. 
  
Therefore, integration with NATO has been extremely important for Portugal and has 
afforded the country the opportunity to develop and modernise its military through 
social learning and technological investment. By embracing an internationalised, 
multilateral, collective security framework in NATO, the foundations have been set for 
Portugal to play a role in other security organisations as they emerge. The most 
significant of these to emerge is the European Union’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy.  
 
 
5.3 Portugal and EU Security and Defence 
 
The European Union evolved into a security actor during the 1990s with the gradual 
absorption of the Western European Union (WEU) and its Petersberg Tasks. A genuine 
security and defence policy for the EU started to emerge after the Saint Malo Summit 
between Britain and France in December 1998. This agreement signalled a desire for 
European states to be able to act independently of the United States. With this goal 
outlined, the Cologne and Helsinki European Council meetings in 1999 sought to clarify 
some of the details and put in place the foundations for a European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) (Howorth, 2007: 4).  
 
Following on from the developments in 1999, the Portuguese Presidency of the Council 
of the EU in 2000 (and its simultaneous Presidency of the WEU), was charged with 
developing the structures of ESDP. At this time, there were no formal mechanisms for 
dealing with security and defence policy and integrating military representatives 
through the EU. Such activities were not in the formal programme for Portugal’s EU 
Presidency in 2000, as this fell within the responsibilities of the WEU. It was forced 
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 upon the Portuguese to address this, as the policy had evolved so quickly during the 
previous year (Interview 10, Lisbon, 2010). The subsequent Portuguese Presidency in 
2007 also saw a significant development in this area. The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 
December 2007, changed the ESDP to the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). This move was designed to portray a renewed sense of common participation 
and purpose among the EU Member States, reflecting their commitment to develop a 
meaningful security presence (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007; Pereira da Silva, 2009: 203). In 
reality, this has not led to a major rejuvenation of EU security and defence policy over 
recent years.  
 
 
5.3.1 Portugal and CSDP missions 
 
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an integral part of the EU’s 
broader Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and seeks to “…provide the 
Union with an operational capacity, drawing on civilian and military assets” (Article 49 
(a), Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). To that end, it is logical to focus on Portugal’s role within 
CSDP by examining its participation in both military missions and its contribution to 
the EU’s civilian missions. In addition to these, an important element of the 
development of CSDP is the commitment to enhancing the military capacity of EU 
Member States. This duty is overseen by the European Defence Agency (EDA). It is, 
therefore, instructive to assess Portugal’s participation in EDA projects and European 
defence procurement, as well as its contribution to operations, in order to assess the 
broader Europeanisation of Portuguese security policy. 
 
With the agreement of the terms of the EU’s security and defence policy and the 
publication of the European Security Strategy in 2003 (European Council, 2003), the 
EU could embark on interventions in order to promote its security objectives, 
particularly the stabilisation of areas geographically or historically close to EU Member 
States. The goal was that the EU should be able to fulfil the Petersberg Tasks by the end 
of 2003. By this point, the EU had launched four overseas missions (Howorth, 2007: 
207). The rapid evolution of the EU’s security presence is particularly striking and 
stems from the difficulties in dealing with matters on Europe’s doorstep during the 
1990s, as the breakup of the former Yugoslavia unfolded.  
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 Portugal’s decision to participate in the NATO mission in Bosnia in late 1995 was as 
much symbolic of its new-found desire to be at the centre of European integration, 
especially in the evolving field of EU foreign and security policy, as it was emblematic 
of Portugal’s long-standing loyalty to NATO. This stemmed from the political 
convictions of António Guterres and his PS government at the time, who were prepared 
to go further than the previous PSD government and commit troops to the ground. This 
was the dawning of a new era in which Portugal could use its membership of 
international organisations, such as NATO and the EU, to increase its visibility in 
international affairs. It seems accepted in Portuguese foreign policy-making circles that, 
had Portugal not taken this monumental step, it would not have had the same 
international credibility to be able to successfully draw the world’s attention to the crisis 
in East Timor a few years later (Interview 13, Lisbon, 2010; Interview 14, Lisbon, 
2010; see also Freire, 2007: 88–92).  
 
The decision to intervene in Bosnia revealed the Europeanisation of Portuguese security 
policy. In the early 1990s, José Manuel Durão Barroso highlighted the importance to 
Portugal of the unfolding crisis in the Balkans. He presented Bosnia as being more 
crucial to the country’s foreign policy than the situation in Angola at the time (de 
Vasconcelos, 2000: 34). For Guterres to go beyond Durão Barroso’s more abstract 
recognition of the dilemma, and to commit troops to the ground, marked a significant 
shift from the early 1990s when Portugal was still learning to be European. This 
response was ideologically driven by wanting to be a fully-fledged member of the 
European club of nations (Interview 14, Lisbon, 2010).  
 
Accepting Portugal’s new place in Europe, although not forsaking its long-standing 
commitment to NATO, the Europeanisation of Portuguese security policy, as Magone 
(2004) argues, has resulted in the Mediterraneanisation of Portuguese security policy. 
The recognition of the importance of relations with the Maghreb, participating in 
maritime patrols, co-operating with Spain, and intervening in the Balkans, are all 
elements of contemporary Portuguese security policy which depart from the traditional 
Atlantic focus associated with NATO and the Lusophone world (Magone, 2004: 250; 
Wong, 2008: 325). Therefore, the intervention in Bosnia can be seen as a watershed 
moment in the Europeanisation of Portuguese security policy. 
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 Following on from the interventions in Bosnia and East Timor, the emphasis on 
Portugal actively participating in EU missions became stronger in the coming years as 
ESDP evolved in scope and capacity at a “breath-taking” rate (Interview 7, Lisbon, 
2010). To date, the EU has embarked on 24 CSDP missions to places in the Balkans and 
the former Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East and Asia – some purely civilian, some 
purely military, and some a combination of the two (EEAS, 2011h).  
 
– EU military operations – 
The cornerstone of CSDP is the capacity to intervene militarily in unstable situations, 
particularly in the Balkans and Africa. However, full military missions under the EU 
banner actually represent considerably less than half of the total interventions under 
ESDP/CSDP, the majority being civilian crisis management missions. The three 
currently on-going military interventions are the EURFOR Althea in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation off the Somali coast and the EU 
Training Mission Somalia in Uganda (EEAS, 2011h). There are two common themes 
which characterise most of the EU’s military interventions. The first theme being that 
the success of the mission depends upon one or more Member States taking a leading 
role in the operation. This then allows other countries to make more modest 
contributions behind the leading nations. The second common theme is that the EU’s 
military muscle has yet to be sufficiently tested, with the possible exception of the 
Artemis mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Howorth, 2007: 240–241). 
 
Portugal has been supportive of the military missions undertaken by the EU, particularly 
in the “privileged theatres”, areas where its participation will have the biggest impact on 
its core foreign and security policy objectives, such as in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Kosovo, Georgia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Interview 
3, Lisbon, 2010). There is considerable national prestige to be gained from acting as an 
operational head of the mission. Portuguese military involved in the Atalanta operation 
are always looking to assume greater responsibilities, but this depends on how much a 
country contributes. It is important to highlight that, although the mission is under an 
EU flag, “a Spanish general is still a Spanish general – not a European one”, meaning 
that when a mission goes wrong there is still a tendency to attach the blame to the 
commanding officer’s Member State (Interview 19, Brussels, 2010). This suggests that 
the creation of a genuine European military identity seems some way off yet, meaning 
that there is still considerable political capital at stake for individual EU Member States. 
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 Portugal has also supported the development of rapidly deployable battle-groups, 
working alongside Spain, Italy and France in particular (Interview 10, Lisbon, 2010). 
This represents a significant step towards the Europeanisation of Portuguese security 
policy and demonstrates improved top-level political relations between Lisbon and 
Madrid. The shared political interests between the two Iberian nations have set the tone 
for improved co-operation between the two countries militarily. However, there was, 
initially at least, some hostility from the Portuguese to the prospect of being 
commanded by the Spanish (Interview 6, Lisbon, 2010). Such reservations stem from 
issues related to history and foreign policy, specific to relations with Spain, rather than 
any unwillingness to co-operate on the battlefield. Historically, for reasons of self-
preservation, Portugal has positioned itself and its military to be ready to ward off 
Spanish invasion. Therefore, Portuguese military being under Spanish command is a 
highly sensitive issue politically. It is for this reason that when Spain joined NATO that 
Portugal was keen for the two nations to be under separate geographical commands 
(Spain under SACEUR at Naples and Portugal under SACLANT at Norfolk, Virginia). 
Nonetheless, relations between the Iberian militaries have been cordial for several 
decades and Portugal was supportive of Spain joining NATO (Magone, 2004: 246).  
 
The fact that these engrained fears of Spain seem to have been ameliorated in recent 
years is testament to the new-found spirit of co-operation between the Iberian nations 
and the effects of European integration on Portuguese foreign policy more generally. 
This suggests that the Portuguese military, through both EU and NATO integration, has 
had a long time to be internationalised and is now well-placed to co-ordinate with other 
countries, even with Spain, a country for so long deemed to be a threat to Portuguese 
survival (Interview 10, Lisbon, 2010). This stems from Portugal managing to 
“normalize” its security relations with Spain in recent years (Hibou, 2005: 327); 
although the fact that during the 1980s Portugal and Spain found themselves in the same 
international alliances for the first time (with both countries becoming members of the 
EEC as well as the WEU and NATO in this decade) did, rather, force Portugal’s hand to 
develop a more open strategy towards Spain (Seabra, 2000: 194). Therefore, Portugal’s 
willingness, forced or otherwise, to integrate with other European partners, and to 
develop battle-groups that are flexible and ready to be deployed rapidly, means that EU 
battle-groups offer a new dimension to Portuguese security. 
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 Portuguese military planners involved in the EU’s military co-operation structure 
believe that flexibility is the key for CSDP missions. It can be argued that this plays to 
Portugal’s strengths, in that it is able to be flexible because of its reluctance to do things 
“by the book”. This means that by paying less attention to making detailed strategic 
plans for military deployment, Portuguese Armed Forces are able to adapt quickly to 
changing situations and can be dropped into operations quickly and relatively easily. 
This lack of rigid preparation affords Portugal, in the view of a Portuguese naval officer 
involved in the EU military structure, a great practical advantage in responding 
effectively to situations which develop quickly, as Portuguese troops are able to adapt 
well to the realities on the ground (Interview 20, Brussels, 2010). This self-perception 
of Portugal’s role in CSDP missions is interesting as it illustrates how an obvious 
weakness, Portugal’s lack of military capacity and hardware, can be reimagined to be an 
advantage in that Portuguese personnel are not tied down and are able to respond 
quickly, especially to crises in Africa.  
 
In the mind of Portuguese military planners, Portugal’s lack of operational hardware is 
made up for by having suitable skills for CSDP operations. In particular, the Portuguese 
see themselves as able to get on well with locals when on missions in Africa. This so-
called “expertise” gives Portugal a useful operational advantage when on EU missions. 
The Portuguese like to perceive themselves as being able to fit in when on missions in 
Africa and are regarded as “good fellows” by the locals and by European partners 
(Interview 20, Brussels, 2010). This self-perception of the Portuguese as able to “mingle 
naturally” in Africa (Interview 7, Lisbon, 2010), because the locals do not feel in the 
least bit threatened by Portuguese military presence (Interview 6, Lisbon, 2010), means 
that Portugal sees itself as able to play an important role in any EU mission to Africa. 
These opinions may be merely rhetoric, but they do help to define how Portuguese 
security policy elites view CSDP missions and the country’s role in EU security policy, 
particularly in contrasting this limited but active participation with Portugal’s 
established role in NATO as a facilitator and base-provider. 
 
– EU civilian missions – 
When assessing the EU’s ability to respond to crises around the world, it is important 
not to neglect the civilian element of CSDP. This seems to embody, for those who argue 
in favour of it, that the EU is morally superior for resorting to civilian power rather than 
relying purely on military means, and this, in turn, reinforces the image of the EU as a 
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 normative, or ‘soft power’, in international affairs (Matlary, 2009: 84). Civilians are “all 
those who are not military” (Interview 22, Brussels, 2010). This generally refers to, but 
is not exclusive to, the deployment of police, prosecutors, judges, and customs officials 
under the EU banner (Interview 22, Brussels, 2010). The size of a civilian operation 
varies, from over 2,000 people in Kosovo, to 40 people in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (Interview 22, Brussels, 2010; EEAS, 2011h). 
 
The European Union’s civilian missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo offer 
a particular insight into Portugal’s motivations, which underpin the country’s 
participation in CSDP more widely. Portugal has been keen to participate but only after 
“lots of calculations” were made by policy-makers in Lisbon (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007b: 
222).  
 
It is clearly evident that Portugal’s interests in the PALOPs were factored into these 
calculations. Portugal needed to be able to demonstrate a willingness to participate in an 
EU mission to defend, in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a former 
Belgian colony, in order to secure reciprocal support in the event of a crisis in 
Lusophone Africa, as Ferreira-Pereira (2007b) argues:  
the rationale behind the Portuguese politico-diplomatic and financial 
investment in African ESDP missions boiled down to the pre-emptive 
reasoning put forward by a national diplomat that: “If we want our 
partners to help us to defend our Africa [i.e. the five former African 
colonies], we have to participate in the defence of the others’ Africa” 
(Ferreira-Pereira, 2007b: 222 [Emphasis in original]). 
 
The involvement of civilians, and the purely civilian nature of the majority of the CSDP 
missions, means that co-ordination between REPER in Brussels and Lisbon is with the 
Interior Ministry (Ministério da Administração Interna), as this is the body responsible 
for Portugal’s police (Interview 22, Brussels, 2010). The involvement of both PSP, 
Polícia de Segurança Pública, and GNR, Guarda Nacional Republicana, in policing 
tasks around the world has been considerable, participating in UN missions in East 
Timor (Magone, 2004: 258), as well as under the EU in Bosnia and elsewhere 
(EMGFA, 2011e; Ferreira-Pereira, 2007a: 41). This enthusiasm was rewarded, in the 
EU context, when the Portuguese PSP Superintendent Adílio Ruivo Custódio was 
appointed head of the EU’s Police Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
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 (Interview 22, Brussels, 2010; Ferreira-Pereira, 2007a: 42–43). Portugal also supports 
the European Gendarmerie Force10 by sending GNR to form the quasi-military police 
rapid reaction force (Witney, 2008: 43). 
 
Portugal’s support for CSDP missions, both military and civilian, in Africa is largely 
motivated by its interests in the PALOPs. Supporting security sector reform in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo was motivated by the possibility of implementing a 
similar programme in countries like Guinea-Bissau (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007a: 42–43). 
Portugal’s interests in countering corruption and promoting good governance in Guinea-
Bissau, and its commitment to the EU mission, were clear from the outset. But the EU 
security sector reform mission in Guinea-Bissau essentially failed because the country 
was too unstable to implement the programme of reforms planned (Interview 22, 
Brussels, 2010). 
 
In sum, Portugal’s positive rhetoric towards CSDP missions in Africa is largely 
motivated by a desire, as Ferreira-Pereira (2007a) argues, to keep “showing the flag” 
(Ferreira-Pereira, 2007a: 41). Participating in missions closer to home, is a concomitant 
of Portugal’s obligations with regard to “European solidarity” (Interview 9, Lisbon, 
2010), and the sense that Portugal must maintain its influence on CSDP, and remain 
visible, in order to mobilise Europe to act with respect to defending Lusophone Africa 
in the future (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007b: 222).  
 
Portugal’s stance is essentially a pragmatic one, able to contribute to both military and 
civilian operations. Portugal’s role is characterised by Portuguese security policy-
making elites as occupying the middle-ground between France’s strongly military 
approach and Germany’s vehemently civilian emphasis (Interview 9, Lisbon, 2010). 
This is very much linked to Portugal’s specific conceptions about the roles of NATO 
and the EU and the tensions at the domestic policy-making level between the MDN and 
the MNE. Portuguese security policy-makers must, therefore, seek to balance the belief 
that the EU is essentially a “soft power”, and that “hard power” missions are in the 
domain of NATO, with the Europeanisation of the foreign policy-making process which 
                                                 
10 The European Gendarmerie Force was formed in 2004, through an agreement between the Netherlands, 
France, Spain, Italy and Portugal, to create an intervention force to carry out militarised police functions 
(Matlary, 2009: 53). The organisation is not strictly an EU one, but has been deployed under the EU 
banner, as well as contributing to UN, NATO and OSCE operations (Ministerio de Defensa de España, 
2009).  
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 has made the MNE, and some elements of the Armed Forces, more attuned to the EU’s 
developing role as a security actor. 
 
– Financing CSDP missions – 
The system for the common financing of EU security operations, the ATHENA 
mechanism, is complicated and contributes to operational difficulties. Therefore, in 
order to guarantee the success of future civilian and military operations under the EU 
banner, particularly given Portugal’s limited economic resources, the idiosyncrasies of 
the ATHENA mechanism need to be addressed. This system creates particular 
difficulties for Portugal. 
 
Member States contribute a percentage of their GDP to the fund and this is used to 
cover the common costs of the EU operation (Council of the European Union, 2008; 
EEAS, 2011i). In practice, the common costs covered by the ATHENA mechanism are 
limited to paying for accommodation and transportation for EU troops. The costs 
incurred by each national military will have to be met out of national defence budgets 
(Pereira da Silva, 2008). As Witney (2008) points out, “[i]t is estimated that Athena has 
covered less than 10% of the extra costs of EU operations…” (Witney, 2008: 46).  
 
Leaving Member States to bear the operational costs of the EU mission is clearly a 
disincentive for participating in future CSDP missions. The solution, in the eyes of 
Portuguese military planners, would be to restructure the ATHENA mechanism and to 
provide more ‘Community’ money, which would surely see support for CSDP missions 
increase (Interview 15, Lisbon, 2010). Rather than relying on the MDN to bankroll 
Portugal’s contribution to EU military missions, enlarging the 20 per cent common 
costs figure could help more countries to play an active role. If the EU were to relax the 
financial barriers to enter into missions, Portugal might be able to broaden its security 
policy horizons. This may see it taking an active interest in areas further from its 
traditional foreign policy priorities (Interview 9, Lisbon, 2010). Essentially, this would 
result in Portuguese security policy becoming increasingly Europeanised, through not 
having to pay for interventions out of the national defence budget. However, given the 
reluctance of Member States to increase their contributions to the EU budget in the 
current difficult economic climate, this may not be possible for some years yet.  
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 5.3.2 Portuguese attitudes towards the European Defence Agency 
 
Portugal was initially hesitant about moves to establish the European Defence Agency 
(EDA). This was largely because of the fact that the right-of-centre coalition 
government in 2004 did not want to support a development of EU defence capabilities 
that would undermine the primacy of NATO (Interview 10, Lisbon, 2010; Dempsey and 
Spiegel, 2004: 4). In fact, such concerns only troubled those on the political level. 
Officials and military personnel were initially quite enthusiastic about the EDA project, 
possibly because it allowed Portugal to strengthen its own position, both inside the EU 
and outside it, if it were seen to be supporting the EU’s plans to increase its security 
capabilities. To that end, Portugal sent an expert to join Nick Witney in setting up the 
agency (Interview 10, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
Since its establishment, Portugal has been a firm supporter of the EDA and has 
participated in many of its co-operation mechanisms. As Portugal is a maritime country, 
it is not unsurprising that the Portuguese Navy has participated in 8 out of the 10 EDA 
maritime projects (Interview 23, Brussels, 2010). In addition to promoting co-operation 
and co-ordination between EU militaries, the EDA seeks to enhance the capacities of 
Europe’s militaries. Portugal’s participation in the two principal aspects of the EDA’s 
activities are discussed below. 
 
– The EDA’s security co-operation initiatives: avoiding overlap with NATO – 
NATO and the EDA essentially occupy the same space but try to co-ordinate their 
activities and avoid unnecessary duplication. Therefore, the EDA has to be in regular 
contact with NATO Headquarters in Brussels and Allied Command Transformation in 
Norfolk, Virginia. Through the EU–NATO Capabilities Group, the EDA has become 
increasingly important in recent years, and through this forum NATO and EDA staff 
have attended each other’s meetings, seminars and conferences (EDA, 2010a: 15). 
Enhanced co-operation on areas of mutual interest, such as counter-IED measures and 
helicopter training for deployment in Afghanistan, have been fruitful and NATO and the 
EDA have sought to co-ordinate their long-term strategies (Interview 23, Brussels, 
2010). 
 
However, “co-operation” between the EDA and NATO is not easy to facilitate in 
practice because of on-going political difficulties involving Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. 
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 Greece is in the EU and NATO, whereas Turkey is in NATO but remains outside of the 
EU. Turkey has taken steps to curtail efforts to share information with the EDA. For this 
reason, on a formal basis, more information is shared between NATO and Russia, than 
is shared between NATO and the EDA. Informally, the EDA and NATO seek to build 
up a reliable network for “co-ordinating activities” rather than developing a formal “co-
operation” mechanism (Interview 23, Brussels, 2010). If co-ordination and co-operation 
between the EU and NATO is being hampered, then this, in turn, makes it difficult for 
Portugal to define clearly what its precise position is within CSDP and reconcile its 
commitments to the EU with its role in the Atlantic Alliance. Both the EU and NATO 
are seen as complementary security actors, but if the organisations are unable to clearly 
demarcate their respective roles and responsibilities, then there is a danger that countries 
such as Portugal will be forced to choose between them. 
 
Despite these co-operation and demarcation issues, Portugal is involved in the EDA’s 
activities, including the European Air Transport Fleet (EATF), Maritime Surveillance 
(MARSUR), and the Helicopter Training Programme. The Portuguese Navy is a keen 
participant, but given that not all Member States have an interest in maritime 
surveillance, it is an activity which is only comprised of states, like Portugal, with the 
interest and the capacity. This involvement, in the view of those in Brussels, has helped 
to keep the Portuguese Naval Staff (Estado-Maior da Armada) more closely involved 
with the EDA than, for example, the Army (Interview 20, Brussels, 2010; Interview 21, 
Brussels, 2010; Interview 23, Brussels, 2010). This may explain why the Portuguese 
Navy chose the EU’s Atalanta mission off the Somali coast over NATO’s Operation 
Ocean Shield, based at Oeiras. 
 
The Portuguese Air Force is also keenly involved in the EDA’s activities. The 
declaration to address the shortfalls in airlift capacity and to develop the European Air 
Transport Fleet stemmed from the very real problems faced during the humanitarian 
crisis in Chad. The EU’s intervention there was pushed for by the Portuguese 
Presidency in 2007 (EDA, 2010a: 22–23; Interview 15, Lisbon, 2010).  
 
As part of the EDA’s Helicopter Training Programme, Portugal is seeking to host the 
next multinational helicopter exercise. This is largely motivated by Portugal wanting to 
emulate, or surpass, Spain’s efforts in hosting the Ex Azor event in 2010. This activity 
has obvious synergies for NATO operations and affords European crews a valuable 
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 opportunity to hone their skills in hot and dusty conditions not dissimilar to what they 
would experience in missions when deployed to Afghanistan. Portugal’s airbase at Beja, 
in the Alentejo, is seen, by Portuguese military planners, as ideal for replicating such 
conditions (Interview 21, Brussels, 2010; EDA, 2010b). There is considerable prestige 
to be gained from hosting an exercise such as this, and it would be a particular fillip to 
the Portuguese if it were regarded as more successful than the one hosted by Spain in 
2010. 
 
Participation in the EDA’s activities does not force Portugal to choose fundamentally 
between NATO and the EU. This is part of what makes CSDP, and participating in the 
EDA, politically credible for even the staunchest of Atlanticist states, the fact that the 
two bodies are somehow complementing, not contradicting, each other. However, given 
the emphasis on participation in maritime patrols and air transport under the EDA 
banner, it seems that not everyone, especially those connected with the Army in the 
MDN and EMGFA, are quite aware of the EDA’s activities. This is partly because the 
reporting back of CSDP activities goes through the MNE which may leave the EMGFA 
and the MDN isolated and may be a factor in reinforcing its tendency towards 
Atlanticism. A concrete example of this is that there is no co-ordination between the 
EDA and its equivalent national body the DGAIED in the MDN in Lisbon (see figure 
3.5). As a consequence the MDN is largely disconnected from the activities of the EDA 
and does not send military staff to it (Interview 24, Brussels, 2010). 
 
– Building capacity by buying European – 
Strengthening Portugal’s national defence capabilities, gives both NATO and the EU 
greater flexibility and capacity to act when called upon. By following EDA projects, 
Portugal is not developing its capacity at the expense of NATO, but instead allows it to 
offer more to both NATO and CSDP missions. However, as military planners recognise, 
Europe-wide defence investment is currently too low. This means that some tasks the 
EU will undertake will, essentially, be inherited from NATO as its role changes 
(Interview 15, Lisbon, 2010). Nevertheless, one of the core tasks of the EDA is to 
promote European-level defence and security co-operation in order to act as a catalyst 
for the European defence industry (EDA, 2011b). Therefore, it is preferable that EU 
Member States, even those, such as Portugal, without a major domestic defence 
industry, still look to procure their defence equipment from European sources.  
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 There are three recent instances where this preferable outcome has been difficult for 
Portugal to achieve, and these highlight the intense competition that European 
producers face. Therefore, EU Member States’ loyalties to European defence producers 
are not necessarily guaranteed. The first instance to illustrate this, outlined in greater 
detail under the section dealing with Lusophone security co-operation, is the decision of 
Portugal to withdraw from the European A400M project and, instead, to invest in a 
similar military transport aircraft from Brazil, the KC-390. 
 
The second instance, which highlights the dilemma Portugal faces in trying to balance 
its commitments between Europe and other parties, was Portugal’s decision to acquire 
German submarines. This arrangement did not turn out well. The allegations of 
corruption, which surrounded the deal, and the inappropriateness of these particular 
purchases at a time of austerity, caused considerable controversy (Pop, 2010). The deal 
was cancelled, but with one submarine already made and another to be delivered. While 
this decision made perfect sense in the period of economic austerity, it would have been 
a major boost to the Portuguese Navy’s capacities to have received the full number of 
submarines initially ordered by the MDN (Interview 21, Brussels, 2010). This episode 
led the American Ambassador in Lisbon, Thomas Stephenson, to question the MDN’s 
purchasing strategy. According to Stephenson, Portugal had purchased these “expensive 
and useless toys” out of a misguided pride in their maritime prowess (Público, 2011).  
 
The third occasion was when the then Minister for National Defence, Luís Amado, 
reneged on his predecessor’s arrangement to buy American frigates and instead opted to 
buy from the Netherlands at a higher price. Both this decision and the submarine deal 
were, in the eyes of Stephenson, evidence of Portugal being “pressured” into buying 
from its European partners rather than from the United States, as a way of confronting 
the country’s “inferiority complex” (Público, 2011). Clearly Ambassador Stephenson 
was aggrieved because he felt that Portugal was obligated to support its allies in NATO 
(of which the United States is the most senior player and expects NATO countries to 
regard it as the favoured supplier of military hardware). However, Luís Amado, as a 
minister in a PS government, inevitably took the view that Portugal’s loyalties lie with 
Europe over America, hence the reversal of an agreement made under the previous 
PSD/CDS–PP coalition government, which was more Atlanticist in outlook. 
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 These deals highlight how it is impossible for Portugal to please all of the people all of 
the time. Nonetheless, it would seem that the Portuguese approach has been fairly even-
handed. The Atlantic Alliance remains of vital importance and, as such, Portugal is 
wary of jeopardising its relationship with the United States. Equally, the special 
relationship between Portugal and Brazil, and the emergence of Brazil as a defence 
player to rival Europe and the United States, creates an opportunity for Portugal to 
strengthen its position in the Lusophone world. Lastly, Portugal has shown considerable 
loyalty to its European partners and demonstrated its commitment to the EDA’s 
programmes. 
 
While these deals highlight corruption and mismanagement with regard to Portuguese 
defence procurement, the overall trend in recent years seems to be to favour Europe 
over America. This may be because of the PS government, under Sócrates, had a natural 
tendency towards Europe. Under the current PSD/CDS–PP coalition government of 
Passos Coelho, the pendulum may well swing in favour of closer ties with the United 
States again, particularly with Paulo Portas as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The KC-390 
deal reflects how Brazil might be able to step in and capitalise where European projects, 
such as the A400M, fail. Managing these competing defence players means that any 
tendency towards long-term Europeanisation of defence procurement is frequently 
tempered by the short-term need to maintain good relations with producers outside of 
Europe and to get the best deal where possible. 
 
Efforts to enhance European and national defence capabilities are fraught with 
difficulties. Pressures from outside of the European Union, whether they be Turkey’s 
suspicions of information sharing between NATO and the EDA, America scoffing at 
European countries not buying American equipment, or the emergence of Brazil as a 
defence sector rival and a major world economic power, put Portugal in a difficult 
position as it seeks to straddle the Atlantic Alliance, the Lusophone world, and be an 
active participant in the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy.  
 
It is evident that Portugal is willing to contribute to the EU’s security capabilities and is 
seeking to maximise its influence as the EU tries to raise its profile as an international 
actor. It is, however, difficult for Portugal to be purely orientated towards the EU in 
terms of its security policy. NATO is still recognised as the main military actor and 
defence guarantor. While the MDN and the Army are more broadly Atlanticist, the 
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 Navy and the Air Force seem more receptive to the EU and are more actively involved 
in CSDP missions and EDA projects. This division is not inconsistent with Portugal’s 
political position which emphasises the complementary nature of NATO, the EU, the 
UN and the CPLP, but it does highlight a sliding-scale of Europeanisation within the 
Portuguese Armed Forces. This represents the positive infiltration of Europeanisation 
on the domestic level, albeit not evenly distributed. 
 
The emergence of the EU as a significant security actor is an important development in 
Portuguese security policy in recent years. As the EU’s competences in this area 
develop over time, the role Portugal will play in CSDP will steadily evolve with it. The 
uncertainties which surround NATO’s precise role in the post-Cold War era further 
emphasise the potential for the EU to grow as a security actor, particularly building on 
its civilian element and pursuing a ‘soft power’ approach.   
 
Portugal’s active participation in CSDP has given another dimension to the country’s 
security policy, particularly in offering a ‘soft power’ alternative to NATO. While some 
areas of interest have opened up for Portugal, participation in CSDP is strongly linked 
with enhancing Portugal’s core foreign policy interests in the Lusophone world. The 
EU’s emerging status as an international actor means that Portugal can lobby more 
effectively on behalf of the Lusophone countries. Portuguese diplomats can use their 
position in both the CPLP and the EU to press for EU development initiatives and 
security missions to be targeted towards the PALOPs and East Timor. Portugal’s 
privileged relations with the CPLP countries is a weapon which, in the eyes of the 
Portuguese, the emerging EU diplomatic service should exploit without equivocation. In 
March 2011, the Portuguese diplomat Ana Paula Zacarias was appointed to head the 
EU’s delegation to Brasília (Ochoa, 2011). Given João Vale de Almeida’s preferment to 
the post of EU ambassador to Washington (Chaffin, 2010; Mahoney, 2010), there were 
considerable fears that Portugal would be unable to secure such an appointment and see 
its influence decline (Interview 14, Lisbon, 2010). However, it appears that Portugal’s 
long-term influence on EU–Brazil relations appears to have been secured and this is 
vital for enhancing Portugal’s status in both the EU and the CPLP. 
 
By externalising Portugal’s relations with its former colonies, and operating in the EU 
context, Portugal is able to enhance its position in the Lusophone world. Portugal’s 
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 relations with its former colonies undoubtedly shape its behaviour within CSDP both in 
terms of the selection of CSDP missions and in defence procurement projects. 
 
 
5.4 Lusophone Security Co-operation 
 
Security and defence relations between the Lusophone countries are located in both 
bilateral and multilateral contexts. Multilaterally, security relations are grounded within 
the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP – Community of Portuguese-
speaking Countries). The fundamental idea of Portuguese foreign and security policy is 
to seek to link its CPLP commitments with its roles in the EU and NATO. According to 
a senior official in the MDN, playing the Lusophone card enhances Portugal’s position 
in international organisations, as being more Lusophone, more Portuguese, enables 
Portugal to bring more added value to its roles in NATO and the European Union 
(Interview 7, Lisbon, 2010). While there is currently only fledgling co-operation among 
the Lusophone nations in this area, it does have the potential to develop into a 
significant contribution and broadens Portugal’s security horizons beyond NATO and 
the EU. 
 
Security co-operation between the CPLP countries is premised upon three shared 
characteristics: Portuguese as a common language; long-standing historical and close 
cultural relations between the countries; and contact with the ocean, for the most part 
the Atlantic Ocean (Loureiro dos Santos, 2009: 357). The famous seafaring discoveries 
took Portugal to “the four corners of the world”, meaning that the member countries of 
the CPLP are spread widely across the globe. This allows the CPLP to gain strength 
from being able to link together, through its individual members, different regional 
organisations, working with these regional actors to contribute to global peace and 
stability (Teixeira, 2009: 210–211). 
 
The cultural and historical ties and the values of lusofonia help to construct a solid 
foundation upon which to build security relations, with Portugal and Brazil clearly 
taking the lead and allowing the African states and East Timor to learn from them. 
However, it is clear that as strong as the common language is in promoting a spirit of 
co-operation, there are still instrumental and geopolitical motivations which lie beneath 
Portugal’s apparent enthusiasm for Lusophone security. The main objective is to put 
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 Portugal at the centre of dialogue between the North Atlantic (NATO and the EU) and 
countries of the South Atlantic, particularly Brazil and Angola that have the potential to 
grow in economic power in the coming years. This allows Portugal to create an 
important niche for itself in NATO and the EU, as the principal interlocutor between 
these organisations and Lusophone Africa and Brazil.  
 
Connecting Portugal with key players, such as the United States, Brazil and Angola, 
through the multilateral organisations of which it is a member and through bilateral 
relations, creates, what Gorjão (2010f) terms as, the “strategic square” of Portugal’s key 
foreign policy interests (Gorjão, 2010f: 6). It is interesting to note that Europe is not a 
strategic interest, per se, but Europe features in Portuguese foreign policy through 
Portugal’s self-nominated role as a conduit between these strategic interests, the United 
States and the Lusophone world, and European partners. Therefore, enhancing security 
co-operation with the Lusophone world allows Portugal to enhance its position in 
Europe by acting as an access point to Lusophone Africa, Brazil and East Timor. 
 
 
5.4.1 Forging security co-operation between Lusophone states: Portugal’s strategy 
 
Security co-operation between Portugal and the Lusophone countries has been 
formalised at the political level in both bilateral and multilateral contexts. Bilateral 
political co-operation on defence and security is largely confined to high-level political 
meetings between heads of government and ministers. Military co-operation at a 
bilateral level is principally between Portugal and Brazil and between Portugal and the 
PALOPs and East Timor, focusing on technical matters and improving military 
capacity. Multilateral security and defence relations between Lusophone states are set 
out in the CPLP defence protocol, signed in 2006, and include meetings of Defence 
Ministers and Lusophone Chiefs of Defence (Ministério da Defesa Nacional, 2011; 
Interview 7, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
The core security goals of NATO, the UN, the EU and the CPLP are broadly similar. 
Therefore, a stronger CPLP does not undermine the EU’s security operations, nor does 
it threaten the Atlantic Alliance. The fact that most of the EU’s security interventions 
have been in Africa, where the majority of the CPLP states are located, highlights the 
potential for enhanced co-operation between the CPLP and the EU, using Portugal as a 
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 portal. Portugal occupies a unique role amongst the CPLP states in that it is the only 
Lusophone country in NATO and the EU. It can, therefore, act as an interlocutor 
between the Lusophone countries and the major security actors in Western Europe and 
seek to link up the North and South Atlantic. While there are important strategic 
motivations behind engaging with key players in the South Atlantic, namely Brazil and 
Angola, there are also considerable obstacles to be negotiated if Portugal is to be able to 
act as an effective bridge between the North and South Atlantic.  
 
The prime motivation behind Portugal pushing to act as a link between the North and 
South Atlantic is to solidify its position in the Euro-Atlantic area. Portuguese foreign 
and defence policy has been firmly rooted in the Atlantic, particularly prioritising 
alliances with the maritime powers of the United States and Britain. Bringing the 
Lusophone dimension into Portugal’s relations with NATO and the EU opens up two 
possibilities for Portuguese diplomacy. Firstly, it is a way to enhance its position 
amongst the Lusophone nations. Secondly, it offers a niche to give added value to 
Portugal’s relations with NATO and the EU, reinforcing the transatlantic link to keep 
the US interested in Europe amid a changing global order because it can use Portugal as 
a vehicle to pursue dialogue with Brazil and Africa (Interview 3, Lisbon, 2010). In 
reality, of course, neither the United States, nor the EU, need to rely on Portugal to be 
able to get their voices heard in international affairs. 
 
Exploiting the Lusophone dimension is part of Portugal’s strategy to enhance its place 
in the world; supporting and strengthening the CPLP to create a global Lusophone space 
is an essential pillar of its foreign policy (Palmeira, 2006: 18–19). The importance to a 
small country, such as Portugal, of maintaining a special relationship with the world’s 
eighth largest economic power, Brazil, is unquestionable and puts the country’s 
Lusophone commitments firmly in the national interest (de Sousa Lara, 2009: 135). To 
that end, Portugal has already demonstrated its loyalties to the Lusophone nations in 
international organisations. Making effective use of its EU Presidencies, Portugal has 
signified its intent to raise awareness of Lusophone issues and shown this in 2007 by 
hosting, in Lisbon, the second EU–Africa Summit and the first EU–Brazil Summit 
(Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2007: 95, 109).  
 
There is no long-term goal to achieve a CPLP mutual defence pact; instead the focus is 
on enhancing co-operation and fostering development and self-sufficiency, particularly 
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 in the PALOPs and East Timor. While Lusophone security co-operation can make a 
contribution to regional stability, Portugal’s motivation is as much about enhancing its 
own roles in NATO and the EU as it is about developing good relations in the 
Lusophone world. In the eyes of Portuguese security policy-makers, the EU, NATO, 
and the CPLP are very much seen as complementary security actors (Interview 7, 
Lisbon, 2010). Additionally, the CPLP has a role in linking together these organisations 
with the African Union (where Portugal holds observer status) and the United Nations 
missions in Africa and East Timor. A key feature of Portugal’s Lusophone security 
strategy is to seek to link together the various organisations of which it is a member, 
allowing the country to assume the role of a conduit between the EU and NATO in the 
North Atlantic with the Lusophone countries in the Gulf of Guinea and the South 
Atlantic. 
 
The South Atlantic is becoming increasingly economically significant with sizeable oil 
and gas reserves located off the Brazilian and West African coasts. Brazil’s resource-
rich coastal waters, the so-called ‘Blue Amazon’, holds 88 per cent of Brazil’s oil, as 
well as gas reserves and metal deposits (Barbosa Guerra, 2011: 73–74; Bravo da Rosa, 
2010: 74). Combining the Brazilian and Angolan stretches of coastline in the South 
Atlantic with the coast lines and islands of the other CPLP states to the north, means 
that vast amounts of the Atlantic coast and sovereign waters belong to Lusophone 
countries (Interview 6, Lisbon, 2010). In total, the eight CPLP member countries have 
jurisdiction over 7.6 million km2 of ocean, approximately 2.5 per cent of the total 
surface area of the world’s seas (Bernadino, 2011: 47).  
 
This means that oceans are an important unifying factor among Portuguese-speaking 
countries11 and that the CPLP, and major countries within it such as Brazil, will have an 
important role to play in international debates on maritime policy. This also has broader 
implications for Portuguese security policy, particularly the relevance of the Navy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 This is not unsurprising given that the Portuguese era of discoveries were almost entirely seafaring 
ones. The CPLP states would not be ‘Lusophone’ countries today had there not been a place for the 
Portuguese maritime explorers to land in the first place. Nevertheless, this geographic factor is something 
which they have in common and this can form the basis for identifying shared security and strategic 
interests. 
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 5.4.2 Features of security co-operation among Lusophone states 
 
Military co-operation between Portugal and NATO has been long-standing, and 
Portugal is also committed to helping to establish a Common Security and Defence 
Policy for the EU. Therefore, Portugal is clearly attempting to make a positive 
contribution to the international security organisations of which it is a member. In 
addition to these undertakings, Portugal has shown a commitment to forge stronger 
security ties with the countries of the Lusophone world. Military co-operation between 
Portugal and the other Lusophone states falls into three principal areas: bilateral 
Technical Military Co-operation between Portugal and the PALOPs; joint training 
exercises within the CPLP framework (‘Felino’ exercises); and joint co-operation in 
developing and building military hardware (exemplified here through Luso-Brazilian 
co-operation to build the KC-390 transport aircraft). 
 
– Portugal and Technical Military Co-operation with the PALOPs and East Timor – 
Technical Military Co-operation (TMC) has been a relatively successful element in 
Portugal’s relations with Lusophone African states and East Timor. Building upon the 
common linguistic and cultural ties, and in an effort to repair relations with the former 
colonies, Portugal has been keen to lead the way in helping to promote learning and co-
operation between militaries in the Lusophone world and to help build security 
structures after years of conflict and unrest in the PALOPs and East Timor. Portugal 
was in a unique position to be the favoured partner for these countries as they sought to 
develop their domestic security architectures (Seabra, 2011a: 1). 
 
This specific co-operation between Portugal and the PALOPs dates back as early as 
1978, although it was first formalised in 1988 with Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe 
and Mozambique. Guinea-Bissau joined the framework in 1989 and Angola, after years 
of civil war, signed an agreement of co-operation in 1996. The logic underpinning co-
operation in this area is that untrained and undisciplined militaries are often at the root 
of civil unrest and domestic instability. As the MPLA and FRELIMO12 were backed by 
Moscow during their respective struggles for independence, it was clear that Portugal 
was duty-bound, as a loyal NATO member, to seek to forge security ties with its former 
                                                 
12 The left-wing independence movements of Angola and Mozambique respectively. The MPLA 
(Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola – Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the 
FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – Liberation Front of Mozambique) continue to be the 
ruling parties in their countries following the struggle for independence and the ravages of civil war. 
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 colonies to undermine the Soviet Union’s influence in Africa. Doing this through TMC 
helps to forge national identities and increase cohesion, promotes stability, enhances 
human security and prepares states to respond better to domestic and regional 
humanitarian crises (Seabra, 2011a: 2; EMGFA, 2010b: 21). 
 
Since 1990 Portugal has trained 5,721 military personnel from Lusophone countries, 
with 3,323 military personnel engaged in 45 TMC missions in the Lusophone world: 11 
projects in Angola; 5 in Cape Verde; 6 in São Tomé and Príncipe; 6 in Guinea-Bissau; 
13 in Mozambique; and 4 in East Timor (EMGFA, 2010b: 20). As of September 2010, 
there were 109 Portuguese military personnel committed to Technical Military Co-
operation projects in the Lusophone world (outlined in table 5.3 below). 
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  Navy Army Air Force Total 
Officers 7 19 7 33 
Sergeants 2 5 2 9 
Angola 
43 Personnel 
Other Ranks 1 0 0 1 
Officers 2 2 0 4 
Sergeants 0 0 0 0 
Cape Verde 
4 Personnel 
Other Ranks 0 0 0 0 
Officers 1 1 0 2 
Sergeants 1 3 0 4 
Guinea-Bissau 
6 Personnel 
Other Ranks 0 0 0 0 
Officers 4 10 2 16 
Sergeants 4 6 0 20 
Mozambique 
27 Personnel 
Other Ranks 1 0 0 1 
Officers 1 2 0 3 
Sergeants 0 1 0 1 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
4 Personnel 
Other Ranks 0 0 0 0 
Officers 8 3 0 11 
Sergeants 11 2 0 13 
East Timor 
25 Personnel 
Other Ranks 1 0 0 1 
Officers 23 37 9 69 
Sergeants 18 17 2 37 
Totals by Rank 
Other Ranks 3 0 0 3 
Totals by Branch of the Armed Forces 44 54 11 109 
Table 5.3: Portuguese military personnel engaged in Technical Military Co-operation 
projects in East Timor and the PALOPs – September 2010 (adapted from EMGFA, 
2010a). 
 
The number of Portuguese military personnel involved in these missions indicates the 
importance ascribed to TMC projects. With 109 personnel based in Lusophone 
countries under the bilateral technical military co-operation banner it is about equal to 
Portugal’s contribution to UN missions and considerably greater than Portugal’s 
contribution to EU military operations. NATO remains the largest-scale Portuguese 
military deployment; however, this is because it includes hundreds of sergeants and 
other ranks, whereas the TMC projects in East Timor and the PALOPs are largely 
comprised of officers (23 from the Navy, 37 Army officers and 9 Air Force officers). 
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 – Military training exercises in the CPLP –  
Defence and security co-operation within the CPLP framework formally builds upon the 
more ad hoc nature of Technical Military Co-operation between Portugal and the 
PALOPs. The central component of Lusophone military co-operation is the annual 
Felino exercise. This programme brings together military personnel from the CPLP 
member countries. Table 5.4 displays the different countries which have hosted the 
annual CPLP Felino military exercises since 2000. 
 
Year Hosting Country 
2000 Portugal 
2001 Portugal 
2002 Brazil 
2003 Mozambique 
2004 Angola 
2005 Cape Verde 
2006 Brazil 
2007 São Tomé and Príncipe 
2008 Portugal 
2009 Mozambique 
2010 Angola (postponed for technical reasons until March 2011)  
2011 Guinea-Bissau 
Table 5.4: Hosting countries of the CPLP Felino military exercises: 2000–2011  
(adapted from EMGFA, 2007; Lusa, 2009; Martins, 2011b: 2). 
 
Felino exercises are relatively small-scale and occur over a few days each year. To give 
an example, only 66 personnel participated in the Felino exercise in 2008 (EMGFA, 
2011f). These exercises often take the form of responding to a humanitarian crisis, 
setting up command and control centres and communications equipment, or carrying 
out peacekeeping operations (EMGFA, 2007; EMGFA, 2009c; EMGFA, 2011f). These 
operations are about developing the interoperability of Lusophone military personnel 
(especially those from the PALOPs and East Timor) to improve their capacity to 
undertake UN peacekeeping tasks and to respond effectively to humanitarian crises.  
 
 234
 The 2010 exercise in Angola was interesting in the postcolonial context as the fictitious 
scenario focused on ethnic and secessionist divisions and the artificial, imposed nature 
of the colonial borders put in place by the Portuguese on their African territories. This 
could be an effective dress-rehearsal for dealing with such tribal and ethnic conflict in 
Africa. However, if the PALOPs are not cohesive and robust, state entities, proud of 
their Portuguese heritage, then the usefulness of the CPLP framework in the long-term 
can be seriously questioned (Martins, 2011b: 3). The bond between the Lusophone 
nations is a fragile one because they are so diverse and that the sense of identity 
between the countries is based on the past, and often artificially constructed state 
boundaries, not on future interests which may well conflict with the unifying mission of 
the CPLP.  
 
The overall goal of Lusophone security and military co-operation is, from the 
Portuguese perspective at least, to turn countries, which have been recent beneficiaries 
of international peacekeeping and stabilisation missions (particularly Angola, East 
Timor and Guinea-Bissau), into more cohesive entities able to respond to crises 
themselves and ultimately to be able to contribute to the security and stability of their 
regions (Interview 7, Lisbon, 2010). Aside from the Felino exercises, additional 
exchanges of information and experiences between CPLP-member militaries also occur, 
with a view to building trust between the various Lusophone security forces (Ministério 
da Defesa Nacional, 2011). To facilitate this, a common strategic analysis centre for the 
CPLP has also been set up in Maputo (Interview 7, Lisbon, 2010).  
 
– The KC-390 transport aircraft – 
In addition to seeking to build technical co-operation between Portugal and the 
militaries of the Lusophone world, there has also been a recent development which will 
see Portugal joining the Brazilian project to develop the KC-390 military transporter. 
The KC-390 will be built by the Brazilian aeronautics company Embraer (Empresa 
Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A.) and is due to be completed in 2014. The Brazilian Air 
Force signed a $1.3 billion contract with Embraer to provide 23 planes over seven years 
(Airforce-Technology.com, 2011). 
 
In September 2010, Portugal signed a deal with Brazil to enter into the development of 
the KC-390 aircraft with a view to purchasing them to serve as replacements for its 
ageing fleet of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. Portugal’s participation in the project 
 235
 will see it working to develop the technical and communications systems of the aircraft 
and will use one factory in Portugal to help manufacture it (Lusa, 2010d; Interview 21, 
Brussels, 2010). This contract represents a significant departure from Portugal’s 
established policy of buying either American or European military hardware as part of 
its commitments to NATO and the EU (Interview 21, Brussels, 2010). 
 
The KC-390 project underlines the importance of Brazil as an emerging economic 
power and producer of military hardware to rival European and American companies. It 
also underscores the important relationship between Portugal and the Lusophone world 
and that Portugal is prepared to show its loyalties to Lusophone countries as well as EU 
and NATO members. From a European point of view, buying Brazilian or American, 
while not helping European military production, is seen as an inevitable result of 
national independence in the area of defence spending. The EDA maintains that so long 
as the deal adds to EU capabilities, which the KC-390 deal will, states are not limited to 
buying European where a better alternative is available outside of Europe, particularly 
given the failures of the A400M project (Interview 23, Brussels, 2010). 
 
– The UN Security Council: an opportunity for CPLP states to make their mark? – 
Portugal was elected to serve as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council 
for 2011–2012 on 12 October 2010 (Gomes, 2010). This meant that during 2011 two 
Lusophone countries occupied seats at the Security Council, as Portugal joined Brazil. 
Both Portugal’s and Brazil’s candidatures were supported by the CPLP at the Praia 
Council of Ministers meeting on 20 July 2009 (CPLP, 2009). This meant that Portugal 
could not only count on the unquestioning support, and votes, of the CPLP states, but 
could also mobilise diplomatic contacts through Africa and Latin America to generate 
further support. This, allied with the success of Portugal’s tactic to play the ‘size card’ 
and act as a representative of the smaller and medium-sized states, and by showing its 
continued involvement in various international security organisations, meant that 
Portugal’s candidacy was, in the eyes of the Portuguese at least, relatively strong 
(Interview 12, Lisbon, 2010; Seabra and Gorjão, 2010: 6). 
 
Portugal’s priorities for its term in the UN Security Council clearly reflect its 
Lusophone interests, with considerable emphasis being laid on East Timor and Guinea-
Bissau, as well as in non-Lusophone African states such as Ivory Coast and Sudan 
(Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2011b). With both Brazil and Portugal round the 
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 table it was easier to press for Lusophone matters to be addressed. Indeed in February 
2011, under the Brazilian presidency, East Timor was tabled for discussion, even amid 
the unrest in North Africa and the Middle East at the time (Moraes Cabral, 2011). 
Consequently, when Portugal has held the rotating presidency of the UNSC, its 
obligations to its fellow CPLP members have meant the Lusophone perspective has 
been an important consideration for Portuguese representatives. 
 
The pact of Lusophone nations formally pledging their support for individual countries’ 
bids for non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council gives countries such as 
Portugal and Brazil a foundation of guaranteed support, as well as a network of 
diplomatic relations in Africa and Latin America to exploit. This highlights the 
uniqueness that Portugal has in international affairs and the importance that is ascribed 
to relations with the Lusophone world as a vehicle through which Portuguese foreign 
policy objectives can be achieved. However, while Lusophone unity presents some 
opportunities for Portugal to maximise its influence, there are still notable challenges 
facing Portugal.  
 
 
5.4.3 Challenges facing Portugal in implementing a Lusophone security strategy 
 
– Competing interests and conflicting commitments – 
The most important constraining factor to linking the North Atlantic and the South 
Atlantic is that NATO is looking eastwards not southwards. It is more interested in the 
Partnership for Peace states formerly part of the Soviet Union and promoting stability 
through Eurasia. As such, the South Atlantic is not really on NATO’s agenda, as at least 
some in the upper echelons of the Portuguese military hierarchy have recognised 
(Interview 18, Brussels, 2010). As outlined above, Portugal was disappointed that 
NATO passed up the opportunity to use its New Strategic Concept to focus on linking 
the North and South Atlantic. Portugal needs have realistic expectations about how it 
can project influence on international organisations such as NATO and accept that its 
calls for attention to be paid to the South Atlantic may be ignored. 
 
Nevertheless, Portugal will continue to draw the attention of the EU and NATO to 
issues in the Lusophone world, particularly the growth of Brazil and Angola and the 
security questions this will raise. Although this will be difficult to do, and Portugal has 
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 already met considerable ambivalence from both NATO and Brazil in seeking to link 
the North and South Atlantic, the best card for Portugal to play is the Lusophone one. 
To act as a norm advocate for Lusophone issues, and to alert EU and NATO partners to 
developments in the countries where Portugal has special connections, is the most 
effective role for Portugal in the twenty-first century. However, straddling between the 
EU, the Atlantic Alliance, and the Lusophone world is difficult and it will not be 
possible to please every party all of the time, but Portugal will continue to try and 
maximise its position in all three arenas and build upon these relations to boost its 
global presence. 
 
The institutional and strategic conflicts are not merely external to the Portuguese State; 
there are also internal conflicts in the policy-making process in Portugal. Whereas the 
MDN and the Armed Forces are more Atlanticist (favouring NATO), the MNE has been 
more Europeanised and geared itself towards the EU’s security operations. Putting an 
emphasis on the potential for security co-operation in the Lusophone world chimes with 
both sides and each can see the potential for it to enhance Portugal’s position in NATO 
and the EU. However, CPLP security co-operation and the Felino exercises are too 
small-scale at the moment. The CPLP is sandwiched between two bigger and more 
credible security actors in NATO and the EU. Acting as a bridge between the 
Lusophone world, NATO and the EU could well enhance Portugal’s position in the 
world but it would not do anything to bridge this internal divide. So the three security 
organisations, although seen as complementary, will be very much separately handled in 
Lisbon, making it difficult to make an effective job of bridging between them. 
 
Promoting Lusophone security co-operation is an attempt by Portugal to put itself at the 
centre of relations between the Lusophone world and Europe and North America. This 
makes the CPLP central to Portuguese foreign policy, but this is not necessarily 
mirrored by other Lusophone countries. For the other member countries of the CPLP, as 
Martins (2010b) points out, the benefits of the CPLP to the growing Lusophone powers, 
particularly Brazil and Angola, will inevitably wane (Martins, 2010b: 1). These 
countries always have the option to become, instead, more deeply involved in their own 
regional co-operation mechanisms and to forge stronger relationships with non-
Lusophone countries, such as when Mozambique opted to join the Commonwealth in 
1996, the same year the CPLP was founded. This decision was taken, partly, to 
strengthen Mozambique’s relations with its Anglophone neighbours (The Times of 
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 India, 2010). Lusophone countries forsaking their historical ties in this way will 
inevitably isolate Portugal and jeopardise its mission to act as the link between the 
North and South Atlantic. 
 
– Brazil, the elephant in the room – 
Brazil’s recent emergence as an economic power is something which Portugal can ill 
afford to ignore, as the KC-390 case illustrates. Portugal’s economic diplomacy is 
increasingly geared towards encouraging Brazilian inward investment, from firms like 
Embraer and Camargo Correa, as a way of helping to stimulate growth in the 
Portuguese economy (Seabra, 2011b: 2). In addition, the emergence of Petrobras as a 
dominant force in the global energy sector means that Brazil, and to a degree other 
CPLP member countries such as Angola and Mozambique, will be well placed to meet 
Portugal’s energy demands (Eiras, 2011: 2–3). Brazil will undoubtedly play a 
significant role in Portugal’s economic recovery, and therefore, this makes the country a 
central focus for Portuguese diplomacy as Lisbon attempts to exploit its unique 
relationship with the South American giant. 
 
However, while the emergence of Brazil as an economic powerhouse offers 
opportunities for Portugal, it is a double-edged sword. For example, Brazil is not as 
interested in linking the North and South Atlantic as Portugal is. This stems from 
Brazil’s defence policy being primarily concerned with securing its borders and 
territorial waters. Securing the Amazonian border from FARC rebels is a considerable 
logistical challenge for the Brazilian military, and now, with oil exploration in the 
Atlantic, maritime security needs also to be stepped up (Gonçalves Mendes, 2010: 58–
59). In short, Brazil does not have the capacity, or interest, to intervene elsewhere in the 
world (Seabra 2010b: 8–12). Furthermore, because of the United States’ failure to ratify 
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Brazil is suspicious of NATO/US-led 
activity in the South Atlantic and would staunchly defend its claim to the considerable 
oil reserves located off its coastline (Seabra, 2010a: 3). Actions by the United States 
military, such as the decision to reactivate its Fourth Fleet (operational from its 
Southern Command in Florida and tasked with providing maritime support in the 
Caribbean and South Atlantic area), make Brazil understandably anxious (Fonseca, 
2011: 81–82; El País, 2008). 
 
 239
 In addition to fears over North American encroachment into Brazilian territorial waters, 
the question of Iran’s nuclear programme also put Brazilian foreign policy firmly at 
odds with the United States. These episodes illustrate how the emergence of Brazil as a 
global player, with its own set of political, economic and strategic interests to defend, 
has the potential to make things awkward for Portugal, as Lisbon tries to remain 
simultaneously friendly to Washington, Brussels and Brasília. Brazil clearly backs its 
own economic might in international diplomacy and, as Gorjão (2010b) observes, it is 
clearly “…prepared to tread a different path from the US to safeguard its national 
interests” (Gorjão, 2010b: 2). 
 
Brazil does participate in military, defence and security co-operation mechanisms in the 
Americas, but these are located outside of the realm of NATO. Rather than being based 
upon the NATO model, the organisations of which Brazil is a member of are more co-
operation mechanisms than mutual defence pacts and these include: the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; the Inter-American Defence Board; the Organisation 
of American States; the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas; the South 
American Defence Council; and the Union of South American Nations (Gonçalves 
Mendes, 2010: 62–66). Therefore, Brazil already has the institutional connections with 
which to deal with Atlantic security issues, and the Brazilian defence establishment is 
already in dialogue with both North American and Latin American counterparts. 
 
With little interest in linking the North and South Atlantic through Europe coming from 
NATO partners or Brazil, Portugal’s geopolitical isolation within the Atlantic Alliance 
is highlighted. NATO’s interest in the East puts Portugal at the periphery, as opposed to 
the centre, of its activities. To say Portugal is not peripheral, as a Portuguese major-
general made clear, would be to confuse the geographic map of NATO’s member 
countries with where the Alliance’s political and strategic interests lie in reality 
(Interview 18, Brussels, 2010). It is fanciful to think that Portugal can influence Brazil. 
This is highlighted by the fact that the Portuguese National Defence Strategy makes 
reference to Brazil, whereas the Brazilian equivalent document makes no reference to 
Portugal in outlining the country’s strategic challenges, interests and potential partners 
(Ministério da Defesa [Brazil], 2009; Resolução do Conselho de Ministros 6/2003, of 
20 January 2003: 283). In addition to this, Brazil is already pursuing South–South 
Lusophone co-operation with Angola and the other PALOPs, actively excluding 
Portugal from this process (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, 2011). 
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 The increasing relevance of the South Atlantic in economic terms, because of the 
potential value of what lies beneath the seabed, has huge economic and security 
implications for both the South and North Atlantic, making it potentially politically 
salient to NATO and the European Union. This reality puts Portugal and the CPLP in a 
key position. Yet those in Portuguese security policy-making circles recognise the 
importance of Brazil and Angola in the future, but there is a reluctance to address the 
South Atlantic question openly, as it may mean Portugal getting left behind. As a senior 
military advisor said “we don’t mention that yet, but Brazil will, for sure, be important” 
(Interview 15, Lisbon, 2010). 
 
Lusophone security co-operation can, therefore, be characterised as a system that 
Portugal would like to be at the centre of, but the reality is that Brazil possesses the 
economic power and the closer geopolitical interest in the PALOPs. Portugal is 
attempting to maximise its influence in NATO, the EU and the Lusophone world, the 
most effective way to do this is to stress the complementarity of the international 
organisations of which it is a member. The problem is that Portugal, in attempting to 
project its influence in these transnational fora, has not fully multilateralised its national 
interests and this has exposed its weaknesses. South Atlantic co-operation, much like 
the CPLP, has clear benefits for Portugal, but more marginal benefits for other 
Lusophone countries. 
 
 
5.5 Assessing Contemporary Portuguese Security Policy: Europeanisation or 
Internationalisation? 
 
This case study of Portuguese security policy offers both an insight into the current 
situation and the empirical evidence needed in order to make a conceptual judgement as 
to whether the changes in this policy area can be attributed to Europeanisation. 
Evidence suggests that Portuguese security policy can be more accurately portrayed as 
being heavily internationalised, rather than being subject to Europeanisation. Portuguese 
policy-making elites and members of the Armed Forces operate with constant reference 
to the multilateral organisations of which Portugal is a member. Considerable emphasis 
is put on Portugal’s active participation in the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy, but NATO, the Lusophone world, and the United Nations, are also vitally 
important to Portuguese security policy. 
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 In terms of the Europeanisation of this policy area, Portuguese security policy reflects 
the limited impact of the EU and the importance of other international organisations and 
areas of interest for Portugal. At the macro levels of analysis, Portugal’s projection of 
its national interest is not confined to the EU, transnational security co-operation 
remains, in the Portuguese case, strongly centred on the Atlantic. This indicates that 
NATO remains the principal focus; the EU’s emergence as a security actor is accepted 
by stressing how it can strengthen NATO and enhance Portugal’s role in Lusophone 
Africa. This means that rather than being about Europeanisation processes, Portugal’s 
security policy purpose is more about the instrumental manipulation of international 
organisations in order to enhance Portugal’s role in multiple arenas. Therefore, the 
alternative explanations are more suitable as the indicators of Europeanisation do not 
tell the whole story with regard to contemporary Portuguese security policy. Rather than 
externalising its domestic preferences onto the EU, Portuguese security policy (on 
levels 2 and 3) is looking to project its influence more widely, using various 
international organisations, not just the EU, to enhance its influence. 
 
Like the macro levels, the meso and micro levels reflect limited Europeanisation in 
terms of policy outputs. Procedures in foreign policy-making may strongly reflect 
Europeanisation, but the reality in security policy is that the EU is not the only relevant 
external force shaping the behaviour of the Portuguese elites, so this limits the role of 
the EU to transform Portuguese foreign policy outputs. The Lusophone world and 
NATO are highly relevant to Portuguese security policy and provide opportunities for 
actor socialisation in multilateral organisations as well as preserving important bilateral 
ties, especially between Portugal and the PALOPs, East Timor, Brazil and the United 
States. The EU is not the only organisation which can mould the behaviours of social 
groups and individuals, as NATO co-operation is embedded and more relevant to 
military elites, the influences on Portuguese security policy elites are more diverse than 
simply exposure to the EU institutions or pressure from the EU as NATO, and pressure 
from the United States, is a significant part of this policy domain. Therefore, 
institutional cultures (level 5) are geared towards actively participating in a range of 
international organisations, meaning that the EU is not the only potential locus for 
socialisation. This means that individuals and groups (levels 6 and 7), especially the 
military, are not just exposed to European norms and ‘Brussels’, but to international 
norms more broadly. This suggests that internationalisation, as opposed to merely 
Europeanisation, has taken place. 
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 Portugal’s participation in EU security and defence co-operation and CSDP missions 
could be viewed as an aspect of the country’s security policy becoming Europeanised. 
However, there are other factors which are also relevant in accounting for recent 
developments in Portuguese security policy practices. Portugal’s active participation in 
CSDP can be partially explained by the desire to conform to ‘logics of appropriateness’ 
(March and Olsen, 1998: 951–952), as part of Portugal’s wider European integration 
project. It can also be explained by more rationalist arguments, insofar as that it is in 
Portugal’s security interests, and broader foreign policy interests, to participate in CFSP 
and CSDP, thus facilitating the ‘rescue’ of Portuguese security policy from the 
declining relevance of NATO in the post-Cold War era and the shock of losing its 
colonial possessions (Major, 2005: 188). 
 
Portugal has also sought to externalise its traditional foreign policy priorities onto EU 
mechanisms, using the CSDP as a vehicle through which to pursue its relations with the 
Lusophone world. While this can be construed as the Europeanisation of Portuguese 
foreign and security policy, it should be stressed that Portugal is also using its roles in 
NATO and the UN to enhance its position within the Lusophone world and is keen to 
present itself within the CPLP as the interlocutor between the Lusophone world and the 
EU and NATO. Therefore, externalising traditional foreign policy priorities is not 
limited to the EU. Instead, Portugal is making sure that its security policy is joined-up 
and grounded in several different multilateral co-operation mechanisms which are 
mutually enhancing and complementary. 
 
NATO remains vitally important to Portuguese defence and security and is the 
organisation to which the most number of Portuguese military personnel are currently 
committed. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that CSDP represents a greater priority to 
Portugal than continued participation in NATO operations. It is Portugal’s long-
standing commitment to NATO which has brought about the internationalisation of the 
country’s security policy and the professionalisation of its Armed Forces. Through 
NATO, Portugal was brought in from international isolation and integrated into a 
transnational co-operative military structure. Portugal’s pre-established transnational 
networks forged via NATO, therefore, mean that the country’s policy-makers and 
military elites are more favourably disposed to co-operating at the EU level too. But it 
should be stressed that NATO, not the EU, is the root cause of this because it is through 
NATO that Portuguese security policy developed and became internationalised. This, in 
 243
 turn, laid the foundations for its later Europeanisation, as the EU sought to develop its 
own security and defence capabilities separate from NATO and to develop its presence 
in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Militarily and politically NATO is still 
paramount to Portuguese foreign, security and defence policy. Therefore, Portugal’s 
relationship with NATO is characterised by self-interested, pragmatic decision-taking 
which seeks to maximise Portugal’s role within the Atlantic Alliance. 
 
Given Mérand’s (2008) assertion that what precisely constitutes the national interest is 
blurred by the intense transnational co-operation in security policy through NATO and 
the EU, the European and the national positions could, conceivably, co-evolve to be 
complementary. However, such convergence should not be solely attributed to the EU, 
as Olsen (2011) argues. In the case of Denmark, which has opted-out of CSDP, the 
‘Europeanisation’ of the domestic security policy-making structures has still been 
identified. The pressure for domestic reorganisation can come from the EU, but can also 
stem from globalisation, or most likely from co-operation and long-term socialisation 
processes within NATO (Olsen, 2011: 20).  It can be argued that NATO, rather than the 
EU, was the original promoter of a more integrated European focus in the security 
policies of Western European states, especially those, like Denmark and Portugal, 
which have been NATO members since its creation in 1949. 
 
Aside from NATO and the EU, fledgling military co-operation in the Lusophone world 
adds another dimension to Portuguese security policy, beyond the European context. 
After NATO, Portuguese military personnel are most heavily committed to Technical 
Military Co-operation (TMC) missions in the Lusophone world and UN peacekeeping 
missions (which include, or have included, deployments in Lusophone countries or their 
close neighbours). TMC programmes and the Felino exercises are significant 
developments, which broaden Portuguese security policy beyond NATO and the EU. 
There are not large numbers of Portuguese foot soldiers in Africa, a circumstance which 
could well be politically sensitive. In fact, the military personnel involved are mostly 
officers, there are no ‘other ranks’ (‘praças’) participating in TMC programmes in the 
PALOPs. It is, therefore, a significant operation, but not one which demands huge 
resources of the Portuguese military. Nor, more importantly, is it seen as threatening by 
the independent Lusophone African countries.  
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 The Felino exercises, TMC programmes, and closer involvement with Brazil in defence 
procurement, are contributions to global security that Portugal can do autonomously, 
drawing strength from its historic ties. Although these activities are relatively small-
scale at the moment, they have the potential to flourish. Exploring the possibilities 
offered by Lusophone security co-operation, gives Portugal a degree of independence 
from NATO and the EU to follow its own specific interests and exploit its unique ties. 
However, given Portugal’s limited resources, pursuing Lusophone security co-operation 
cannot be seen to be at the expense of NATO or the EU as it could undermine 
Portugal’s position in these organisations. It already seems that, by investing 
considerable numbers of officer-class personnel on TMC projects, Portugal has already 
signalled that it is prioritising the Lusophone world. Inevitably, this will leave fewer 
resources for pursuing NATO co-operation strategies and EDA projects, but will ensure 
that Portuguese security policy has a broad range of interests and remains 
internationalised. This allows Portuguese security policy-making elites to continue 
viewing the different organisations of which Portugal is a member as complementing 
each other, rather than being contradictory. 
 
The Europeanisation of Portuguese security policy should not, therefore, be read as 
purely ‘EU-isation’ but, instead, as a broader process of working alongside European 
partners and recognising European interests. To that end, Portugal’s improved 
disposition towards Spain can be partially attributed to the two countries working more 
closely as EU partners, but it is also to do with the shared experiences of the Iberian 
nations as they trod the same path from dictatorship to democracy and the gradual 
recognition of their mutual interests in the world. Therefore, the ‘Europeanisation’ of 
security policy, although a product of European construction post-World War II, 
encompasses something which goes beyond European integration, and could, perhaps, 
be better explained by the concepts of transnational institutionalised security 
communities, the broader internationalisation of the policy-making process, the effects 
of globalisation, and the construction of the ‘West’ during the Cold War. This chimes 
with Portugal’s commitment to multiple security organisations and its continued 
emphasis on the importance of NATO. In the eyes of the Portuguese, Atlanticism 
remains the favoured orientation for Europe. The EU’s CSDP is not regarded as an 
alternative to NATO, but as something which complements and enhances the Atlantic 
Alliance. Given that Europeanisation tends to refer to processes stemming from 
integration with the EU, it is, therefore, less problematic to regard Portuguese security 
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 policy as being heavily internationalised and aware of the multilateral context in which 
contemporary global security issues are now handled, than to it being ‘Europeanised’. 
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 Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis accounts for the current trends in Portuguese foreign policy, its strategic 
priorities, and the underlying motivations guiding foreign policy decision-making. The 
mini-case studies provided this richness of detail, but it is now necessary to 
systematically relate these findings back to the seven specific research questions 
formulated earlier, and to the analytical framework. The case study highlights the 
weaknesses inherent in Europeanisation as a concept, especially when it is applied to 
studies of national foreign policies in periods of transition and identity crisis. 
Consequently, European foreign policy studies should take particular note of the 
Portuguese experience because it is nuanced and offers a fresh perspective on long-
standing theoretical debates. This chapter concentrates on interpreting and 
contextualising the detail from the previous chapters, in order to establish whether 
Portuguese foreign and security policy has been subject to Europeanisation, and what 
insights the Portuguese case study might offer in improving the utility of 
Europeanisation as a concept for the future. 
 
In order to address the dual-focus of the thesis, on the specific factors relating to 
Portugal, as well as the more general theoretical debates surrounding the utility of 
Europeanisation as a concept, this concluding chapter is organised into four sections. 
The first section deals with the specific conclusions of the mini-case studies and relates 
these findings back to the research questions and the analytical framework. After that, 
the assertion that the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy is 
limited is discussed in a more general context. Then, to bring the findings of this thesis 
into an even wider context, the utility of Europeanisation in foreign policy studies is 
discussed with reference to the specific insights of the Portuguese case. Finally, the 
more general challenges for future research on Europeanisation of national foreign 
policies and Portuguese foreign policy are discussed. 
 
 
6.1 Discussion of Findings and Responses to the Research Questions 
 
Portugal’s foreign policy-making institutions have responded to the realities of 
European integration and the EU’s emergence as an international actor. However, as the 
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 evidence from chapter 3 shows, the evolution of Portuguese foreign policy-making 
institutions is motivated by a myriad of factors in addition to pressures stemming from 
the EU, such as the emphasis on maximising Portugal’s influence in various 
international organisations, the internal desire for modernisation, and the need to 
streamline the administrative system. Notable continuities also remain, such as the 
importance ascribed by certain Portuguese elites to NATO. The evidence from chapters 
4 and 5 shows that the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy outputs is limited, 
despite significant changes to the institutional context of Portuguese foreign policy-
making in recent years. This section relates these findings from the mini-case studies 
back to the theoretical framework by systematically addressing each level of analysis. A 
detailed response to each of the seven research questions is then provided.  
 
 
6.1.1 Assessment of the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy 
on multiple analytical levels 
 
Building upon table 2.4, which sets out the theoretical framework, table 6.1 (below) 
outlines, by drawing upon evidence provided in chapters 3, 4 and 5, how the 
Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy is limited across multiple 
analytical levels. The analytical levels of the policy-making process are, in practice, 
interrelated. For example, separating individuals from their social milieux is difficult 
and national identity (level 2) is a pervasive force in shaping the behaviours of 
institutions, networks, social groups and individuals at the micro levels (levels 5, 6 and 
7). While table 2.4 outlined seven distinct layers of the policy process, the interview 
evidence did not reveal any instances where individuals (level 7) made an impact on 
institutional behaviour and brought specific experiences to a group. The reality is that it 
is difficult to untangle individuals from the social groups with which they interact. 
While an individual may look to force change, this cannot be done if the person is 
isolated in the organisation, and thus the support of “a small group of disciples” is 
required in order for an individual to effectively put pressure on his/her superiors and 
force change (Downs, 1967: 6). In a revised analytical framework, levels 6 and 7 would 
be merged as they cannot be sufficiently unravelled for separate analysis with the 
information contained in the thesis.  
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 On the most macro level, transnational cultures (level 1), Portuguese foreign and 
security policy is heavily internationalised because of the importance ascribed to 
actively participating in multilateral organisations. The emphasis on strengthening the 
international community and building strategic partnerships means that Portugal’s 
interest is not limited to the EU. Rather than Europeanisation, this level reflects 
internationalisation, globalisation, multilateralisation and the persistence of Atlanticism. 
This is especially evident with regard to security policy, where integrating with the EU 
is justified because it enhances Portugal’s position in both NATO and the Lusophone 
world. Additionally, with regard to development policy, Portugal has sought to 
legitimise its actions by conforming to established international norms, not just within 
the context of the EU’s relations with the ACP states, but through other organisations, 
such as the OECD, the CPLP and the United Nations. Similarly, as concluded in chapter 
3, with a myriad of other external forces shaping Portuguese foreign policy-making 
processes, Europeanisation cannot be asserted to be a dominant factor when Portugal is 
not just looking to fit into the EU, but is also internalising international norms to 
legitimise and multilateralise its diplomacy more broadly. Therefore, this level most 
resembles scenario A in figure 2.1, where the alternative explanations dominate. 
 
On level 2, it was evident that Portuguese national identity has been preserved, and this 
has served to limit the impact of Europeanisation. Portugal’s Atlantic and Lusophone 
role identities are most clearly visible on this level, and because these factors are 
geographically, historically and culturally relevant to Portuguese national identity, the 
scope for Europeanisation is limited by Portugal’s preoccupation with maintaining the 
transatlantic link and strengthening its position within the Lusophone world. While 
there is some evidence that Portugal has looked to project certain national interests onto 
the EU, the extent to which this can be justifiably categorised as ‘uploading’ 
Europeanisation is limited when Portugal is keen to play the Lusophone card with 
regard to other international organisations, and to project its influence in Africa by 
invoking historical legacies in order to promote Portuguese language and culture. 
Therefore, with little penetration of Europeanisation present, this level corresponds with 
scenario A in figure 2.1. 
 
There was some evidence to suggest that Portuguese foreign policy purpose and 
statecraft (level 3) had adapted to the realities of being in the EU. However, rather than 
being Europeanisation, the instrumental manipulation of various international 
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 organisations, not just the EU, appeared to be the dominant trend for contemporary 
Portuguese foreign policy. The EU is regarded as an asset to Portuguese diplomacy, but 
only for what it can offer Portugal as it pursues its national interests in the multilateral 
context. The CFSP is important to Portugal, but, primarily, as a mechanism for 
strengthening Portugal’s position within the Lusophone world. The rationale is that: 
Portugal is in Europe, the Lusophone world is part of Portugal’s foreign policy role 
identity, ergo, through Portugal, the Lusophone world can be part of the EU’s emerging 
foreign policy identity. This is a contribution that only Portugal can bring to the table in 
the EU context. Therefore, scenario A also applies to this level, as the alternative 
explanations dominate again here. 
 
Portuguese policy-making structures (level 4: ‘policy instruments and processes’) 
showed significant signs of Europeanisation, as the MNE has had to respond to the 
realities of EU membership. Therefore, some ‘top-down’ Europeanisation pressures are 
evident in how the Portuguese administration has evolved. Equally, there is willingness 
to utilise the EU’s foreign policy apparatus to strengthen Portugal’s position on the 
world stage. This is the product of Portugal’s active participation in the EU in recent 
years (particularly Council Presidencies) and the changing culture that stems from 
frequent interaction with Europe, i.e. viewing the EU as an extension of Portuguese 
national policy-making. On this level, policy processes show signs of Europeanisation 
(resembling scenario C), however, the final outputs reflect limited Europeanisation 
effects. Processes may have evolved, but there is a sense that Portuguese foreign policy 
is able to interact with Europe in a more instrumental and utility-maximising way, 
because of Portugal’s established Luso-Atlantic national role identity. Therefore, with 
arguments on both sides, scenario B applies to this level and Europeanisation cannot be 
asserted as the dominant influence. 
 
On level 5, there is the most evidence to suggest that Europeanisation has had an impact 
on institutional cultures in Portugal. The MNE is the government department which co-
ordinates EU policy: therefore, it is the organ of government which has the most 
frequent contact with Brussels. While security policy is sheltered from the 
Europeanisation pressures that affect other policy areas handled by the DGAE (because 
it is handled by the DGPE instead), the exploration of the ‘European option’ has meant 
developing a relationship between Lisbon and Brussels, which has meant that elite 
socialisation has occurred and Portuguese officials have adopted European ‘ways of 
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 doing things’, or, at the very least, have developed a more open-minded approach to 
policy-making in the European context. The alternative explanations cannot be 
discarded entirely, particularly as NATO is another important locus for elite 
socialisation. However, the MNE is well-placed to co-ordinate EU business and has a 
positive relationship with Brussels, which meant that it has taken steps to evolve and 
adapt as the EU has developed. Therefore, this level of the policy process resembles 
scenario C, where Europeanisation is identified as the more dominant pressure and 
seems more plausible than the alternative explanations.  
 
However, even this is limited in the Portuguese case because of the importance of the 
historical legacies of Portugal’s Atlantic role and Lusophone identity. Therefore, the 
wider foreign policy-making elite in Portugal (i.e. outside of the pro-EU institutional 
culture inside the MNE), such as Portuguese political elites (especially those affiliated 
with the CDS–PP), the military and the MDN, are not as enthusiastic towards the EU 
and instead prioritise NATO and the Lusophone world. This was evident in chapter 3, 
with regard to the institutional disconnects brought about the ‘MNE-isation’ of 
Portuguese security policy, and was also revealed in chapter 5, with reference to the 
varied levels of enthusiasm for the European Defence Agency among the different 
branches of the Portuguese Armed Forces. 
 
On the most micro analytical levels, social groups and individuals (levels 6 and 7), 
Brussels has had a discernible impact on Portuguese diplomats. Exposure to Brussels is 
a vital learning experience for Portuguese diplomats and this has resulted in 
interviewees adopting positive views about Portugal’s relationship with Europe. 
Furthermore, most senior diplomats have been appointed to REPER at some point, 
which emphasises the importance Portugal ascribed to being well-represented in 
Brussels. It also points to the fact that only the cream of the diplomatic service get the 
opportunity to go to Brussels. However, while Portuguese diplomats have become 
integrated into the EU institutions and common decision-making processes in the 
Council, and now take the positions of European partners into account when 
formulating the national strategy, it does not mean that diplomats are less Portuguese. 
There is a tendency not to rock the boat, but on key issues, especially relating to Africa, 
Portuguese diplomats are under political pressure to be more assertive. Therefore, with 
arguments on both sides, Europeanisation cannot be asserted as the dominant influence 
on individuals and groups, meaning that scenario B is most appropriate. 
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 The picture across all levels is mixed, but, overall, Europeanisation is unable to assert 
any clear dominance over the alternatives. When taken together, the more micro levels 
(levels 4–7) reflect integration, internationalisation and the modernisation of Portuguese 
domestic policy-making and political structures in the European context, although 
specific Europeanisation effects can be identified (especially on level 5 with regard to 
the functions of the MNE). In contrast, the more macro levels (levels 1–3) reveal how 
little Portuguese foreign policy priorities have been Europeanised. Instead, Portugal is 
able to use multilateralisation and internationalisation to give a European dimension to 
its foreign policy. This allows Portugal to sew its Lusophone world badge onto the 
CFSP/CSDP patchwork of national interests which shape the EU’s external action. Such 
externalisation is less evident with regard to NATO, as Portugal was unable to upload 
South Atlantic dialogue onto NATO’s strategic agenda.  
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 Table 6.1: The limited Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign and security policy: an 
assessment on multiple analytical levels. 
Levels  
of Analysis 
The Dominant Trends in  
Portuguese Foreign Policy 
Is This Evidence of 
Europeanisation? 
Macro   
1. Transnational 
       Cultures 
 
 
 
 
Portuguese foreign and security policy is heavily 
internationalised. The interconnectedness of states 
(especially countries in both NATO and the EU) 
and the importance of multilateral international 
organisations as norm promoters, help to frame 
Portuguese foreign policy-making in terms of 
international norms and working with strategic 
partners (not limited to the EU). International 
organisations are viewed as complementary. 
No, as Atlanticism is still 
important. Integration in 
Europe makes Portugal 
more integrated in the EU 
and in the Euro-Atlantic 
strategic area generally. 
There is complementarity 
between NATO, EU and 
other global actors. (A) 
2. National 
Identity 
Portuguese foreign policy is concerned with 
building upon historical legacies and promoting 
the Portuguese language to enhance Portugal’s 
place in the world and to make the Lusophone 
world relevant to Europe and North America in 
particular. The Lusophone niche is something that 
Portugal is uniquely placed to exploit; it allows the 
country to occupy a central role between the EU 
and Africa and the EU/NATO and Brazil.  
No, there is insufficient 
‘uploading’ onto the EU. 
Instead, the strategy is for 
Portugal to colour various 
international bodies (not 
exclusively the EU) with 
its Lusophone interests, 
and to multilateralise its 
interests generally. (A) 
3. Foreign 
Policy 
Purpose and 
Statecraft 
The EU’s CFSP is as an important element of 
Portuguese foreign policy, but largely because it 
can be manipulated to reflect Portuguese interests. 
The EU complements Portugal’s relations in the 
Lusophone world, and allows Portugal to bring its 
specific Lusophone ties to the EU’s disposal. 
Only in the recognition 
that the EU can enhance 
Portuguese bilateral ties 
by offering global reach 
and resources to boost its 
diplomacy. (A) 
4. Policy 
Instruments 
and Processes 
Portuguese foreign policy is geared towards the 
maximisation of its influence through playing an 
active role in all of the international organisations 
of which it is a member, keeping bilateral relations 
but framing them increasingly in a multilateral 
context. The EU and NATO are used to strengthen 
Portugal’s position in the Lusophone world, 
allowing it to punch above its weight globally.  
Yes, in terms of processes 
and structures, especially 
in the MNE and in some 
of the Armed Forces (but 
not so much in the MDN). 
No, in terms of the end-
products of foreign policy 
actions and priorities.  (B) 
5. Institutional 
Cultures 
There is considerable scope for the EU to shape 
Portuguese public policy-making, but because of 
the relevance of other actors, belief systems 
relating to security policy are sheltered from 
institutional Europeanisation in the DGAE and 
remain concentrated in the DGPE. Beyond the EU, 
NATO is an important locus for elite socialisation. 
Yes, in terms of day-to-
day dealings with the EU 
in the MNE. But this is 
more evident in the 
general co-ordination of 
EU affairs than in foreign 
and security policy. (C) 
6. Social Groups 
 
 
 
 
7. Behaviour of 
Individuals 
Politicians, military planners, individual 
diplomats, clusters and small networks of policy-
makers show traits that indicate that ‘Brussels’ has 
impacted  upon their thinking, suggesting EU 
socialisation. REPER and the PSC offer 
opportunities for socialisation within the EU’s 
institutions (as distinct institutions to NATO, the 
UN, and the OSCE). Interviewees showed 
awareness that the EU is increasingly important in 
foreign policy terms and that EU integration 
embodies the democratic regime post-1974, as a 
way of rejuvenating Portugal. Only the best go to 
Brussels; in turn, Brussels is a prerequisite for 
climbing up the Portuguese diplomatic service.  
Yes, but only to a degree. 
National diplomats have 
become integrated into 
the EU, but this does not 
mean that key national 
interests have become less 
of a priority. Portuguese 
diplomats act on behalf of 
Portugal, but they are 
careful to factor in the 
positions of EU partners 
and are mindful of the 
impact of their actions on 
wider European unity. (B) 
Micro   
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 6.1.2 Responses to the specific research questions 
 
The dominant trends in contemporary Portuguese foreign policy reflect a limited impact 
of Europeanisation pressures. Given that the construction of a national foreign policy 
role, and specific interests within that role, is closely intertwined with notions of 
national identity, the fact that Europeanisation has only a limited transformative effect 
on national foreign policy outputs would not surprise an intergovernmentalist, not least 
because of the weakness of the EU’s supranational institutions in the domain of foreign 
policy. With the dominant trends in contemporary Portuguese foreign policy and the 
impact of Europeanisation on various analytical levels outlined, responses to the 
specific research questions posed at the beginning of this thesis can now be given. 
 
– To what extent has the emergence of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor 
changed Portugal’s foreign policy priorities and transformed how Portugal interacts 
with the outside world? – 
The main research question concerned the extent to which the emergence of the EU as a 
foreign and security policy actor has changed Portugal’s foreign policy priorities. From 
the evidence presented in this thesis it can be concluded that Portugal’s interactions with 
the outside world do not rest upon the EU’s ability to fulfil its role as an international 
actor, but rather that a stronger EU allows for Portugal’s position to be strengthened 
with regard to its other multilateral and bilateral relations, not least with its former 
colonies. Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate this: the emergence of the EU as an international 
actor has not made Portugal adjust its focus on the Atlantic and the Lusophone, despite 
the Europeanisation of domestic structures and diplomats. If the EU had transformed 
how Portugal approaches these issues in any meaningful way, then Portugal’s overseas 
development assistance strategies and cultural policy would reflect this by being less 
Lusophone-orientated, and Portugal’s support for NATO and Lusophone security co-
operation would be less entrenched than it is.  
 
– What has been the overall impact of EU membership on foreign and security policy-
making processes in Portugal? – 
EU membership has allowed Portugal to diversify its relations with the outside world; 
integration in the Euro-Atlantic area allows Portuguese foreign and security policy-
making processes to become further multilateralised and internationalised. Since 1974, 
political elites and policy-makers recognise that the EU is an important consideration 
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 and can enhance Portugal’s diplomatic reach, both within Europe and beyond. 
Portuguese diplomats recognise that being integrated in the EU is a way of broadening 
the country’s foreign policy horizons and enhancing Portugal’s relations with other 
European countries, as well as those in the Mediterranean and further afield. It is, 
however, difficult to unravel the significant impact of EU membership on the foreign 
policy-making process in Portugal, and the emerging role of the EU as a global actor, 
from the other notable factors, such as the country’s continued emphasis on the 
importance of NATO to Europe in the post-Cold War era and the elevated standing of 
the Lusophone world in Portugal’s foreign policy priorities. 
 
– Is the EU the principal, or only, focus of contemporary Portuguese foreign policy, 
or are there other areas of interest which matter? – 
The EU is not the sole focus for Portuguese foreign policy. NATO and the Lusophone 
world are of fundamental importance also. With Portugal’s exploration of the ‘European 
option’ now complete, the EU appears to be viewed by Portuguese foreign policy-
making elites as an enabler, as a way of enhancing Portugal’s relations with the United 
States (alongside NATO) and the Lusophone world, especially the PALOPS (through 
CSDP missions, the EU–ACP framework and EU–Africa Summits). Portugal’s 
approach is, therefore, one of the opportunistic pragmatist, where the EU is recognised 
as a valuable asset for Portuguese foreign policy because it provides the country with a 
platform to raise issues relating to the Lusophone world at the European level, such as 
the floods in Mozambique, instability in Guinea-Bissau, injustices in East Timor, or to 
assist Cape Verde in developing closer ties with the EU. 
 
– If important non-EU priorities for Portugal do exist, are they meaningful and 
strong enough to be sustained without Portugal being an EU Member State? – 
Portugal is increasingly emphasising the importance of the Lusophone world. If it were 
not an EU Member State, Portugal’s bilateral relations with Lusophone countries and its 
place in the CPLP are stable and useful enough that they would be sustainable. 
However, enhancing Portugal’s place in the Lusophone world is best done by raising its 
standing within Europe. The Portuguese Presidency of the EU Council of 2007 was 
seized as an opportunity to move relations with the PALOPs forward. It was Portugal’s 
effectiveness in dealing with external relations matters, together with the resolution of 
the Constitutional Treaty crisis, which led to Portugal’s Presidency being lauded as a 
success. Enhancing Portugal’s position in the EU, by running a successful Presidency, 
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 raises the country’s stature among the Lusophone countries, especially if its Presidency 
devoted considerable attention to Lusophone matters, which both the 2000 and 2007 
Presidencies did. 
 
– What Europeanisation pressures and transformations can be identified in 
Portuguese foreign and security policy-making? – 
The MNE has evolved to be able to deal with EU policy-making effectively, across all 
policy areas, including security policy. The creation of the DGAE and the emergence of 
REPER as an important tool for Portuguese diplomacy demonstrate that Portugal now 
has to bear Europe in mind. However, while Portuguese foreign policy-makers factor in 
Europe, national interests still underpin foreign policy outputs and this means that 
Europe is manipulated in an instrumental way in order to give Portugal a greater role in 
global security and to enhance Portugal’s relationship with Lusophone Africa. 
Portuguese policy-making structures have had to adapt to the realities and opportunities 
of EU membership. Co-ordinating EU affairs now appears to be no longer an aspect of 
‘foreign’ policy, as the domestic institutions for handling EU affairs have now been set 
up so that the DGAE and REPER mirror each other. However, although not a direct 
Europeanisation pressure, the reform of Portugal’s public administration (under the 
PRACE and later the PREMAC) is very closely linked to the austerity measures 
associated with the Euro crisis. This will have an effect on Portugal’s diplomatic and 
military spending capacities in the future. 
 
– Is Europeanisation able to account for unique processes of change, which cannot 
be explained through other concepts? – 
While some of the transformations observed could be labelled as ‘Europeanisation’, 
other concepts are able to account for the processes of change in Portuguese foreign 
policy. The domestication of EU affairs, internationalisation, multilateralisation, 
modernisation and democratisation all intersect what is generally understood to be 
Europeanisation, and were features of Portugal’s exploration of the ‘European option’ 
post-1974. It would, therefore, be more precise to deploy these concepts to account for 
institutional change, rather than to use the catch-all term that Europeanisation has 
become. This is especially relevant given the limited dominance of Europeanisation 
across the various levels of the policy process, where the alternative explanations have 
been able to capture and account for processes which have often been misread as 
Europeanisation in the literature.  
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 – If Europeanisation has significantly transformed domestic policy-making processes 
in the Portuguese case, what was the motivation of domestic actors, and can evidence 
be found to challenge the Europeanisation narrative in order to paint a more 
nuanced picture of domestic change in the face of European integration and 
pressures from outside the nation-state?  – 
Both external pressures and the internal desire to modernise are evident. The external 
pressures are not limited to the EU, as, along with the exploration of the ‘European 
option’, Portugal’s participation in UN missions and active involvement in NATO have 
come to define its post-1974 foreign policy. Therefore, the Europeanisation of 
Portuguese foreign policy captures both exogenous pressures on the Portuguese State to 
integrate, and internal desires to modernise, consolidate democracy and to be seen as 
playing an active role in European integration and international affairs more broadly. 
Internationalisation was already established well before accession to the EEC in 1986. 
NATO co-operation and the transatlantic link are more historically engrained, especially 
among military elites, and the emergence of the EU as a security actor has only slowly 
challenged the predominance of NATO in the eyes of Portuguese security policy elites. 
Therefore, the picture is varied and the solution to Portugal’s strategic “trilemma” is to 
stress the complementarity between the EU, NATO and the Lusophone world, rather 
than having to make difficult choices and to navigate in one particular direction. 
 
 
6.2 The Limited Europeanisation of Portuguese Foreign and Security Policy 
 
Table 6.1 and the responses to the research questions paint a picture of the overall effect 
of Europeanisation on Portuguese foreign and security policy as being limited. In part, 
this is because it is problematic to assert Europeanisation when Portugal is so actively 
pursuing relations with the Lusophone world. Additionally, Europeanisation, when 
applied to foreign policy studies, is both too restrictive and not sufficiently defined to be 
able to account for processes which have occurred in the Portuguese case. It is ill-
defined in that accepting the Europeanisation thesis leaves little room for other plausible 
and more wide-ranging explanations, such as modernisation, multilateralisation and 
internationalisation. It is too restrictive in the sense that, while Portugal’s integration 
with the EU has rejuvenated the country and allowed it to pursue its foreign policy goals 
post-1974, Europeanisation is too heavily centred on the EU and explaining the 
specifics of integration with EU institutions. 
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 The EU is not the only international organisation to have left its mark on Portuguese 
foreign policy-making elites, but the way in which Europeanisation has evolved as a 
concept means that the transformative impact of these other organisations is displaced 
and overshadowed by the features of EU integration which are inherent in the concept 
of Europeanisation. Therefore, in accounting for continuity and change in Portuguese 
foreign policy since 1974, it would appear that Europeanisation and ‘EU-isation’ have a 
limited ability to capture the nuances and the complexities of the processes of 
transformation and resistance in this case. As used in the conventional wisdom, 
Europeanisation privileges the EU and marginalises other international organisations 
from the analysis. 
 
EU membership has had a considerable impact on foreign and security policy-making 
processes in Portugal. Above anything else, EU membership has allowed Portugal to 
diversify its relations with the outside world. This has meant that policy-makers can 
pursue relations with NATO and the Lusophone world, as well as forging ties with the 
country’s European neighbours, because EU membership complements and enhances 
Portugal’s traditional interests. However, it is difficult to unravel the enthusiasm for EU 
security policy from Portugal’s continued loyalty to NATO, for example. This is 
because NATO’s role in Europe has become uncertain since the end of the Cold War, 
and demarcation issues with the EU have arisen as the latter seeks to develop a 
Common Security and Defence Policy. Portugal’s commitment to the one, reinforces its 
commitment to the other. Portugal does not want to have to choose between NATO and 
the EU, as this would raise the Atlantic–European tension of what it means to be 
Portuguese. It is much less contentious to be seen to embrace both. Therefore, rather 
than being purely ‘EU-isation’, the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy 
encompasses broader internationalisation, modernisation and a recognition that building 
strong multilateral relations is key to Portuguese diplomacy being successful, rather 
than being isolationist or limited to pursuing bilateral strategies. This is an important 
caveat, which the Europeanisation literature often tends to overlook. Europeanisation 
not only enhances relations between the EU institutions and the Member State, but it 
promotes broader openness and integration into other multilateral organisations. 
 
The features of the Portuguese experience challenge some of the accepted wisdom 
surrounding Europeanisation, such as domestic institutional change, socialisation, 
‘misfit’ pressures, and ‘top-down’ Europeanisation. In the literature, these features are 
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 the focus of Europeanisation analyses, which examine how institutions, policy 
paradigms, and politico-legal frameworks deal with pressures emanating from Brussels. 
The degree of ‘misfit’ prescribes the level of change that is necessary, and, ultimately 
promotes convergence and harmonisation across the EU’s Member States. 
Europeanisation is portrayed, therefore, as the political institutions of the Member 
States adapting to the realities of policy-making in the EU context (Börzel and Risse, 
2000: 8–10; Börzel, 2005: 56–57; Bulmer and Burch, 2009: 26–28). However, because 
of other intervening variables and the persistence of national role identities, Portuguese 
foreign policy outputs have not been transformed through Europeanisation, despite 
institutional processes being subject to these Europeanisation pressures.  
 
A less accepted, but nonetheless still extant, feature of Europeanisation is the notion of 
‘bottom-up’ national projection onto the EU level. While the literature acknowledges 
that this conception complicates matters, as it echoes liberal intergovernmentalism and 
makes it harder to identify the patterns of cause and effect in order to isolate the 
Europeaniser from the Europeanised (Denca, 2009: 393; Moumoutzis, 2011: 616), the 
Portuguese case presents an opportunity to explore the specifics of national projection, 
and how this can be categorised as ‘Europeanisation’, because Portugal has succeeded 
in raising Lusophone issues in the EU context, especially during Council Presidencies.  
 
Furthermore, this case study is especially equipped to offer a more critical perspective 
on the existing Europeanisation literature because Portugal is a representative case 
study. There may be particular overlaps between Portuguese foreign policy and the 
ways in which states in Central and Eastern Europe interact with the outside world, 
given that they, like Portugal, have gone through recent transitions to democracy and 
are being brought into the Western European fold after decades of isolation. Like these 
states, Portuguese foreign policy embodies both Atlanticism and a commitment to 
Europe: it has had to adapt to the realities of EU membership, and the EU’s emergence 
as a foreign and security policy, without rejecting Atlanticism or wanting Europe to be 
too separate from the United States. With France’s recent reintegration into NATO’s 
military command, it can be argued that the majority of EU Member States now view 
the EU and NATO as being able to co-exist and complement each other, meaning that 
the Europeanist–Atlanticist dichotomy is now starting to be bridged. Understanding 
Portuguese foreign policy provides an insight into how other EU Member States might 
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 manage this dual-loyalty and organise their foreign policies to maximise their influence 
in multiple spheres. 
 
The majority of EU Member States are, like Portugal, comparatively small and weak in 
the wider global context. However, Portugal is able to use its former colonial legacy to 
strengthen its contemporary foreign policy. For its size, Portugal has quite broad 
diplomatic connections and can mobilise them when in dialogue with key global actors. 
Its empire spread from Macau to Brazil, so the fact that the CPLP is spread across 
several continents gives Portugal access to various global regions. Portugal used Macau 
as a diplomatic platform to engage with China, for example. This option is not available 
to the majority of EU Member States; countries such as Finland or Hungary have 
nothing like the multi-continental platform for their diplomacy that Portugal’s colonial 
legacy affords it. Therefore, the Lusophone link is so closely intertwined with national 
identity that it serves to dampen ‘top-down’ Europeanisation, and presents Portugal 
with a concrete specialism it can use to colour EU diplomacy. In this respect, 
Portuguese foreign policy has more room for manoeuvre than most EU Member States. 
 
The Portuguese case study offers an opportunity to develop Europeanisation as a 
concept, to better prepare it for Member State case studies that, like Portugal, actively 
pursue important relationships outside of the EU context. The challenge is to develop a 
robust theoretical framework that recognises that, in the domain of foreign policy at 
least, traditional national interests will persist. These may be specific areas of interest or 
more general attitudes and normative viewpoints, but the convergence of 27 national 
foreign policies into a single common EU foreign policy remains an unlikely prospect. 
Consequently, the convergence of Europe’s foreign policies should not be viewed in 
absolute terms, or as an end goal for the EU, because it is unlikely to be achieved for 
this reason. 
 
Nevertheless, the theoretical contribution of this thesis to the wider literature on the 
Europeanisation of national foreign policies is therefore significant. By using the 
Portuguese case as a specific illustration of the more general problems with 
Europeanisation, this thesis supports the growing body of studies that have found that 
the application of the concept to foreign policy studies is problematic. Some lessons can 
be drawn from the Portuguese experience to enhance the understanding of specific 
empirical national case studies of foreign policies in transition, and, crucially, the more 
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 general theoretical debates surrounding the wider utility of Europeanisation as a 
concept. 
 
 
6.3 The Utility of Europeanisation in Foreign Policy Studies 
 
The Portuguese case study offers some useful insights into the nature of the concept of 
Europeanisation and the particular difficulties of applying it to foreign policy studies. 
While it has some utility, Europeanisation is an unwieldy concept; based on this case 
study examination, other alternative explanations appear to be better suited to explain 
patterns of change observed in the foreign policies of EU Member States. If 
Europeanisation is to be retained as a device for assessing change in the political 
systems of EU Member States, its specific characteristics need to be identified in order 
for the concept to be strengthened for the future. The conclusions of this thesis 
(particularly the multi-level analysis outlined in table 6.1) offer a contribution to making 
Europeanisation a more precise and robust concept, by delineating the precise effects of 
the concept and demonstrating that it needs to have a more consistent penetration across 
multiple levels of the policy process. If Europeanisation is better defined, its impact on 
national identity and policy outputs may be much less widespread than the literature 
suggests. Instead of inferring that the transformation of policy-making processes creates 
the conditions for more widespread political change to occur, this analytical framework 
allows for the macro levels of the policy-making process to be properly contextualised 
and subjected to empirical testing. 
 
Evidence from this case study shows that states still guard their national sovereignty, 
and prize their individuality in international affairs. This is a practical hindrance to 
genuine commonality and coherence in EU foreign and security policy being achieved. 
This would appear to lend weight to intergovernmentalist accounts of how states 
behave, as acknowledging that states have retained considerable autonomy and 
independence with regard to foreign policy implies that the traditional state-centric view 
of international politics rings true. This is problematic because liberal inter-
governmentalism tends to overplay the autonomy of the state, and often underplays the 
trend towards integration with multilateral organisations. Instead of interacting with 
international organisations on the basis of short-term preferences, integration into 
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 multilateral fora allows states to act out specific national roles in the long-term and to 
align their bilateral ties with their various multilateral commitments.  
 
Integration is, therefore, constructed as being complementary to national roles that are 
often based upon fundamental notions of the state’s identity. Consequently, 
Europeanisation or internationalisation do not so much undermine a state’s ability to 
pursue its interests, but serve to give its foreign policy greater legitimacy and purpose 
than it would otherwise possess by acting unilaterally, i.e. enhancing national 
sovereignty and protecting unique ties which define a country’s specific foreign policy 
role. As Matlary (2009) argues, rather than ‘EU-isation’ taking place, there has been a 
marked shift towards more general integration and internationalisation in European 
foreign policy (Matlary, 2009: 29–30).  
 
Therefore, this thesis chimes with the work of Matlary (2009), Major and Pomorska 
(2005) and Olsen (2011) and highlights the fact that the EU’s role in the evolution of 
national foreign and security policies in recent years has often been overstated, and that 
European integration and the existence of Europeanisation pressures do not mean that 
the homogenisation of the national foreign policies of EU Member States is more likely. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented here underscores how instrumental NATO has 
been in forging integration in Europe and internationalising national foreign and 
security policy-making and elites, as Gheciu (2005) and Mérand (2008) argued. Gross 
(2007) echoes this, maintaining that the Europeanisation of German security policy is 
often exaggerated, as internal factors and NATO considerations remain the principal 
determinants of policy outcomes (Gross, 2007: 501).  
 
The Portuguese case is also congruous with the Dutch experience as described by Tonra 
(2001). The competing Atlanticist and Europeanist visions for defence have made the 
Netherlands “hesitant in two ways”, as elites are careful not to alienate the Americans 
and cause friction in Europe (Tonra, 2001: 262 [Emphasis added]). In Portugal’s case, 
Europeanisation, or ‘EU-isation’, is also limited because of the pre-eminence of NATO, 
but the need to balance these commitments with the importance of maintaining its 
presence in the Lusophone world, makes Portugal, consequently, hesitant in three ways. 
 
Europeanisation, in the sense that it refers specifically to the EU, seems too restrictive 
when applied to national foreign and security policies, as integration with NATO has 
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 promoted similar processes and has also led to more integrated policy-making 
structures. The internationalisation of domestic policy-making structures and the 
accelerated interconnectedness of national political systems and policy-makers, 
especially in integrating military elites and defence ministries, are aspects of European 
integration (or, more precisely, Euro-Atlantic integration) that have occurred, 
predominantly, through NATO, rather than the EU. Consequently, it would be 
misleading to label these developments as ‘Europeanisation effects’. Therefore, national 
foreign policies find themselves operating in an integrated, internationalised context, 
not necessarily bound by the constrictions of Europeanisation, but by the realities of 
being committed to the international community more broadly. 
 
The external pressures on national foreign policies are, therefore, not limited to the 
European Union, and the Europeanisation pressures emanating from the EU are 
relatively weak, as there is no legal framework to ensure compliance by Member States. 
The EU has difficulty in imposing a common foreign policy on its Member States, so 
national foreign policies have retained independence and autonomy in exchange for 
piggybacking on the EU’s collective economic bargaining power and global reach.  
 
The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) may go some way 
towards the EU developing a more coherent role on the world stage and could provide 
the centralised institutional framework to fuel the communitarisation of European 
foreign policies, in the same way that European integration has been able to harmonise 
other areas of national public policy. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon coming into force, 
the institutional context for the EU’s foreign policy-making was disharmonious, with 
the rotating Presidency creating a lack of continuity in the EU’s priorities, and the 
Commission still retaining control and authority over certain aspects of the EU’s 
external relations (chiefly, trade and development policy). It remains to be seen whether 
the EEAS can deliver, but its creation represents a step along the road to addressing 
these issues (Crowe, 2008: 11–12). However, even if the EU’s external relations were 
more joined-up and effective, Portugal could still pursue its foreign policy interests 
through other multilateral fora and through specific bilateral relations, meaning that the 
EEAS is unlikely to replace national diplomatic missions to locations of strategic 
importance, but it could complement Portugal’s bilateral relations with the PALOPs and 
Brazil. 
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 The EU has derived its legitimacy in foreign affairs by acting as a representative of 
states which share a vaguely articulated set of common values. While the creation of the 
EEAS may allow for the EU’s common foreign policy priorities and values to become 
better defined, the EU’s norm-advocacy is not a posture exclusive to the EU, as other 
international organisations also promote the rule of law and good governance. Norm 
promotion and elite socialisation are features of the Europeanisation of national foreign 
policies. However, because other international organisations embody shared 
international norms and are loci for integration and socialisation, there is nothing 
especially unique about the EU and the associated Europeanisation pressures, which 
differentiate its norms from those of other international organisations. Consequently, the 
internationalisation and multilateralisation of Portuguese foreign policy encompass the 
potential for normative transformation that is often regarded as a specific feature of 
Europeanisation. 
 
European integration is more than absorbing norms of behaviour; for national public 
policies to become Europeanised, existing national structures must adapt to the realities 
of policy-making and decision-making occurring on both the national and the European 
levels. Europeanisation is well-placed as a concept to capture how the EU can create 
pressures for national policy-making institutions and political systems to adapt, because 
of its evolution from Community (first pillar) policy studies. The national co-ordination 
of EU affairs (especially with regard to ‘first pillar’ briefs) has evolved to reflect the 
reality that the bulk of the policy-making occurs at the European level. Member States 
have, generally, adapted their policy-making machinery to be able to deal with this 
reality of European integration. However, this could just as easily be described as being 
the ‘domestication of EU affairs’ (a Member State led process) as it could be labelled 
the ‘Europeanisation of national policy-making structures’ stemming from ‘top-down’ 
pressure from the European level.  
 
Elite socialisation is regarded as an important process in the transformation of domestic 
policy-making processes, consequently, studies have looked to measure the extent to 
which the EU institutions have moulded the behaviour of national elites as a way of 
inferring the extent to which the Europeanisation of national political institutions has 
taken place. However, socialisation pressures cannot take hold unless there is 
willingness from the national level to integrate with supranational entities. 
Europeanisation tends to imply an external ‘Europe’ transforming the national, but the 
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 reality is that national elites and policy-making institutions are willing participants, and 
rationalise the engagement with Europe in their own ways. Therefore, like in Portugal, 
elites in the recent accession states may be predisposed to be open to Europeanisation 
because of the political backdrop in their countries, where Europeanisation is an 
extension of their own national political regeneration projects to consolidate democracy, 
foster economic growth and to open up to the West in the post-Cold War era.  
 
The willingness to conform to Europe, and for national foreign policy-makers to follow 
‘logics of appropriateness’, could be explained by ‘misfit’ creating adaptational 
pressures (i.e. ‘top-down’ Europeanisation), but this may only reveal part of the picture. 
National policy-making processes may adapt to Europe, and elites may wish to fit into 
Europe, but this could be one element of a larger modernisation project, where political 
elites and civil servants are predisposed to become ‘Europeanised’ and actively seek to 
adapt their practices in order to maximise the country’s influence in the longer-term and 
to be seen as following best-practice and being ‘the good student’. Following the 
Carnation Revolution of 1974, many aspects of Portuguese economic, social and 
political life underwent significant transformations. The exploration of the ‘European 
option’ was a product of the revolutionary mind-set and the wider desire within the 
populace for modernisation and revitalisation, which meant that elites were more open 
to new ideas during this time and, therefore, predisposed to being ‘Europeanised’. 
 
While there is potential for socialisation pressures to promote international norms, 
which may cause national foreign policy priorities to be modified over time, the 
persistence of national interests and role identities means that there is only very limited 
scope for these external norms to transform the core foreign policy priorities of Member 
States. Absorbing European ‘ways of doing things’ and becoming integrated into 
transnational organisations and policy-making networks does not mean that European 
priorities become national priorities. However, national priorities can be rebranded as 
being in the wider European interest, or multilateralised to be viewed as being in the 
interest of the international community more generally. Thus the ‘uploading’ of national 
foreign policy priorities onto the EU is evident, but to assign a motivation or cause is 
difficult, as it requires distinguishing the specific Europeanisation pressures from a 
state’s more general instrumental manipulation of international organisations.  
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 The characteristics of European foreign policy are, therefore, derived from the foreign 
policies of the EU’s constituent Member States. Rather than eroding national 
sovereignty, European integration appears to have enhanced the ability of Member 
States to leave their mark on the EU’s CFSP and CSDP. This is particularly evident 
where countries, such as Portugal, can bring unique ties or a focused area of interest to 
the table. This means that the EU’s CFSP, rather than leading to the harmonisation of 
the various foreign policies of Europe, promotes the construction of a patchwork of 
diverse relations. 
 
Elite socialisation and institutional change are key elements of how Europeanisation is 
theorised, and are directly relevant to foreign policy-making in terms of understanding 
the scope for change in national policy processes, but specific national foreign policy 
role conceptions appear to be key determinants of foreign policy outputs. Culturally 
embedded factors, historical roles, and geostrategic positioning help to define the 
national interest by shaping a state’s foreign policy purpose and the wider national 
identity, which, in turn, influences institutional belief systems and the behaviour of 
political elites, military planners and diplomats. Integration and multilateralising 
national foreign policy interests create external pressures on the state to conform or 
adapt, such as Europeanisation or internationalisation. These pressures fuel institutional 
change but also allow for national role identities to be reconstructed, reimagined, and 
reapplied to a new situation. 
 
National role identities are persistent and evolve with the nation-state as it becomes 
integrated into the global system, as the state needs an institutional framework that 
recognises its specific role in order to enact it. Therefore, regional integration does, 
indeed, allow for the rescue of national foreign policies. Portuguese sovereignty has 
become enhanced by being integrated into international multilateral organisations that 
allow it to pursue its Lusophone interests. Therefore, the exploration of the ‘European 
option’ meant that, not only could the democratic regime become consolidated, but 
Portuguese foreign policy could be multilateralised in order to increase its legitimacy in 
the Atlantic and the Lusophone world. This is an option that is especially important to 
small states, because of their relative weakness in the international system when acting 
alone. By promoting stability and consensus in international organisations, i.e. a clear 
willingness not to ‘rock the boat’, small states, such as Portugal, can negate their 
 266
 weaknesses in terms of power politics, and enhance their national sovereignty by 
multilateralising their foreign policy in order to enhance the legitimacy of their actions. 
 
The multiple-level theoretical framework of this thesis is able to account for the national 
interest, which underpins foreign policy decision-making, as well as a myriad of other 
influences on the policy process such as transnational cultures and institutional belief 
systems. It is an inherently complex and nuanced process that the two-level games 
concept of national preference formation and inter-state bargaining, advocated by 
Moravcsik (1993), does not fully capture. Rather than being the product of short-term 
preferences, the national interest is based upon culturally embedded factors, which stem 
from national identity. These factors are especially resistant to pressures from outside 
the state, because they cut to the core of national identity, but are fluid enough to be 
reappraised and reconstructed over time, so that the national interest can be presented as 
being consistent with integration. Moving away from two-level games allows for a 
better understanding of how states can defy their material weakness in order to pursue 
key foreign policy priorities. By multilateralising their foreign policy, and seeking to 
enact specific roles in international organisations, small states can wield influence in 
global affairs by building consensus and exploiting norms of behaviour in order to 
mitigate their relative weakness. 
 
In building upon the framework developed here, future studies of Europeanisation have 
to recognise that other factors shape both the EU and the Member States. 
Europeanisation is a manifestation of broader processes, such as internationalisation and 
multilateralisation. For foreign policy, the wider influences are more relevant, certainly 
when compared to other areas of public policy relating to the Single European Market, 
where the EU’s position is more clearly established and backed up with a credible legal 
framework. Consequently, the scope for change has often been overplayed. Future 
studies must devote considerable attention to the more macro levels of analysis and 
identify changes that reflect the unique influence of the EU in transforming national 
foreign policy outputs. The transformation of institutional processes, as shown with the 
Portuguese case, does not automatically lead to a shift in core foreign policy priorities, 
although, through multilateralisation, the EU increasingly has a role to play in 
legitimising and reinforcing the foreign policy interests of its Member States. 
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 6.4 Challenges for Portuguese Foreign Policy: Directions for Future Research 
 
The key to the rejuvenation of Portuguese foreign policy was not EU membership 
alone, but the fact that contemporary Portuguese foreign policy is in an 
internationalised, integrated, multilateral context. EU membership enhances Portugal’s 
ability to influence other spheres, but much of the internationalisation/Europeanisation 
which has gone on has stemmed from Portugal’s long-standing membership of NATO, 
which predates EU accession and even predates democratisation. Nonetheless, 25 April 
1974 allowed for Portugal’s Atlantic-facing, but isolationist, foreign policy to be located 
in the European context. Thus, after a period of looking to Europe and exploring the 
‘European option’, Portuguese foreign policy is now firmly anchored in the multilateral 
context and is not excluded or marginalised. This has allowed Portugal to renew its 
traditional foreign policy priorities in the Atlantic, especially allowing it to develop ties 
with Lusophone Africa and Brazil. As such, it seems spurious to conclude that the 
‘Europeanisation’ of Portuguese foreign policy has taken place. In this instance, 
‘Europeanisation’ has, conversely, renewed Portugal’s ability to pursue an independent 
foreign policy. 
 
Part of the problem of locating future studies of Portuguese foreign within the 
Europeanisation paradigm is that the challenges that Portuguese foreign policy will face 
in the coming years lie less in European integration, and more in maximising the 
country’s effectiveness in multiple spheres of interest. With the ‘European option’ now, 
largely, explored, the Lusophone world will now dominate Portugal’s diplomatic 
priorities. Having secured its place within the European fold, Portuguese foreign policy 
scholarship, therefore, needs to focus on how the country’s continued re-engagement 
with its former colonies is balanced with its commitment to Europe. While 
developments will occur in Portugal’s relationship with the EU, especially as the EU 
evolves as an international actor, Portuguese foreign policy is now orientated to pursue 
its interests beyond Europe. However, any potential conflict between the EU’s external 
relations and Portugal’s bilateral and multilateral relations with the Lusophone world 
must be minimised. 
 
It remains to be seen whether Portugal has been able to shape the EEAS in order to 
multilateralise and externalise its key foreign policy priorities. Assessing Portugal’s 
lobbying tactics during the formation of the EEAS would be interesting as there is little 
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 research on how Member States shape the EU’s foreign policy activities in the post-
Lisbon framework (where previously many studies focused on how Member States have 
embraced the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union to leave their 
mark on the EU’s foreign policy priorities). Where Crowe (2008) argues that the 
overseas embassies of Member States should be seen as able to reinforce the impact of 
the EEAS missions abroad (Crowe, 2008: 24), the patchwork of interests of EU 
Member States that constitute the EU’s external action allows Member States to use 
appointments to the EEAS to enhance their bilateral relations and to increase their 
impact in specific areas of interest. While this could, arguably, be for the greater good 
of the EU, it allows Member States to continue to influence the EU’s external relations 
in order to satisfy their specific interests. Previously, it was possible to use the rotating 
Presidency of the Council to draw the EU’s attention to certain national priorities. 
Portugal views Brazil and Africa as particular areas of expertise, and while it has been 
initially successful in getting diplomats to front the EEAS’ missions in these areas, this 
specialisation needs to be sustained over a longer timeframe, in order to enhance both 
Portugal’s bilateral relations in the Lusophone world and its position within the EU. 
 
With the EU and NATO enlarging eastwards and into the Balkans, Portugal’s 
geostrategic influence within these organisations is likely to wane. Where Western 
Europe and the North Atlantic were once central, shifting priorities could marginalise 
Portugal in the post-Cold War era. The strategic importance of the Azores is, 
increasingly, less of a consideration for Allied military planners, which could further 
weaken Portugal’s position in NATO. Additionally, the recent decision by the United 
States’ Navy to move sixty per cent of its fleet to the Pacific, signals America’s 
intentions to concentrate on the Pacific at the expense of the Atlantic. As a reaction to 
the economic and military growth of China, the United States asserting itself as a 
Pacific power in the twenty-first century suggests that the long-term strategy is to scale-
back its military presence in Europe (Barnes, 2012). This could be damaging for 
Portugal as it will make it harder to justify its Atlantic-orientated foreign policy stance, 
and its status as a link between Europe and America, if Lajes and Oeiras no longer 
feature in the long-term strategic plans of the US and NATO. 
 
Therefore, in order for Portugal to continue to maximise its influence, Portuguese 
foreign policy-makers are well-advised to continue to attempt to draw Lusophone issues 
to the attention of EU and NATO partners. With the increasing economic power of 
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 Brazil, and the on-going security challenges in Lusophone African states and East 
Timor, Portugal should continue to seek to remind key global powers that Europe and 
North America must not overlook the Lusophone world or ignore the potential for the 
South Atlantic to be an important strategic axis in promoting economic growth and 
global security. The Mediterranean will also be an important strategic focus, both for 
the EU and NATO. While Portugal has interests in this area, the Lusophone world is an 
asset that, like the Azores in the 1940s, Portugal can uniquely bring to the table. 
 
The wider Portuguese-speaking world will continue to be an important focus for 
Portugal. As Brazil grows as an economic power, this will lend further weight to the 
argument that the international community should pay more attention to the Lusophone 
world. However, this could go against Portugal and undermine the country’s relative 
strength within the Lusophone club. While it was not the prime concern of this thesis to 
deal with Brazilian foreign policy, it would be useful, in order to better contextualise 
how Portuguese diplomacy has limited manoeuvrability in the Lusophone world, to 
investigate contemporary Brazilian foreign policy and its increasing diplomatic 
assertiveness in recent years. In order to better understand Portuguese foreign policy in 
the coming years, it will be helpful to examine the priorities and motivations that 
underpin Brazil’s external policy, and how this may create tensions and lead to shifts in 
the balance of power that could see Europe’s influence in Africa, for example, decline 
over the course of the century. Therefore, Brazil should be a focus for scholarship in the 
coming years, not just to better understand the foreign policy options for Portugal, but 
because the EU, and the established Euro-Atlantic ‘Western’ order, is likely to be 
gradually undermined by emerging economic powers, such as India, China and Brazil.  
 
On the back of the rise of Brazil, co-operation in the CPLP may be further enhanced and 
the potential of this organisation could eventually be fulfilled. This, more so than the 
EU and NATO, represents the principal potential growth-area for Portuguese foreign 
policy in the coming years, especially with regard to security and military co-operation. 
While it is touched upon in this thesis, further research is needed to examine the 
potential for this organisation to become a meaningful transnational integration project 
and a genuine success story of postcolonial re-engagement. However, the balance of 
power in the CPLP may mean that it evolves to be more of a mechanism for integrating 
states in the Gulf of Guinea with Brazil than a Portuguese Commonwealth. Thus, the 
integration options for all eight official Lusophone states need to be examined further. 
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 While the CPLP has potential as a multi-continental political and cultural community, 
its constituent member countries would probably be better served by pursuing regional 
integration strategies and building up closer ties with powerful neighbours (e.g. for 
Mozambique this would mean strengthening ties with South Africa, and for East Timor 
deepening relations with Australia). The CPLP may also evolve to be more 
supranational, with a more powerful role for institutional bodies rather the constituent 
member countries. Depending on which integration paths were followed, Portugal could 
even find itself marginalised in the Lusophone world. Therefore, the CPLP, as an 
integration project, is a potentially interesting subject for future research. 
 
Lusophone Africa will continue to be a central concern for Portuguese foreign policy-
makers in the coming years, especially oil-rich Angola. In order for Portugal to maintain 
its influence in Africa, it is likely to concentrate its limited resources on promoting the 
Portuguese language further, principally, but not necessarily exclusively, in the current 
five PALOPs. A programme of targeted development aid spending to promote 
investment, which is of mutual benefit to Portugal and Africa, is likely to be the trend. 
However, given the current financial crisis and the cuts to Portugal’s foreign affairs 
budget, this is going to be an interesting area to follow in the coming years. Rather than 
looking to Europe, Portugal has already turned its attentions to the Lusophone world, 
particularly Angola, for a cure to its economic woes. Portugal’s limited funds are going 
to be concentrated on making the biggest impact on Lusophone Africa, in order to 
benefit Portuguese investors and to enhance the global standing of the Portuguese 
language. It remains to be seen whether Angolan oil can provide the long-term solutions 
for Portugal concerning the Eurozone crisis, but the Lusophone world represents a 
growth area for Portuguese businesses and will be the main focus for Portuguese 
economic diplomacy, development aid and cultural policy in the coming years. 
 
Additionally, it will be interesting to observe how Portugal deals with the potential 
expansion of the CPLP. The inclusion of countries that embrace Lusophony but were 
not Portuguese colonial possessions in the twentieth century, such as Senegal and 
Equatorial Guinea, could cause problems for Portugal as an enlarged Lusophone 
community may create friction between its members (between African and non-African 
states, between founder-members and accession countries, and between Portugal and the 
rest), which may mean that Lusophone integration, as a foreign policy option for 
Portugal, becomes a dead-end. 
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 For the latter part of the twentieth century, Europe was the focus for Portuguese foreign 
policy. This went against the grain of centuries of Portugal pursuing an Atlantic-
orientated foreign policy, whereby the country set itself to face away from continental 
Europe and away from its Iberian neighbour, Spain. From 1974 until the mid-1990s the 
‘European option’ was explored, fully and to considerable benefit, by Portugal, as it 
offered the opportunity to foster economic growth and to consolidate the nascent 
democratic regime. As the EEC has evolved into the European Union, its emergence as 
a foreign and security policy actor has given a new dimension to Portuguese foreign 
policy, but the years of European integration have not transformed core foreign policy 
priorities for Portugal. Consequently, the Atlantic and the Lusophone world, especially 
Portuguese-speaking states in Africa, have now returned to prominence. 
 
The Portuguese case highlights the fact that the window for Europeanisation to 
transform national policy-making was small. While notable reforms to institutions took 
place while Portugal looked to explore the ‘European option’ (1974–1986), and when 
the country went through the initial learning phase of European integration (1986–
1996), this was a brief aberration, where the Lusophone world could not overtly feature 
in Portuguese foreign policy. This was because focusing on the Lusophone world could 
have sounded like a return to Salazarism, potentially undermining the nascent 
democratic regime, which began in 1974 by making a swift and clean break from the 
colonies. Embracing Europeanisation was an effective way of differentiating the period 
1974–1996 from the past, but the creation of the CPLP in 1996, meant that the 
Lusophone world could legitimately return to Portugal’s foreign policy agenda. 
 
As a consequence of this insight, future studies that examine Europeanisation need to be 
better prepared to consider historical factors and traditional foreign policy roles that 
some countries may possess. Changing rhetoric, and allowing domestic policy-making 
structures to be transformed, may suggest that a country’s foreign policy has been 
Europeanised. However, elite socialisation and institutional change have taken place in 
the Portuguese case, but these have not prevented traditional priorities from taking a 
central role, once the country became fully integrated into the EU. The conceptual 
framework developed in this thesis shows that Europeanisation needs to have a more 
penetrating impact on multiple levels of the policy process if it is to be convincing. 
Future studies need, therefore, to concentrate on finding evidence of Europeanisation 
that can effectively challenge the alternative explanations, such as multilateralisation 
 272
 and internationalisation. This is especially important on the more macro levels of the 
policy process, because in foreign policy, national sovereignty, issues of identity and 
uniqueness, and constructions of national foreign policy roles matter, and affect how 
states behave.  
 
Portugal has now consolidated its position in Europe, but the ‘Europeanisation’ of 
Portuguese foreign policy can be seen as part of the wider internationalisation and 
multilateralisation of the country’s external relations. Having a committed relationship 
with Europe allows Portugal to pursue any re-engagement with its former colonies from 
a more legitimate vantage point, rather than being perceived as acting unilaterally, or 
with an obviously neo-colonial agenda with regard to the Lusophone world. Atlanticism 
and the Lusophone world are so closely intertwined with what it means to be 
Portuguese, and draw from historical legacies which are embedded in political rhetoric, 
policy-making worldviews and the wider national culture, that even such a major 
political integration project as the exploration of the ‘European option’ could not force 
Portugal to abandon these ties, as they are seen as being a uniquely Portuguese legacy. 
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